Review no. 62

Press Review 16-28 February 2014

African Union

Table of Contents Pages

- The African-led International Support Mission in the Central African Republic condemns the killing of innocent civilians in Bangui - La Mission internationale de soutien à la Centrafrique sous conduite africaine condamne l'assassinat de civils innocents à Bangui - AMISOM condemns attack on Villa Somalia - Operational conclusions: Fourth meeting of the heads of intelligence and security services of the countries of the Sahelo-Saharan region - Conclusions opérationnelles: 4ème réunion des chefs des services de renseignement et de sécurité des pays de la région Sahélo-Saharienne - 3rd ministerial meeting on the enhancement of security cooperation and the operationalisation of the APSA in the sahelo-saharan region, Niamey, 19 february 2014 - 3ème réunion ministérielle sur le renforcement de la coopération en matière de sécurité et l’opérationnalisation de l’APSA dans la région sahélo-saharienne, Niamey, 19 février 2014 4 5 6 7 11 15 - Communique de presse de la 420ème réunion du CPS sur les droits et le bien-être de l'enfant - Press statement of the 420th meeting of the PSC on the Rights and Welfare of the Child - La MISCA riposte à une attaque d’éléments armés sur un convoi et démantèle un barrage routier à Beloko

Terrorism in Africa

- L’Afrique de l’Est sous la menace des terroristes islamistes? 20 25 27 29 30 - Sahel/terrorisme : onze pays africains affinent leurs stratégies de lutte contre le terrorisme à Niamey 33 - West Africa: Terror and Other Challenges in the Sahel - Don't Ignore the Local 35

Burkina Faso

- BURKINA FASO’S ‘WEST AFRICAN SPRING’ – ANALYSIS 38

CAR

- Pourquoi la France doit être soutenue en Centrafrique 42 44 - The Muslims of the Central African Republic Face a Deadly Purge

Egypt

- Terrorists Target Egypt's Red Sea Tourism -- And It's Working - Taba terror attack sends dual murderous message - Tourism targeted - Égypte : quatre morts dans un attentat visant un bus de touristes sud-coréens

Libya

- Pas de lien entre la guerre en Libye et l'armement des terroristes au Mali (expert) - The stillbirth of the new Libya 47 51 54 57 60 62 2

Mali

- Les jihadistes toujours présents dans le nord du Mali - Mali: Kidal region still waits for resolution

Nigeria

- Le Nigeria impuissant face à la terreur de Boko Haram - Nouveau massacre de Boko Haram : le Nigeria appelle à plus de coopération

Somalia

- Al-Shabab: Rising From the Ashes of the Phoenix

South Africa

- Kidnap for ransom: to pay or not to pay?

Sudan

- "New" Sudan: back to the future

Tunisia

- Attentat de Jendouba : La stratégie antiterroriste doit changer - Médias et terrorisme: La difficile équation

International Organizations UN

- Stop paying al-Qaeda ransoms, UN experts urge - Al-Qaeda: Younger men take up leadership roles - UN study

Terrorism in the World

- Opinion: Terrorism in Sochi

Bangladesh

- Qaeda for intifada in Bangladesh?

France

Deal entre la France et le Mnla 99

Iraq

A Comprehensive Strategy Against Terrorism 101

Ukraine

- With President’s Departure, Ukraine Looks Toward a Murky Future

USA

- What Might Terrorists Do Next?

Yemen

- Yemeni ‘global terrorist’ says he has counterterrorism advice for Washington - In Yemen, a woman's life entangled with Al Qaeda 64 68 88 90 92 95 108 113 116 119 71 73 75 77 80 85 86 3

African Union

The African-led International Support Mission in the Central African Republic condemns the killing of innocent civilians in Bangui

Bangui, 23 February 2014:

civilians yesterday in the 4 th The African-led International Support Mission in the Central African Republic (MISCA) condemns the cold blood killing of three innocent district of Bangui, in an area called 'Combatant'. According to witness accounts, six individuals took a taxi from the city center of Bangui to run their errands. On the way to their initial destination, the taxi driver, who seemed to be an accomplice to this murder, went in a different direction and called other individuals who came to attack the passengers aboard the taxi. The attack resulted in the death of three of the passengers. Two other passengers were able to break away and fled the area; one was severely injured and was treated by elements of the Sangaris operation who arrived later at the scene of the incident. It appeared that all the passengers were Muslims, and the driver has been used by unknown groups as a disguised taxi driver to help commit this crime. MISCA would like to reiterate that impunity will not be tolerated and those who use religion to incite violence and cause harm to innocent civilians will be dealt with firmly. MISCA urges the population to continue to work closely with their com munity leaders and the forces of MISCA and the Sangaris by providing any informa tion that could lead to the arrest of those involved in yesterday's criminal attack and by reporting any suspicious acts or incidents that can lead to loss of human lives. MISCA reassures the population that, at this critical juncture when security is slowly improving and the people are once again beginning to resume their daily lives, efforts will continue to be made to enhance the measures that have been put in place to protect them. Regular patrols across the city will be reinforced by robust security operations such as those conducted in the area of Boye-Rabe, in Bangui, a week ago, to root out those who continue to commit acts of violence. MISCA and partners will also continue to work with the Government so that those who are bent on terrorizing the population face justice for crimes committed. 4

La Mission internationale de soutien à la Centrafrique sous conduite africaine condamne l'assassinat de civils innocents à Bangui

Bangui, le 23 février 2014:

La Mission internationale de soutien à la Centrafrique sous conduite africaine (MISCA) condamne le meurtre de sang froid de trois civils innocents, perpétré hier dans le 4 ème arrondissement de Bangui, dans une zone ap pelée «Combattant». Selon les témoignages qui ont été recueillis, six personnes ont pris un taxi du centre de la ville de Bangui pour faire des courses. Alors qu’elles se dirigeaient vers leur destination initiale, le chauffeur de taxi, qui semble être complice de cet assassinat, est allé dans une direction différente et a appelé d'autres individus qui sont venus attaquer les passagers à bord du taxi. L'attaque a causé la mort de trois des passa gers. Deux autres passagers ont pu fuir la zone, cependant qu’un autre a été griève ment blessé et a été traité par des éléments de l'opération Sangaris, arrivés plus tard sur les lieux de l'incident. Il est apparu que tous les passagers étaient musulmans, et que le conducteur de la voiture, utilisé par des groupes inconnus, s’est présenté comme un chauffeur de taxi pour aider à commettre ce crime. La MISCA voudrait souligner que l'impunité ne sera pas tolérée et que ceux qui uti lisent la religion pour inciter à la violence et causer du tort à des civils innocents seront traités avec la fermeté requise. La MISCA invite la population à continuer de travailler en étroite collaboration avec les responsables communautaires, ainsi qu’avec les forces de la MISCA et de Sangaris, et ce en fournissant toute informa tion pouvant conduire à l'arrestation des personnes impliquées dans l'attaque cri minelle d'hier et en signalant tous actes ou incidents qui peuvent conduire à des pertes de vies humaines. La MISCA voudrait assurer la population qu’à ce moment critique, marqué par une amélioration progressive de la sécurité et la reprise d’une vie quotidienne norma le, des efforts continueront à être déployés pour renforcer les mesures déjà en pla ce pour protéger les civils. Les patrouilles régulières à travers la ville seront renfor cées par des opérations de sécurité robustes telle que celle qui a été menée dans la zone de Boye-Rabe, à Bangui, il y a une semaine, pour neutraliser les éléments en gagés dans des actes de violence. La MISCA et les autres partenaires concernés continueront également à travailler avec le Gouvernement, afin que ceux qui s’emploient à terroriser la population soient soumis à la rigueur de la loi pour les crimes commis. 5

AMISOM condemns attack on Villa Somalia

Mogadishu, February 21st 2014

– The Special Representative of the Chairperson of the African Union Commission (SRCC) Ambassador MahamatSalehAnnadif has con demned the cowardly attack on Villa Somalia today. As people gathered for Friday prayers, a Vehicle Borne Improvised Explosive De vices (VBIED) went off at the entrance of the Presidential palace and was followed by ground al shabaab fighters. The Somali National Army soldiers supported by AMISOM troops bravely fought off the attackers. “I commend the actions of the brave security forces who fought off the attackers, hell-bent on shedding the blood of innocent Somalis. The attack was against, the Somali people, their institutions and their religion. Ambassador Annadif added, it is unconceivable to believe that people who say they are Muslims can choose a Friday which is a Holy Day in Islam to carry out this senseless attack. He appealed to the Somali people to help the Somali armed forces and AMISOM in their efforts to defeat al shabaab and its supporters . 6

Operational conclusions: Fourth meeting of the heads of intelligence and security services of the countries of the Sahelo-Saharan region

17 FEBRUARY 2014, NIAMEY, NIGER OPERATIONAL CONCLUSIONS

The 4 th meeting of the Heads of Intelligence and Security Services of the countries of the Sahelo-Saharan region was held in Niamey, Niger, on 17 February 2014. The following countries participated in the meeting: Algeria, Burkina Faso, Chad, Cote d’Ivoire, Libya, Mali, Mauritania, Niger, Nigeria and Senegal. In addition to the Com mission of the African Union (AU), the AU Mission for Mali and the Sahel (MISAHEL), the African Centre for the Study and Research on Terrorism (ACSRT), the Committee of the Intelligence and Security Services of Africa (CISSA), the Fusion and Liaison Unit (UFL), the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) and the Community of the Sahelo-Saharan States (CEN-SAD), as well as the United Nations Office for West Africa (UNOWA) and the UN Multidimensional Integrated Mission for Stabilization in Mali (MINUSMA), also participated in the meeting. The meeting was held within the framework of the Nouakchott Process on the En hancement of Security Cooperation and the Operationalisation of the African Peace and Security Architecture (APSA) in the Sahelo-Saharan Region, as a follow up to the previous meetings of the Heads of Intelligence and Security Services of 7

the countries of the region, held respectively in Bamako, on 18 April 2013, in Abid jan, on 20 and 21 June 2013, and in Ndjamena, on 10 September 2013. The opening ceremony was marked by the statements made by the Minister of In terior, Public Security, Decentralization and Customary and Religious Matters of the Republic of Niger, Mr.AssoudouHassoumi, and Ambassador SmailChergui, AU Commissioner for Peace and Security, as well as by the representative of the Chair person of the ECOWAS Commission, Mr.KadréDésiréOuédraogo. The meeting reviewed the security situation in the region and the measures taken for the implementation of the Operational Conclusions adopted in N’Djamena, on the basis of the 2 erre Buyoya. nd Progress Report on the Nouakchott Process submitted by the AU Commission, as well as the presentation on the overall situation in the Sahel made by the AU High Representative for Mali and the Sahel, former President Pi Participants welcomed the progress made during the period under considera tion, stressing that the Nouakchott Process had made it possible to significantly enhance security cooperation among the countries of the region. They con gratulated the countries of the region which have taken specific steps as part of the implementation of the Ndjamena Conclusions, including the combating of radicalization, the prevention of infiltration of terrorist elements into the Ma lian refugee camps in the neighboring countries and the establishment of inter Ministerial structures to deal with specific issues. Participants encouraged the Commission, the ACSRT, CISSA and UFL to facilitate, in cooperation with the countries concerned, the dissemination of these best practices. Participants stressed the need to pursue and intensify the efforts made, particu larly in the light of the persistence of the terrorist threat, as evidenced by the re sumption of the attacks and other acts perpetrated by the terrorist groups operat ing in northern Mali and the continued acts of terrorism perpetrated by Boko Haram and Ansaru in Nigeria. Participants exchanged on the difficult situation in Libya and agreed on the need for renewed efforts to assist that country address the challenges at hand, including through exchange of information. Participants noted the exploitation by the terrorist groups of inter-communal ten sion and conflicts, stressing that this situation calls for specific measures and the active involvement of the local authorities and Governments in the border areas. They also noted the links with cross-border criminal activities, including drug traf ficking (cocaine and cannabis) and the proliferation of small arms and light weap ons, as well as the threat posed by the return to the region of terrorist elements who were involved in fighting in other parts of the world. Participants, noting the delay sometimes experienced in the exchange of intelli gence among Services, agreed to take appropriate measures to expedite the com munication of operational information, bearing in mind their urgent nature. Simi 8

larly, they recognized the need for the Member States to equip themselves with strengthened capacity in terms of personnel and equipment, including the estab lishment of special units to be able to address more effectively the challenge of terrorism and transnational crime. Recalling the relevant provisions of the commu niqué adopted by the AU Peace and Security Council (PSC), at its 249 of terrorist acts. th meeting held on 22 November 2010, participants encouraged the Commission to expedite the elaboration of an African arrest warrant for persons charged with or convicted Participants were updated about the efforts for the establishment of a secure com munication system among the services of the countries participating in the Nouak chott Process. They were informed that a solution for the operationalization of this system would be found very soon. In the meantime, they welcomed the offer made by the UFL to extend its secure communication system to the three member coun tries of the Nouakchott Process which are not members of the UFL (Côte d’Ivoire, Guinea and Senegal), as well as to ACSRT, CISSA and MISAHEL. Participants noted with satisfaction the activities carried out by the ACSRT in the field of capacity building, through the organization of training workshops and the conduct of assessment missions to some countries of the region. They congratu lated the ACSRT on the growing role it is playing with respect to national capacity building. They also welcomed the initiatives taken by the CISSA and the UFL, and called for the pursuit of all capacity building efforts on the basis of the matrix pre pared by the ACSRT, CISSA and UFL. Within that framework, they stressed the need for the AU Member States to contribute financially, according to the most appro priate modalities, to the implementation of the envisaged programs. Regarding the operationalization of the APSA in the Sahelo-Saharan region, partici pants stressed the need to expedite the efforts exerted in this respect, taking into account the decisions adopted by the January 2014 AU Summit on the assessment of the African Standby Force (ASF) and the operationalization of the African Capac ity for Immediate Response to Crises (ACIRC). They noted, in this respect, the pro posals made by the Commission in its progress report to the attention of the minis terial meeting, namely the convening of meetings of the Chiefs of Defense Staff and the Ministers of Defense to consider the generic concepts of operation for joint patrols and mixed units and the modalities for the enhancement of the existing structures for security cooperation, as well as the establishment in Niamey of a lean Secretariat under MISAHEL leadership. Participants reaffirmed the commitment of their respective countries and organiza tions to continue to work towards the enhancement of the Nouakchott Process. They noted in this respect the proposal made by the Commission for the convening of a Summit of the countries participating in the Process. They also encouraged the concerned Regional Economic Communities to own the Nouakchott Process and to support its implementation. Participants were briefed by MISAHEL on the AU Strategy for the Sahel region, 9

which will be submitted to the ministerial meeting of 19 February 2014, for consid eration and validation. Participants welcomed the offer by Burkina Faso to host the 5 th meeting of the Heads of Intelligence and Security Services, at a date to be agreed upon through consultation between the Commission and the relevant Burkinabe authorities. Participants expressed their gratitude to the Government and the people of the Republic of Niger for the warm reception accorded to them and for all the arrange ments that ensured the smooth holding of their meeting .

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Conclusions opérationnelles: 4ème réunion des chefs des services de renseignement et de sécurité des pays de la région Sahélo-Saharienne

NIAMEY, NIGER, 17 FEVRIER 2014 CONCLUSIONS OPÉRATIONNELLES

La 4 ème réunion des chefs des Services de Renseignement et de Sécurité des pays de la région sahélo-saharienne s'est tenue à Niamey, le 17 février 2014. Les pays sui vants ont participé à la réunion: Algérie, Burkina Faso, Côte d'Ivoire, Libye, Mali, Mauritanie, Niger, Nigeria, Sénégal et Tchad. Outre la Commission de l'Union afri caine (UA), la Mission de l’UA pour le Mali et le Sahel (MISAHEL), le Centre africain d'Étude et de Recherche sur le Terrorisme (CAERT), le Comité africain des Services de Renseignement et de Sécurité (CISSA), l’Unité de Fusion et de Liaison (UFL), la Communauté économique des États de l’Afrique de l’Ouest (CEDEAO) et la Commu nauté des États sahélo-sahariens (CEN-SAD), ainsi que le Bureau des Nations unies pour l’Afrique de l’Ouest (UNOWA) et la Mission multidimensionnelle intégrée des Nations unies pour la Stabilisation au Mali (MINUSMA), ont également pris part à la réunion. La réunion a eu lieu dans le cadre du Processus de Nouakchott sur le renforcement de la coopération sécuritaire et l'opérationnalisation de l'Architecture africaine de paix et de sécurité (APSA) dans la région sahélo-saharienne. Elle a fait suite aux pré cédentes réunions des chefs des Services de Renseignement et de Sécurité des 11

pays de la région, tenues respectivement à Bamako, le 18 avril 2013, à Abidjan, les 20 et 21 juin 2013, et à Ndjamena, le 10 septembre 2013. La cérémonie d’ouverture a été marquée par les allocutions prononcées par Mon sieur MassoudouHassoumi, Ministre de l’Intérieur, de la Sécurité publique, de la Décentralisation et des Affaires coutumières et religieuses de la République du Ni ger, et l'Ambassadeur Smail Chergui, Commissaire à la Paix et à la Sécurité de l'UA, ainsi que par le représentant du Président de la Commission de la CEDEAO, M. Ka dré Désiré Ouédraogo La réunion a procédé à une revue de l'évolution de la situation sécuritaire dans la région et des mesures prises pour la mise en œuvre des Conclusions opérationnel les adoptées à Ndjamena, sur la base du 2 ème rapport intérimaire soumis par la Commission de l’UA sur le Processus de Nouakchott, ainsi que de la présentation d’ensemble de la situation au Sahel faite par le Haut Représentant de l’UA pour le Mali et le Sahel, l’ancien Président Pierre Buyoya. Les participants se sont félicités des progrès accomplis au cours de la période consi dérée, relevant que le Processus de Nouakchott avait permis de renforcer significa tivement la coopération sécuritaire entre les pays de la région. Ils ont félicité les pays de la région qui ont pris des dispositions spécifiques dans le cadre du suivi des Conclusions de Ndjamena, y compris en ce qui concerne la lutte contre la radicali sation, la prévention de l’infiltration d’éléments terroristes dans les camps de réfu giés maliens dans les pays limitrophes et la mise en place de structures interminis térielles pour faire face à des problèmes spécifiques. Les participants ont encoura gé la Commission, le CAERT, le CISSA et l’UFL à faciliter, en coopération avec les pays concernés, la diffusion de ces bonnes pratiques. Les participants ont souligné la nécessité de la poursuite et de l’intensification des efforts déployés, particulièrement au vu de la persistance de la menace terroriste, comme l’attestent la reprise des attaques et autres actes perpétrés par les groupes terroristes opérant au Nord du Mali et la poursuite des activités terroristes des groupes BokoHaram Les participants ont échangé sur la situation difficile qui prévaut en Libye et sont convenus de la nécessité d’efforts renouvelés pour aider ce pays à faire face aux défis auxquels il est confronté, y compris à travers l’échange de renseignements. Les participants ont noté l’exploitation par les groupes terroristes des tensions et conflits communautaires, soulignant que cette situation appelle des mesures spéci fiques et une implication active des autorités et des collectivités locales dans les zones frontalières. Ils ont aussi noté les liens avec les activités criminelles transfron talières, y compris le trafic de drogue (cocaïne et cannabis) et la prolifération d’ar mes légères et de petit calibre, ainsi que la menace liée au retour dans la région d’éléments terroristes partis combattre dans certaines parties du monde. Notant les retards quelquefois accusés dans l’échange d’informations entre servi 12

ces, les participants ont convenu de prendre les mesures appropriées pour raccour cir les délais de communication d’informations opérationnelles, ayant en vue leur caractère urgent. De même, ils ont reconnu la nécessité pour les États membres de se doter de capacités renforcées en hommes et en équipements, y compris la cons titution d’unités spéciales, pour pouvoir relever plus efficacement le défi du terro risme et de la criminalité transnationale. Rappelant les dispositions pertinentes du communiqué adopté par le Conseil de paix et de sécurité (CPS) de l’UA, lors de sa 249 ème réunion tenue le 22 novembre 2010, les participants ont encouragé la Com mission à accélérer l’élaboration d’un mandat d’arrêt africain pour les personnes accusées d’actes terroristes, ou condamnées pour de tels actes. Les participants ont suivi une mise à jour sur les efforts visant la mise en place d’un système de communication sécurisé entre les services des pays participant au Pro cessus de Nouakchott. La réunion a été informée de ce qu’une solution sera trou vée dans de très brefs délais pour l’opérationnalisation de ce système. Dans l’inter valle, les participants se sont réjouis de l’offre faite l’UFL d’étendre son système de communication sécurisé aux trois pays du Processus de Nouakchott qui ne sont pas membres de l’UFL (Côte d’Ivoire, Guinée et Sénégal), ainsi qu’au CISSA et à la MISA HEL. Les participants ont relevé avec satisfaction les activités entreprises par le CAERT dans le domaine du renforcement des capacités, à travers l’organisation d’ateliers de formation et la conduite de missions d’évaluation dans certains pays de la ré gion. Ils ont félicité le CAERT pour le rôle croissant qu’il joue dans le renforcement des capacités nationales. Ils se sont également réjouis des initiatives prises par le CISSA et l’UFL, et ont appelé à la poursuite de tous les efforts de renforcement des capacités sur la base de la matrice élaborée par le CAERT, le CISSA et l’UFL. Dans ce cadre, ils ont souligné la nécessité pour les États membres de l’UA de contribuer financièrement, selon les modalités les plus appropriées, à la mise en œuvre des programmes envisagés. S’agissant de l’opérationnalisation de l’APSA dans la région sahélo-saharienne, les participants ont souligné la nécessité d’accélérer les efforts déployés à cet effet, en prenant en compte les décisions prises par le Sommet de l’UA de janvier 2014 sur l’évaluation de la Force africaine en attente (FAA) et l’opérationnalisation de la Ca pacité africaine de réponse immédiate aux crises (CARIC). Ils ont noté, à cet égard, les propositions soumises par la Commission dans son rapport intérimaire à l’atten tion de la réunion ministérielle, à savoir la tenue de réunions des chefs d’État-major et des Ministres de la Défense pour examiner les concepts d’opération généri ques pour les patrouilles conjointes et les unités mixtes et les modalités de renfor cement des structures de coopération existantes, ainsi que la mise en place, sous la direction de la MISAHEL, d’un Secrétariat réduit à Niamey. Les participants ont réaffirmé l’engagement de leurs organisations et pays respec tifs à continuer à œuvrer au renforcement du Processus de Nouakchott. Ils ont noté à cet égard la proposition faite par la Commission en vue de tenir un Sommet des 13

pays participant au Processus. Ils ont aussi encouragé les Communautés économi ques régionales concernées à s’approprier le Processus de Nouakchott et à en ac compagner la mise en œuvre. Les participants ont suivi une présentation de la MISAHEL sur la Stratégie de l’UA pour la région du Sahel, qui sera soumise à la réunion ministérielle du 19 février 2014, pour examen et validation. Les participants se sont félicités de l’offre faite par le Burkina Faso d’accueillir la 5 ème réunion des chefs des Services de Renseignement et de Sécurité, à une date qui sera arrêtée après consultations entre la Commission et les autorités burkina bés compétentes. Les participants ont exprimé leur gratitude au Gouvernement et au peuple de la République du Niger pour l'accueil chaleureux qui leur a été réservé, ainsi que pour toutes les dispositions prises pour assurer le bon déroulement de leur réunion. 14

3rd ministerial meeting on the enhancement of security cooperation and the operationalisation of the APSA in the sahelo-saharan region, Niamey, 19 february 2014

CONCLUSIONS

1. The 3 rd ministerial meeting of the countries on the Enhancement of Security Co operation and the Operationalization of the African Peace and Security Architec ture (APSA) in the Sahelo-Saharan region was held in Niamey, Niger, on 19 Febru ary 2014, within the framework of the Nouakchott Process, initiated by the African Union (AU), in March 2013. The meeting was held in follow up to the ministerial meetings held in Nouakchott and Ndjamena on 17 March and 11 September 2013, respectively, and took place on the heels of the 4 th meeting of the Heads of Intelli gence and Security Services held in Niamey on 17 February 2014. 2. Ministers and other representatives of the following countries participated in the meeting: Algeria, Burkina Faso, Chad, Côte d’Ivoire, Libya, Mali, Mauritania, Ni ger, Nigeria and Senegal. The President of the Commission of the Economic Com munity of West African States (ECOWAS) and the acting Secretary-General of the Community of the Sahelo-Saharan States (CEN-SAD), as well as the Special Repre sentative of the UN Secretary-General for West Africa (UNOWA) and the Special Representative of the United Nations (UN) Secretary-General for Mali and Head of the UN Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission for Mali (MINUSMA), also participated in the meeting. In addition, the Director of the African Centre for the Study and Research on Terrorism (ACSRT), the Executive Secretary of the Commit tee of the Intelligence and Security Services of Africa (CISSA), the Coordinator of the Fusion and Liaison Unit (UFL) and the Deputy Executive Secretary of the North Africa Regional Capability (NARC) also participated in the meeting. The AU Commis sioner for Peace and Security and the AU High Representative for Mali and the Sa hel (MISAHEL) were also in attendance. 3. The opening ceremony was marked by statements made by Ambassador Smail Chergui, AU Commissioner for Peace and Security; Mr. Kadré Désiré Ouédraogo, President of the ECOWAS Commission; Mr. Ibrahim Abani, acting Secretary-General of CEN-SAD; Ambassador Said Djinnit, Special Representative of the UN Secretary General for West Africa; and Mr. Mohamed Bazoum, Minister of Foreign Affairs, Cooperation, African Integration and Nigeriens Abroad of the Republic of Niger. 4. Participants exchanged views and agreed as follows: Overall situation in the Sahelo-Saharan Region and enhancement of security coop eration 15

