Lori J. Brown Western Michigan University WATS/SCSI 2010, Orlando, Florida [email protected]

Fatal Communication Gaps

Gaps in effective communication, can lead to loss of life, or create a communication gap that could impede the information transfer to the pilots.

  Pilots of Northwest Airlines Flight 253 were not immediately alerted that a passenger had tried to ignite a bomb on the flight from Amsterdam to Detroit”. The pilots said they had a problem when the flight landed in Detroit. “there was a communication gap between the cabin and the flight deck crew, " which left pilots unaware that there had been an alleged bombing attempt on-board” (FAA Administrator Randy Babbitt told a House subcommittee, on February 4, 2010). The flight deck crew reported they had someone who had attempted to set firecrackers off.

 Thinking the alleged bombing was no more than a prank, air traffic controllers took no extreme action like routing the aircraft to a remote location of the airport, “nor did the cockpit get very excited about it,” (Babbitt, 2010)

The Pilot/Flight Attendant Communication and Joint Training Survey

(Brown & Niehaus 2009) • • Funded by Western Michigan University, Faculty Research and Creative Activities Award.

29 Countries • 427 Participants (322 complete) Translated to Chinese and Spanish Published in the FAA International Journal of Applied Aviation Studies, (Summer 2010, in press).

How would you rate your current airline's level of effective communication between pilots and flight attendants? (IJAAS, 2010)  Figure 1. Flight Attendant/Pilot Communication Effectiveness France U.S.

               This study has identified barriers, which may leave flight attendants, and pilots feeling isolated and may impede effective communication. Inadequate Briefing- Brief all of the Crew No Introductions – Introductions to entire crew Poor Morale – Pay cuts, Contracts, crew rest Lack of respect- Begin the flight with open and respectful dialogue.

Fatigue Fortress Door * Post 9/11 Procedures and Stressors Time and Operational Constraints * Lack of scenario based CRM training Crew scheduling – Only paired 1-2 legs Job understanding – Lack of familiarity jump-seating Gender or assumed sexual orientation Misunderstanding of the sterile cockpit rule Aircraft interphone – See HR 2200 (lack of wireless communication) Unfamiliar Accent

 “I fear that the post- 9/11 security measures & economic constraints have set CRM back twenty years. I would have to say that 8 out of 10 flights are done where the pilots do their thing and we do ours in the cabin. A briefing is always done with the Purser (per FARs) but anything above that is rare. It is not uncommon, when working in the back, to have never met our flight deck crew when they fly just one segment that is dangerous”.

 “Pilot and Flight Attendants often switch crews after one or two legs. This can cause misunderstanding and poor communication. Multiple crew changes during quick turns, prevent introductions and briefings since boarding is already under way”.

  “Many flight attendants are now "afraid" to contact the flight deck due to concerns over breaking the new security regulations. Many times in my own flights I have only seen/heard from the pilots twice during the flight. Before pushback/cabin door closure and once we are parked at the gate. But yet we are still supposed to come together and form a cohesive team in the event of some catastrophic event”.

“Having just completed my annual CRM this afternoon I was reminded just how little we FAs know about what is happening up front even during cruse let alone during an explosive decompression, and how little the Pilots know of what we are doing”.

 “ There does need to be a fundamental shift in thinking...something needs to be done to rebuild the relationship between front and back end.”

    Out of the 224 Flight Attendants sampled 55% reported that they have been hesitant to report a problem, and 16% indicated that they have had a situation where they did not reported a problem and did not inform the flight deck, because they thought they already knew. Out of the 51 Pilots sampled 41% indicated that they have had a situation where a flight attendant reported a problem and did not inform the flight deck, because they thought they already knew. Additionally, 57% of the pilots indicated they have noticed that flight attendants may be hesitant to report a problem due to misunderstanding of the sterile cockpit rule, or other reason. (IJAAS, 2010)

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The survey results indicated that gender has the potential to impede or influence flight attendant/pilot communication.

Male pilot/male flight attendant Female pilot/male flight attendant Female pilot/female flight attendant

    79% reported that they think it would be beneficial for flight attendants and FAMS to training together (IJAAS, 2010).

“At my airline of employment, during recurrent training one or two Federal Air Marshals would come in to speak to the classes. They would discuss their role onboard the aircraft and what would be expected of the pilot/flight attendants if they were called to action”. “As with any resource, in order to use it effectively, one must know how to use it and that knowledge is best obtained through joint training. As a pilot, I have gone through some joint training with the Federal Air Marshalls and, as a result, I feel I have a better understanding of their use and function thereby.

This training is done in my airline and shows positive effects in cooperation”.

      How do you assess the effectiveness of your CRM program? CMAQ Crew Orientated Flight Training (COFT) training events within Crew Integrated Flight training (CIFT) curriculum. This can be integrated into existing training. AQP MPL and other competency based training programs should include flight attendant/pilot communication and coordination. Line/Los Checklist- behavioral marker for CRM assessment (Helmreich)

 “I too have been growing increasingly alarmed about what has been happening, especially with new and increasingly younger pilots who are being hired that never had Flight Attendants, now they are faced with this new person to deal with and there is basically a brick wall between us, and don’t really know what to do with us.”

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Briefing- Open Interactive Leadership/Followership Workload/Distractions Interpersonal Relationships/Group Climate Inquiry/Advocacy/Insertion Preparation/Planning Vigilance Communication/Decisions Crew self feedback

Crew Integrated Flight Training (CIFT)

A ssess •Evaluate -the effectiveness of your CRM Programs.

C hange •Integrate -Accident, Incident, Safety reports, and AQP data into your CRM Program.

T rain •Educate –Real world scenarios •Crew Integrated Flight Training (COFT)

   While it is doubtful that fortress doors or secondary barriers will be removed from U.S. Airlines, communication gaps surrounding these post 9/11 changes can be lessened with the application of possible remedies Crew Orientated Flight Training (COFT) training, development and scheduling may not be realistic for all carriers in these lean economic times, improvement of sterile cockpit training, and improved crew briefings are both viable and crucial. Coordination of the flight deck and cabin crew has never been more challenging, than our current operating environment. Let us not forget the possible effects of AIRLINE MERGERS on communication and crew coordination!

  I would like to thank AFA, EAAP, APA, IFALPA, ALPA, CAPA, AEPA members, and hundreds of aviation industry professionals from 29 countries for their participation, feedback and assistance in the distribution of the survey. Dr. Maria Novis, (AEPA) for translating the survey to Spanish. Dr. Jiazhong Yang, (Civil Aviation Flight University, China) for translating the survey to Chinese, Dr. Amy Alexander (Aptima, Inc.) for data analysis, John Niehaus and Beth Seiler for contributions to the survey design, and development.

 Contact: [email protected]

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