Transcript Space and security relationships issues from a political and technological point of view

Space and security relationships
issues from a political and
technological point of view
Florence Gaillard-Sborowsky
Fondation pour la Recherche Stratégique
4TH MANFRED LACHS INTERNATIONAL
27-28 May 2016
Montreal, Quebec, Canada
Interplay between space and security is not new
But despite this long history space powers have often had troubles to find a common
ground
implicit comprehension of the space security, lack of definitions of the main
notions in the field (threat, risk, vulnerability, space security etc.)
some preconceived notions on security in space also often because of its
disconnection from the ASAT’s programs reality
Impact the core fondations on which the rules of law at international level
could be built
Space security from political science: lessons learned for international rules framework
 Space security notion emerges on the international scene since the 80s
 Emergence of new problems transforming the relationships between space and security
leading to anew term ‘space security’. Actors intend to bring together : militarization ,
weaponization, debris, satellite meteorology etc.
 But Space security is widely discussed, more rarely defined. What means space security ?
 Space security is a "sub-concept" of the security concept
 Methodological point of view from security studies : potential guidelines to delimit space
security
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Space security for whom?
For what values?
How far?
At what price?
Over what period?
What threats or/and risks? qualification is essential
Current situation of the security in space from technological standpoint
What are the technologies’ realities ?
3 broad categories of effort :
 development of ground-based weapons designed to damage or destroy ground
installations
 development of ground-based weapons targeting objects in orbit
 space weapons (possibly co-orbital) can destroy a spatial target
Historical and chronological review of ASAT’s technologies proposed, studied, tested,
developped and in service :
 programs specifically anti-satellite
 not specifically anti-satellite programs but tested as anti-satellite
 not specifically anti-satellite programs but considered / proposed as anti-satellite
programs specifically anti-satellite
fgdefg
not specifically anti-satellite programs but tested as antisatellite
not specifically anti-satellite programs but considered/
proposed as anti-satellite
Major trends in the development of American and Soviet-Russian systems:
United States
Not specifically
specifically
Weapons system
Kinetic Energy
Ground
Airborne
Space
Total KE
Directed Energy
Ground
Airborne
Space
Total ED
Total
Project/
Studies
Tested
3
1
5
9
2
1
3
In
service
Project/
Studies
Tested
In
service
1
3
1
1
7
8
4
1
1
1
1
4
5
14
3
1
9
4
1
2
URSS/Russia
Not specifically
specifically
Total
10
3
12
25
2
1
4
7
32
Project/
Studies
2
2
Tested
1
2+2 ?
5
In
service
Project/
Studies
Tested
1
1
1
2
1
1?
1
1
1
3
1
6
2
1
2
In
service
Total
2
1
7
10
1
1
1
3
13
 Current potentially operational systems:
US : MIRACL+AEGIS (ground)
Russia : IS-Mu (space) + relaunch of KONTAKT program and Sokol Eshelon
(airborne)
 Threat credibility :
• United States : only country to have a complete doctrinal vision of the use of
their ASAT capabilities + associated means + corresponding budget. US have the
majority of military satellites in orbit and therefore could be threatened, but no
other space nations has sufficient ASAT destroying capabilities.
• Russia : most of the programs officially stopped
• China : 2007 essay, continued technologies demonstrations (without ASAT
destruction and ABM) in 2010, 2013, and 2015
• India : hostility in principle to the militarization but desire the skills recognition
 Motivations for ASATs:
Specific position of the United States : securing space while preparing for war?
Third-party countries’ position is paradoxical as the US cannot be convinced to abandon
the principle of installing weapons in orbit. They have no alternative but to consider
engaging in the way they denounce. It disadvantages them and formalizes the US
approach’s legitimacy, they initially wanted to prevent.
Lessons learned for international framework and the rules of law
 A problematic relationship between the national and international level
 Reflected in three main tensions :
 “Province of all mankind" versus "Sovereignty"
 "Global Commons" versus "Ownership"
 "Peace use" versus « Secure use"
 At collective level, preferred effective approaches tend to increase transparency and
confidence building measures among space powers
 International convergence on risk rather than threats
 Prerequisites