5. Participants reviewed the political and security situation in the region since their last meeting, held in Ndjamena, on 11 September 2013. In this regard, they welcomed the positive evolution of the political situation in Mali, marked by the completion of the transition process, through the successful holding of the legisla tive elections whose first and second rounds were held on 24 November 2013 and 15 December 2013, respectively. They also welcomed the recent progress made in the implementation of the Ouagadougou Preliminary Agreement of 18 June 2013, particularly the conclusion, with the support of MINUSMA, of an agreement on the encampment of the elements of the armed groups. They urged for the continuation of the efforts made within this framework, and encouraged all countries participat ing in the Nouakchott Process, as well as the relevant international organizations, to continue to lend the necessary support to the Malian Government and other stakeholders, on the basis of national ownership and leadership. Participants also took note of the progress made in the deployment of MINUSMA, and welcomed the prospects for the enhancement of the Mission both in terms of strength and logistical capability. 6. Participants also noted with satisfaction the continuous efforts aimed at build ing confidence and promoting good neighborliness in the Sahelo-Saharan region. Within that framework, they welcomed the visits which President Ibrahim Bouba car Keita of Mali undertook to Mauritania and Algeria in January 2014. They en couraged the pursuit of such initiatives. They urged the AU High Representative for Mali and the Sahel and the Special Representative of the UN Secretary-General for West Africa to continue to support the efforts of the countries of the region, includ ing through continuous interaction with their leaders. 7. With regard to the security situation in the region, participants, while welcom ing the overall positive developments recorded during the period under considera tion, expressed concern at the persistence of the terrorist threat, as evidenced by the recent events in northern Mali and the attacks that the Boko Haram and Ansaru groups continue to carry out in Nigeria. They noted with deep concern the growing magnitude of the scourge of transnational crime and its linkages to terrorism. Par ticipants also stressed the difficult situation obtaining in Libya, which calls for an increased engagement of the region and the continent as a whole, to help this brotherly country overcome the challenges facing it, in a spirit of African solidarity. 8. Participants, cognizant of the need to pursue and intensify the efforts made, endorsed the operational conclusions of the 4th meeting of the Heads of Intelli gence and Security Services of the countries of the region, held in Niamey, on 17 February 2014, noting with appreciation the offer made by Burkina Faso to host the 5th meeting. They stressed their determination to implement the measures agreed upon. They requested the Commission to take all the necessary steps to ensure ef 16

fective follow-up, including through the preparation of a matrix identifying all the measures to be taken, as well as the actors concerned. They also requested the Commission to ensure the necessary follow-up, at the regional level, of the conclu sions of the workshop, organized by the AU in collaboration with the 1540 Commit tee and with the support of the UN Office for Disarmament Affairs, on the imple mentation, in Africa, of resolution 1540 (2004) on the non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction to non-state actors, adopted by the UN Security Council on 28 April 2004. Participants noted with appreciation the efforts made by ECOWAS and CEN-SAD in the fight against terrorism and transnational crime. In this regard, they called for the pursuit of the efforts undertaken by the Inter-Governmental Action Group Against Money Laundering in West Africa (GIABA), established by the ECOWAS Summit in 2000, as well as those exerted within the framework of the Praia Political Declaration and Plan of Action on Drug Trafficking in the region, adopted by ECOWAS in 2008. Finally, participants called for the development of close cooperation between the Intelligence and Security Services of the countries of the region and the Intelligence Cell that MINUSMA intends to put in place. 9. Participants also welcomed the establishment in Algiers, on 9 February 2014, of a structure bringing together, under AU aegis, the police institutions in the conti nent (AFRIPOL). They stressed that AFRIPOL is a valuable tool for enhancing police and judicial cooperation in Africa. 10. Participants welcomed the invitation extended by Libya to the AU for it to conduct an assessment mission that would include relevant structures of the Un ion, to better identify the challenges at hand in southern Libya and make recom mendations on the collective action to be undertaken by Libya and the neighboring countries within the framework of the Nouakchott Process. Participants looked for ward to the meeting to be held in Rome on 6 March 2014, under the auspices of the Italian and Libyan Governments, to mobilize more effective international sup port for Libya, in the light of the security challenges facing the country. Participants agreed that the neighboring countries invited and Libya would hold consultations prior the Rome meeting, in order to harmonize their positions and facilitate the at tainment of the set objectives. They requested Niger, with the support of the AU Commission, to facilitate the holding of the planned consultation as soon as possi ble. 11. Participants welcomed the measures envisaged regarding the operationaliza tion, as soon as possible, of the secure communication system among the intelli gence and security services of the Sahelo-Saharan countries. They also welcomed the offer made by UFL to extend in the meantime its secure communication system to three countries of the Nouakchott Process that are not members of the UFL, as w e l l a s t o A C S R T , C I S S A a n d M I S A H E L . 17

12. Furthermore, participants requested the Commission, in cooperation with the United Nations and other actors concerned, to set up a team of experts to map out the different threats to security in the region, with a particular focus on terrorist and other armed and criminal groups operating in the region. The outcome of this mapping exercise will be presented at the next ministerial meeting of the countries participating in the Nouakchott Process. Next steps in the operationalization of the African Peace and Security Architecture 13. Participants reaffirmed the commitment of their respective organizations and countries to work towards the continued implementation of the Nouakchott Proc ess, acknowledging that this Process provides a unique framework for a common approach to the security challenges facing the region on the basis of shared vision and collective responsibility. 14. In this respect, participants, having welcomed the decisions on the assess ment of the African Standby Force (ASF) and on the African Capacity for Immediate Response to Crises (ACIRC), agreed on the following measures aimed at facilitating the operationalization of the APSA in the Sahelo-Saharan region: (i) the convening of meetings of the Chiefs of Defense Staff and Ministers of De fense to consider the generic Concepts of Operation for joint patrols and mixed units, as well as the modalities for strengthening the existing cooperation struc tures and all other modalities of collaboration between and among the countries of the region. In this respect, participants welcomed the offer by Mali to host these meetings at a date to be agreed upon with the AU Commission. They requested the AU High Representative for Mali and the Sahel, Pierre Buyoya, in consultation with all concerned actors, to undertake consultation missions to the countries of the re gion to facilitate this process; (ii) the convening of a Summit of the countries participating in the Nouakchott Process, to mobilize further political support for the Process and enhance owner ship by the countries of the region; and (iii) the establishment, under MISAHEL leadership, of a lean Secretariat in Niamey, to better coordinate the implementation of the Nouakchott Process, pending its possible transformation into an Executive Secretariat linked to MISAHEL. On strategies and initiatives regarding the Sahel 15. Participants stressed that the Nouakchott Process is one of the components of the integrated and holistic approaches to the challenges facing the Sahelo Saharan region. In this respect, they welcomed the elaboration by the AU of a Strategy for the Sahel region and commended the AU High Representative for Mali 18

and the Sahel and his team for the efforts made. They validated the document in light of the observations made, notably those relating to the issue of coordination with existing initiatives and the recognition of the role of the relevant regional or ganizations in the implementation of the Strategy. Similarly, the participants stressed that the Strategy should foster the implementation, within the Sahelo Sahara region, of the major continental initiatives, particularly those conducted by NEPAD, on infrastructure and development. They agreed that all the observations made would be reflected in the final text of the Strategy. Participants urged AU Member States and international partners to extend support for the effective im plementation of the AU Strategy. 16. Participants also noted with satisfaction the measures taken by the UN sys tem, under the leadership of the UN Special Representative for West Africa, to wards the implementation of the UN Integrated Strategy for the Sahel. They wel comed the ECOWAS efforts, as well as those of other international institutions, no tably the European Union (EU). Acknowledging the need for close coordination of all initiatives, in support of the countries of the region and on the basis of regional ownership, participants hailed the efforts being deployed by the Office of the UN Special Representative for West Africa and MISAHEL towards the establishment of the Technical Secretariat for the Coordination Platform of the different strategies for the Sahel, notably through the preliminary meeting organized, in Bamako, on 28 January 2014, and the meeting scheduled for 21 February 2014, also in Bamako. Vote of Thanks 17. Participants thanked the Government and the people of Niger for having hosted the ministerial meeting and the preparatory meeting of the Heads of Intelli gence and Security Services, as well as for their hospitality and the arrangements made to facilitate the smooth holding of these meetings. In particular, they ex pressed deep gratitude to President Mahamadou Issoufou, for his personal and continued commitment in fostering peace, security and development in the region. 19

3ème réunion ministérielle sur le renforcement de la coopération en matière de sécurité et l’opérationnalisation de l’APSA dans la région sahélo-saharienne, Niamey, 19 février 2014

la 4 ème à Niamey, le 17 février 2014.

CONCLUSIONS

La troisième réunion ministérielle des pays de la région sahélo-saharienne sur le renforcement de la coopération sécuritaire et l’opérationnalisation de l’Architectu re africaine de paix et de sécurité (APSA) a eu lieu à Niamey, au Niger, le 19 février 2014, dans le cadre du suivi du Processus de Nouakchott, initié par l’Union africai ne (UA), en mars 2013. Elle a fait suite aux réunions ministérielles tenues respecti vement à Nouakchott et à Ndjamena, les 17 mars et 11 septembre 2013, ainsi qu’à réunion des chefs des services de renseignement et de sécurité, qui a eu lieu 2. Les Ministres et autres représentants des pays ci-après ont pris part à la ré union: Algérie, Burkina Faso, Côte d’Ivoire, Libye, Mali, Mauritanie, Niger, Nigeria, Sénégal et Tchad. Le Président de la Commission de la Communauté économique des États de l’Afrique de l’Ouest (CEDEAO), le Secrétaire général par intérim de la Communauté des États sahélo-sahariens (CEN-SAD), ainsi que le Représentant spé cial du Secrétaire général des Nations unies pour l’Afrique de l’Ouest et le Repré sentant spécial du Secrétaire général des Nations unies au Mali et chef de la Mis sion multidimensionnelle intégrée des Nations unies pour la stabilisation pour le Mali (MINUSMA), ont également pris part à la réunion. En outre, la réunion a vu la participation du Directeur du Centre africain d’Étude et de Recherche sur le Terro risme (CAERT), du Secrétaire exécutif du Comité des Services de Renseignement et de Sécurité de l’Afrique (CISSA), la Coordinatrice de l’Unité de Fusion et de Liaison (UFL), et le Secrétaire exécutif adjoint de la Capacité régionale pour l’Afrique du Nord (NARC). Le Commissaire à la Paix et à la Sécurité de l’UA et le Haut Représen tant de l’UA pour le Mali et le Sahel ont également pris part à la réunion. 3. La cérémonie d’ouverture a été marquée par les allocutions prononcées par l'Ambassadeur Smail Chergui, Commissaire à la Paix et à la Sécurité de l'UA ; M. Ka dré Désiré Ouédraogo, Président de la Commission de la CEDEAO ; M. Ibrahhim Abani, Secrétaire général par intérim de la CEN-SAD ; l’Ambassadeur Saïd Djinnit, Représentant spécial du Secrétaire général des Nations unies pour l’Afrique de l’Ouest ; et M. Mohamed Bazoum, Ministre des Affaires étrangères, de la Coopéra tion, de l’Intégration africaine et des Nigériens de l’Extérieur de la République du Niger. 4. Les participants ont échangé sur les questions ci-après et convenu des conclu sions suivantes: Sur la situation d’ensemble dans la région sahélo-saharienne et le renforcement de la coopération sécuritaire 20

5. Les participants ont passé en revue la situation politique et sécuritaire dans la région depuis leur dernière rencontre tenue à Ndjamena, le 11 septembre 2013. À cet égard, ils se sont réjouis de l’évolution positive de la situation politique au Mali, marquée par l’aboutissement heureux du processus de transition, grâce à la tenue réussie des élections législatives dont les premier et second tours ont eu lieu, res pectivement, le 24 novembre et 15 décembre 2013. Ils se sont également réjouis des avancées récentes enregistrées dans la mise en œuvre de l’Accord préliminaire signé à Ouagadougou, le 18 juin 2013, notamment la conclusion, avec le soutien de la MINUSMA, d’un accord sur le cantonnement des éléments des groupes armés. Ils ont exhorté à la poursuite des efforts entrepris dans ce cadre, et ont encouragé tous les pays participant au Processus de Nouakchott, ainsi que les organisations internationales compétentes, à continuer à apporter l’appui requis au Gouverne ment et aux autres parties prenantes maliennes, sur la base de l’appropriation na tionale et du leadership du Mali. Les participants ont également pris note des pro grès accomplis dans le déploiement de la MINUSMA et des perspectives de renfor cement de ses capacités humaines et logistiques. 6. Les participants ont aussi relevé avec satisfaction les efforts continus visant à promouvoir la confiance et le bon voisinage dans la région sahélo-saharienne. Ils se sont félicités, dans ce contexte, des visites que le Président Ibrahim Boubacar Keita du Mali a effectuées en Mauritanie et en Algérie, en janvier 2014. Ils ont encouragé la poursuite de ce type d’initiatives. De même, ils ont exhorté le Haut Représentant de l’UA pour le Mali et le Sahel et le Représentant spécial du Secrétaire général des Nations unies pour l’Afrique de l’Ouest à continuer à appuyer les efforts des pays de la région, y compris par une interaction continue avec leurs dirigeants. 7. S’agissant de la situation sécuritaire dans la région, les participants, tout en se félicitant de l’évolution globalement positive enregistrée au cours de la période sous examen, se sont inquiétés de la persistance de la menace terroriste, ainsi qu’en témoignent les incidents récemment survenus au Nord du Mali et les atta ques que les groupes Boko Haram et Ansaru continuent de commettre au Nigeria. Ils ont noté avec une profonde préoccupation l’ampleur croissante du fléau de la criminalité transnationale et ses liens avec le terrorisme. De même, les participants ont relevé la situation difficile prévalant en Libye, qui appelle, dans un esprit de so lidarité africaine, à une mobilisation de la région et du continent dans son ensem ble pour aider ce pays frère à surmonter les défis auxquels il est confronté. 8. Les participants, conscients de la nécessité de poursuivre et d’amplifier les ef forts entrepris, ont entériné les Conclusions opérationnelles adoptées par la 4ème réunion des chefs des services de renseignement et de sécurité des pays de la ré gion, tenue à Niamey, le 17 février 2014, notant avec appréciation l’offre faite par le Burkina Faso d’abriter la 5ème rencontre de ce genre. Ils ont souligné leur déter mination à mettre en œuvre les mesures convenues. Ils ont demandé à la Commis 21

sion de prendre toutes les dispositions nécessaires pour assurer un suivi effectif, y compris à travers l’élaboration d’une matrice identifiant toutes les mesures à pren dre, ainsi que les acteurs concernés. Ils ont demandé à la Commission d’assurer également, au niveau de la région, le suivi des conclusions de l’atelier d’experts, organisé par l’UA en collaboration avec le Comité 1540 et avec le soutien du Bu reau des Nations unies chargé des Affaires de désarmement, sur la mise en œuvre en Afrique de la résolution 1540 sur la non-prolifération d’armes de destruction massive aux acteurs non-étatiques adoptée par le Conseil de sécurité des Nations unies, le 28 avril 2014. Les participants ont noté avec appréciation les efforts dé ployés par la CEDEAO et la CEN-SAD dans le cadre de la lutte contre le terrorisme et la criminalité transnationale. À cet égard, ils ont appelé à la poursuite des efforts engagés par le Groupe Intergouvernemental d’Action contre le Blanchiment d’Ar gent en Afrique de l’Ouest (GIABA), établi par le Sommet de la CEDEAO en 2000, ainsi que dans le cadre de la Déclaration politique et du Plan d’action de Praia sur le trafic de drogues dans la région, adoptés par la CEDEAO en 2008. Enfin, les partici pants ont appelé au développement d’une coopération étroite entre les services de renseignement et de sécurité des pays de la région et la cellule de renseignement que la MINUSMA envisage de mettre en place. 9. Les participants ont, par ailleurs, favorablement accueilli la mise en place, à Al ger, le 9 février 2014, d’une structure regroupant, sous l’égide de l’UA, les polices du continent (AFRIPOL). Ils ont souligné qu’AFRIPOL constitue un outil précieux pour le renforcement de la coopération policière et judiciaire en Afrique. 10. Les participants se sont félicités de l’invitation faite par la Libye en vue de la conduite d’une mission d’évaluation de l’UA, comprenant les différentes structures compétentes de l’Union, pour mieux identifier les problèmes qui se posent au Sud de la Libye et faire des recommandations sur l’action collective à mener par la Libye et les pays voisins dans le cadre du Processus de Nouakchott. Ils ont indiqué atten dre avec intérêt la réunion qui sera organisée, à Rome, le 6 mars 2014, par les Gou vernements italien et libyen, pour mobiliser un soutien international plus effectif en faveur de la Libye, au regard des défis sécuritaires que connaît le pays. Les parti cipants ont convenu que les pays voisins invités et la Libye se concerteraient en amont de la réunion de Rome pour harmoniser leurs positions et faciliter la réalisa tion des objectifs poursuivis. Ils ont demandé au Niger, avec le soutien de la Com mission de l’UA, de conduire cette consultation dans les plus brefs délais. 11. Les participants se sont félicités des dispositions envisagées en ce qui concer ne l’opérationnalisation, dans de très brefs délais, du système de communication sécurisé entre les services de renseignement et de sécurité des États sahélo sahariens. Ils se sont aussi félicités de l’offre faite par l’UFL d’étendre, dans l’inter valle, son système de communication sécurisé aux trois pays du Processus de Nouakchott qui ne sont pas membres de l’UFL, ainsi qu’au CAERT, au CISSA et à la MISAHEL. 22

12. En outre, les participants ont invité la Commission, en collaboration avec les Nations unies et d’autres acteurs concernés, à mettre en place une équipe d’ex perts pour cartographier les différentes menaces à la sécurité dans la région, avec un accent particulier sur les groupes armés terroristes et autres qui y opèrent. Les résultats de cette cartographie devront être présentés à la prochaine réunion mi nistérielle des pays participant au Processus de Nouakchott. Sur les prochaines étapes de l’opérationnalisation de l’Architecture africaine de paix et de sécurité 13. Les participants ont réaffirmé la volonté de leurs organisations et pays respec tifs d’œuvrer au renforcement continu du Processus de Nouakchott, reconnaissant que celui-ci constitue un cadre unique pour une approche collective des défis sécu ritaires que connait la région, sur la base d’une vision et d’une responsabilité parta gées. 14. Dans ce cadre, les participants, après s’être réjouis des décisions adoptées par le dernier Sommet de l’UA tenu en janvier 2014 sur l’évaluation de la Force africai ne en attente (FAA) et la Capacité africaine de réponse immédiate aux crises (CARIC), se sont accordés sur les mesures suivantes destinées à faciliter l’opération nalisation de l’APSA dans la région sahélo-saharienne : (i) la tenue de réunions des chefs d’État-major et des Ministres de la Défense pour examiner les concepts d’opération génériques pour les patrouilles conjointes et les unités mixtes, sur la base des expériences africaines et internationales perti nentes, ainsi que les modalités de renforcement des structures de coopération existantes et de toutes autres formes de collaboration entre les États de la région. À cet égard, les participants se sont félicités de l’offre faite par le Mali d’abriter ces réunions à une date qui sera convenue avec la Commission de l’UA. Ils ont deman dé au Haut Représentant de l’UA pour le Mali et le Sahel, Pierre Buyoya, en consul tation avec tous les acteurs concernés, d’entreprendre des missions de consulta tion auprès des pays de la région pour faciliter ce processus; (ii) la tenue prochaine d’un Sommet des pays participant au Processus de Nouak chott, pour mobiliser un soutien politique accru au Processus, et renforcer son ap propriation par les pays de la région; et (iii) la mise en place, sous la direction de la MISAHEL, d’un Secrétariat réduit à Niamey, pour mieux coordonner la mise en œuvre du Processus de Nouakchott, en attendant sa transformation éventuelle en un Secrétariat exécutif rattaché à la MI SAHEL. Sur les stratégies et initiatives portant sur le Sahel 23

15. Les participants ont souligné que le Processus de Nouakchott est l’une des composantes des approches intégrées et holistiques des défis auxquels est confrontée la région sahélo-saharienne. Dans ce cadre, ils se sont réjouis de l’éla boration par l’UA d’une Stratégie pour la région du Sahel, et ont félicité le Haut Re présentant de l’UA pour le Mali et le Sahel et son équipe pour l’effort déployé. Ils ont validé le document à la lumière des observations faites, y compris en ce qui concerne la question de la coordination avec les initiatives existantes et le rôle des organisations régionales compétentes dans la mise en œuvre de la Stratégie. De même, les participants ont souligné que la Stratégie devrait favoriser la mise en œuvre, au sein de la région sahélo-saharienne, des grandes initiatives continenta les, notamment celles conduites dans le cadre du NEPAD, sur les infrastructures et le développement. Il a été convenu que l’ensemble de ces observations seraient reflétées dans la version finale de la Stratégie. Les participants ont exhorté les États membres de l’UA et les partenaires internationaux à apporter leur contribution à la mise en œuvre effective de la Stratégie de l’UA. 16. Les participants ont aussi noté avec satisfaction les mesures prises par le sys tème des Nations unies, sous la direction du Représentant spécial du Secrétaire gé néral des Nations unies pour l'Afrique de l'Ouest, en vue de la mise en œuvre de la Stratégie intégrée des Nations unies pour le Sahel. Ils se sont félicités des efforts de la CEDEAO, ainsi que de ceux d’autres institutions internationales, notamment l’U nion européenne (UE). Reconnaissant la nécessité d’une coordination étroite de toutes les initiatives, en appui aux pays de la région et sur la base de l’appropria tion régionale, les participants ont salué les efforts déployés par le Bureau du Re présentant spécial des Nations unies pour l’Afrique de l’Ouest et la MISAHEL, en vue d’établir le Secrétariat technique de la Plate-forme de coordination des diffé rentes stratégies pour le Sahel, à travers notamment la réunion préliminaire organi sée, à Bamako, le 28 janvier 2014, et celle prévue, également à Bamako, le 21 fé vrier 2014. Remerciements 17. Les participants ont remercié le Gouvernement et le peuple nigériens pour avoir abrité la réunion ministérielle et celle préparatoire des chefs des services de renseignement et de sécurité, ainsi que pour l’hospitalité et les dispositions prises en vue bon déroulement des travaux. Ils ont, en particulier, marqué leur profonde gratitude au Président Mahamadou Issoufou, pour son engagement personnel et continu en faveur de la paix, de la sécurité et du développement dans la région. 24

Communique de presse de la 420ème réunion du CPS sur les droits et le bien-être de l'enfant (CAEDBE)

Le Conseil de paix et de sécurité (CPS) de l'Union africaine (UA), en sa 420 è me réunion tenue le 18 février 2014, à Addis Abéba, a consacré une séance pour une consultation avec le Comité africain des experts sur les droits et le bien-être de l'enfant (CAEDBE), en tant qu’organe de l'UA. La réunion a été tenue en vertu de la décision du Conseil exécutif EX.CL/Dec.712 (XXI) qui a été adoptée en juin 2012, lors de sa 21 ème session ordinaire , tenue à Ad dis Abéba , dans laquelle le Conseil exécutif a demandé au CPS de tenir compte des droits de l'enfant dans son ordre du jour et de coopérer activement avec le Comité, dans ses efforts visant à promouvoir le bien-être des enfants en Afrique . Le Conseil a souligné la nécessité pour le Comité de promouvoir des initiatives aux niveaux national, régional et continental, afin de sensibiliser davantage diverses parties prenantes sur les droits et le bien-être des enfants. Le Conseil s'est félicité de l'appel à l’institutionnalisation de la collaboration entre lui-même et le CAEDBE en engageant les États membres de l'UA à prendre les me sures et les initiatives nécessaires afin d’assurer la protection des droits des enfants dans les conflits armés. Le Conseil a demandé que les autorités des pays touchés facilitent le signalement des faits de recrutement et d’utilisation des enfants dans les situations de conflit au CAEDBE, conformément à la résolution 1216(2005) du 25

Conseil de sécurité des Nations unies mettant l’accent un mécanisme de surveillan ce et de rapports sur l'utilisation des enfants soldats. A cet égard, le Conseil a souli gné la nécessité pour les autorités dans les pays touchés de prendre des mesures contre ceux qui recrutent et utilisent les enfants dans les conflits armés et a exhor té le CAEDBE à convenir de modalités pour assurer le suivi et la réception de rap ports sur des cas de recrutement et d’utilisations des enfants dans les conflits ar més. Le Conseil a discuté de la possibilité d'institutionnaliser ses interactions avec le CAEDBE dans le cadre de l'Article 19 du Protocole relatif à la création du Conseil de paix et de sécurité de l'Union africaine, qui prévoit une coopération étroite entre le Conseil et la Commission africaine des droits de des droits et des peuples (CADHP). Le Conseil a en outre discuté de l’opportunité pour le CAEDBE d’étendre son inte raction au niveau national, ainsi qu’au niveau régional, afin de renforcer sa coopé ration au niveau local. Le Conseil a également convenu d'étudier la possibilité d'organiser une réunion de haut niveau consacrée à la paix, à la sécurité et aux droits et au bien-être des en fants en Afrique, ainsi que de la nécessité d'élaborer des mécanismes appropriés à travers lesquels les Secrétariats des deux organes peuvent institutionnaliser leur collaboration et renforcer davantage leur engagement en faveur des enfants. Le Conseil a convenu de tenir chaque année une session publique consacrée aux questions des enfants sur le continent. Le Conseil a appelé les Etats membres, qui ne l’ont pas encore fait, à signer et rati fier la Charte africaine sur les droits et le bien-être de l’enfant (CADBE). 26

Press statement of the 420th meeting of the PSC on the Rights and Welfare of the Child (ACERWC)

The Peace and Security Council (PSC) of the African Union (AU), at its 420 in its capacity as an Organ of the AU. th meeting held on 18 February 2014, in Addis Ababa, devoted a session to a consultation with the African Committee of Experts on the Rights and Welfare of the Child (ACERWC), The meeting was held pursuant to the Executive Council Decision EX.CL/Dec.712 (XXI) that was adopted in June 2012, at its 21 st Ordinary Session, held in Addis Ababa, in which the Executive Council requested the PSC to take into account the rights of the child in its agenda and cooperate actively with the ACERWC, in its ef forts aimed at promoting the welfare of children in Africa. Council emphasized the need for the ACERWC to champion initiatives at national, regional and continental levels, to bring more awareness on children’s rights and welfare to various stakeholders. Council welcomed the call for an institutionalized collaboration between itself and the ACERWC in engaging AU Member States to take necessary measures and initia tives to ensure the protection of the rights of children in armed conflicts. Council required the authorities of the affected countries to facilitate reporting on inci dence of recruiting and use of children in conflict situations to the ACERWC; in ac cordance with the UN Resolution 1216 (2005) centering on monitoring and report 27

ing mechanism on the use of child soldiers. In this regard, Council stressed the need for authorities in affected countries to take measures against those found recruit ing and using children in armed conflicts, and urged the ACERWC to come out with modalities for ensuring monitoring and receipt of reports of cases of recruitments and use of children in armed conflict. Council discussed the possibility of institutionalizing its interactions with the ACERWC within the framework of Article 19 of the Protocol Relating to the Estab lishment of the Peace and Security Council of the African Union, which provides for close cooperation between the Council and the African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights (ACHPR). Council further discussed the opportunity for the ACERWC to extend its interaction to national, as well as regional level, to enhance its coop eration from the grassroots. Council also agreed to look into the possibility of organizing a high-level meeting devoted to peace, security and children’s rights and welfare in Africa, as well as the need to devise appropriate mechanisms through which the Secretariats of the two Organs can institutionalize their collaboration and further strengthen their engage ment in favor of children. Council agreed to hold, each year, an open session of the PSC, devoted to issues of children on the continent. Council called all AU Member States, who have not yet done so, to sign and ratify the African Charter on the Rights and Welfare of the Child (ACRWC) 28

La MISCA riposte à une attaque d’éléments armés sur un convoi et dé mantèle un barrage routier à Beloko

Bangui, le 17 février 2014:

La Mission internationale de soutien à la Centrafrique sous conduite africaine (MISCA) a riposté à une attaque d’un convoi par des élé ments armés illégaux, dans la soirée du 16 février 2014, aux environs de l’agglomé ration de Beloko, sur le corridor reliant la capitale Bangui à la frontière avec le Ca meroun. Comme indiqué dans son communiqué de presse daté du 15 février 2013, la MISCA a, depuis le 18 janvier 2014, mis en place un dispositif pour escorter les véhicules empruntant cette voie, et ce suivant les modalités suivantes: les lundi, mercredi et vendredi, de la localité de Beloko, à la frontière avec le Cameroun, à Bangui; et les mardi, jeudi et samedi, de Bangui à la frontière camerounaise, pour raccompagner les véhicules ayant déchargé leurs cargaisons. C’est dans ce cadre que le cinquième convoi escorté par la MISCA a quitté Bangui le samedi 15 février 2014, avec soixante-douze (72) véhicules, dont soixante-deux (62) camions et dix (10) véhicules de transport d’usagers, rejoints, le dimanche 16 février 2014, dans la ville de Bouar, par dix-sept véhicules (17) supplémentaires, portant ainsi le nombre de véhicules à quatre-vingt-neuf (89). La colonne ainsi constituée a essuyé une attaque d’éléments armés du groupe dit des anti-balaka et de coupeurs de route. Ces derniers, équipés d’armes à feu, ont attaqué les militai res de la MISCA escortant le convoi, cependant que d’autres , également armés, tentaient de monter à bord des véhicules d’usagers, pour commettre des exactions sur les civils à bord. Les éléments de la MISCA ont dû faire usage de la force appropriée, en position de légitime défense ainsi que pour protéger les civils en danger imminent. Le bilan de l’affrontement est de onze (11) assaillants armés neutralisés et de douze (12) civils légèrement blessés. Les civils ont immédiatement été pris en charge par l’équipe médicale de la MISCA insérée dans le convoi. L’escorte de la MISCA a récupéré 3 fusils automatiques, des fusils de chasse de calibre 12, ainsi que de nombreuses machettes, épées, arcs et flèches. La MISCA réitère, encore une fois, sa détermination, à mettre en oeuvre, en toute impartialité et de façon robuste, son mandat de protection des populations civiles, ainsi que de soutien à la restauration de l’autorité de l’État centrafricain sur l'en semble de son territoire, y compris par la protection du corridor vital qui relie la RCA au Cameroun. 29

Terrorism in Africa

L’Afrique de l’Est sous la menace des terroristes islamistes?

attentats du Westgate en septembre dernier à Nairobi, le Kenya est en état d’a-

lerte. Le conseil de sécurité du pays a donc acté une intensification des dispositifs de sécurité, eu égard à la menace terroriste émanant des radicaux islamistes.

