Transcript Japan’s Perspective on Asian Regionalism

Japan’s Perspective
on Asian
Regionalism
Kozhakhmetova Dinara
Outline
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Miltilateralism
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Twin challenges
Rediscovery of multilateral diplomacy
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Throughout the modern history Japan focused on bilateral alliances
with perceived hegemonies of the day. In 1952 it was the US
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The liberation of the United Nations from bipolar paralyses of the Cold
War, prompted the new focus on multilateralism.
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The 1990/1991 Gulf War had an impact on Japanese thinking and led
to the passage of the International Peace Cooperation Law in 1992.
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Discouraged by the limited reform of the United Nations including their
own bid for a permanent UNSC seat, Japan turned its focus on
regionalism in Asia-Pacific region in the 1990s and then in East Asia
beginning in the late 1990s.
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At the same time, bilateralism with the US is still central to Japanese
foreign policy.
Twin challenges
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Playing in both arenas of bilateralism and multilateralism, Japan has a
challenge of reconciling the two, particularly because East Asian
regionalism does not include the United States.
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Another challenge is whether and how Japan can lead regionalism in
Asia, given the remaining and painful legacy of its history in the region.
The cold war era: bilateral relations
over regionalism
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December 1956: Japan joined the United Nations which was a step
toward legitimization as a member of the international community.
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February 1957: PM Kishi Nobusuke outlined 3 pillars: to center its
foreign policy around the UN, to cooperate with free and democratic
nations of the West, and to identify closely with Asian nations.
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Japan was willing to lead the regional campaign against communism,
but was unable and unwilling to join South East Asia Security
Organization (SEATO) and newly independent SEA countries were
unenthusiastic about Japan’s leadership in the region.
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Japan normalized diplomatic relations with S.Korea in 1965 and with
China in 1972. It set aid agreements instead of reparations with
Indonesia but also provided assistance throughout SEA and China.
But regional resentment against Japan’s economic success erupted.
The cold war era: bilateral relations
over regionalism
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1977 Fukuda doctrine: Japan would not become a military power;
Japan would establish relationships built upon mutual trust and Japan
would partner with the Association of Southeast Asian nations
(ASEAN) and would support its efforts for peace and prosperity in
Southeast Asia.
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Japan’s cooperative regional policies were designed more often as
bilateral relations with individual SEA countries and sometimes with
SEA as a region. There was no regional context but a collaboration
between Japan and Asian neighbors.
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Japan did not have “a diplomatic strategy vis-à-vis Asia.” (Ogoura
Kazuo, Japanese diplomat)
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At the private level scholars and businesspeople tried to create a
series of regional forums since the 1970.
the post-cold war era: from asiapacific to east asia
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After the end of the Cold War, Asian regionalism started to grow
stimulated by examples of EU regional integration and NAFTA.
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In 1988, the Sakamoto report from the Japanese Ministry of
International Trade and Industry was important by suggesting not a
closed economic bloc, but rather a multilateral cooperation open to
economic partners outside the region.
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This report found a support in Australia which led to 1989 Australia
proposal to establish Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation. The US
was included by Japan’s suggestion to assure the Trans-Pacific
nature of the grouping.
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1990 Malaysian PM Mahathir bin Mohamad proposed East Asian
Economic Caucus (EAEC). But with strong US opposition to any
group which excludes US, Japan did not back the proposal.
the post-cold war era: from asiapacific to east asia
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1997 Asian financial crisis raised awareness in Japan and the region
about the importance of constructing measures to meet financial
threats.
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The Japanese ministry of finance proposed the creation of new Asian
Monetary Fund to supplement the IMF with U.S.$100 billion reserve in
emergency funds but due the discontent of US and China, the
proposal died early on.
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The government introduced a scheme called “the New Miyazawa
initiative”, worth U.S.$ 30 billion to help the region in financial
emergencies.
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ASEAN Plus Three (APT) became an annual event with the inclusion
of Japan, China and S.Korea. Chiang-mai initiative (CMI) became the
biggest achievement of ASEAN plus 3.
the post-cold war era: from asiapacific to east asia
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In 2004 the Japanese government prepared 3 issue papers on an
East Asian community, on functional cooperation and on the East
Asian summit (EAS).
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EAS was given a functional approach focusing on trade, investment,
information technology, finance, development assistance, food safety,
environmental protection etc.
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EAS was proclaimed as an open community. In 2011 Russia and the
US joined the summit.