Marc Lavergne, spécialiste de la Corne de l’Afrique, tempère les raccourcis entre

terrorisme et fait religieux.

Les miliciens islamistes du Shebab, en Somalie - Photo EU Humanitarian Aid and Civil Protection / Flickr cc

JOL Press : Le gouvernement kenyan a annoncé ce mercredi 26 février vouloir ren forcer son dispositif de sécurité à cause de

« risques accrus de radicalisation d’isla mistes et de factions locales »

. Est-ce un problème d’insécurité locale et de violen ces urbaines, ou existe-t-il un vrai danger régional grandissant ?

Marc Lavergne : mans. Avant tout, le problème de cette région est le chômage des jeu-

nes. Ils n’ont pas d’autres débouchés que l’agriculture. A l’heure du village mon dial, ce n’est pas très attirant pour eux. Ils préfèrent être connectés… Ce désœu-

vrement et ce désenchantement se traduisent par un durcissement religieux.

Mais même chez les Shebab, ce n’est qu’un affichage. Il n’y a pas aujourd’hui de

regain de la religiosité en Afrique, que ce soit chez les chrétiens ou les musul-

Néanmoins, cela dépend évidemment de chaque région, de chaque pays. Le Kenya est assez fragilisé : il est en proie à la désertification, à la surpopulation. Le pouvoir 30

y est détenu par une oligarchie corrompue, parfois incompétente, et surprotégée par l’Occident. En outre le pays est miné par des guerres ethnico-tribales, spéciale ment à chaque élection. Elles ont d’ailleurs conduit l’actuel Président Uhuru Ke nyatta à être sous mandat d’arrêt de la CPI. Il y a un affrontement entre les ethnies Kikuyu et Luo, principalement. Cette dimension ethnique cache une réalité sociale, qui est la désertification du territoire, due à l’urbanisation des populations. Ces migrants se retrouvent dans les bidonvilles, qui sont les pires d’Afrique. L’ancrage religieux y est certes plus facile. Mais il est surtout l’épouvantail qu’agite le gouvernement pour augmenter la sur veillance, en vue d’endiguer l’insécurité urbaine… JOL Press : Le risque terroriste lié à l’islamisme radical n’est donc pas pour vous, plus important qu’il y a 10 ans ?

Marc Lavergne :

Il l’est dans la mesure où l’islam progresse

lisme et déstabilisation.

: c’est une religion ex-

pansive. Cependant, la radicalisation est un phénomène qui est moins certain.

D’ailleurs, je ne crois pas vraiment à un lien direct, de cause à effet, entre radica-

A mon sens, le lien tient aux conversions à l’islam. Ces hommes y viennent parce qu’ils estiment que l’islam n’est pas une religion coloniale, d’exploiteurs, de blancs. Les prêcheurs islamiques appuient donc là-dessus. En outre, cette religion est sim ple, et fournit facilement un guidage à ceux qui sont un peu perdus. Le terrorisme, qui vient par-dessus ce phénomène, n’est finalement qu’un moyen parmi d’autres. Il est question de rapport de force et d’efficacité. Mais hormis les croyances autour du paradis des djihadistes, la religion n’influe pas forcément sur le terrorisme. En atteste les attentats du Westgate en septembre 2013 à Nairobi : ses auteurs ont tenté de s’enfuir, ce n’étaient pas des kamikazes, ils n’avaient aucu ne vocation au martyr. Source: http://www.jolpress.com/ 31

JOL Press : La menace terroriste serait donc plus liée à des facteurs ethnico-sociaux que religieux, selon vous ?

Marc Lavergne : mondialisation. Oui, je le pense. Mais ça ne change rien : le regain de menaces islamistes dans certaines régions, réel ou supposé, est utilisé pour attirer la com passion et le soutien des Occidentaux. Ceux-ci sont tétanisés par le danger islami que. Les islamistes sont le symbole des empêcheurs de tourner en rond de la

JOL Press : On ne peut pas non plus nier le danger islamiste en Afrique de l’Est. Avec l’intervention kenyane en Somalie, la piraterie maritime, les actions du She bab (dont l’attentat du Westgate en septembre dernier), la menace est bien réel l e …

Marc Lavergne : La menace islamiste est évidemment réelle. Mais cette réalité n’enlève rien à celle de la déstabilisation de l’Afrique entière.

du territoire africain ? JOL Press : Peut-on voir une collusion entre les différents troubles religieux en Afri que (le Shebab, Boko Haram, les conflits religieux en Centrafrique, les groupes isla miques dans le Sahel…) ? Le fait religieux est-il en train de déstabiliser l’ensemble

Marc Lavergne : coloniale. Je ne dirais pas cela. Cette déstabilisation est naturelle, inélucta ble. Elle est beaucoup plus due au fait que l’Afrique n’est pas sortie de la période

Le Kenya, par exemple, est une vitrine occidentalisée, qui paraît fonctionner. Nairo bi semble être une ville fonctionnelle. Pourtant, vous ne sortez pas dans les rues après 8 heures le soir. Vous ne vous arrêtez pas au feu rouge avec vos vitres bais sées. Nairobi a beau être un centre névralgique de l’ONU, le hub africain pour l’Oc cident, la criminalité y est extrêmement élevée. Le Kenya tient, aujourd’hui, par la présence occidentale. Et par le bâton plus que la carotte. JOL Press : L’Afrique de l’Est, en dépit du terrorisme et de l’éclatement de la Soma lie, est le nouveau terrain de jeux des pétroliers. La bulle de prospection y est forte, les découvertes prometteuses, les chantiers et aménagements titanesques. La me nace terroriste, liée entre autres au Shebab et à d’autres groupuscules, risque-t-elle d’impacter ce développement autour du pétrole ?

Marc Lavergne : La Somalie a éclaté il y a 25 ans. En outre, la situation n’y est pas inéluctable : le Somaliland, bien que non reconnu, est assez stable.

Les perspectives pétrolières ne sont pas en elles-mêmes un facteur de déstabilisa tion. La déstabilisation précède l’arrivée du pétrole. Les ressources ne créent pas la guerre. Elles peuvent simplement l’accélérer. 32

Sahel/terrorisme : onze pays africains affinent leurs stratégies de lutte contre le terrorisme à Niamey

19 fév 2014 - 5:47

Les ministres des Affaires étrangères des pays membres de l’Unité de fusion et de liaison ( UFL) sont réunis mercredi à Niamey afin d’étudier les voies et moyens les

plus appropriés pour la lutte contre le terrorisme et le crime organisé dans la ré gion du Sahel.

Au cours de cette réunion d’une journée, les ministres qui sont assistés par des chefs des services de renseignements et de sécurités de leurs pays respectifs, ainsi que des représentants de l’Unité africaine et de la Communauté économique des Etats de l’Afrique de l’Ouest (CEDEAO), échangeront sur la situation politique et sécuritaire dans la région sahélo-saharienne, le renforcement de la coopération sécuritaire et l’opérationnalisation de l’architecture africaine de paix et de sécurité, entre autres. L’UFL est un organisme de lutte contre le terrorisme et le crime organisé créé en avril 2010 par les sept pays concernés par la question terroriste dans le Sahel, l’Al gérie, la Mauritanie, le Niger, le Burkina Faso, la Libye, le Mali et le Tchad auxquels se sont joints le Nigeria, le Sénégal, la Guinée et la Cote d’Ivoire. Elle coordonne l’action de lutte contre le terrorisme et mène une propagande contre ses méfaits. « Les récents événements survenus à Gao au Mali, portant sur l’enlèvement d’une équipe du CICR revendiqués par le MUJAO, démontrent à suffisance l’état de pré carité de la situation sécuritaire dans notre région et doivent nous interpeler da vantage sur l’urgence et la nécessité d’une coopération renforcée entre les acteurs compétents », a préconisé le ministre nigérien des Affaires étrangères, Bazoum Mohamed, présidant l’ouverture de la réunion. Selon le chef de la diplomatie nigérienne, son pays qui subit « les impacts collaté raux des crises libyenne et malienne » s’est très tôt investi dans la recherche des voies et moyens de sécurisation de ses frontières extracommunautaires à travers un partenariat qui garantisse les droits humains et la libre circulation des person nes. « La situation en Libye, tant au plan politique que sécuritaire, reste marquée par des tensions plutôt inquiétantes, nous devons y réfléchir de façon à contribuer à générer une dynamique nouvelle », a-t-il suggéré. Pour Bazoum Mohamed, l’adhésion du Niger à la stratégie intégrée des Nations unies pour le Sahel et son entrée au Conseil de paix et de sécurité de l’Union afri caine constituent une autre illustration de l’engagement des plus hautes autorités du Niger à servir la cause de la paix partout où cela s’avère nécessaire. 33

« Le processus de Nouakchott est en effet un processus d’évaluation, nos réunions sont donc des occasions pour mesurer avec précision l’état de la sécurité dans no tre espace. Les choses évoluent à cet égard incontestablement dans le bon sens, au Mali notamment où le processus de cantonnement des groupes armés sera bientôt amorcé », s’est réjoui le chef de la diplomatie nigérienne. Le président de la Commission de la CEDEAO, Kadré Désiré Ouedraogo, a, pour sa part, fait cas de la stratégie de lutte contre le terrorisme élaborée par son institu tion qui vise à renforcer les capacités opérationnelles des états membres pour une réponse effective au terrorisme. Selon lui, cette stratégie repose sur trois piliers principaux, à savoir la prévention, la répression et la reconstruction. « Il ne fait aucun doute que les stratégies initiées par diverses organisations, si cel les-ci sont bien coordonnées, devraient contribuer, de manière significative, au dé veloppement socio-économique et à la stabilité dans la région du Sahel, conformé ment aux principes de démocratie, de bonne gouvernance et de l’état de droit, de manière à prévenir la survenance des nouvelles crises dans le futur », estime Kadré Désiré Ouedraogo. Le même optimisme est partagé par la Communauté des Etats sahélo-sahéliens (Cen-Sad) représentée par son secrétaire général par intérim, Ibrahim Sani Abani, qui a estimé que « la volonté politique forte existe ». « Il reste à donner un contenu opérationnel et donc à créer les synergies nécessai res, en ayant à l’esprit notamment le rapport du secrétaire général des Nations unies en date du 1er août 2013 sur le causes des conflits et la promotion d’une paix et d’un développement durable en Afrique », a-t-il soutenu. « Nous devons éviter la dispersion des efforts en faisant fonctionner, tant au ni veau des Etats que des organisations internationales, la règle de la complémentari té », a conseillé M. Abani, ajoutant que « la Cen-Sad reste ouverte à tous les parte nariats pourvu qu’ils concourent à la restauration et la culture de la paix singulière ment dans l’espace sahélo-saharien, cet espace qui aujourd’hui focalise toutes les attentions ». Source: http://maliactu.net/ 34

West Africa: Terror and Other Challenges in the Sahel - Don't Ignore the Local

17 FEBRUARY 2014 ANALYSIS "T HE CHALLENGES FACED IN THE S AHEL DO NOT RESPECT BORDERS AND , THEREFORE , NEITHER CAN THE SOLUTIONS ," UN S ECRETARY G ENERAL B AN K I MOON HAS CORRECTLY OBSERVED . N ARCOTICS AND WEAPONS SEEP ACROSS S AHELIAN BORDERS EFFORTLESSLY , AS DO SOME OF THE BALEFUL CONSEQUENCES , ESPECIALLY POPULATION DISPLACEMENT , HUMANITARIAN CRISES AND ENVIRONMENTAL STRESS . Mr. Ban visited the Sahel region in late 2013 along with World Bank President Jim Yong. While his observation might be true in the case ofterrorism, trafficking and armed conflicts leading to the spillover of refugees in neighboring countries, the structural fragilities of the governments of this region do in fact respect borders. Before becoming debilitating regional threats to the stability of the Sahel, issues of terrorism and armed conflicts started as poorly managed domestic challenges. While keeping this in mind, the quest for sustainable results in the Sahel may imply revisiting the roots of its seemingly unsolvable crises. Fragile democracies, low and precarious standards of living, a harsh climate jeopar dizing livelihoods, weak and corrupt governments, artificial and porous borders, security threats in the forms of human trafficking, drugs and arms smuggling and radical religious factions are some of the most prominent difficulties encountered in this region of approximately 150 million inhabitants. Located between the Sahara desert to the north and the Sudanese Savanna to the south and extending from the West African coast to the Horn of Africa, the strate gic and geopolitical importance of this region has become undeniable to Washing ton and its European partners. When the Community of Sahel-Saharan states (CEN-SAD) was established in 1998, its initial goal was the creation of an economic union based on an integra ted development plan among and between all member states. Seven years later, the United States launched theTrans-Sahara Counterterrorism Partnership (TSCTP) enhancing the capacities of the Sahel states to cooperate and combat terrorism. Exclusively focused on security, the TSCTP differs remarkably from the most re cent European Union Strategy for Security and Development in the Sahel (2011) and the United Nations Regional Integrated Strategy for the Sahel (2013). The latter have designed comprehensive "integrated" approaches tackling the de 35

velopment-humanitarian-security nexus specifically in Mauritania, Mali, Burkina Faso, Niger, Nigeria and Chad. Unfortunately, as sophisticated as these strategies might be, the people of the Sahel have had very little input or influence in their de velopment. Worth noting is the strategies' quasi-exclusive focus on external threats, potentially undermining key internal dynamics and overlooking country particularities, which must in fact determine successful implementation of any comprehensive strategy. The March 2012 military coup that toppled the democratically elected President of Mali, Amadou Toumani Touré, was a direct consequence of the fall of Libyan dicta tor Muammar Gaddafi a few months earlier. The ensuing loss of two thirds of Mali's northern territory to Al-Qaeda linked Isla mists and separatist rebels triggered a multidimensional French-led military inter vention which soon enabled the transitional government of Bamako to regain two out of three lost territories. The intervention has yet to bring home the last rebel stronghold of the northern region of Kidal. A categorical refusal to cooperate, long-time grievances and a lack of recognition of the central government on the part of rebel groups testify to the intricacy of endemic, country-specific problems. The structural complexities of Mali, a vast, landlocked country hosting a multitude of ethnic groups, certainly contributed to this great divide between its northern population and its central government. Whether Boko Haram, the infamous Nigeria-based terrorist group, is affiliated to jihadist groups outside of Nigeria has long been disputed. The Sunni militant group has caused thousands of deaths in one of the most populated countries of the Sa hel and the U.S. State Department has recently labeled it a terrorist organization. The group has often asserted that it is in the midst of a "war against the govern ment of Nigeria," the world's eighth largest oil exporter. The Nigerian government's inability to distribute wealth and services in its northeast region is, in reality, one of the main drivers of insecurity. The problems facing the Sahel are enormous and complex. They will only be resol ved, if at all, by sustained, indigenously-tailored efforts over time. The large size of most Sahel countries, as well as the multitude of ethnic and religious groups in the region, also calls for carefully implemented decentralization efforts providing grea ter autonomy to local governments. With a fast growing population, the Sahel promises to become ever more impor tant. As massive donor funding targets the region, donors risk promoting a mis conceived one-size-fits-all approach, overlooking country specificities and root cau ses. 36

If the crises that have more recently haunted the Sahel did anything, they laid bare the fragility of its states. Creating more responsive local governments within bigger states and generating greater democratic control will necessarily lead to more se cure borders, better local management, and eventually, greater socio-economic development.

Source: Allafrica.com

37

Burkina Faso BURKINA FASO’S ‘WEST AFRICAN SPRING’ – ANALYSIS

FEBRUARY 27, 2014 Sustained anti-government rallies inThailand,Ukraine, andVenezuela have captured the attention of millions. But large pro-democracy demonstrations in Burkina Faso last month largely escaped the Western media’s radar. Since January, tensions have flared between the West African country’s authorita rian government and the impoverished masses yearning for democratic reforms. Depending on how developments unfold, the protests in Burkina Faso could serve as a catalyst for further uprisings in the region. On January 18, over 10,000 Burkinabe citizens rallied in the nation’s capital, Ouaga dougou (WAH-gah-DOO-goo), and other cities to protest the concentration of poli tical power in one man — President Blaise Compaore, who has ruled Burkina Faso since 1987. While Compaore claims democratic legitimacy, the opposition demands his departure from power, maintaining that Compaore’s past electoral victories we re fraudulent and rigged. The demonstrators, led by opposition leader Zephirin Diabre, have taken to the streets to protest Compaore’s plans to revise Article 37 of the country’s constitu tion. This provision, incorporated in 2000, limits the president to two five-year terms. After winning presidential elections in 2005 and 2010, Compaore’s final term is set to end in 2015. Although Compaore has issued no official statement concerning his intention to seek another term, his critics contend that he is laying the groundwork for a constitutional amendment to extend his rule beyond 2015. 38

Calling January 18 a “historic day,” Diabredeclared that the thousands of protestors were “taking a stand in this free and republican protest to send Compaore into reti rement in 2015.” Compaore’s failure to improve living standards for average Burkinabes also factors into popular resentment of the government. Despite being rich with gold reserves, Burkina Faso remains one of the world’s poorest countries. Nearly half of the 18 million citizens who inhabit this landlocked nation live below the poverty line, and GDP per capita hovers around a paltry $1,400. Fewer than 30 percent of adults are literate and the nation’s infant mortality rates rank ninth globally. Recurring floods and droughts in recent years have exacerbated all of these dismal conditions. The perception that Compaore’s cronies in power have usurped the nation’s re source wealth at the public’s expense has further fueled the opposition’s determi nation to end his presidency.

Historical Tensions

Compaore’s reckoning reflects tensions that have accumulated gradually since the country’s independence. Burkina Faso’s Cold War experience was marked by violent instability. Following its independence from France in 1960, power changed hands frequently through a series of bloody coup d’états, including a Marxist-inspired revolution in 1983 that installed the Communist leader Thomas Sankara as president. Sometimes likened to “Africa’s Che Guevara,” Sankara implemented radical social reforms, ranging from efforts to abolish gender inequality to the collectivization of agricultural land. He even renamed the republic, replacing its previous name (Upper Volta) with its current name, Burkina Faso, or “Land of Upright Men.” Such reforms drew some support from the poorer sectors of society, but they also crea ted enemies among the economic elite. Under Sankara’s leadership, Burkina Faso faced numerous challenges on the inter national stage. Burkina Faso and Mali went to war during December 1985 in a conflict referred to as the “Christmas War.” The brief war resulted from a territorial dispute between the two countries over a 100-mile-long portion of desert, rich with minerals, referred to as the Agacher strip. Both militaries engaged in aerial bombings before a truce was reached. More generally, Sankara pitted Burkina Faso against the interests of Western su perpowers and their African allies. Sankara was anoutspoken opponent of South Africa’s apartheid system and military raids against the African National Congress (ANC) in Botswana, Zambia, and Zimbabwe. Additionally, the Burkinabe lea derexpressed solidarity with the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) and Nica ragua’s Sandinistas. Burkina Faso’s ties with Libya and Ghana prompted the United States and France to fear that the “Burkinabe model” would spread throughout Africa. From 1983 to 1990, Paris canceled foreign assistance to Ouagadougou. 39

On October 15, 1987, Sankara was killed in a coup that the United States, France, and Liberia are widely suspected of helping to orchestrate. Blaise Compaore, who served in the upper echelons of Sankara’s government and was a childhood friend of Sankara himsef, was one of the major leaders behind the coup. Compaore continues to deny that Sankara’s death was intentional. Compaore moved quickly to undo many of the social reforms of Sankara’s govern ment, working to build a neoliberal economy that was integrated into the global marketplace. Burkina Faso returned to its former colonial master France for inter national support as opposed to countries like Cuba or the Soviet Union. These re forms allowed the country to export its ample natural resources and created a sta ble political climate for investment. But they also allowed for the enrichment of a small elite, which stoked a growing resentment of the privileged governing class.

Burkina Faso and Washington

Western capitals have eyed the current protests warily, viewing Burkina Faso as a strategic ally in the post-9/11 era. Certainly, the country’s stability contrasts marke dly with the ethnic conflicts, insurgencies, and civil wars that have destabilized the Central African Republic, Liberia, Libya, Mali, Nigeria, and Sierra Leone, among other countries. The government has managed to keep the region’s extremist jihadist forces at bay even as bloody insurgencies are waged in neighboring countries. Burkina Faso has remained a steadfast U.S. ally in the “war on terrorism” and is lauded by the State Department as a cooperative partner in the Trans-Sahara Counterterrorism Part nership (TSCTP), a U.S.-led initiative in North and West Africa designed to confront al-Qaeda. The State Department has not made any major pronouncements about the recent rallies or the possibility of Compaore’s re-election. On the contrary, the United States has remained more concerned with continuing military co-operation through the TSCTP than bringing up the issue of political unrest. Given the potential for Islamist extremists — such as al-Qaeda in the Islamic Mag hreb (AQIM), Boko Haram, and the Movement for Oneness and Jihad in West Africa (MUJAO) — to exploit any power vacuum that could emerge in a post-Compaore era, it is doubtful that the United States or France will side with the Burkinabe pro testors demanding that Compaore relinquish power. Compaore has also taken credit for mediating conflict resolutions in war-torn neighboring countries. In June 2013, Compaore’s government hosted talks bet ween the Malian government and two Tuareg rebels groups — the Movement for the National Liberation of Azawad (MNLA) and the High Council for the Unity of Azawad (HCUA) — in Ouagadougou. The Ouagadougou Accords that resulted were a preliminary agreement aimed at resolving the lingering tensions between the Ma lian government and Tuareg rebels following last year’s French-led military opera tion (Operation Serval) that dispersed AQIM and MUJAO from northern Mali. In 2011, Compaore hosted AU-sponsored talks in Burkina Faso to help mediate the 40

Cote D’Ivoire crisis. Two years earlier, the Burkinabe president secured the relea se of two Canadian envoys for the United Nations whom AQIM had kidnapped in Niger for 130 days. During the 2008 coup in Guinea, Compaore helped mediate the aftermath. And in 2006, Compaore played a role in brokering negotiations that ended a crisis in neighboring Togo. Compaore’s opponents, however, are unimpressed. They contend that the presi dent’s efforts to mediate regional conflicts and focus on international terrorism are guided by an interest in deflecting criticism over corruption and cronyism wi thin his own government.

Numbered Days?

Burkina Faso’s relationship with Western superpowers cannot easily sustain Com paore’s presidency into its 27 th year. Even if Compaore maintains his hold on po wer this year, he will face new pressures that were not in play earlier in his rule, such as an energized and better connected opposition. At the beginning of the year, 75 politicians from Compaore’s Democracy and Pro gress Party published a letter that announced their resignation, citing that demo cracy had “disappeared” from the ruling party. The president’s former allies for med a new party, the Movement of People for Progress, which claims to repre sent the will of the demonstrators who took to the streets and used non-violent measures to demand an end to Compaore’s presidency. Burkina Faso’s future is naturally uncertain, and the regional climate will bring unique challenges to a post-Compaore political order. However, this new party’s formation and the demonstrators’ peaceful tactics justify cautious optimism about what may yet become a “West African Spring.” Source: http://www.eurasiareview.com/ 41

CAR

Pourquoi la France doit être soutenue en Centrafrique

27.02.2014 à 13h09 L'union nationale autour des missions militaires engagées sur des théâtres exté rieurs est une spécificité française. Le Parlement n'a pas failli à la tradition en ap prouvant massivement, le 25 février, la prolongation indéfinie de l'opération « San garis » en Centrafrique. L'Assemblée nationale a donné son feu vert au maintien des forces françaises par 428 voix contre 14 et 21 abstentions, suivie par le Sénat, qui s'est prononcé dans le même sens par 328 voix pour, 3 contre et 15 absten tions. C'est un vote remarquable, lorsque l'on sait l'état des divisions politiques enFrance et la frilosité de nos partenaires européens. Il est également remarquable eu égard au peu d'enthousiasme de l'opinion publique française : selon un sondage IFOP, le soutien à l'opération « Sangaris » est passé de 51 % début décembre, au moment où la mission a été lancée, à 42 % ces derniers jours. Comme l'opposition, les Français sont conscients des dangers d'enlisement dans un pays africain où la violence intercommunautaire opposant musulmans et chrétiens est explosive. Ils s'inquiètent aussi du coût financier de cette intervention, actuelle ment entièrement à la charge de Paris, alors que les troupes françaises sont déjà engagées dans un autre conflit africain, au Mali. Sans se priver de critiquer la gestion présidentielle de cette affaire, les parlementai res ont choisi la responsabilité ; il faut saluer leur sagesse. Le soutien du Parlement est important au moment où le président François Hollande se rend au Nigeria, pour discuter, notamment, de sécurité régionale. Le problème de la solitude de la France en Centrafrique reste néanmoins entier. Une opération présentée par François Hollande comme mier ministre, Jean-Marc Ayrault, peutprendre de cinq à neuf mois.

« rapide » « des difficultés considérables »

, lorsque les pre miers soldats sont partis, le 5 décembre, avec un mandat de l'ONU, s'est transfor mée en une mission de plus en plus complexe. Celle-ci présente, de l'aveu du pre . Les effectifs de la force Sangaris, portés à 2 000 soldats, auxquels s'ajoutent 6 000 hommes des forces africaines de la Misca, sont insuffisants. Les pays européens ont promis de 500 à 1 000 hommes, qui tardent à arriver. A l'ONU, Ban Ki-moon s'active pour monter une opération de maintien de la paix, mais ce processus Il y a pourtant urgence. Les forces françaises et africaines ont évité l'embrasement général en Centrafrique, mais elles n'ont pu empêcher le nettoyage ethnique. Ban gui s'est vidée de ses musulmans, et le Haut-Commissariat aux réfugiés a tiré le si gnal d'alarme sur la situation désespérée de 15 000 musulmans encerclés dans l'ouest du pays. Croire, comme semblent le faire plusieurs pays européens, que la Centrafrique se 42

limite à une crise locale dans le pré carré de la France est une profonde erreur. Cet te république est entourée de pays instables, situés sur un arc de tensions qui va du Nigeria à la Somalie. En laissant la France seule, la communauté internationale, et l'Europe en particulier, encourage le risque d'une déstabilisation régionale ac crue, avec, pour conséquences, l'immigration illégale et le terrorisme. Source: LE MONDE 43

The Muslims of the Central African Republic Face a Deadly Purge

This fragile African nation is witnessing unprecedented sectarian strife. Here's why. Feb. 20, 20141 Eric Feferberg / AFP/ Getty Images Chadian civilians in the PK12 district of Bangui climb on a military truck to go back to Chad on Jan. 15, 2014. The anti-balaka have outgrown their name. These militias in the Central African Re public, once united under a moniker meaning “anti-machete” in the local Sango language, are exacting their own vicious revenge upon the mainly Muslim rebels who overthrew the government last March and waged months of terror against the Christian population. They are now accused of atrocities far worse than what first prompted them to take up arms. An Amnesty International report on Feb. 12 said attacks on Muslims in January by anti-balaka militias, made up of Christians and animists, had amounted to “ethnic cleansing.” Fatou Bensouda, chief prosecutor at the International Criminal Court at The Hague, has already opened a preliminary investigation into crimes against hu manity, saying some “victims appeared to have been deliberately targeted on reli gious grounds.” A top U.N. official issued similar warnings during a recent visit to the ravaged capital, Bangui, telling reporters: “There is an ethnic-religious cleansing taking place. It must be stopped.” 44

The campaign of looting and murder in recent weeks has led to an alarming demo graphic crisis in the Central African Republic. About 1 million of its 4.6 million peo ple have been displaced and at least 2,000 have been killed. Muslims account for 15 percent of the population, or about 690,000 people; Médecins Sans Fron tières said in a conference call with reporters on Feb. 18 that at least 80,000 had already left. Entire neighborhoods in Bangui and towns in the northwest have emptied as a mass exodus pours into neighboring countries Cameroon and Chad. Aid groups fear the fleeing of Muslim traders and cattle herders, who are crucial to the country’s food production and distribution, may spark a famine. The scene today vastly differs from last year. “If you drove across the country in November, you would have been impressed by the power of the Séléka,” says Joanne Mariner, a senior crisis adviser with Amnesty in Bangui, referring to the im pact of the rebels’ offensive that began in late 2012. “Now if you drive across the country, you find anti-balaka everywhere. They are the people who are in control of the roads and the majority of the towns.” William Lacy Swing, director-general of the International Organization for Migration and a young U.S. envoy to Bangui in the mid-1970s, was “shocked” by the scenes there during a trip in early February. “The Central African Republic that I knew at the time, this element now of inter-religious conflict was absent,” he told TIME, “and now it is at the heart of some of the problems.” How political payback turned into a sectarian purge isn’t entirely understood. Ex perts gesture to spillover from conflicts throughout the region as well as the legacy of decades of poor governance in the former French colony. But the country has no such precedent of religious strife. Louisa Lombard, a post doctoral fellow and Central Africa expert at the University of California-Berkeley, said a main cause was the systemic marginalization of Muslims that ramped up af ter former President François Bozizé won power in 2003. Muslims, many of whom live in the isolated and underdeveloped northeast, were largely neglected and treated like “foreigners.” This dispossession eventually led to Séléka’s formation. The rebels, supported by Chadian and Sudanese fighters, overran the state’s decayed army in late 2012 and quickly gained control of much of the country. Bozizé appointed a prime minister from the opposition and signed several peace dealswith Séléka in Libreville, Gabon, the following January. But when he failed to honor the agreements, Séléka toppled his government and installed Michel Djotodia as the country’s first Muslim presi dent. The rebels favored Muslim civilians and bands of fighters terrorized Christian com munities; mistrust grew as Muslims were viewed as complicit in Séléka’s rampages. Djotodia dissolved Séléka in September but the rebels continued their attacks, 45

prompting the formation of the anti-balaka squads and an uptick in tit-for-tat vio lence. In early December, two days of carnage left hundreds dead. Amadou Sy, a senior fellow at the Brookings Institution’s Africa Growth Initiative, said the immediate arrival of French and African Union peacekeepers was a turn ing point. Anti-balaka saw the wind changing and went underground. By early January, with Séléka in retreat and Djotodia forced out by regional powers, anti balaka had reemerged with uncontrollable fury. After weeks of killing, Lombard said, “whatever social fabric that was once there has been torn to shreds.” The turnaround led interim President Catherine Samba-Panza to declare war on anti-balaka and France to commit more troops. Even after the security situation is resolved, easing the humanitarian crisis and maintaining global attention on this ignored nation will be difficult. As thousands more Muslims look to flee their own country, it may already be too late. The Muslims of the Central African Republic Face a Deadly Purge Source: http://world.time.com/ 46

Egypt

Terrorists Target Egypt's Red Sea Tourism -- And It's Working

February 18 2014

A bus targeted by a suicide bomber burns in Taba, Egypt, Feb. 16, 2014. Reuters CAIRO, Egypt -- When a yellow tourist bus full of South Korean pilgrims traveling from St. Catherine’s Monastery to Israel exploded on Sunday in Taba, near the Is raeli border, at least four people were killed and 17 wounded. Beyond that personal tragedy, the terrorist attack could be the death knell of Red Sea tourism in Egypt’s Sinai peninsula. According to Egyptian interior ministry spokesman Hani Abdel-Latif, a suicide bomber pushed himself inside the bus and detonated the explosives. It was the first time that jihadists’ attacks have targeted Sinai tourists, but the tourism industry was already reeling due to previous attacks on military and security targets. “Striking tourists is a big jump,” said David Barnett, research associate at the Foun dation for Defense of Democracies. Ansar Beit Al Maqdis, a Sinai-based group that has claimed responsibility for most of the recent attacks, also claimed responsibility for the Taba explosion. "We will target [the Egyptian regime's] economic interests everywhere to paralyze its hands from what they do to the Muslims,” the group said in a statement on Monday. The Muslim Brotherhood condemned the Taba attack, according to 47

a statement posted on its website on Monday. While the latest attack represents a significant departure and a potential radicaliza tion of the group’s strategy, the troubles for Egypt’s tourism industry began long before the Taba explosion. Since the ouster of former Muslim Brotherhood President Mohamed Morsi and the military’s crackdown on Islamists in July, Egyptian businesses have been struggling in general, and since the January 2011 uprising the inflow of tourists has declined to a record low.

Suspended Flights

Mick Hargreaves and his wife, Jill, told International Business Times that, driven by declining tourism and dwindling business, they moved their Puddleduck restaurant from Luxor, an ancient city in Upper Egypt, to El Gouna, an upscale Red Sea coastal town, at the end of 2013. “At the end of July, problems in Cairo completely killed us [in Luxor],” Mick Har greaves said. Direct flights from the U.K. to Luxor were suspended in July. But Luxor is about 450 miles from Cairo. “People tend to associate, and they don’t realize how far Cairo is from Hurghada and Sharm El Sheikh,” he said. Now, the troubles have followed the Puddleduck to the Red Sea coast. By the end of 2013, the number of tourists still coming to Egypt declined by 31 per cent to 678,000, compared with December 2012, according to the state statistical agency CAPMAS. The turmoil and ongoing instability have resulted in sluggish economic growth, in creasing unemployment and poverty, and a sharp depreciation of the Egyptian pound by 19 percent in December 2013, compared with December 2010 -- before the January uprising that toppled Hosni Mubarak. The resulting rocky transition and political instability, with two former leaders jailed within a period of two years, have hit foreign direct investment and led to massive capital flight during the past three years. Egypt’s foreign reserves fell from $35 billion in 2010 to less than $15 billion in 2012. “The tourism sector remains the most affected by the political scene in Egypt,” said Omneia Helmy, director of research at Egyptian Center of Economic Studies. “Security concerns are considered a main business constraint.” At the end of last year, Egypt’s tourism revenue declined to $6 billion for the year, compared to $10 billion the previous year. The tourism sector, long an Egyptian mainstay, is among the hardest hit, and 70 percent of the industry focused on South Sinai and the Red Sea, according to Egypt’s tourism data. After investors began pulling out, construction was halted on massive tourist resorts, leaving unfinished hotels and resort towns all along the Red Sea coast. 48

Business in Egypt’s main tourist hubs along the Red Sea coast, which range from budget diving centers to upscale golf resorts, were biding their time, hoping for a turnaround. Sunday’s bus attack will inevitably worsen the prospects for those businesses. “In Gouna it’s a quiet winter period, but there are more locals here, there are Euro peans who live here,” Hargreaves said, noting the recent increase in attacks and violence that already had a negative impact on tourism. “There is a faithful customer base, but new customers and the all-inclusive clients are not coming back,” said Aron Daniel Arngrimsson, co-owner of Dahab Divers Technical. Across Egypt, the number of hotel bookings declined by 63.1 percent, with 5.1 mil lion bookings at the end of 2013 compared to 13.9 million bookings in December 2012, according to CAPMAS data. In an interview with local Al Hayat newspaper

,

Egypt’s Tourism Minister Hisham Zazou called 2013 the “worst year on record” for the tourism industry.

Well-Funded Jihadists

The latest wave of bombings and attacks by Sinai-based jihadist groups on military targets in Cairo increased the potential threat of a wider jihadist movement, fur ther encouraging tourists to stay away from Egypt. Even before the bus attack, Sinai-based jihadist groups had in recent weeks demon strated an increasing ability to stage and coordinate attacks on military and security targets beyond the peninsula. According to Stratfor analysts, the Sinai-based jihadists appear to be better funded and have secured outside international support since the ouster of the Muslim Brotherhood’s Mohamed Morsi in July 2013. “Based on recent operations, especially the progression of attacks that began in mid-2013 and accelerated over the past quarter of the year, Ansar Beit al-Maqdis now appears to be sufficiently armed,” wrote Scott Stewart in a research note on Jan. 30. “This may indicate that the group has found a new source of revenue ei ther from foreign donors or from willing or extorted local sources.” In response to declining tourism revenues, the Egyptian government has stepped up its efforts to bring tourists back to Egypt. “Tourism is of course related to safety and security,” says Rasha Azaizi, press ad viser to the minister of tourism, adding that the government has “a strategic plan to recover this, to attract 12 million tourists in 2014.” The Egyptian government planned to step up advertising and PR campaigns outside Egypt to bring tourists back, including what it calls the “Egypt Now” project, which will distribute 25 cameras in resort locations to show tourists sunbathing, diving 49

and otherwise enjoying themselves in real time. The government plans to double the number of cameras in 2014 and invite international celebrities to demonstrate Egypt is safe and open for business. “The Egyptians are determined to counter terrorism,” Azaizi said. “We are at war against black terror.” The government sees the Sinai-based jihadists and its own anti-terror efforts as a part of a broader crackdown on Islamist extremists and supporters of the Muslim Brotherhood, outlawed in 2013. “There are elements in the Muslim Brotherhood that don’t support violence, but the Muslim Brotherhood has not cut the umbilical cord with the jihadist groups,” argued Mohamed Gomaa, an analyst with the regional studies unit at Al Ahram Institute in Cairo. Increasingly, both Egyptian and U.S. officials have sought to link Sinai-based ji hadist groups with al-Qaida’s growing regional presence. Though al-Qaida’s emir, Ayman Zawahiri, praised Sinai jihadists’ attacks in late January, there is currently no evidence of cooperation between al-Qaida and any of the Sinai groups beyond ideological affiliation. “The car bombings have features of al-Qaida -- it indicates they have experience,” Gomaa said. In addition, he pointed to al-Qaida’s latest strategy and increased presence in the Middle East and North Africa. “The purpose now is to fight close enemies, not the far ones,” he said. “We see more activity of al-Qaida now in Libya, Yemen, Lebanon, Egypt.” Top U.S. intelligence officials echoed this assessment of al-Qaida as a franchise and its shifting regional focus at Senate Armed Services Committee on Tuesday. The “core al-Qaida -- the central leadership -- picks and chooses who is among the wannabes or are actually knighted, if you will, so designated as an al-Qaida organi zation,” said Director of U.S. National Intelligence James Clapper. Given the groups’ fluid organization and sources of financing, analysts say the rate of attacks against strategic targets, including tourists, is likely to continue. "While the Taba attack is an extremely worrying development that will likely re sult in a harsh response from Egypt’s rulers, it is too early to deem this a game change," said Barnett. "Targeting tourists on a regular basis will over the long run likely do more harm to the group and its attempts to garner greater support." However, he noted "further attacks against tourists cannot be ruled out now that that line has been crossed." Source: http://www.ibtimes.com/ 50

Taba terror attack sends dual murderous message

The Islamists’ blast reverberated across the border — a fatal strike on Egyptian tourism, and a symbolic message to Israel

February 17, 2014 Foreigners wait to cross to Egypt at the Israeli side of the Taba crossing near the Red Sea resort of Eilat, Sunday, Feb 16, 2014. An explosion ripped through a tour ist bus Sunday near the border crossing between Egypt and Israel, killing at least three South Koreans and an Egyptian driver in an attack that stoked fears Sinai militants have resumed a bloody campaign against tourists. The targeting of for eign tourists was the first in the area in nearly a decade. (photo credit: AP Photo/ Tsafrir Abayov) There were, it would seem, two goals to Sunday’s terror attack in Taba, one sym bolic, one concrete. The attack, which killed three South Korean tourists and an Egyptian bus driver, was carried out, apparently with a remote-control explosive device, only 100 yards from the border with Israel. The blast, as intended, reverberated across the territorial divide. It was a symbolic reminder to Israelis that the global jihad, once relegated to far flung corners of Somalia, Yemen, and Afghanistan, has taken root in the heart of the Levant, half a day’s drive from the Al-Aqsa Mosque. “It is very hard for them to penetrate into Israel,” said Maj. (res.) Aviv Oreg, for merly the head of Al Qaeda and Global Jihad desk at the IDF’s military intelligence directorate. But for jihadist organizations in the Sinai Peninsula, this sort of attack is ”very sufficient in order to pinpoint that Israel is their target in their aspira tions.” More concretely, it targeted tourists on Egyptian soil. Last year, in the wake of 51

president Mohammed Morsi’s ouster and the ongoing attacks in Sinai and the Egyptian mainland, tourist revenue in Egypt dropped by 41 percent. The $10 billion earned in 2012 dwindled to $5.9 billion in 2013, Reuters reported in January. This, the first attack against tourists since Morsi was pried from power, will further cut into the foreign cash flow. It will also push Egypt, and certainly the Sinai Peninsula, one more step in the direction of anarchy, the ecosystem in which terror thrives.

The wreckage of the bus blown up near the Taba crossing on the Egypt-Israel border, February 16, 2014 (photo credit: AFP) Oreg, who today heads Ceifit, a company that analyzes global jihad threats, sug gested two possible perpetrators – the al-Qaeda-linked Ansar Bayt al-Maqdis or Majlis Shura al-Mujahedin Fi Aknaf Bayt al-Maqdis, a group that was once based in Gaza, he said, but which was forced to operate in Sinai and to target Israel from there “because it is not convenient for Hamas.” The group more likely responsible, Ansar Bayt al-Maqdis, the most dominant ji hadist group in the Sinai, “is very close to al-Qaeda,” Oreg said in a conference call with journalists Sunday evening. So much so that al-Qaeda head Ayman al-Zawahiri has been heard, “in his own voice,” claiming Ansar Beit al-Maqdis attacks. Although Oreg said that not a great deal is known about the terror organization’s “layout and infrastructure,” it is clear that it possesses a vast array of weapons. “They have everything,” he said, including thousands of mines that can be made into IEDs and advanced missiles that came from Libya after the fall of Muammar Ghaddafi. In late January, the group downed an Egyptian military helicopter, killing all five soldiers onboard. “Name whatever weapons you need, and you can find it in the Sinai Peninsula,” he said. In recent months, ever since Morsi’s ouster, cooperation between Israeli and Egyp 52

tian authorities “has been largely enhanced,” Oreg said, moving from the tactical and operational level to the intelligence realm. The Shin Bet, too, has been forced, over the course of the past two years, to realign itself in order to address the growing threats from the Sinai. But, as Oreg noted, there is no foolproof defense and this attack, which may have been largely aimed against General Abdel Fattah el-Sissi and his supporters, will also deter some of the 1.8 million Christians who visit Israel annually, many of whom enter the country via the Sinai Peninsula. Source: http://www.timesofisrael.com/ 53

Tourism targeted

Security experts say the Taba blast marks a dangerous escalation in terrorist tac tics.

Ahmed Morsy

reports Three Korean innocent visitors were killed along with their Egyptian bus driver on their way back from St Catherine Monastery. Ansar Beit Al-Maqdis claimed responsibility for the deadly explosion near the Egyptian border crossing with Israel in Taba. South Korean sightseers said that they would brave the journey to the Sinai Peninsula proving that terrorist tactics do not cow tourists Sunday’s bomb on a bus carrying 33 tourists in Taba which killed three South Ko reans and their Egyptian bus driver and left 16 injured is the first major terrorist attack targeting tourists in Egypt in eight years. The Sinai-based militant group Ansar Beit Al-Maqdis, which has claimed responsi bility for a host of recent attacks targeting security forces, masterminded the blast. The bomber used an explosive belt weighing 5-10kg in the attack, according to security sources. Since the ouster of Islamist president Mohamed Morsi, terrorist attacks targeting police stations, military checkpoints and other government facilities have left doz ens of security forces dead. The majority of attacks have taken place in the Sinai, a leading tourist destination. In response the army launched an anti-terrorism operation in the peninsula. Dozens of militants have been killed, hundreds ar rested, and smuggling tunnels linking Gaza to Sinai have been closed. Injured bus passengers are being treated in hospitals in Taba, Nuweiba and Sharm Al-Sheikh. Security officials say the bus arrived at the Taba crossing from St Catherine’s in 54

central Sinai where the tourists had been visiting the monastery. Minster of Health Maha Rabat, accompanied by Minister of Tourism Hisham Zaa zou, visited the injured in the Sharm El-Sheikh International Hospital. The ministers also met with the deputy Korean ambassador and Khaled Fouda, the Governor of South Sinai. “The targeting of a tourist bus in Taba is a qualitative change in terrorist tactics,” says security expert Tharwat Okasha. Many experts see the attack as a harbinger of a new wave of violence. “Terrorist groups will now target any object in their attempts to undermine the Egyptian state,” says Major General Fouad Allam, a former deputy head of state security. “They now have the tourism industry in their sights.” These are opportunistic attacks, he added, and whenever an opportunity arises the terrorists will take it. Zaazou told state TV that the Taba explosion was a deliberate attempt to halt the slight recovery in tourist numbers visiting Egypt. In the wake of the attack a num ber of countries issued travel warnings for Sinai. Seoul issued a special travel alert “on the inland areas of the Sinai Peninsula and the coastal areas of the Gulf of Aqaba” and urged South Korean nationals “to pay special heed to their safety and head to a safer country as soon as possible”. Egypt’s tourism industry, which once employed four million, has been struggling to recover since the 2011 revolution. It deteriorated further following the political upheavals of summer 2013. “Tourism is a major source of income and therefore a target in the eyes of terror ists seeking to destroy the stability of the state,” says Major General Magdi Bas siouni. The last major terrorist attack in Egypt took place in April 2006 when three explo sions in Dahab left 23 and more than 80 wounded. Responsibility for the attack was claimed by the militant group Al-Tawhid Wal-Jihad. In 2005 the group detonated a bomb in Sharm El-Sheikh that killed 88 people and injured 150. In October 2004 three bombs went off in Taba leaving 34 dead and 171 injured. An attack in Luxor carried out by Al-Jamaa Al-Islamiya killed 60 tour ists in 1997. “It will not be the last terrorist attack,” warns Allam. “It will take longer to uproot terrorism than most people expect.” A number of commentators have drawn comparisons with the late 1980s and early 90s when Egypt was rocked by a spate of bomb attacks targeting tourist sites across the country. 55

“I’m confident that Egypt is going to eliminate terrorism. The national security ap paratus and other security agencies did so before, in the 1990s, and will do so again,” says Allam. Sunday’s blast was condemned at home and abroad. Prime Minister Hazem Al Beblawi conveyed his condolences to the families of the victims on Monday. Egypt’s Grand Mufti Shawki Allam described the incident as “evil” while the United Nations, the Arab League and the United States unequivocally condemned the bombing. Source: http://weekly.ahram.org.eg/ 56

Égypte : quatre morts dans un attentat visant un bus de touristes sud coréens

16/02/2014 L'autobus transportant les touristes sud-coréens près de la station balnéaire de Taba. © AFP Une bombe visant un autobus de pèlerins chrétiens sud-coréens a fait quatre morts dimanche dans le Sinaï, dans le premier attentat contre des étrangers en Egypte depuis que l'armée a destitué le président islamiste Mohamed Morsi.

Mis à jour à 17h50.

Trois Sud-Coréens ainsi que le chauffeur égyptien ont été tués dans cette attaque menée au poste-frontière de Taba, une station balnéaire sur la frontière avec Israël, qui a également fait 14 blessés, selon le gouverneur du Sinaï du Sud Khaled Fouda. L'autocar transportait 31 membres d'une église chrétienne de la province méridio nale de Jincheon en Corée du Sud ainsi que leur guide, a précisé Séoul. L'attaque n'a pas été revendiquée dans l'immédiat. Les attentats sont devenus fréquents en Egypte depuis que l'armée a destitué et arrêté M. Morsi le 3 juillet, mais ils ne visaient jusqu'à présent que les forces de l'ordre. La plupart ont été revendiqués par Ansar Beit al-Maqdess, un groupe jihadiste basé dans le Sinaï, disant s'inspirer d'Al-Qaïda et assurant agir en représailles à la répres sion sanglante menée par le nouveau pouvoir dirigé de facto par l'armée contre les partisans de M. Morsi. 57

La bombe a explosé à l'avant du bus alors que le chauffeur attendait au passage frontalier de Taba, a annoncé le ministère de l'Intérieur, sans préciser si les touris tes arrivaient ou repartaient d'Egypte. Le haut de l'autocar jaune a été littéralement dévasté par la déflagration et l'incen die qui a suivi. Le porte-parole du ministère de la Santé, Ahmed Kamel, a précisé à l'AFP qu'il était impossible de reconnaître les corps.

Fuite des touristes

L'attaque de dimanche risque de pousser un peu plus l'économie de l'Egypte vers le gouffre, le pays des pyramides et des célèbres spots de plongée de la Mer Rouge étant déserté par les touristes depuis la révolte populaire de 2011 qui a chassé le président Hosni Moubarak du pouvoir. Aucun attentat n'avait plus visé des étrangers en Egypte depuis février 2009, quand une Française avait été tuée par l'explosion d'une grenade en bordure du souk de Khan el-Khalili, au coeur du Caire historique. Il s'agissait alors de la première atta que terroriste contre des Occidentaux en Egypte depuis 2006. Entre 2004 et 2006, nombre d'Egyptiens et de touristes étrangers avaient péri dans des attentats dans les stations balnéaires du Sinaï. Et en 1997, un commando d'insurgés islamistes avaient mitraillé des touristes sur le site des célèbres temples de l'Egypte antique à Louxor, dans le sud, tuant 58 étran gers, des Suisses pour la majorité. La sécurité s'est considérablement dégradée en Egypte depuis que le général Abdel Fattah al-Sissi, chef de la toute-puissante armée, a destitué le premier président démocratiquement élu du pays. Depuis plus de sept mois, le pouvoir dirigé de facto par le nouvel homme fort de l'Egypte réprime dans un bain de sang toute manifes tation des partisans de M. Morsi.