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Japan negotiated bilateral free-trade agreements (FTAs) or economic
partnership agreements (EPAs) first with Singapore, Malaysia and
Thailand.
the post-cold war era: from asiapacific to east asia
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2006 the Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry (METI) announced
the Nikai Initiative, which included the Comprehensive Economic
Partnership in East Asia (CEPEA) and the Economic Research
Institute for ASEAN and East Asia (ERIA) which is an East Asian
version of OECD.
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CEPEA will deal with such issues as trade in goods, countries of
origin, services, investments, and intellectual property.
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ERIA is a think tank providing policy recommendations and
coordination on statistics, trade, investment, industrial policy, energy,
intellectual property.
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Through ASEAN regional forum (ARF) Japan participated in security
in Asia processes with focus on Six-Party talks on Korean peninsula
security.
Japanese debates about asian
regionalism
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Official Japanese standpoint states that the driving force for
regionalism in East Asia is economic interest.Building an East-Asian
community is a long-term goal and an important ongoing process.
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Some argue that regionalism should stop at the level of economic
cooperation, others argue it should go beyond to non-traditional
security issues.
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Opinions on community building vary even within the state itself.
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Debates on community building go along with Sino-Japan relations,
plummeting in the moments of tensions between two countries.
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Conservative realists see multilateral security cooperation as a
potential trap for Japan in light of China’s rowing military
modernization.
Japanese debates about asian
regionalism
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Enthusiasts about Community building acknowledge that the pace will
be slow and the focus will remain on finance and trade in the
foreseeable future.
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Former deputy foreign minister Tanaka said: “over the long term, it is
even plausible to think that nationalism in the region can eventually be
complemented and perhaps absorbed by a sense of regionalism and
common identity.”
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Enthusiasts see potential for developing a sense of common security
interests as several countries together tackle common transnational
threats.
Perspectives on the u.s. role
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Strong belief in Tokyo that the United States will ultimately benefit
from an Asian economic community that reinforces stable economic
growth.
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Traditional security scholars view the cooperation with the US and the
US allies in the region as a main objective.
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Most Japanese experts argue that there is no point taking up hard
security issues in the region without including the U.S.
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Japanese officials and experts expect the US support Asian
regionalism which pursues universal values instead of Asian
exceptionalism.
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Without the U.S. consent, community building would a difficult task for
Japan.
Conclusions: principles and prospects
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1. The regional architecture must allow both bilateralism and
multilateralism to flourish and complement each other.
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2. Future regional architecture should promote both healthy
cooperation and competition.
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3. The future regional architecture should offer “open regionalism”.
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4. The future regional architecture should reflect a respect and
realization of democracy, human rights, and other universal values.
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5. The future regional architecture should be driven by a functional
approach that helps address the many political, economic and
security challenges the regions faces. It should be constructed in a
way that goes beyond conferences and undertakes effective action.
40 years of friendship with asean
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The Summit was seen as part of Japan’s pursuit of its ‘Strategic
Diplomacy’ toward ASEAN in balancing China’s increasing influence in
East Asia.
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The joint statement highlighted the importance of “ASEAN’s centrality”
in regional multilateralism, such as the ASEAN Plus Three (APT) and
the East Asia Summit (EAS)
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The emphasis on the importance of international rules and norms in
the statement showed that Japan and ASEAN struck a right balance in
their political demands. While Japan is concerned about China’s
recent assertiveness over the East China Sea, it was clear that
ASEAN as an institution did not want to become overly entangled in
great power politics.
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The statement East Asia Summit as “a Leaders-led forum for dialogue
and cooperation on issues of strategic importance to the region”.
Tokyo’s pragmatic approach
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Japan’s basic stance toward ASEAN in 2013 is to advance what is
“feasible” and avoid an “unfeasible” cooperation.
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Japan separately approached each ASEAN member state as part of
its strategy toward China. For example, as Prime Minister Abe
traveled to each ASEAN member state in 2013, Japan pursued
strategic cooperation bilaterally with each member. Through these
travels, Japan attempted to strengthen its political and security ties
with ASEAN states throughout 2013.
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Japan’s ‘Strategic Diplomacy’ toward ASEAN is a dual strategy—
enhancing bilateral security cooperation with those willing among the
ASEAN member states, while respecting the institutional
cohesiveness of ASEAN by explicitly recognising ASEAN centrality.
A question to think
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Bilateralism or multilateralism...What is better for Japan?
• Thank you for attention