Ansar Beït al-Maqdess

Plus de 1.400 personnes, des manifestants islamistes pour la plupart, ont ainsi été tuées par la police ou l'armée, selon Amnesty international, dont la moitié au cours de la seule journée du 14 août au Caire. Depuis le 3 juillet également, les attentats et attaques visant la police et l'armée se sont multipliés dans tout le pays, mais surtout au Caire. La plupart ont été revendi qués par Ansar Beït al-Maqdess, mais le gouvernement accuse les Frères musul mans, la confrérie de M. Morsi, de les avoir commandités ou organisés. Plusieurs milliers de membres de cette organisation désormais déclarée "terroriste" ont été arrêtés, dont la quasi-totalité de leurs dirigeants. Ils encourent, à l'instar de M. Morsi en personne, la peine de mort dans divers procès, dénoncés comme "politiques" par les accusés mais aussi par des organisations internationa les de défense des droits de l'Homme. 58

M. Morsi est d'ailleurs apparu dimanche à l'ouverture du troisième procès --pour "espionnage"-- sur les quatre qui lui sont intentés. A la barre, il a dénoncé une "farce" de la part du régime issu selon lui d'un "coup d'Etat militaire". Promu récemment maréchal, Abdel Fattah al-Sissi ne cache plus ses intentions de se présenter à l'élection présidentielle prévue pour 2014, qu'il est assuré de rem porter compte tenu de sa popularité et de l'absence d'autres candidats pouvant sérieusement le défier. Source: Jeuneafrique.com 59

Libya Pas de lien entre la guerre en Libye et l'armement des terroristes au Mali (expert)

2014-02-28

Dakar, 28 fév (APS)

–

L'expert américain en diplomatie Nicholas Kralev réfute la thèse selon laquelle l'armement des grou pes terroristes au Mali serait liée à la guerre en Libye en 2011. "En 2011, il y a eu des frappes de l'OTAN (Organisation du traité de l'Atlantique nord), avec un objectif très précis. […] Je ne pense que l'instabilité en Libye ait quoi que ce soit à voir avec l'instabilité au Ma li. Et je ne vois pas comment on peut éta blir un lien entre les deux", a fait valoir M. Kralev, ancien journaliste au Financial Ti mes et au Washington Times. Il a rendu visite à l'APS vendredi, à l'occasion d'un déplacement qu'il effectue au Sénégal. "Les frappes aériennes de l'OTAN étaient limitées. […] Je ne pense pas que ces frap pes aient quelque chose à voir avec la rébellion" au Mali, a-t-il soutenu. "Je viens de Washington, mais cela ne m'empêche pas d'être objectif autant que je pourrai, en vous disant que l'OTAN n'a armé personne", a-t-il encore dit, répondant à une question portant sur les liens présumés entre la guerre en Libye (2011-2012) et le l'armement des djihadistes au Nord du mali. Interrogé sur l'absence de Washington au plan militaire en Afrique de l'Ouest, Ni cholas Kralev a dit que "les Etats-Unis ne peuvent pas être partout". "Au Mali, la France joue un rôle depuis des années", a-t-il affirmé, laissant entendre que son pays n'a pas à entrer en concurrence avec la France, en matière d'interven tion militaire en Afrique de l'Ouest. M. Kralev, d'origine bulgare et diplômé de Harvard Kennedy School of Gouverne ment (Etats-Unis d’Amérique), signale par ailleurs que "le développement écono mique est un volet important de la politique américaine, durant les 10 dernières années". "Les Etats-Unis considèrent davantage l'aide étrangère comme un investissement qui doit aider les pays bénéficiaires à parfaire leur gouvernance et contribuer en fin de compte à leur stabilité", a-t-il expliqué, en évoquant l'approche américaine 60

consistant à financer le développement économique dans certains pays africains, pour les aider à se maintenir dans la stabilité. Mais, "en dernier ressort, a souligné M. Kralev, il revient aux gouvernements de ces pays d'utiliser ces ressources de façon sage, pour pouvoir donc garantir la sé curité et la stabilité, et apporter une meilleure qualité de vie aux citoyens." Source: http://www.aps.sn/ 61

The stillbirth of the new Libya

Britain’s

Guardian

newspaper has an excellent editorial on the unfolding crisis in Libya – or perhaps it would be more accurate to describe it as the unravelling of Libya as a state. You can read it here , but here’s one passage:

The hard truth is that power in Libya has been captured by armed militias, who con trol much of what goes on in each region. Some are tribal or local. Others are the armed wings of political parties which did not do well in elections but insist, at the point of a gun, in having their say in all decisions. They do not govern or administer in any full sense of the word. That is work for which they have neither the inclina tion nor the capacity, expecting the task of keeping the streetlights on and the wa ter running to be done by others, but reserving the right to intervene in an arbitrary or predatory way whenever they wish to do so.

A few days after the demise of the Gaddafi regime, in an article entitled “ Libya be tween tyranny and an uncertain future truly pluralistic society. ”, we expressed cautious optimism about the ability of Libyans to overcome the political and psychological challenges of a Rather optimistically, we argued that “Libyans are becoming normal”, and that in this normality

differences of opinion will be expressed and different social and political trends will emerge. People not used to arguing their case will turn to emotion and, regrettably, sometimes even to violence. Others will be frightened and upset by the very fact that an opinion different to theirs is being expressed and given airtime on television and radio and space in newspapers.

Back then, we said that Libyans will have to get used to the art of persuasion, and that they “will have to learn that theirs is not the only opinion worth listening to 62

and that nobody, whether Islamist or liberal, holds a monopoly over the truth”. This, we added, “will take time and in Libya, where there is a total absence of civil society institutions and no political sophistication, and where a primitive education system and the defunct Gaddafi regime discouraged people from using their critical faculties, it will not be easy”.

…militias now haunt all Libyans. A Frankenstein’s monster has been created and it may not be possible to bring it under control quickly enough before the country falls apart completely.

As it turned out, our cautious optimism was too optimistic. Virtually without ex ception, Libyans have failed to match even the lowest standard of civilized political interaction found among the most debased democratic pretenders in the Third World. To make matters worse, the various post-Gaddafi authorities, from the National Transitional Council to the present government of Prime Minister Ali Zidan, have adopted a uniquely idiotic security concept: building an army composed of a coali tion of “approved militias”. Those militias now haunt all Libyans. A Frankenstein’s monster has been created and it may not be possible to bring it under control quickly enough before the country falls apart completely. And now there’s an added problem. As the attracted other undesirables.

Guardian

editorial states, the failure of the various administrations that succeeded Gaddafi to bring about security and build a law-governed state – or any state – has left a vacuum which has allowed Islamist groups, notably Ansar al-Sharia, to establish themselves. That, in turn, has Ever since it became plainly clear that Libyans cannot get their house in order on their own, we have advocated international military intervention (see here , here and here ). For that to work, it would have to be massive and in clude ground forces – no half measures such as drones or aerial bombardment. Moreover, it would have to be undertaken by competent forces from countries not associated with the recent failed imperial adventure in Iraq. However, the US and NATO attention and surveillance we are getting instead is unlikely to solve the plague of militias and lawlessness. On the contrary, it can only add to the sewer in which the Islamists and their armed goons thrive. http://www.redressonline.com/ 63

Mali Les jihadistes toujours présents dans le nord du Mali

28/2/2014

Un représentant du HCUA avec le commandant de la Minusma, Jean Bosco Kazura, en juil let.Reuters/Joe Penney Dans

Appels sur l’actualité

, Moussa, un auditeur de Gao, revient sur la «

sécurité au Sahel

». Il a appris sur des radios libres que la plupart des jihadistes présents lors de l’occupation du nord du Mali sont à nouveau visibles ces derniers temps. Des roquettes ont encore été lancées la semaine dernière sur les villes de Gao et de Tombouctou.

Moussa : Compte tenu de la forte présence des forces internationales sur le terri toire malien, par quels moyens les jihadistes ont-ils réussi à retourner dans le nord du pays?

D’abord, il faut rappeler quelles sont les forces internationales actuellement pré sentes au Mali. Il y a laMinusma en brousse.

–

ou Mission multidimensionnelle intégrée des Nations unies pour la stabilisation au Mali – qui est une Opération de maintien de la paix qui compte moins de 6 000 hommes, soit la moitié des effectifs prévus, à savoir 11 000 soldats. Il reste aussi un peu plus de 1 000 militaires français. Cet ef fectif de 6 000 hommes peut paraître important. Néanmoins, il n'est pas suffisant pour couvrir tout le territoire malien. Ces contingents déployés dans le nord du pays permettent de patrouiller en ville à Tombouctou, Gao ou Kidal, et de sécuri ser les lieux stratégiques : check-points, aéroports, bâtiments administratifs. Mais c'est tout. Il n'y a pas de patrouilles à l'extérieur, très peu de mission « militaire » Autre problème, le matériel. La Minusma ne dispose pas de moyens techniques, 64

par exemple des hélicoptères, des systèmes d'écoute, en quantité suffisante pour être efficace. Enfin, la majorité de ses soldats africains, sauf les Tchadiens appelés en RCA et les Nigérians repartis chez eux se battre contre Boko Haram - ne sont pas formés pour les dures conditions du nord du Mali. Et le constat est le même pour l'armée malienne : une armée en plein reconstruction, qui dispose de moyens limités et dont les hommes ne sont pas aguerris dans ces zones arides…

Qu’en est -il des jihadistes ?

Au contraire, les jihadistes connaissent le nord du Mali. Les hommes d'AQMI sont dans la région depuis 2003-2004. Adaptés, habitués à vivre dans les massifs mon tagneux, comme la vallée d'Amettetaï qu'ils ont eux-mêmes aménagée, protégée. Les combattants touaregs d'AQMI et d'Ansar Dine, le mouvement d'Iyad Ag Ghali, sont originaires de la zone. Ils sont dans leur fief et ils ont la faculté de se fondre dans la population, de passer inaperçus. Une anecdote. Lorsque les militaires français ont attaqué la vallée d'amététaï si tuée dans le massif du Tigharghar (au nord de Kidal), ils ont utilisé des caméras thermiques, de nuit, depuis des avions, pour voir les déplacements humains. Mais les jihadistes avaient compris que la nuit, les rochers rejetaient la chaleur du jour et rendaient inefficaces ces caméras. U n an après le début de l’opération Serval, le nord du Mali est loin d'être sécurisé.REUTERS/Joe Penney Autre histoire. Les otages français enlevés à Arlit au Niger racontent que lorsqu’ils ont été exfiltrés du même massif en janvier 2013 par des jihadistes, ils sont passés au cœur de combats, déguisés en nomades… Tout près, parfois, des soldats fran 65

çais. Cela montre la connaissance du terrain de ces combattants. Mais le plus inté ressant, quelques mois plus tard, c’est quand les otages ont été ramenés - c'est ce que raconte Daniel Larribe - exactement au même endroit…. Les Français n'étaient plus là. Et les jihadistes avaient repris leurs quartiers. Donc, aujourd'hui, et pas seu lement au Mali - leur zone d'action s'étend jusqu'au sud de la Libye -, ces mouve ments armés ont la faculté, les compétences et les moyens de se déplacer dans La Minusma monte la garde devant le siège du gouverneur de Kidal. 15 novem bre 2013.Reuters/Stringer toute la zone.

Quelles sont les mesures prises par la communauté internationale pour assurer la sécurité au Sahel ?

Vaste question… Un an après le début de l’opération Serval, les régions de Tom bouctou, Gao et Kidal sont loin d'être sécurisées. Il y a un soutien international pour que les Etats africains créent cette force d'intervention rapide proposée au sommet de l'Union africaine à Addis-Abeba, mais il faudra du temps, des moyens financiers importants pour que celle-ci voit le jour et soit active sur le continent. En attendant, la France et les Etats-Unis sont les pays les plus actifs dans ce dossier sur la « sécurité au Sahel » et leur collaboration paraît de plus en plus importante. Le sujet a été abordé lors des récentes visites à Washington du président François Hol lande et du ministre français de la Défense, Jean-Yves Le Drian. Sur le terrain, les deux pays sont en train de se déployer à Niamey au Niger. Une présence qui n'est pas nouvelle mais qui se développe en vue de lutter contre 66

le terrorisme. Les Américains possèdent d'importants moyens d'écoute, les Fran çais une base pour leurs forces spéciales. Récemment, ils ont acheté deux drones aux Américains, drones, ce n'est pas un hasard, qui ont été basés à Niamey. Mais si le nord du Mali est scruté de près, la zone qui intéresse ces deux pays est le sud de la Libye, une région présentée par différentes autorités comme un incubateur des groupes jihadistes. Le Niger a clairement demandé à la France et aux USA d'interve nir dans la zone pour assurer le service après vente de l'opération militaire contre Mouammar Kadhafi. Au niveau régional, pour s'atteler à ce dossier sécuritaire, les présidents du Burki na, du Niger, de la Mauritanie, du Mali et du Tchad ont annoncé récemment la création du G5. La communauté internationale a promis 8 milliards d'euros d'inves tissements dans ces 5 pays dans le domaine du développement et de la sécurité. L'idée, c'est de travailler dans des zones à l'abandon… La création de cette nouvelle instance doit aussi permettre d'accroître les collaborations entre les armés de ces pays, les échanges d'informations sécuritaires, etc. Certains se sont félicités car les relations entre ces Etats ont toujours été compliquées… D'autres regrettent déjà que le Maroc et l'Algérie ne soient pas également dans cette structure. A suivre. Source: http://www.rfi.fr/ 67

Mali: Kidal region still waits for resolution

17 February 2014

Bamako (Mali) - Despite international efforts to restore peace in Mali, the northern region of Kidal remains an MNLA stronghold. While the rest of Mali slowly recovers from the rebel takeover and Islamist occupation, officials worry the distrust and enmity lingering in Kidal could destabilize the country.

"Sandy" El Hadj Baba Haïdara, who has just lost his seat as the National Assembly representative for Timbuktu, says Mali's destiny is tied up with Kidal, a former garrison town in the remote Adrar des Ifoghas region. "You find people saying that Kidal is just a stone in the shoe, or a thorn in the foot, but a thorn in the foot can damage the whole body," Haïdara argued. "Kidal has to be resolved. It will allow everyone to breathe again, and then we can move on to the other things." Military solution Insecurity persists in the northeast. The Movement for Oneness and Jihad in West Africa (MUJAO) this week announced it captured four International Committee of the Red Cross staff and a veterinarian on the road between Gao and Kidal. The MNLA, whose members are from the Tuareg ethnic group, has denounced such incidents in the past, arguing that part of its purpose was to push Islamist militants out of the north. Haïdara endorses a Malian military solution. Malian troops are present in Kidal, along with troops from the UN's Stabilization Mission in Mali (MINUSMA) and the French army. But there are not enough of them to secure the vast area, say ob servers. Increased presence in Kidal by the Malian army, promised before the elections by interim President Dioncounda Traoré, never happened. Despite the return of the governor to Kidal Region in July 2013 and the MNLA's grudging handover of key buildings, the government's writ does not run in Kidal. MNLA warned a reporter in 2013, that "to plant a Malian flag in Kidal is an act of war". Haïdara says the UN and French should step aside and let a strengthened Malian army step in. These views are echoed by many politicians and commentators in Bamako, the capital. Turning against Paris Although France's military intervention, staged in early 2013, helped remove the country's Islamist occupiers, Malians' gratitude has diminished in recent months. It is increasingly argued in Bamako that, although the French forces dislodged the Islamists from their strongholds in Timbuktu, Gao and elsewhere, they adopted a 68

"hands-off" approach when it came to Kidal. The French troops worked with Chadian soldiers there, pointedly excluding the Malian army. France left the MNLA in place, hoping the group's knowledge of the desert terrain would make it an ally in hostage negotiations and military operations against the residual threat posed by jihadists. Malians critics believe France was duped on both counts. They say the French gov ernment sees as MNLA as an indigenous movement with legitimate grievances while viewing the Islamists as opportunists mainly from outside Mali - a distinction they say is wrong-headed. "This is not the MNLA we had at the beginning," argued Haïdara. "Under this flag you will find all the jihadists who lost their own battles." Ali Nouhoum Diallo, former president of the National Assembly and current head of COMODE, the Malian coalition of democratic organisations, a broad-based alliance and parties and pressures groups that have called for the liberation of Kidal, told IRIN: "Up until now, I don't understand what France is really about when it comes to the north," Diallo told IRIN. "If you are serious about the protection of territorial integ rity, you cannot let another flag fly in Ardrar. To us, that is just incoherent." Dealing with the MNLA Diallo says he has watched with concern as the MNLA has kept the flag of Azawad raised around Kidal, organized demonstrations against government delegations and avoided talk of handover. Previous rebellions and peace settlements have left many people sceptical, says Diallo. He says separatist commanders have signed deals, assuming senior civilian and military posts, only to later back further insurgencies. Diallo says that to be taken seriously, the MNLA has to disarm. The MNLA has told intermediaries and reporters a very different story, highlighting civilians killed by Malian security forces while demonstrating, accusing France of leaving the movement exposed and isolated in Kidal, and registering disappoint ment that current President Ibrahim Boubacar Keïta, widely known by the initials IBK, has brought nothing new to the table. IBK is adamant that the north must be Mali's main priority. Since taking office, he appointed Cheikh Oumar Diarra, former ambassador to the US, as minister of na tional reconciliation and development of the northern regions. He also convened a national court for northern Mali in Bamako and established a revamped truth, jus tice and reconciliation commission whose work is expected to focus on the origins of the crisis and the abuses that came in its wake. Losing momentum 69

But many fear the peace process has lost momentum. The Ouagadougou Agreement of 18 June 2013 stipulated that an "inclusive dia logue" should begin 60 days after the naming of a new government. That has not happened. Meanwhile, the MNLA and the government have accused each other of reneging on agreements on security arrangements in Kidal. Observers point out the Ouagadougou Agreement is one of several, including the 1992 National Pact and the 1996 Algiers Accords, to attempt to bring peace to Ki dal. Mohamed Ag Ossade, director of the Tumast Tuareg Cultural Centre in Bamako, says both sides have a responsibility to develop a settlement that will not simply crumble after a couple of years. If the Ouagadougou Agreement were to fail, he said, "that would be pointless". Ag Ossade has been sceptical about the MNLA, arguing that its campaign for an autonomous Azawad is backed by idealists and opportunists. But he is equally wary of those calling for a military solution. "Send the Malian army in and you would kill 90-year-old people or two-year-old children. What is more, the army would be crushed. Everyone there is MNLA," he said. He is adamant that Mali can be a tolerant melting pot - if there is proper leader ship. Proving this point, he says, is the concert hosted by Tumast, featuring a Tuareg band whose members mostly hail from Kidal. Tuareg audience members share the dance floor with dignitaries, diplomats and music enthusiasts of all races. "We can get through all this," Ag Ossade tells IRIN. "But only if the Malian govern ment loves all its children and treats them equally." http://www.afrika.no/Detailed/24825.html

70

Nigeria Le Nigeria impuissant face à la terreur de Boko Haram

27.02.2014 François Hollande a promis, à l'occasion de sa visite les jeudi 27 et vendredi 28 février, l'aide de la France au Nigeria dans le combat contre la secte islamiste Boko Haram. Quelques heures plus tard, des autorités locales annonçaient qu'au moins 32 personnes avaient été tuées au cours de trois attaques menées par des islamistes présumés dans le nord du pays.

MASSACRE D'UN LYCÉE

Impavide, Boko Haram poursuit ainsi sa campagne de terreur, lancée en 2009 dans le nord-est du pays. Mardi 25 février, des membres présumés de la secte sunnite – dont le nom signifie littéralement « l'éducation occidentale est un péché » – avaient lancé une attaque meurtrière dans l'Etat de Yobe, placé sous état d'urgence en mai 2013 au même titre que les Etats de Borno et d'Adamawa. Leur cible ? Le lycée fédéral de la ville de Buni Yadi. Le bilan de ce massacre était particulièrement lourd : quarante-trois élèves, âgés de 8 à 11 ans, ont été tués en pleine nuit dans leur dortoir, parfois à l'arme blan che, rapportent

ThisDay

et

Leadership

. Seuls les garçons ont été visés. Les filles, el les, auraient reçu l'ordre de

« rentrer chez elles, de se marier et derenoncer à l'édu cation occidentale, jugée contraire aux préceptes de l'islam »

. C'est la quatrième fois en moins d'un an qu'un établissement scolaire est la cible des sicaires de Boko Haram, rappelle le 2010.

New York Times

, pour qui cet accès de vio lence délibérée accroît un peu plus la pression sur l'armée nigériane et sur le prési dent Goodluck Jonathan, un chrétien originaire du Sud, au pouvoir depuis mai 71

« ABSENCE DE SYNERGIE »

Dans un communiqué, le chef de l'Etat a fustigé

« un meurtre haineux, brutal et in sensé d'étudiants innocents par des terroristes fous et des fanatiques »

.

« Les for ces armées du Nigeria et les autres agences de sécurité vont poursuivre leur combat contre la terreur avec vigueur et détermination »

, a-t-il assuré, tout en appelant ses voisins francophones à œuvrer à ses côtés contre le terrorisme – au premier rang desquels le Cameroun, avec lequel le Nigeria partage près de 2 000 kilomètres de frontières particulièrement poreuses. De fait, pour l'éditorialiste Olusegun Adeniyi , le Nigeria est sans aucun doute

« une nation en guerre »

. Et

« le fait est que, sur le terrain, les insurgés islamistes rempor tent certaines batailles stratégiques »

, estime-t-il, insistant sur

« les sacs mortuaires, non seulement de civils mais aussi de soldats, qui s'empilent de jour en jour »

. Selon le décompte du

Nigerian Tribune

te volatil, le pouvoir, par ses

« silences »

, leur croisade macabre aurait déjà coûté la vie à deux cent quarante-cinq personnes depuis le 14 janvier 2014. Dans ce contex récurrents, n'inspire plus confiance, déplo re Bala Liman, spécialiste de Boko Haram, sur Think Africa Press . Pis, il est engagé dans une Boko Haram serait

« guerre de mots »

avec le gouverneur de l'Etat septen trional de Borno, Kashim Shettima. Lequel s'est attiré les foudres du porte-parole présidentiel en suggérant que, faute de troupes et de ressources supplémentaires,

« impossible à battre »

. Une

« absence desynergie »

contre productive, conclut

ThisDay

, à l'heure où la coopération est plus que jamais néces saire. Source: http://www.lemonde.fr/ 72

Nouveau massacre de Boko Haram : le Nigeria appelle à plus de coo pération

25.02.2014 En pleine nuit ils ont pénétré dans le dortoir, lancé des explosifs et ouvert le feu sur les pensionnaires. L'attaque d'un lycée nigérian par les islamistes de Boko Haram a fait au moins quarante-trois morts, mardi 25 février, à Buni Yadi, dans le nord-est du pays. Selon un responsable d'un hôpital de Damaturu, la capitale de l'Etat de Yobe, les élèves étaient âgés de 8 à 11 ans, et seuls les garçons ont été visés. Les écoles sont l'une des cibles privilégiées de Boko Haram, dont le nom signifie « l'éducation occidentale est interdite », depuis le début de son insurrection en 2009, qui a fait au moins quatre mille morts dans le nord et le centre du pays. Boko Haram veut créer un Etat islamiste dans cette région à dominante musulma ne, et s'y oppose à l'armée. L'état d'urgence y a été proclamé en mai 2013. Dans une vidéo récente, le chef de Boko Haram, Abubakar Shekau, a promis depoursuivre la campagne de son groupe et a menacé de l'étendre au sud pétrolier du Nigeria, région à majorité chrétienne.

« NOUS AVONS BESOIN D'UNE COOPÉRATION INTERNATIONALE »

Mardi, le Nigeria a lancé un appel à la France et à ses voisins francophones de l'Ouest africain pour combattre à ses côtés l'insurrection du groupe islamiste. Une déclaration qui survient juste avant la visite au Nigeria du président François Hol lande, qui sera jeudi et vendredi l'invité d'honneur du centième anniversaire de l'unification du pays.

« Je pense que nous avons besoin d'une coopération internationale avec les Fran çais, avec les pays francophones d'Afrique de l'Ouest, de travailler ensemble

73

pour régler ce problème avant qu'il ne devienne un problème majeur pour la Fran ce, pour les intérêts occidentaux en Afrique de l'Ouest

, a déclaré le ministre de l'in formation, Labaran Maku.

Les intérêts français seront anéantis si nous permettons à ce terrorisme de prospérer. »

Le ministre a insisté sur les récents problèmes à la frontière avec le Cameroun, dans le Nord, estimant qu'aucune solution ne serait trouvée

« tant que nous n'au rons pas accru notre partenariat avec le Cameroun »

frontière camerounaise quand ils sont poursuivis. . La participation de ce pays à la force militaire internationale surveillant les frontières est

« un peu faible »

, a-t-il jugé ; ce qui permet aux insurgés de se replier et de se réfugier de l'autre côté de la Cette force internationale, composée de soldats du Nigeria, du Tchad, du Niger et du Cameroun, a été établie pour surveiller les activités criminelles aux frontières des pays participants. Le Nigeria, qui a fermé la semaine dernière une partie de sa frontière nord-est avec le Cameroun, assure que les islamistes ont établi des bases dans des zones peu peuplées du Cameroun, du Tchad et du Niger. Source: http://www.lemonde.fr/ 74

Somalia Al-Shabab: Rising From The Ashes of The Phoenix

Feb 22, 2014 Soldiers and forensic photographers at the scene of the attack. Photograph: Mo hamed Abdiwahab/AFP/Getty Images

Today’s heavy explosion on Villa Somalia reminds me of a story I read when I was a child. The phoenix is an immortal bird that when it dies, bursts into flames and is reborn from its own ashes. Less than two years Al-Shabab militants were driven out of the capital city of Moga dishu, today Mogadishu residents witness a series of suicide bomb attacks that echo throughout the city. On Friday, February 21, al-Shabab has attacked the heav ily-fortified Somali presidential palace compound, blowing up through a gate with a car loaded with explosives and engaging in a fierce gun battle with guards. Such these attacks against government targets have shattered hopes of peace and gen erate terror among Somalis. The attack shows government’s vulnerability to the threat and thus questions the government’s legitimacy and its military weakness. The latest strike is another reminder of the threat still posed by this group, the question we need to ask now is what will the Somali government do to mitigate the mounting suicidal attacks that brought the country to a standstill? In this section, I will underscore the existing security problems and how the govern ment can close the security gap. 60 percent of Mogadishu population is youth under the age of 25. Many of those who were born during the conflict have no basic education and jobs. The mounting crisis has led many youth to join al-Shabab. When I was visiting in Mogadishu, some residents whom I spoke reported unem 75

ployment and lack of education caused some of the young people to join the net work. In order to meet an atmosphere conducive to a shift in strategy away from conflict, the government should offer the youth jobs and education. The main challenge to this government is that it is weak and heavily reliant on Afri can Union peacekeeping troops, but that doesn’t mean they can’t negotiate with its adversaries. Since the government can’t end the scourge of the militancy though military force, therefore they should seek other means other than the use of force. In order to get durable peace, the Somali government should consider engaging in a series of track II diplomacy with members of al-Shabab. To further explain what track II diplomacy is. This type of discussion refers informal and unofficial activities between civil society or a groups of people. Such negotiation can facilitate contacts among adversaries who couldn’t otherwise meet. Somali Ulema Council who is religious scholars and clan elders are the two credible groups in Somalia who can help the Track II diplomacy to take place between the government and its arch rival, al-Shabab. To draw people’s attention about the role the religious leaders played. One of the endeavors in conflict transformation by the Somali Ulema Council took place when they mediated between the interim government headed by Ali Mahdi and his rival Mohamed Farah Aideed in 1992. This is a clear demonstration the religious scholars and clan elders will bring peace through the use of Track II diplomacy should they are given a chance to go ahead with their nonjudgmental and non-coercive ap proach. Somali government should enter into an informal dialogue with al-Shabab. This will offer al-Shabab incentives that are alternative to their violent policies. Somali gov ernment should have a clear approach to reintegrate the youth back into the com munity, at the present, there is no a mechanism in place to promote the return and rehabilitation of ex combatants. If the current militants realize the government is not stigmatizing and dehumanizing them, the chance of defection among the cur rent radical militias will likely be high. http://www.somalicurrent.com/ 76

South Africa Kidnap for ransom: to pay or not to pay?

18 February 2014 It is one of the best-kept secrets in the world. As freed hostages step on the tarmac af ter being released by terror groups in places like Mali, Nigeria or Yemen, no one dares to reveal whether a ransom had been paid to the kidnappers. Invariably, governments deny having handed over the huge sums requested by terrorists. Too much is at stake. Lately, more and more governments are advocating for a ban on such payments. Yet experts believe that, faced with a moral dilemma and pressure of public opinion, many governments still pay millions of dollars in ransom money to terror groups. As South Africans continue to wait for where they operate. news of schoolteacher Pierre Korkie , who was kidnapped along with his wife in Yemen last year, analysts indicate that there is a wor rying new trend of kidnappers increasingly targeting locals in the African countries In its latest risk report , consultancy Control Risk Management cites Mali, Somalia, Syria, Afghanistan and Pakistan as the having the highest risk for kid 77

napping worldwide. In Africa, Nigeria, Mauritania, Niger, southern Algeria, Kenya and parts of Sudan are also on the list of high-risk places where terror groups engage in kidnapping. Other studies also indicate that Nigeria and Mexico still top the list when it comes to the num ber of kidnappings for ransom that are carried out annually. Institute for Security Studies (ISS) Senior Researcher Martin Ewi says kidnapping for ransom has become one of the most important sources of income for terror groups. ‘They use the money to buy sophisticated weapons and to expand their terrorist opera tions,’ he explains. A declassified August 2013 report by the UK government states that at least US$70 million was paid to terrorists in the previous three to four years, and that al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM), which operates in the Sahel, has collected at least US$45 million in ransom payments from various governments. ‘It is the single larg est source of income for a number of key groups, including al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula [AQAP] and AQIM,’ the report states. "

Invariably, governments deny having handed over the huge sums requested by terrorists"

Ewi says that the governments of the United Kingdom and Algeria have been particu larly steadfast in their efforts to crack down on and prohibit the payment of ransoms to terror groups. Yet, this remains a very difficult moral choice, as governments could be accused of failing to assist citizens who become kidnap victims. France, in particular, has been accused of dishing out millions of euros to secure the release of its many nationals held hostage over the last few years, mostly in Mali, Niger and northern Nigeria. If this is true, is France encouraging hostage taking? Ewi says this moral dilemma, which is faced by governments all over the world, is one of the reasons why this is such a sensitive issue. ‘Even former hostages won’t talk about it, because keeping this issue a secret is often part of the conditions of their re lease,’ he says. The South African government seems to be taking a case-by-case approach on the is sue – sometimes with a high-profile approach and at other times discreetly participating in negotiations. The government has consistently denied paying any ransom for its citi zens. In June 2012, a South African couple held hostage by Somali pirates was re leased after intervention by the South African government. A ransom of US$500 000 was demanded for their release, but the government never admitted to paying it. De spite this denial, South African citizens are increasingly being targeted for ransom. The Korkie case has created unprecedented media interest, particularly after the in volvement of charity organisation, Gift of the Givers. A deadline to pay a ransom of over US$3 million expired on 8 February, but unconfirmed reports indicate that Korkie, who 78

was reported gravely ill, is still alive. "

The kidnapping could be seen as an act of desperation by a group whose funds may be running out"

His wife, Yolande, who was released by the kidnappers and returned to South Africa on 17 January, month, made an emotional appeal funds may be running out. , together with her two children, for his release. South African Deputy Minister in the Department of International Relations and Coop eration, Ebrahim Ebrahim, also travelled to Yemen in January in an attempt to secure Korkie’s release. In an open letter to the kidnappers he appealed to their sense of hu manity and stated, ‘Islam enjoins us to show mercy.’ While fewer foreigners might now be travelling to the dangerous zones in the Sahel, local workers of foreign companies and NGOs are still at risk, says Ewi. Earlier this five Malians working for the Red Cross were kidnapped in Gao in northern Mali. The Islamist Movement for Unity and Jihad in West Africa (Mujao) claimed responsibility for the kidnapping, which could be seen as an act of desperation by a group whose Ewi says that the kidnapping of locals could also be used to put political pressure on African governments – who are not likely to pay for their citizens’ release – to yield to certain terrorist demands such as the release of prisoners, or even to abandon certain policies. ‘Depending on the response, this could become a trend,’ says Ewi. In Nigeria, groups such as the Movement for the Emancipation of the Niger Delta (MEND) have notori ously used kidnapping not only for financial gain, but also to get their political message across. This has abated somewhat since the 2009 amnesty offered to MEND by the Nigerian government, but Ewi says that the kidnapping of foreign and local oil workers in that country continues. The issue is just not receiving the same media attention it had in the past. Lately, foreigners in northern Nigeria and parts of Cameroon have also become victims of kidnapping by Islamist organisation Boko Haram and its breakaway group, Ansaru. Two high-profile cases last year – one of a French family kidnapped in Cameroon and another of a French priest, who had managed to escape his attackers – have been linked to Boko Haram. Ewi says that while the organisation had initially distanced itself from kidnapping for ransom, considering it a ‘dirty business,’ it now engages with this practice because of the potential profits involved. The group’s biggest ransom thus far is believed to be a payment of US$3 million for the release of the French family kidnapped in February 2013. According to the UK govern ment report, 19 people have thus far been kidnapped by Boko Haram and Ansaru. Could the tracking of financial transactions be of some assistance in fighting this prob lem? The fight against piracy has been aided, for example, by tracking the financial 79

Sudan "New" Sudan: back to the future

February 15, 2014 - The sight of Hassan al-Turabi in his impeccably white jellabiya, socks and shoes, seated in the front row next to Sadiq al-Mahdi and Ghazi al Attabani, awaiting President Bashir to ascend the podium and deliver his ‘surprise speech’ on 27 January, was sufficient to signal to Khartoum’s political pundits that a grand bargain was underway in the capital’s saloons. Seated in the comfortable Chinese-built hall were essentially all the President’s love victims: Sadiq al-Mahdi the prime minister deposed in the 1989 coup; Hassan al-Turabi, the veteran sheikh evicted from power in the 1998/1999 showdown; Ghazi al-Attabani, the aspiring Islamist moderniser disciplined out of the NCP last November into the wilderness of an abortive sectarian split; Ali Osman Mohamed Taha and Nafie Ali Nafie, the sacrificial lambs of the NCP’s reform agenda, effectively purged out of government in the company of allies last December, in addition of course to the honourable Mahdi and Mirghani juniors, Sadiq al-Mahdi’s oldest Abd al-Rahman and Mohamed Osman al-Mirghani’s youngest Jaafar al-Sadiq, training on the job as assistants to the President. Order prevailed in the first and second rows, but from the third backward hierarchy was hard to ascertain, the scene closer to male congregations in a Sudanese bika (mourning house) than the audience of a state sovereign. In deed, the event only took off when the President finished speaking and the guests could mingle at will, the well-ironed jellabiyas swooshing in tandem in the glow of the neon lamps. The seventy years old President strained to read what his cooks had prepared, a speech written in the artificial Arabic of themuthagafattiya, a dismissive term used to refer to pretentious intellectuals obsessed with convoluted form, and peppered with words dug out of a medieval dictionary as a measure of Islamic ornamenta tion. Had the President been in the class of an Arabic teacher of an old mould he would have surely failed ‘reading’, the vexing sentence structures and demanding grammar had him almost prostrating were it not for the intensive air-conditioning. Turabi, grimly composed, could not hide his disregard for the dyslexic officer seated above at presidential distance, grimacing in his distinctive manner in response to the embarrassing flow of errors. The backbenchers just chatted the time away un deterred by the passage of the cameras. The press had primed the public for a ‘surprise’, speculations founded on a remark by the former US president Jimmy Carter during his visit to Khartoum a week before and actively nourished by the NCP’s high priests. Carter told reporters after meeting President Bashir that the President would soon make “important” decisions. Predictions were that the Presi dent would resign and pass the baton to his new deputy Bakri Hassan Salih as head of a ‘transitional’ all-parties government. Apart from the injunction to place na tional interests above petty partisan concerns, ripped out of the pages of the ‘patriotic education’ curriculum that Sudanese pupils had to endure under Ni mayri’s reign, the President offered the political club gathered under his watch an abstract invitation to dialogue with the ruling party on reform of the political sys 80

tem through the drafting of a new constitution and multi-party elections scheduled for 2015, peaceful resolution of armed conflicts in the country, economic reform, and closure on the contentious issue of Sudanese identity. The President’s speech brought “nothing new”, lacked a diagnosis of the country’s problems and offered no fundamental solutions, Turabi told the press afterwards, comments that were notably carried by the official Sudan News Agency (SUNA). NCP enthusiasts hailed the speech an “intellectual breakthrough” and the declara tion of a new regime of peace and prosperity. The NCP’s deputy chairman, Ibrahim Ghandoor, who sat next to the reading President offering corrections, said Presi dent Bashir would deliver a follow-up talk to the less equipped masses to explain the first intended for a superior political audience once he returns from the African Union (AU) summit in Addis Ababa, but retracted the statement a day later. The best argument however was made by Amin Hassan Omer who said President Bashir did not wish to dictate dialogue mechanisms or outcomes on the political parties with the conviction that concrete propositions should be allowed to emerge from the very process of dialogue. Since the ‘surprise speech’ the chatter of the political class in Khartoum has been conducted predominantly in ‘dialogese’. Ghazi al Attabani accompanied by trusted captains in his newly formed NCP-breakoff, aptly named the ‘Reform Now Movement’, trotted from one meeting to another as if on commission, first Hassan al-Turabi and his Popular Congress Party (PCP); then Sadiq al-Mahdi and his National Umma Party (NUP); leaders of the Unionist Movement, a runaway faction of Mirghani’s Democratic Unionist Party (DUP) that refused alli ance in government with the NCP; the sheikhs of the pre-Turabi Muslim Brother hood, and a new umbrella organisation christened the ‘National Movement for Change’ led by the presidential uncle Tayeb Mustafa. Attabani’s propagandists made sure that each meeting produced an official statement of consensus and a stylised photograph of the ‘leaders’ posing standing and seated in two neat rows in good old effendiya fashion. The surprise, if any, came with the PCP’s declaration that it accepts unconditional dialogue with the NCP in line with the President’s reform agenda. Kamal Omer, the party’s political secretary and spokesman of the opposition alliance, the National Consensus Forces (NCF), slipped as if on a banana peel from the antics of ‘overthrowing the regime’ to slick ‘dialogese’. Kamal accused the allies of yester day, primarily the Communist Party and fractured remnants of the Nasserite and Baathist parties, of unwarranted recalcitrance and wished for a reunion of the par ties of the historic Islamic Movement, the NCP and the PCP, in a heavenly gush of Islamic accord. Turabi’s deputy, Abdalla Hassan Ahmed, went further stressing that the PCP holds no grudges against the fellow ikhwan ([Muslim] brothers) of the NCP, not even against Taha and Nafie. Reporters close to the PCP ‘leaked’ stories of rec onciliation bids between the eighty two years old Turabi and his most capable disci ple, the seventy years old Ali Osman Mohamed Taha, the latest victim of the dys lexic officer, followed by reports that preparations for a meeting between Turabi and President Bashir were diligently pursued by keen mediators. NCP jellabiyas 81

sought Turabi’s counsel in the dark of night but made sure to leave Manshiyya (the Khartoum neighbourhood where Turabi resides) before the break of light, it was claimed. President Bashir did eventually deliver a follow-up speech in free style but to the NCP’s Shura (Consultative) Council in the humbler ‘Martyr Zubeir Hall’ where he reiterated commitment to dialogue with the political parties and the armed opposi tion. The NCP instructed its coalition partners, an assortment of breakoff factions from almost the entire political spectrum, on the requirements of the new era; and a few days ago President Bashir received Sadiq al-Mahdi and a high-level delega tion of his party joining the opposition-hardened Sara Nugdalla, chairwoman of the party’s politburo and a favourite of the gender-sensitised activists crowd, in the presidential guesthouse. The two sides agreed to deliberate on a mechanism and agenda for dialogue, said a statement after the meeting. The seventy eight years old Sadiq al-Mahdi, on his part, boasted to European Union (EU) ambassadors in Khartoum of taming the aging regime into democracy, and in similar fervour dis missed calls to step down from leadership of the NUP, a throne that he jealously occupies since the 1960s, as the fantasies of “spiteful and corrupt detractors”. The NCP’s calculation, it seems, is to entice the ‘Islamic’ opposition, primarily the PCP, the Reform Now Movement of Ghazi al-Attabani and the NUP, in addition to its minor Islamist allies in the cabinet, the pre-Turabi Muslim Brothers and Ansar al Sunnah, into a broad alliance that would eventually determine the terms of a new constitution and form a safe majority in the upcoming elections. With this ap proach, the NCP in all likelihood wishes to proceed with a managed democracy, i.e. consensually partitioned constituencies in the upcoming elections, which would satisfy international beholders without running the risk of surrendering power. Such an arrangement of forces would confront the insurgent Sudan People’s Lib eration Army/Movement in North Sudan (SPLA/M-N) and the holdout Darfur armed movements with a consolidated mainstream political class committed to some form of sharia rule and resistant to any substantive transformation of power, but would nevertheless allow the government to claim the desired fruits of ‘democratisation’, namely relief of Sudan’s international debt, lift of sanctions and definitive rapprochement with Western countries, primarily the US. The SPLA/M-N, in talks with the government in Addis Ababa, responded with a similar rationale inviting disenchanted stars of the opposition parties and armed movements as ‘experts’ irrespective of the position of their home organisations in a bid to stretch its national mantle and forge a counter-bloc to the NCP and its mainstream dia logue partners. Expectedly, the government announced that it is not in Addis Ababa to negotiate with ‘experts’ but with the SPLA/M-N proper over South Kordo fan and the Blue Nile and tabled an offer that fell short of admitting a national mandate for the SPLA/M-N pushing the aspirant contender of central power to the local squabbles against NCP-allies in the two areas. If the SPLA/M-N’s perspective is to wind back to the six years relay of the CPA 82

where it had the opportunity to invent the politics of the ‘New Sudan’ but failed, the NCP’s fantasy is to resurrect a political order that it has aggressively dismem bered through the long years of its reign. A bloc joining the historic Islamic Move ment and the NUP with Sadiq al-Mahdi and Hassan al-Turabi as bedfellows guarded by a president of military stock, whether Bashir or Bakri, seems an echo of Prime Minister Sadiq al-Mahdi’s third and fourth coalition cabinets (May 1988 – February 1989) between the NUP and the National Islamic Front (NIF) under Hassan al Turabi and his able deputy Ali Osman Mohamed Taha, the NCP’s immediate ances tor. The coalition that flouted the opportunity to engage the SPLA/M under John Garang in negotiations with a constitutional process as their favoured channel pre ferring instead tactical rounds of sharia blackmailing. This time around, if such an alliance does materialise, Sadiq al-Mahdi enters the calculation as the junior part ner and the SAF command preserves a presidential veto over its products. In fact, the SPLA/M-N in the long run might prove the ‘tamed’ partner that the NCP and its allies should actively welcome into the political club when compared to the more than real armies of the Sudanese hinterlands. As the President and his guests were exchanging niceties after the ‘surprise speech’ militia forces hired by the Na tional Intelligence and Security Service (NISS) to fight against the SPLA/M-N in South Kordofan and the Blue Nile had camped outside al-Obeid, the capital of North Kordofan State, seeking recuperation and reward. The state governor, Ah med Haroun, organised on 12 January a welcome celebration for the gallant fight ers, rebranded the Rapid Response Forces, to showcase their victories. SUNA iden tified the commander of the fighters as Brigadier-General Mohamed Hamdan Dalgo, better known as Himeidti, the lean commoner who announced himself back in 2010 a war chief of the Rizeigat of North Darfur. When asked how he ended up fighting the government’s counter-insurgency war in Darfur Himeidti said his herds had been rustled and his kin taken hostage by rebels while en route to Libya. I traded between Sudan, Chad, Libya and Egypt, and as far as Nigeria, he said at the time, the standard itinerary of the adventurous smuggler in Sudan’s western realms. By 2013 Himeidti had established himself as commander of the Darfur ‘Border Guards’, furniture businessman and prominent real estate owner in Nyala. He served as security advisor to three consecutive governors in South Darfur, Ali Mahmoud Abd al-Rasoul, Abd al-Hameed Musa Kasha and Hammad Ismail until his dismissal under the latter, a decision that Hammad was to regret considering the havoc Himeidti allegedly unleashed in Nyala forcing the central government to in tervene and replace the besieged governor with the military officer Adam Mah moud Jar al-Nabi. Himeidti’s Rapid Response Forces, five thousands according to conservative esti mates, had troubles managing anger as they waited for pay, rather bored in al Obeid’s dry environs. Gangs of militia fighters attacked their host villages in the first February week, looted a local market, and managed to kill at least four people, including a shopkeeper who refused to hand over the cash-starved fighters the money they demanded by the gun. Ahmed Haroun, rather struck by the fiasco, of 83

fered the people of North Kordofan an apology announcing that the Rapid Re sponse Forces were not regular troops force but a rogue militia of “herders” resis tant to discipline, recruited by the NISS operations department. President Bashir, while still in Addis Ababa, reportedly had to communicate his displeasure to Himeidti and offer a satisfactory price for restraint. Accordingly, Haroun announced to the aggrieved kin of the slain shopkeeper, who carried the body of the deceased to the government’s headquarters in al-Obeid in protest, that the Rapid Response Forces would withdraw from North Kordofan within seventy two hours. Govern ment media reported nervously that the the Rapid Response Forces are about to withdraw, have started withdrawing, are in the process of withdrawing, but never where to, until the deputy governor of South Darfur Mahdi Bosh declared on 12 February that the government in Nyala had completed preparations to receive the militia, news that signalled coming disaster for the crime-stricken city. If precedent is any measure, South Darfur is likely to witness a surge of ‘tribal’ battles, consider ing Himeidti’s main complaint. We don’t have land, he told an interviewer in 2013. In South Darfur, we are hosted by the Fur chief Abbakar Issa, whom we protect with our gunfire. I wonder whether Himeidti and his men, come the 2015 elections, would surrender to the authority of a NUP envoy to South Darfur, or rather carve an own autonomous space with their Fur ally and continue the business of selling their fighting power at the best price available. The political class in Khartoum might succeed in forging a future of mutual accom modation under a SAF sovereign, plagiarised from its past endeavours, but it is by all means a brittle one, much like time travel, precarious and full of surprises, Himeidti’s land hunger aside, the government, no less eager to appropriate land for its own rent purposes, declared recently a plan to form a national land authority with the power to acquire ’unregistered’ land, trade it off to investors, and adjudi cate on land disputes between locals claimants and foreign investors supported by a separate prosecutor office and police force. The last time the government at tempted to grab worthwhile land, namely the Jebel Amir gold mines in North Dar fur, it precipitated a months-long war that eventually had even Musa Hilal, Himeidti’s cousin and role-model, calling for ‘reform’.

The author is a fellow of the Rift Valley Institute. He publishes regular opinion arti cles and analyses at his blog Still Sudan.

He can be reached at [email protected]

http://www.sudantribune.com/spip.php?article49969

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Tunisia Attentat de Jendouba : La stratégie antiterroriste doit changer

17-02-2014 Suite à l’opération terroriste qui a qui a coûté la vie à trois agents de sûreté et à un citoyen dans la région d’Awled Mannaâ , du gouvernorat de Jendouba, le responsa ble des affaires juridiques au sein de l'Union Nationale des syndicats des forces de sécurité intérieure, Sahbi Jouini, a imputé aux dirigeants du ministère de l’Intérieur la responsabilité de l’embuscade de Jendouba. Le syndicaliste a, à ce propos, appelé à la révision de la stratégie de lutte contre le terrorisme, tout en alertant contre le blanchiment du terrorisme, précisant que l’o pération de Jendouba ne vient pas en réaction aux événements de Borj Louzir, mais il s’agit plutôt d’un projet terroriste bien délibéré. Et de confirmer qu’elle s’inscrit, dans le cadre d'un projet terroriste prenant pour cible les citoyens. Pour sa part, Issam Dardouri, président de l'Organisation Tunisienne des Forces de Sécurité et du Citoyen , a fait savoir qu’il s’agit d’une opération de représailles et de vengeance, et ce suite à la victoire des agents de sûreté en matière de la lutte contre le terrorisme et la mort des chefs terroristes dans les dernières événements de Raoued-Plage. Et d’ajouter que cette opération est bien planifiée, ce qui atteste que le terrorisme se développe davantage en Tunisie. Le président de l'Organisation Tunisienne des Forces de Sécurité et du Citoyen, a en outre, affirmé que les opérations terroristes en Tunisie ressemblent beaucoup au scénario algérien des années quatre-vingt dix. Et d’ajouter qu’il faut continuer à combattre le terrorisme et anticiper les dangers et les éventuels actes de représail les des terroristes qui pourront frapper de nouveau pour venger la mort de leurs chefs.

Une méthode plus sophistiquée utilisée par les terroristes algériens

Pour sa part, Mazen Cherif, l'expert des affaires sécuritaires et responsable du dé partement de la lutte contre le terrorisme dans le Centre tunisien pour l'étude de la sécurité globale, a affirmé que cette opération terroriste est un acte de représailles visant à déstabiliser les agents de sécurité tunisiens. Il a considéré la méthode utili sée dans cette opération est plus sophistiquée et très proche de celles utilisées par les terroristes algériens. Il convient de rappeler que dimanche 16 févier2014, vers 01h00 du matin, une uni té de la Garde nationale s’est dirigée vers la localité de Aouled Manaa à la suite d’informations qui lui sont parvenues, indiquant que des individus ont bloqué la route et procédé à des opérations de vol. Dès l’arrivée de l’unité de la garde natio nale, quatre terroristes ont ouvert le feu en direction des agents qui se trouvaient encore à l’intérieur de la voiture tuant les martyrs, les agents de la Garde nationale et le citoyen, tous décédés sur place et blessant un officier et un autre agent de la Garde nationale. http://www.africanmanager.com/ 85

Médias et terrorisme: La difficile équation

17/02/2014 "Le terrorisme existe essentiellement grâce aux médias", déclarait en août dernier le colonel retraité Mokhtar Ben Nasr sur les ondes de radio Mosaïque FM. "Le ter rorisme n'a pas de sens sans les médias", selon ses termes. La presse doit-elle faire un black out total sur ce qui se passe pour éviter de répandre ce climat de terreur? Les évènements survenus ce week-end à Jendouba, que et la lutte contre le terrorisme. et les opérations anti terroristes à Raoued et Borj Louzir, ont relancé le débat sur le traitement médiati-

Rendre compte du terrorisme n'est pas un soutien au terrorisme

Selon le sociologue français Raymond Aron, "le terroriste ne veut pas que beau coup de gens meurent, il veut que beaucoup de gens écoutent" avoir un grand impact. . Les médias se raient en ce sens un des outils utilisés par les "terroristes" grâce auquel ils espèrent Comment alors informer sans servir le terrorisme? Faut-il imposer une restriction pour les médias sous prétexte de lutter contre le terrorisme? Certains tendent à le penser, mais ce serait contraire autant au principe de liberté de la presse et des médias qu'au droit du citoyen d'être informé. Pour l'assemblée parlementaire du Conseil de l'Europe , "le terrorisme ne doit pas affecter la liberté d’expression et d’information dans les médias en tant qu’un des fondements essentiels de toute société démocratique. Cette liberté comprend le droit du public à être informé des questions d’intérêt général, notamment des ac tes et des menaces terroristes, et des réponses qui y sont données par l’Etat et les organisations internationales." Mais pour certains observateurs et représentants de forces de sécurité, en se fai sant l'écho des actes terroristes, les médias "répandent un climat de terreur", ob jectif atteint pour les "terroristes". La presse doit-elle alors faire un black out total sur ce qui se passe pour éviter de répandre ce "climat de terreur"? Pas sûr. Aujourd'hui, les médias n'ont plus le monopole de l'information. La problématique ne touche donc pas uniquement '"l'information", mais le traitement médiatique. D'après le chercheur à l'IRIS, François Bernard Huyghe, "le terroriste tente de re tourner les médias de l’adversaire contre lui (..) pour exercer une contrainte, pour recruter de futurs disciples." Là encore, il reviendrait au journaliste de faire atten tion dans le traitement de ces sujets.

Affaire Samir El Wafi

Au lendemain de l'opération anti-terroriste à Raoued , Samir El Wafi invite dans son émission "Pour celui qui ose seulement" ( ( sur la chaîne Ettounsiya, le père de Kamel Gadhgadhi, présumé meurtrier de Chokri Belaïd, ainsi qu'un prédica 86

teur salafiste, Khamis Mejri. Le premier a considéré son fils, mort dans l'opération sécuritaire de Raoued, comme "une victime" et "un martyr" , le second a qualifié Oussema Ben Laden de héros. Largement critiqué par ses confrères, le présentateur a été convoqué par la Haute Autorité Indépendante de la communication audiovisuelle (HAICA) et s'est engagé à ce qu'il n'y ait pas de rediffusion du numéro en question. Dans un communiqué, l'instance a énuméré deux infractions: non respect des dispositions de la conven tion internationale des droits civils et politiques, et particulièrement l'article 6 rela tif au droit à la vie, et non respect de la pluralité des avis et des positions . Dans un communiqué rendu public le 10 février, le Syndicat national des Journali stes Tunisiens (SNJT) , " rappelle aux confrères qu'il n'y a pas de neutralité avec le terrorisme et les terroristes, ennemis de la Tunisie, de la liberté et de la démocra tie", et " appelle à être prudent dans le traitement du dossier terroriste". Le com muniqué du SNJT note que "les abus commis par Samir El Wafi lors de son émis sion, au cours de laquelle il a cherché à présenter les terroristes comme des victi mes, ont contribué à orienter l'émission pour justifier le terrorisme, offensant pro fondément les familles de martyrs et le peuple tunisien." En plus de la corporation, l'émission a fait réagir le syndicat des forces de sûreté. "C'était une émission orientée, cherchant à avoir la sympathie de personnes en particulier", déclare Imed Belhaj Khalifa, secrétaire général du syndicat sur Mosaï que FM. Le syndicaliste refuse même qu'on remette en cause le mode opératoire des forces de sécurité, s'indignant du contenu de l'émission. Face à la grande polémique et la vague d'indignation, Samir El Wafi a admis "des erreurs" et a présenté des excuses à "toutes les familles des martyrs" et "agents de sécurité". "L'erreur est humaine", dit le présentateur. "La liberté est nouvelle, le terrorisme est nouveau", se justifie-t-il, expliquant qu'il a voulu "avoir tous les points de vue" sur le plateau. Comment informer sans servir le terrorisme? L'équation est difficile pour les médias. Intervenant sur Nesma TV dimanche 16 fé vrier, le chargé des affaires juridiques au sein de l'Union nationale des syndicats des forces de sécurité intérieure, Sahbi Jouini, a estimé que mise à part "les spécia listes" avec lesquels la police collabore, "les autres doivent se taire et (nous) laisser travailler". Un discours agressif qui fait craindre des dérives sécuritaires au nom de la lutte contre le terrorisme, ou pousser indirectement les médias à pratiquer l'auto censure http://www.huffpostmaghreb.com/ 87

International Organizations

UN Stop paying al-Qaeda ransoms, UN experts urge

Radical Islamist terror group finances jihadist operations by taking hostages, earned $120 m. in eight years February 20, 2014, 8:46 am 1 Warren Weinstein, a US contractor taken hostage by al-Qaeda in Pakistan in August 2011. UNITED NATIONS (AP) — UN experts are urging a halt to hefty ransom payments that have made kidnapping a core tactic for al-Qaeda and its affiliates in recent years. In a report to the Security Council late Wednesday, the panel monitoring sanctions against al-Qaeda also recommended reinforcing a travel ban against affected indi viduals by using biometrics and improving government lists of “inadmissible” pas sengers. The experts say improvised explosive devices are “the primary weapon of choice of al-Qaeda and its affiliates” and recommend that all countries include explosives and the raw materials and components to make IEDs under the al-Qaeda arms em bargo. According to the experts, al-Qaeda has engaged widely in kidnapping to finance its operations. They cited a US estimate that $120 million in ransom was paid to ter rorist groups between 2004 and 2012. “A total of 1,283 kidnappings motivated by terrorism were reported in 2012, and a 88

single hostage could deliver a seven-figure ransom into the hands of terrorists,” the experts said. The experts said Africa and the Asia-Pacific accounted for 53 percent of kidnap pings recorded worldwide in 2012, an increase from 18 percent in 2004, while the Middle East accounted for 19 percent of kidnappings, up from 4 percent in 2008. Noting that governments worldwide have condemned ransom payments to terror ist groups, the experts urged an end to payouts, stressing that this is a violation of UN sanctions on individuals and groups subject to an asset freeze because of their al-Qaeda links. Overall, the panel said al-Qaeda “remains a threat, even though it has not been able to recover its former strength.” Its leader, Ayman al-Zawahri, is “relatively ineffective,” and affiliates are disregard ing his operational instructions, it said. At the same time, the panel said “multiple al-Qaeda affiliates are evolving, often autonomously.” The experts cited a “generational change” in some al-Qaeda affiliates, with leaders shifting away from figures in their late 40s to 70s to younger men in their late 30s and 40s. Al-Qaeda affiliates have taken advantage of conflicts in Syria and northern Yemen, and gaps in governance in parts of Libya, Iraq and Afghanistan, the report said. They have also found new space to operate when pushed back, it said. Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Magreb, or AQIM, for example, is no longer “anchored” in Mali or its original sanctuaries in Algeria but many fleeing militants have regrouped in southern Libya, the experts said.

Copyright 2014 The Associated Press

Source: The Times of Israel 89

Al-Qaeda: Younger men take up leadership roles - UN study

Feb 21,2014 The leadership of some al-Qaeda affiliates is witnessing a genera tional shift from older men to men in their 30s and 40s, a UN report says. The study also found young as 12. some cells were now recruiting members as It warned of new international networks emerging from foreign militants in Syria meeting the lo cal al-Qaeda-linked Nusra Front. The report concluded that the global terror organisation re Ayman Alzawahiry mained "a threat" despite losing "its former strength". "The ideas, inspiration and networks generated by al-Qaeda continue to reverber ate," according to the report submitted to the Security Council by the UN's Analyti cal and Sanctions Monitoring Team. 'Different perspective' The study on al-Qaeda trends observed a global generational change away from leaders in their late 40s to 70s in recent times. "Mid-level commanders, in particular, are shaped by a different historical experi ence than their predecessors," it said. The report added that "those gaining the most operational terrorist experience to day are younger in age, primarily consisting of individuals in their teens through to early 30s". "Younger commanders and fighters have a different perspective on international affairs, have the potential to generate propaganda that chimes with their genera tion more easily, and can also challenge their own leadership on tactics and tar gets," the UN experts found. They noted that this was particularly evident in groups fighting in Somalia, Yemen, Nigeria, Mali, and Syria. With regard to Syria, the experts warned claims that the al-Nusra Front had no in terest in launching attacks outside the country could "not be taken for granted, as they are an al-Qaeda affiliate in a rapidly evolving conflict". The panel of experts also said the group's Middle East affiliates had begun to ignore 90

instructions by the nominal al-Qaeda leader, Ayman al-Zawahiri, who is currently at large. Ayman Zawahiri was appointed head of the organisation in 2011 following the death of Osama bin Laden, but has become "relatively ineffective" since, the UN report said. http://yemenonline.info/news-3909.html

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Terrorism in the World

Opinion: Terrorism in Sochi

19 February 2014 The world has been clutching its heart since a Dagestan-based terrorist group de clared its intention to target the athletes competing in the Winter Olympic Games in Sochi. The irony here is that one of the reasons the Olympic Games were intro duced was to avert violence between nations and societies. They provided an op portunity for peaceful competition while creating a space for compulsory peace. This was the logic of the ancient Hellenic founders of the Olympics and the idea was revived with the Olympic tradition in the modern era. This is not to suggest that politics or even political confrontation were absent, merely that there would be a kind of temporary truce. In the Cold War era, the Olympics offered a window for political propaganda. Communist nations, for exam ple, paraded the notion that Olympic victories reflected the superiority of an entire political order. The Cold War has ended, of course, while the Olympic Games re main a space for athletic competition and human ingenuity. Moreover, whereas before they were held once every four years in the summer, we now have the Win ter Olympics, held in countries endowed with heavy snowfalls, a phenomenon un familiar to most Arab countries. This year, it was Sochi’s turn to host the Winter Olympics. Russia’s political circum stances and the many small civil wars waged by “Islamist” groups of various stripes based in former Soviet republics with majority Muslim populations would inevitably cast their shadow over the games. This time the threat came from Dagestan. Oddly enough, it took the form of a publicized threat. Generally, the major instrument of terrorism is the element of surprise that can create the largest possible reverbera tions. In fact, the question at hand is far broader and more complex than the nervous ap prehension that has descended upon Sochi. Along a broad global front there ap pears to be a major “awakening” of terrorist groups inspired by or working directly with Al-Qaeda. This resurgence comes after a lull in Al-Qaeda’s operations follow ing the American execution of Osama Bin Laden. At one point, many believed the Arab Spring revolutions had been a major setback for Islamist terrorist movements. It was argued that these revolutions cleared the way for alternative drivers for change in Arab and Islamic states and societies aside from the mechanism of violence disguised in a religious cloak. This contention has turned out to be groundless. What has happened is that Al-Qaeda and its affiliates and their clones have reorganized themselves and have begun to move along two parallel lines. One was to regroup and deploy their forces along a broad front ex tending from the borders of Morocco and northern Mali to Afghanistan; the other was to exploit Muslim minorities to create terrorist cells in other countries. One of 92

those cells surfaced in faraway Boston in the US; another has today reared its head against Sochi in Russia. In fact, these movements benefited greatly from the Arab Spring revolutions that they exploited in various ways. Above all, the revolutions weakened states in the Arab and Islamic world along with their security forces—the police and armed forces. These countries were, therefore, easily penetrable, enabling terrorist groups to establish new bases, as has occurred very visibly in Libya, Yemen and Egypt. In Syria, these groups also succeeded in weakening a peaceful and democ ratic revolution, furnishing the fascist Bashar Al-Assad regime with a golden oppor tunity to survive. The revolutions also opened the way to power—or something resembling it—for the Muslim Brotherhood that found in groups linked with and inspired by Al-Qaeda a handy weapon to wield against civil and democratic political forces. The Muslim Brotherhood, therefore, cooperated with these groups. It is well known that the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt made a deal with the Ansar Bayt Al-Maqdis group for the latter to cease its bombardment of Egyptian natural gas pipelines in exchange for the release of imprisoned members of terrorist groups and for permission for Islamist militants abroad to return to Egypt. That deal marked the beginning of the Muslim Brotherhood–Ansar Bayt Al-Maqdis alliance that we see in operation in Egypt today. Thirdly, the revolutions generated enormous arsenals of advanced weaponry that gave Islamist terrorist groups a major material and logistical boost. These groups had never previously dreamed of the abundant arms sources they would find in Libya, Syria and Iraq. This alarmingly broad scope of terrorist movements with their various guises and interpretations of fundamentalism received powerful blows when the Muslim Brotherhood regime in Egypt fell and when the Syrian resistance decided it could ally itself terrorist groups like the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS) in order to establish a civil democratic government in a unified Syrian state. However, the great clash between terrorism and the Arab state is still in its initial phases. Some strategic thinking of the first order will have to be brought to the fore, as the battle not only takes place in streets and squares but also in hearts and minds. There is also a danger of setbacks due to the circumstances of the socioeconomic classes these groups seek to exploit. Nevertheless, the battle that is unfolding in Egypt has brought some initial benefits. Not only did it prove how the Muslim Brotherhood and its allies failed in their management of the state, it also showed how they failed to win the support of the majority of the people behind the false religious banners they wielded for the purposes of deception, tyranny and aggression. A complex and multifaceted battle such as this also requires intensive and coordi nated regional and international action. Various forms of cooperation between the security agencies of the countries concerned probably already exist. However, co 93

operation must be closer, not only with respect to direct confrontation against ter rorist groups but also with respect to addressing “Islamist thinking” and the socio economic classes these groups prey on and from which they draw their recruits, brainwashing them until they become savage killing machines that murder women, children and the elderly without a moment’s hesitation, and who become so bloodthirsty that they wrench the hearts out of their victims and brandish them in front of TV cameras. Clearly there must be closer coordination in intelligence gathering and border con trols, and the most sophisticated technology available must be put to use. The de teriorating situations in Iraq, Syria, Libya, Somalia and Sudan cannot be allowed to continue, as they increasingly threaten the stability and security of other countries in the region that have managed to defeat the onslaught of the blend of extrem ism and terrorism. Arab national security as a whole and that of individual Arab states is facing a terri fying danger. Its roots do not only exist in this part of the world; they extend to other countries where it extends its networks of hatred and hostility. Its threat against the Olympic Games in Sochi is not the first manifestation of this peril, nor will it be the last. Once, several years ago, former Egyptian president Hosni Muba rak proposed an international anti-terrorism conference. Its purpose was to set into motion an international campaign to unify efforts in the fight against terror ism and to establish systems for tracking and monitoring the funding, armament and training operations of terrorist groups. Is anyone out there ready to take up this proposal? http://www.aawsat.net/2014/02/article55329142 94

Bangladesh Qaeda for intifada in Bangladesh?

Message posted last month; authenticity not confirmed; govt cautious Star Report

An audiovisual message purported to be from al-Qaeda chief Ayman al Zawahiri has urged the Muslims in Bangladesh to wage an intifada (popular upris ing) to confront the “crusader onslaught against Islam”. Posted in Jihadology.net, the message alleged thousands of people were being killed in the streets of Bangladesh for protesting the “collusion of the anti-Islam secular government with a bunch of transgressing secularists”. "I invite you to lead the masses in a vast and inclusive popular uprising (intifada) whose tide dose not recede, nor its dynamism subsides, until the Shariah of Islam governs the land of Islam, instead of being governed over,” it went on. Titled “ Bangladesh: A Massacre behind a Wall of Silence ”, the message was re leased on January 14, but it surfaced in the media only yesterday. In it, the voice of an unseen narrator is placed over still images including Zawahiri's and video clips along with English subtitle. Not a single shot does show the al Qaeda chief speaking on camera. Jihadology, which describes itself as a clearinghouse for Jihadi source materials, said this was a new message of Zawahiri and it was presented by As-Saḥab, known as the media house of al-Qaeda. The Daily Star could not independently verify the authenticity of the message. The government was communicating with counterterrorism partners like the US and the UK to verify whether the voice was indeed of Zawahiri, State Minister for 95

Foreign Affairs Shahriar Alam told this newspaper yesterday. Zawahiri, an Egyptian physician, took the helm of the much-feared global militant organisation after US Navy SEALS killed Osama bin Laden in Pakistan in 2011. The audiovisual material starts with photographs from the May 5, 2013 Hefajat-e Islam rally in Dhaka and the subsequent crackdown by law enforcers on it. "A massacre of Muslims is being carried out these days, and the Muslim world is totally oblivious to it. The western media is colluding with the killers to belittle its significance and hide the facts," the message said. “Hundreds of callers to the religion and scholars are also facing hardships, man hunts, imprisonment, trials, death sentences and life imprisonments without any guilt,” it said. "My Muslim brothers in Bangladesh, I invite you to confront this crusader on slaught against Islam, which is being orchestrated by the leading criminals in the subcontinent and the West… The release went on, "Bangladesh is the victim of the conspiracy in which the agents of India, the corrupt leadership of the Pakistan army, and treacherous power hungry politicians of Bangladesh and Pakistan, who are always prepared to sacrifice everything for the sake of fulfilling their ambitions and desires, were all equal participants." Turning to the Liberation War, 1971, the message said, "Their purpose was not in dependence from Pakistan, stopping the aggression against the people of Bangla desh, or getting rid of military rule in Pakistan." The real purpose was weakening the Muslim Ummah in the subcontinent, the release claimed. Bangladesh is being turned into "a subjugated surrogate of India", it also said. "Those who massacred the Muslims in Bangladesh only yesterday are the same people who are massacring the Muslims in Pakistan today. Similarly, those who al lied with India against Pakistan by claiming that they sought to defend the honour and sanctities of Bengalis are the same people who are attacking the sanctities, be liefs, honour, lives and properties of Bengalis today." While accusing the media for downplaying the alleged attacks, he also criticised the West for remaining "unmoved". The events in Bangladesh enjoy the blessings of both India and America, "since their interests in fighting Islam overlap, and this is why their bilateral relations are becoming stronger day by day". When people of Afghanistan, Mali, and Somalia "decide to implement” Shariah", "they are then met with a full-fledged military onslaught, in which the leading inter national criminals and their local surrogates take part". 96

"But when Salman Rushdie, Taslima Nasrin and Ali Rajib Haider insult Islam, the Prophet of Islam (pbuh), and the beliefs of Islam, they are treated as heroes who must be defended, honoured, and given awards," said the al-Qaeda chief. Comparing the situation in Bangladesh with the attacks on Muslims in Myanmar, he said, "The events in Bangladesh and Burma are not too distant from the oppres sion and killings of Muslims in Kashmir or the racial cleansing in Assam, Gujarat and Ahmadabad either."

'GOVT NOT FRIGHTENED'

Bangladesh has worked with different countries to combat terrorism and gradually built its capacity to deal with the issue in the last five years, State Minister Shahriar told The Daily Star. "Our efforts and successes in the arena of counterterrorism have been praised by many countries and international platforms. I hope that our partners will continue cooperating with us in this regard." He alleged the BNP-Jamaat alliance was making political efforts to belittle Bangla desh and it has been instigating international terrorist organisations like al-Qaeda by its irresponsible comments and activities. The opposition alliance has chosen the path of terrorism as it failed to do anything democratically, Shahriar said. "They carried out terrorist activities before the parlia mentary election and now they are issuing threats through the international terror groups like al-Qaeda." BNP leaders in Brussels urged the European Union to suspend Bangladesh's trade privileges in the market but their effort went futile, said the state minister. The recent filing of a complaint against Bangladesh with the International Criminal Court (ICC) was also not by coincidence, he added. British lawyer Toby Cadman, who represented the Jamaat-e-Islami, filed the com plaint on February 14, urging the ICC to conduct an investigation into "the persecu tion of political foes by the government". The complaint was filed 10 days after BNP Chairperson Khaleda Zia in a press brief ing cited imaginary figures of unnatural deaths. "The complaint quoted those imaginary figures," Shahriar said. Asked about the government's next course of action regarding the complaint, he said, "We have learnt about it unofficially and are preparing to respond to it. We will prove that the accusation is false once the ICC informs us of it formally." Agriculture Minister Matia Chowdhury said the government was neither taking the so-called al-Qaeda threat lightly nor giving it too much importance. "The govern ment is not frightened by the threat." 97

Meanwhile, State Minister for Home Asaduzzaman Khan told the BBC Bangla ser vice that he had not heard of the audio message but "I would say regarding this that we are always alert to the matter and that we will never allow the rise of ter rorism in our country." Asked about the post, Senior Home Secretary CQK Mustaq Ahmed said they are looking into it. Also, Director General of the Rapid Action Battalion Mokhlesur Rahman said the al Qaeda chief's so-called statement did not go with the real picture in Bangladesh. “The situations in Bangladesh and Afghanistan are not the same." The law enforcement agencies are always ready to deal with such threats, the offi cial added. http://www.thedailystar.net/frontpage/qaeda-for-intifada-in-bangladesh-11575 98

France Deal entre la France et le Mnla

17 Février 2014

Que faut il retenir, depuis toujours, du Mouvement national de libération de l’A zawad ? Y’a t -il une complicité entre la France et ce groupuscule ?

Tout le monde sait que le Mouvement national de libération de l’Azawad a mis en péril le Mali et empoisonné la vie d’Amadou Toumani Touré. Avec ses acolytes jiha distes et narcotrafiquants, il s’illustre en plus dans les crimes contre l’humanité. Qui soutient le Mnla ? Et pourquoi ? Personne n’ignore que l’existence de ce grou pe de mécréant, tout comme sa pérennité, c’est du bluff sous la houlette de la France, la Communauté internationale et l’Occident avide de richesses, surtout cel les de l’Azawad. Un flash back en apporte la preuve tangible à partir d’un bref re tour sur le passé ! L’histoire officielle du Soudan français -avare en impasse ou en falsification- n’indi que pas comment l’administration coloniale, mécontente des velléités du peuple soudanais développa dans la conscience des touareg la supériorité raciale sur des concitoyens jugés indignes, esclaves. 99

Las et déboussolé de voir ses intérêt s’effriter, après avoir vendu leurs grands au Américains, le maudit colon, encouragea, pour retourner à sa source de vie, une révolte cinglante au Mali indépendant. La première se déroula sous Modibo Keita. Elle ne reposait sur rien dans une nouvelle nation éprise de paix. Mais, elle a été sévèrement réprimée avec ses relents ethnocentristes et séparatis tes. Car, elle constituait une réelle menace pour la cohésion nationale. Alors, il fal lait, à tout prix l’éradiquer pour ne pas compromettre le développement du Mali. Source: http://www.malijet.com/ 100

Iraq

A Comprehensive Strategy Against Terrorism

Iraq is using all the political, economic, and military tools at its dis posal in its effort to defeat al Qaeda.

FEBRUARY 18, 2014 BAGHDAD — When al Qaeda and other terrorist groups attacked Anbar province in late December and temporarily took control of parts of the cities of Fallujah and Ramadi, U.S. Secretary of State John Kerry said, "This is a fight that belongs to the Iraqis." Indeed this is our fight. More than two years after American troops left Iraq, with violent extremist groups such as al Qaeda resurgent, Iraq accepts that it is our re sponsibility to defeat them militarily, to isolate them politically, and to create the social and economic conditions that will deny them any local support in the future. While the battle against al Qaeda in Anbar province is Iraq's fight, it is part of a lar ger struggle against terrorism that threatens our neighbors in the Middle East and North Africa and also endangers the United States and the entire world commu nity. The terrorism we face is transnational in nature, and defeating it will require international collaboration, including a strong partnership between the United States and Iraq. As President Barack Obama emphasized in his State of the Union address, we need to work together as partners to "disrupt and disable" terrorist networks. Both the United States and Iraq, then, have much to gain by making the shared effort against our shared enemies. 101

In order to defend and rebuild our country, Iraq needs American equipment and American know-how, as well as private investment in our own country and strate gic coordination in our region. Such common efforts against common enemies in pursuit of common goals are the object of the Strategic Framework Agreement that the United States and Iraq signed before the withdrawal of American troops in 2011. Iraq is not a protectorate; we are a partner. Iraqis are grateful to the U.S. troops who served in our country, some of whom made the ultimate sacrifice. But today Iraq is a sovereign country that does not need American boots on the ground. In that spirit of partnership, I want to share the thinking behind our efforts to de fend our country against terrorism. Over the last decade, the Iraqi people and their elected leaders have learned many lessons. We understand that a purely military approach will not succeed in stopping terrorism, much less in healing the sectarian, ethnic, and regional rifts that are exploited by violent extremism. We also understand that terrorism is not solely an Iraqi problem but an interna tional problem. Nowhere is this more evident than in the case of the Syrian civil war: Time and again, I have cautioned against the spillover of terrorism from that conflict to our own country, and now it has happened. With logistical support from their bases in Syria, al Qaeda and other extremist forces have re-established their presence in western Iraq and increasingly are able to send suicide bombers into our country to cause death, destruction, and disorder. These groups have renewed their campaign to foment sectarian violence and have sought to drive a wedge be tween our people. The spillover from Syria is the most important factor in the up surge of violence in Iraq over the past year. But make no mistake: What we are witnessing is not sectarian strife -- it is indis criminate slaughter. Al Qaeda kills Shiites. Al Qaeda kills Sunnis. And, on Christmas, the terrorists bombed Christian neighborhoods in Baghdad, murdering more than two dozen people on their holiest day. Because al Qaeda believes in blowing people up, not in winning people over, it can be beaten, must be beaten, and will be beaten. Iraq has defeated al Qaeda before, and we have a holistic strategy to defeat al Qaeda again. We aim not only to defeat terrorists when we find them, but also to diminish the discontent on which they feed. We are pursuing a comprehensive, multifaceted strategy of constitutional governance, social inclusion, security operations, diplo matic outreach, and economic development to accomplish this. We want to work in partnership with the United States on all these efforts, especially as we move forward toward a crucial milestone in Iraq's progress from dictatorship to democ racy -- our fourth parliamentary elections since 2003. We are committed to conducting these elections by April 30, 2014, and to provid ing a secure environment across Iraq that will encourage voter participation, thereby enhancing the legitimacy of the democratically elected government and 102

diminishing the appeal of the extremists. Al Qaeda understands the importance of our elections, and so should Iraqis and Americans. By trying to sow disorder and chaos less than three months ahead of the vote, the terrorists are seeking to reignite divisions within Iraqi society and un dermine our emerging democratic institutions. We cannot and will not allow this to happen. It is our duty to ensure that communities can exercise their right to vote freely without intimidation or fear.

Security Operations

Winning the support of the people we defend is central to our strategy for defeat ing terrorism. Because al Qaeda is targeting all Iraqis -- whether Shiites, Sunnis, Kurds, or Turkmen, among other groups -- we are seeking to unite all Iraqis against the forces of extremism An effective counterterrorism strategy requires us to harness the full capacity of our security forces. Because of our outreach efforts, many Sunni tribes and clans have been fighting alongside the security forces in Anbar, Ninevah, and other trou bled provinces. As during the American "surge" beginning in 2007, the security forces have the sup port of the Sons of Iraq. These groups of local citizens -- which started among the Sunni tribes in Anbar province and expanded nationally -- help to protect their communities by serving as auxiliary police forces. We are also empowering local tribesmen, who fight alongside Iraqi police forces, to help eradicate the scourge of al Qaeda. We are providing these tribesmen with the weapons, money, and logistical support to take on the challenge -- and where local forces require extra assistance, we have sent in special forces that are trained in counterterrorism operations. The national army is also pursuing terrorist camps in the remote desert areas of Anbar, in addition to securing our borders. We have also listened to the concerns of the local provincial council and have re frained from ordering the Army into Anbar's towns. We know that al Qaeda uses civilians as human shields -- because of our desire to avoid civilian casualties, we have sought to empower local forces to tackle this threat from within. These operations may take time, but they are the surest way of reducing the suffer ing of local residents, who have endured much over the years, while ensuring that the security gains can be sustained and consolidated. That is why we plan to build upon our effort to incorporate the Sons of Iraq movement into the security forces so that they can take primary responsibility for their own areas -- and to eventually position Army units outside the provinces, as stipulated by the constitution. Our government has also sought to reinstate army and police officers who had been unfairly dismissed after the collapse of the former regime. We have held five rounds of reinstatements to encourage former officers to rejoin the security forces. U.S. support for Iraq's security is still important -- especially military equipment and 103

intelligence cooperation, which allows us to track down and eliminate terrorist net works. We have also begun discussions with our American counterparts on resum ing training for our counterterrorism forces. We are not asking for American for eign aid. Thanks to our rapidly growing economy, we are able and willing to pay for all the military equipment we need. That is why the Obama administration offered to sell us Apache helicopters, and we are grateful that Congress has now approved that sale.

Social Inclusion

Open, inclusive politics is an integral part of our security strategy. A society where every community has a voice and no one feels excluded will deny extremists the support they require for their violent aims. As a testament to our progress, Freedom House recognized that opposition parties were able to organize freely during last year's provincial elections. For this and other reasons, Freedom House upgraded Iraq's rating on political rights. We are striving for a society where grievances can be heard and differences can be re solved through open debate and peaceful protests. However, we cannot allow extremists to undermine our country by taking advan tage of our democratic freedoms. Once it became clear that terrorists in Anbar were attempting to hijack the lawful demands of civilian protesters and infiltrating their protest camp in Ramadi to foment sectarian tensions, in addition to blocking the main highway to Jordan and Syria for several months, we moved to work with the local provincial council and tribal elders to end the protests peacefully. We knew that given the opportunity to address their concerns peacefully, local leaders would reject those who preach divisiveness and practice violence. When security forces eventually moved to close down the camp, there was not a single instance of violence. As our past elections have shown, the overwhelming majority of Iraqis embrace ballots, not bullets. From our recent history, Iraqis have concluded that no single faction -- whether ethnic, religious, regional, or political -- should dominate our country. The only way for our government to succeed is to be inclusive, in every way. In all these efforts, it is essential to empower local governments to settle local grievances. By decentralizing governmental authority, we aim to promote the social inclusion that discourages people from resorting to, or even tacitly supporting, vio lent rebellion. Decentralization may not be the easiest way to govern, but it is the most empowering because everyone has a stake in the system. Iraq is led today by a government of national unity. All the major political blocs in parliament are represented at the cabinet level. This is the antithesis of the kind of single-party government that we endured under Saddam Hussein. We may have our differences, but we are resolving them through dialogue and understanding within our constitutional institution. While inclusiveness and dialogue may not be the speediest ways to make decisions, they are the best ways to ensure that deci 104

sions are accepted across ethnic, regional, and religious lines.

International Support

Complementing our domestic outreach, we have called on the international com munity, including the United States, the European Union and the Arab League, to tackle the transnational nature of terrorism. Much of our effort has focused on working with our neighbors to find a just end to the civil war in neighboring Syria, which has had a direct impact on our security. We have insisted from the very beginning of the conflict that only a negotiated political settlement can offer hope for ending the cycle of violence, and we have fully sup ported the United Nations' initiatives, such as the Geneva process, which provides a framework for talks between the Syrian government and the opposition. We are also cooperating closely with Jordan, the United Arab Emirates, and other countries in the region to address the crisis in Syria. Such cooperation is critical to demonstrating moderate Arab solidarity and countering growing sectarian polariza tion. In the face of extremism and terrorism, we need an axis of moderation with our Arab brothers. Our region requires a concerted effort to cut off regional sources of funding that are sustaining al Qaeda and other extremist groups. We also need to address the worrying rise of recruitment by jihadists who incite hatred and sectarianism by glamorizing their evil acts of violence. Throughout the Middle East, governments and civil society need to be more vocal in countering the sectarian narrative of ji hadists who seek to pit the people of our region against each other. Iraq is reaching out diplomatically to all our neighbors in order to build strong rela tions and resolve any outstanding political issues, which will involve tackling the sources of regional instability upon which al Qaeda thrives. Turning the page from the previous regime, we have a policy of noninterference in our neighbors' affairs. We do not want to have differences with any country in the region -- not Turkey, not Saudi Arabia, not Iran, and not Syria. And our policy is working. Under Saddam, Iraq was isolated internationally and re gionally. Today, 17 nations from the Middle East and North Africa have embassies in Iraq, and we have good relations with almost all Arab countries. Where we still have disagreements, we are moving forward to resolve them through constructive dialogue. We are resolving our outstanding issues with Kuwait -- a legacy of the former regime. The recent official visit to Baghdad by the prime minister of Kuwait and the restoration of air travel for the first time in 23 years are significant developments in resolving our differences. As a consequence of our im proved relations with Kuwait, the U.N. Security Council has lifted the crippling sanc tions against our country. Our diplomatic progress is also reflected in our having hosted the Arab League summit in Baghdad in March 2012. Today our neighbors see us as the partner that we are, not the pariah that Saddam 105

Hussein once was.

Economic Development

Economic development dampens support for extremist violence by offering better lives for all our people and opportunities for the young men targeted by extremists for recruitment. On Saturday, Feb. 15, I visited Anbar and discussed with local council officials and tribal leaders our plan to defeat terrorism and rebuild the prov ince. We agreed to integrate some 10,000 tribal fighters into the local security forces and announced plans to allocate a multimillion-dollar reconstruction pack age for Anbar in this year's federal budget. By providing jobs and stimulating invest ment, we can begin to undo the damage that has been inflicted upon our people in Anbar by terrorists. On the national level, we have made significant strides in bolstering our economy. The Economist Intelligence Unit recently listed Iraq as one of the 10 countries whose economies are expected to grow the most in 2014. On the energy front, our oil production has increased by 50 percent since 2005. And it is poised to grow further: We produced 3.2 million barrels a day last year and expect to increase our oil production to 4.5 million barrels per day by the end of 2014 -- and then to 9 million barrels per day by 2020. This translates into $5 trillion in oil revenue for the Iraqi government through 2035, and we are investing this money in our people, our communities, and our infra structure. We are rebuilding roads, bridges, highways, railroads, and airports. We are restoring our electric power, water supply, and sanitation systems. And we are improving our schools and health-care facilities. Americans can provide what our nation needs through investment and trade, not charity and aid. Iraqis want to partner with every segment of society -- not only the government, but also the business sector. Iraq offers American companies tremendous opportunities to design and build schools, bridges, highways, hospitals, water treatment facilities, telecommunica tions systems -- and much more. These investments are potentially lucrative and play an important role in our stra tegic plan to fight terrorism and promote reconciliation. Major American compa nies, including Citibank, Ford, Boeing, and General Electric are doing business with Iraq, and we hope that many more will seize the opportunities of our expanding economy. Iraq's recent purchases from American companies have soared into the billions of dollars -- notably 41 Boeing planes, contracts with General Electric to re habilitate our power grid, and purchases of military hardware to equip the Iraqi se curity forces. These are just a sign of our potential as a partner and market. Our determination to build a united and prosperous Iraq that is a beacon of stabil ity and democracy in the region has not waned. The threat of al Qaeda has rallied Iraqis behind our security forces at this crucial historic moment. 106

Americans and Iraqis have sacrificed so much in our common struggle against our common enemy -- terrorism. With a comprehensive strategy against violent ex tremism, we are determined to build an Iraqi future worthy of our shared sacri fices. Source: http://www.foreignpolicy.com/ 107

Ukraine With President’s Departure, Ukraine Looks Toward a Murky Future

FEB. 22, 2014 Launch media viewer Deputies entered the Parliament building in Kiev. President Viktor F. Yanukovych fled the capital, taking with him any trace of a peace deal that had sought to freeze Ukraine’s tumult. Sergey Ponomarev for The New York Times KIEV, Ukraine — As ranks of riot police officers, Interior Ministry troops and even the president vanished Saturday from the capital, Ukraine slipped, with often eerie calm after months of tumultuous protests and a week of bloody mayhem, into the hands of revolution. Gone along with President Viktor F. Yanukovych, who had fled to eastern Ukraine, was any trace of a Friday peace deal that had sought to freeze the country’s tu mult by trimming the powers of the president while allowing him to stay in office until the end of the year. At the president’s mist-shrouded residential compound just outside the capital in Mezhgorye, Sergey Belaus, a major in Ukraine’s State Protection service, said he had handed over control of Mr. Yanukovych’s living quarters and his tennis court to the head of a small band of antigovernment militants at 9 a.m. 108

“He came. We talked, and we agreed that he would now be in charge,” said Mr. Belaus, recounting that helicopters and cars had fled the compound, on a bluff overlooking the Dnieper River, overnight. He said he did not know where Mr. Yanukovych had gone.

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A New Order in Ukraine

Also unknown is what now fills the vacuum left by Mr. Yanukovych’s departure: perhaps an orderly new leadership headed by established opposition parties, per haps a chaotic cacophony of voices driven by the passions of the street or, most ominously of all, perhaps the establishment of two or more rival power centers pushing the fractured nation into a Yugoslav-style disintegration. Fear of the establishment of rival power centers gained ground on Saturday when Mr. Yanukovych, having left the capital, popped up on television from Kharkiv, a Russian-speaking and strongly pro-Russian city in the east of the country near the Russian border. He said he had not resigned, had no plans to do so and was con sulting with supporters in the east about what to do next. “I am a legitimately elected president,” he said defiantly. “What is happening to day, mostly, it is vandalism, banditism, and a coup d’état.”Kharkiv has strong ties to Russia. Early Soviet leaders — doubtful of Kiev’s loyalty, fearful of Ukrainian speaking regions farther west but determined to anchor Ukraine under Moscow’s control — chose Kharkiv as the capital of their newly established Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic, a nominally autonomous entity but entirely controlled by Mos cow. 109

Southern Ukraine, especially the region of Crimea, also has strong ties to Russia. Pro-Russian politicians in Crimea have been demanding autonomy from Kiev and even “protection” for their aspirations from Moscow, which has a large military presence in the Black Sea region, notably in Sevastopol, a port city with a huge Rus sian naval base. If Mr. Yanukovych sought to rally the east of Ukraine to his side, the west of the country, long a bastion of fierce Ukrainian nationalism, would almost certainly re spond by mobilizing its own forces to protect the idea of a single nation. All this presents an unwelcome distraction for President Vladimir V. Putin of Russia, who has been busy at the Winter Olympic Games in Sochi trying to present a softer, friendlier image of his country to a suspicious world. But, with the Olympics set to end on Sunday, Mr. Putin will no doubt turn all his attention to a drama that has driven a key Russian ally from Kiev and now threatens to install a new government dominated by people Moscow has characterized as extremists, terrorists and even Nazis. The east-west divide has bedeviled Ukraine since it first emerged as an independ ent state after the 1991 collapse of the Soviet Union. In each election since, voters have split along a line running roughly through the middle of the country. But these divisions have grown into a gaping chasm in recent months as the Ukrain ian-speaking west has rallied unambiguously behind protesters in Kiev’s Independ ence Square while many in the east, their views shaped in part by doom-laden re ports on widely watched Russian television, have recoiled in horror at what they saw as an attempt to oust a legitimate, democratically elected leader viewed as one of their own. Mr. Yanukovych built his political career in Donetsk, an eastern coal-mining and in dustrial center whose bleak Soviet-era urban landscape is a world away from the elegant and proudly European splendor of western cities like Lviv. These stark divisions, rooted in history, language and culture, have put Ukraine on a fault line that has shaped not only the country’s domestic politics but also a geo political struggle between Russia and the West at the heart of Ukraine’s current tumult. The protests in Independence Square began in November after Mr. Yanukovych rejected a sweeping trade and political deal with the European Union and turned to Moscow for help.

Culturally and Politically Divided

Ukraine’s political split reflects a deeper cultural divide in the country. In the 2010 presidential election, the opposition won in all of Ukraine’s western provinces, where most people speak Ukrainian rather than Russian and many call for deeper economic and political ties with Europe. 110

Looming over this struggle, and over the prospects of survival for whatever gov ernment emerges in Kiev, is a stark question: Who will help fill the depleted cof fers of a country on the brink of bankruptcy and crippled by arguably one of the most troubled economies in the world? Russia was willing back in December, offering $15 billion and cheap natural gas. But the price Moscow exacted in return, a future in the Russian orbit, only in flamed the protests. A rejection of Russian aid seems to have been one of the con ditions set by European diplomats who helped mediate the now-moribund politi cal deal on Friday between Mr. Yanukovych and three opposition leaders. Russia’s envoy at the talks, unlike the Europeans, refused to sign the final agree ment. And while Washington and European capitals cheered the accord as a breakthrough that could end a lethal spiral of violence, Moscow raised niggling legal points about constitutional changes. Europe’s determination to force a deal was captured by a television camera that filmed Radoslaw Sikorski, the Polish foreign minister, giving a blunt warning to op position leaders. “If you don’t support this, you will have martial law, the army,” Mr. Sikorski said as he hurried out of a room at the presidential administration. “You’ll all be dead.” With protesters now in control of the presidential compound in Mezhgorye and the government district of Kiev, the deal lies in ruins. It is now Mr. Yanukovych who risks being killed if he shows his face in Kiev. But the economic mess that drove much of the anger against him remains, only now it is Europe and America that must help Ukraine. The agreement signed Friday did not explicitly reject money from Russia, but Europe and the United States have been leaning heavily on Kiev to accept that only a Western aid package led by the International Monetary Fund can rescue Ukraine’s economy. “The United States view — and I believe this view is shared by our European allies and partners — is that the only viable route back to sustainable economic health for Ukraine goes through the I.M.F.,” said a senior state department official speak ing on the condition of anonymity on Friday. To this point, however, neither Washington nor Brussels has figured out how ex actly to come to the aid of one of the most corrupt and inefficient economies in the world without being dragged into the sinkhole with it. “Nobody wants to end up owning all the problems that Ukraine faces,” said Mark Leonard, director of the European Council on Foreign Relations. “The country is bankrupt, it has a terrible, broken system of government and insane levels of cor ruption.” With this in mind, Europe and the United States have largely subcontracted the job to the I.M.F., which has been negotiating with Kiev for months over an aid 111

package that, unlike the money offered by Moscow, has numerous strings at tached, notably requirements that Ukraine scythe a thicket of bureaucratic regula tions and cut subsidies that keep domestic energy prices low — and cripple the government’s finances. American and European officials have indicated that the I.M.F. might be ready to relax conditions that, if imposed on Ukraine’s new government, would only stoke public anger and jeopardize the survival of what is likely to be a very fragile and fractious leadership. After three months of chanting “bandits out,” Ukraine’s protesters appear to have finally achieved their goal. But whoever now comes in will inherit a country bereft of money, political consensus, a unifying culture and even rudimentary agreement among citizens on what their nation is. http://www.nytimes.com/ 112

USA What Might Terrorists Do Next?

February 24, 2014 The Sept. 11, 2001, terrorist attacks created an atmosphere of anxiety and uncer tainty. No one knew how many more large-scale attacks were in the pipeline. Might more Mohammad Attas already be in the country making the final preparations for new 9/11s? Were armies of terrorist “sleepers” awaiting their wakeup call? Over the last dozen years, would-be terrorists plotted to strike the American home land with bombs, bullets, poisons and fire, targeting transportation venues, sport ing events, financial institutions, any place that offered the potential for a high body count. For all their plotting, though, only a few domestic terrorists have suc ceeded in striking on U.S. soil since 2001. America’s counterterrorism defense was crafted with attention to past terrorist behavior and critical thinking about what might be ahead. America’s evolving counterterrorism regimen included a fundamental shift in law enforcement. Instead of investigating attacks after they took place – a dissatisfying response to terrorists trying to kill thousands – investigators were pushed to un cover and thwart terrorist attacks before they occurred.

Post-9/11

If there is one lesson America learned about counterterrorism on 9/11, it’s that the coming attack may look nothing like those that preceded it. Post-9/11, the focus of analysis shifted from threat-based to vulnerability-based 113

assessments. Instead of starting with what we knew about terrorists’ intentions and capabilities, the traditional starting point for assessing risk, analysts started with hypothetical vulnerabilities. Attacks on the power grid, transportation, food processing, nuclear reactors, were among the worst-case hypotheticals considered. There were alarming alerts, but no more 9/11s, no army of sleepers. Domestic in telligence efforts, while still not optimal, have thus far proved largely successful. Of 43 jihadist terrorist plots in the U.S. since 9/11, the FBI and local police have uncov ered and thwarted all but four of them – two attacks by lone gunmen, a failed at tempt to detonate a bomb in New York’s Times Square and the 2013 bombing at the Boston Marathon. Al Qaeda’s intense online campaign to inspire homegrown terrorists to action mus tered a tiny turnout. Its message of armed jihad against the West gained little trac tion among America’s Muslims. Since 9/11, fewer than 300 persons have been ar rested for providing material support to jihadist groups, attempting to join jihadist fronts, or more seriously, plotting to carry out terrorist attacks in the United States. Few resembled the “lone wolves” portrayed in the news media. Most were barely competent although still dangerous.

Still a Threat

But terrorism will continue to be a threat. Unrelenting pursuit of al Qaeda’s leaders has degraded its operational capabilities but not dented its determination. The spread of its ideology and its establishment of new footholds in Africa and the Mid dle East demonstrate al Qaeda’s resiliency and guarantee new generations of ter rorists to continue its global terrorist campaign. And al Qaeda is not the only terror ist threat. Since 9/11, would-be terrorists contemplated crashing a hijacked airliner into an urban area at least seven times. New security measures make that more difficult, but terrorists continue to be obsessed with sabotaging commercial airliners. Au thorities also worry about commercial airliners being shot down with missiles – there have been a few attempts. Meanwhile, terrorists have bombed or plotted to bomb airports. They have targeted subways, trains, and stations and have at tempted to derail speeding passenger trains. For terrorists seeking high body counts, surface transportation targets are easily accessible and offer crowds of people in confined environments. Most planned attacks involved bombings, though suicide bombings have rarely been contemplated. Most focused on “soft” targets that offered easy access. New security measures hopefully have made it more difficult for local terrorists to as semble the large vehicle bombs seen in conflict zones abroad, but terrorists can fabricate smaller devices. Online extremist publications urge terrorists to exploit the more accessible weapon of fire. Terrorists also have thought about releasing poison gas or dispersing home 114

made ricin in crowded public places. Conventional explosives may cause more casualties, but chemical, biological, or radiological attacks would cause more alarm and create costly cleanups. Terrorists have plotted the assassination of government officials, but security offi cials worry most about terrorists killing and seizing hostages at shopping malls, hotels or other public places as we saw in Mumbai and recently in Nairobi. But many of the terrorist plots that come to light today are nothing more than ambitious fantasies. No one can predict with any certainty what terrorists might do next. However, looking back at their recent attacks, attempts, and interrupted plots gives us an idea of what they are thinking about. This is useful, though it should not get in the way of creative thinking. If there is one lesson America learned about counterterrorism on 9/11, it’s that the coming attack may look nothing like those that preceded it. Source: http://www.insurancejournal.com/ 115

Yemen Yemeni ‘global terrorist’ says he has counterterrorism advice for Washington

Feb 17,2014 SANAA, Yemen — Abd al Wahhab al-Humayqani has some advice for Washington. The United States is doing more to stoke terrorism, here in the heartland of al-Qaeda’s most active franchise, than to defeat it, he says. What the United States ought to do, he argues, is strengthen Yemen’s state institutions — rather than create enemies by carry ing out drone strikes. “The U.S. can protect itself by cooperating directly with local authorities,” he said in an in terview in Yemen’s capital. Take it from a man who might know. In December, the U.S. Treasury Department branded Humayqani, 42, a specially designated global terrorist, freezing his assets and sanctioning anyone who does business with him. The Treasury accused Humayqani of using his network of Yemen-based charities to funnel money to al-Qaeda, placing him “at the center of global support networks that fund and facilitate terrorism.” The Treasury said that as of 2012, Humayqani was “an important figure” within one of the terrorist group’s most dangerous wings, al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula, and that he had helped to orchestrate violent attacks on government targets and to recruit fighters. Humayqani denies all of it. He said his charities benefit “orphans, mosques and poor families,” not al-Qaeda. “My personal stance is against al-Qaeda operations, because they kill outside the law,” he said. It may be no surprise that a person who is the subject of sanctions dismisses the charges against him. But what makes Humayqani’s case slightly more puzzling, and potentially awkward for the United States, is that he says he is willing to meet with U.S. officials — he 116

claims to have requested a meeting at the U.S. embassy; the embassy declined to comment — and even face a court of law. “I don’t have any objections to going on trial here in Yemen to defend myself against any charges — even if it’s from the American Treasury,” he said, speaking in the lobby of a five- star hotel that is frequented by politicians and diplomats. His life is hardly that of a terrorist, he said. “I’m the secretary general of a political party, and I live here in Sanaa,” he said, as two politicians from another party stopped to greet him with kisses. “I’m a member of the National Dialogue,” he added, referring to a partially U.S.-sponsored effort to bridge divides among Yemeni political parties, tribes and activists.

An uncomfortable disconnect

Humayqani’s open challenge to the U.S. government highlights an uncomfortable disconnect between Washington and a government that it depends on for local in telligence and cooperation in its global war on terrorism. Al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula ( ing a AQAP ) has deep roots in this impoverished cor ner of the Arab world. AQAP has carried out at least two failed attacks on U.S. soil in recent years, and U.S. intelligence officials say they have thwarted others, includ plot in August that shut down embassies across the region. The CIA and the Pentagon have collectively carried out dozens of covert airstrikes against terrorism suspects here over the past five years, according to the Long War Journal and other monitoring groups that track the strikes. But Yemen’s government has long been a fickle partner, pledging allegiance to Washington in its war on terrorism while simultaneously appeasing local anger over drone strikes by paying compensation to some victims. Critics here also accuse some powerful politicians, including former president Ali Abdullah Saleh, of culti vating the country’s homegrown jihadists. In December, the Yemeni government openly took issue with its American allies over Humayqani. “Yemenis were surprised . . . that a national religious, academic and political figure .

 . .was, without any basis, placed on a list of terror supporters,” Yemen’s Ministry of Human Rights said in a statement. Yemen’s National Dialogue Conference also condemned the charges. Humayqani, who said he has met with President Abed Rabbo Mansour Hadi multi ple times since the Treasury imposed its sanctions, was an active participant in the National Dialogue, which concluded in January. But the Treasury says Humayqani’s Rashad Union political party is a front for al-Qaeda recruitment. Humayqani counters that if the United States knows anything about terrorists, it knows that al-Qaeda doesn’t believe in participatory politics. Al-Qaeda, he said, “believes in jihad as a means to establishing an Islamic state, and it believes that 117

joining the political arena is a form of infidelity, or a non-Muslim goal.” Humayqani, who wore a string of pearl prayer beads around his traditional Yemeni dagger, is a smooth operator who knows he has powerful local allies. He smiled during the interview and expounded on what sounded like well-honed talking points — discussion, national reconciliation, peace and justice. “One of our party’s goals is to cooperate with the United States within the frame work of justice and forgiveness, mutual interests, benefits, mercy and peace,” he said, beaming. Whether Humayqani is grandstanding or telling the truth, his words — and very public presence in the Yemeni capital — may leave Washington on awkward foot ing. Legal scholars say the Obama administration has not provided a specific definition for a direct and “imminent” threat to U.S. citizens — a label that would qualify a person to become a target for death or capture in Yemen, Pakistan or Somalia. Legal experts say the category of specially designated global terrorist, as Humay qani is described, is strictly a financial classification. But the Treasury’s depiction of Humayqani’s activities in al-Qaeda — as more than simply a financier — also raise the possibility that he could find himself on a U.S. kill list , said Ashley Deeks, a Uni versity of Virginia law professor and former legal adviser to the State Department. Humayqani, who appeared relaxed, confident — even a little smug, said he is not too worried. Surely the U.S. Treasury will reverse its decision, he said. In the meantime, he sug gested that the U.S. government consider an alternative counterterrorism policy. “Support the Yemeni government through a national project that would face al Qaeda,” he said. Cease drone strikes and develop a reconciliation plan whereby militants would turn in their weapons. But he acknowledged it would not be so sim ple. “Not all of them will give up their weapons. But this way you give those who are willing to leave al-Qaeda a chance to become a citizen again and live a normal life. Those who don’t will lose the public’s sympathy,” he said. Separately, he said, he would be “very grateful” if the United States would drop its charges. “It has affected me financially and psychologically.” He smiled.

Washington Post

http://yemenonline.info/news-3889.html

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In Yemen, a woman's life entangled with Al Qaeda

SANAA: Abeer al-Hassani's ex-husband was famed for his beautiful voice.

He used it, she says, singing poetic hymns to martyrdom and jihad to try to draw youth from their neighbourhood of the Yemeni capital into joining Al Qaeda. He sang at weddings of fellow members of the terror group, and held discussions with young men at local mosques. ''One woman complained to me that her son wanted to go fight in Iraq after speak ing with him,'' the 25-year-old Al Hassani recalled in an interview with the Associ ated Press. For most of her young life, Al Hassani has been entangled with Al Qaeda through family bonds she has tried to shake off. Three of her brothers became fighters for the group, and all three are now dead, two of them killed by US drone strikes on consecutive days in January 2013. Her story provides a rare look into one of the most dangerous branches of the ter ror network, which has withstood successive blows and yet continues to thrive. It has moved to fueling conflict elsewhere in the region, sending fighters and exper tise to Syria and to Egypt's Sinai Peninsula. Her ex-husband, Omar Al Hebishi, backed up his recruiting with cash. During their four-year marriage, she says, he received large bank transfers or cash delivered overland from Saudi Arabia — money, he told her, that was to support the families of ''martyrs.'' 119

She and Al Hebishi divorced in 2010. A month ago, he left for Syria to fight alongside Al Qaeda — inspired extremists — but not before trying to recruit the older of their two sons, 8-year-old Aws, to come with him by showing the boy videos of Al Qaeda fighters jogging and swimming. ''Mom, I want to go because they have a swimming pool,'' Aws told her, Al Hassani said. Al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula, as the Yemen branch is known, has been hit hard in the past few years. A US — backed government offensive in 2012 drove it out of southern cities that it seized a year earlier. Relentless US drone strikes have killed several senior figures and dozens of lower level fighters, keeping the group on the run. Still, several Yemeni security officials say Al Qaeda has spread to operate in every province of the country of more than 25 million. Al Qaeda's branch demonstrated its capabilities with a sophisticated and brutal at tack in December on the Defense Ministry in the capital, Sanaa, that killed more than 50 people. The group benefits from Yemen's political instability since the ouster of longtime President Ali Abdullah Saleh. While his replacement Abed Rabbo Mansour Hadi is battling the group, Saleh's loy alists still infusing security and intelligence agencies have quietly backed Al Qaeda fighters to keep the government unstable, the officials told the AP. They spoke on condition of anonymity because they are not authorized to talk to the press. ''The former regime forged a close relationship with Al Qaeda,'' said Fares al Saggaf, an adviser to Hadi. In the southern province of Abyan ''entire army camps have been handed over to Al Qaeda.'' Al Saggaf said Al Qaeda is on the ropes, in large part due to the drone strikes. He said sympathy for the group has fallen, particularly after the December attack, during which fighters broke into a hospital inside the Defense Ministry complex and killed patients, doctors and nurses. Hadi ordered security camera footage of the bloodshed released to the public, a move Al Saggaf said ''dealt the image of Al Qaeda a serious blow.'' But Al Hassani's tale illustrates the pull that Al Qaeda has in a society where pov erty is rife, the population is deeply conservative and many resent a corrupt gov ernment and abuses by security forces. ''I can guarantee you that my two sons, Aws and Hamza, will follow in the footsteps 120

of their father if we stay in Yemen,'' Al Hassani said. ''We need to get out of Yemen.'' Diminutive and soft-spoken, wearing an enveloping black niqab veil and robes that leave only her large dark eyes visible, Al Hassani has lived under the full weight of Yemen's patriarchal society. She was first married off at the age of 15, but she kept running away from her hus band, so they divorced after only a month. Soon after, her older brother Bandar brought home a new husband for her — Al Hebishi, a man 20 years her senior. Al-Hebishi, known by his is the renowned in extremist circles as a ''munshid,'' or singer of Islamic hymns and anthems. His voice is often heard singing in Al Qaeda propaganda videos showing footage from their attacks and of martyrs. The Yemeni security officials confirmed to AP that he works in the media branch of Al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula. A veteran jihadi who fought in Bosnia in the 1990s, he was a secretive man who didn't like having his picture taken, Al Hassani said. She showed one of the few photos she has of him — their wedding picture, where he stands grim-faced. ''He was unhappy my mother was photographing him,'' she said. ''He was so courteous and convincing when he spoke to the teenagers he wanted to recruit," said Al Hassani. In one case, she said, he used the money he received to buy a car and house for a Yemeni who lost both his legs while fighting alongside miltiants in Iraq, she said. At home, she said, he was abusive, striking her and the children. After their divorce, her brothers forced her at one point to hand custody of their sons to Al Hebishi. During the time they were with him, Al Hebishi told her he burned matches on their younger son, Hamza, as part of his toilet training, Al Hassani said, showing photos of her son with the burns. She said she received word two weeks ago that her ex-husband was now in Syria. http://www.dawn.com/ 121

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