Transcript Document 7151676

Disclaimer: The views expressed herein are solely the
views of the author and not of her employer, the
Northrop Grumman Corporation, the RAND Corporation,
or of the U.S. Government.
Weaponizing Space:
Technologies and Policy Choices
Dana J. Johnson, Ph.D.
Adjunct Professor, Georgetown University
20 April 2005
Agenda

Characterizing the “space weaponization” debate

National space policy and the importance of
space to the U.S.

Space Control and Force Application missions

Decision-making rationale and factors for space
weapons acquisition by U.S. and/or others

Policy choices and conclusions
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Characterizing the “Space Weaponization Debate”
Pro Arguments



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Just as other environments are used for offensive military purposes, so will the
environment of space be used
Emerging threats to our national interests and assured access to space require
we develop and maintain capabilities to protect our space assets
The U.S. economy and way of life depend on space systems
The space weaponization debate is a red-herring. Space was weaponized long
ago by the transit of ballistic missiles
Con Arguments
 Space should remain a sanctuary for peaceful scientific uses
 Space weaponization is:
Not inevitable and international agreements barring weaponization are
possible and desirable
 Pre-mature and the sanctuary status of space is in the interests of the
United States
Use of space weapons would create harmful orbital debris
There is no conceivable scenario in which space weapons provide a benefit
greater than their harm
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Agenda

Characterizing the “space weaponization” debate

National space policy and the importance of
space to the U.S.

Space Control and Force Application missions

Decision-making rationale and factors for space
weapons acquisition by U.S. and/or others

Policy choices and conclusions
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National Space Policy (1996)
The United States is committed to the exploration and use of outer
space by all nations for peaceful purposes and for the benefit of
all humanity. "Peaceful purposes" allow defense and intelligencerelated activities in pursuit of national security and other goals.
The United States rejects any claims to sovereignty by any nation
over outer space or celestial bodies, or any portion thereof, and
rejects any limitations on the fundamental right of sovereign
nations to acquire data from space. The United States considers
the space systems of any nation to be national property with the
right of passage through and operations in space without
interference. Purposeful interference with space systems shall be
viewed as an infringement on sovereign rights.
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National Space Policy (1996) (Cont.)
National security space activities shall contribute to U.S. national security
by:
(a) providing support for the United States' inherent right of self-defense
and our defense commitments to allies and friends;
(b) deterring, warning, and if necessary, defending against enemy attack;
(c) assuring that hostile forces cannot prevent our own use of space;
(d) countering, if necessary, space systems and services used for hostile
purposes;
(e) enhancing operations of U.S. and allied forces;
(f) ensuring our ability to conduct military and intelligence space-related
activities;
(g) satisfying military and intelligence requirements during peace and
crisis as well as through all levels of conflict;
(h) supporting the activities of national policy makers, the intelligence
community, the National Command Authorities, combatant
commanders and the military services, other federal officials, and
continuity of government operations.
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Importance of Space to the U.S.

Contributed $100 billion to US economy in 2000

Weather satellites – improved severe weather predictions

Communications – point to point and broadcast

GPS
–
–

Navigation—commercial and civil exceed military applications
Ubiquitous timing signal—enables global Internet
Environmental monitoring
–
–
–
Geodesy
Mapping
Terrain Characterization
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Space: An Economic Center of Gravity
and Thus, a Vital National Interest
Today:
Over
600 Active Satellites (200+ US Satellites)
Over
$100 Billion US Dollars Invested
Future: Forecast 20% annual growth in space investments
GPS-related
products: $8 Billion (2001) projected to
grow to $50 Billion by 2010
Precision
Farming
Weather
Prediction
Resource
Management
Communications
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Surveying
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Agenda

Characterizing the “space weaponization” debate

National space policy and the importance of
space to the U.S.

Space Control and Force Application missions

Decision-making rationale and factors for space
weapons acquisition by U.S. and/or others

Policy choices and conclusions
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Space Missions*
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Space Force Support: launching satellites and dayto-day management of on-orbit assets
Space Force Enhancement: includes all space
operations aimed at increasing effectiveness of
terrestrial military operations
Space Control: ensuring our use of space while
denying the use to our adversaries
Space Force Application: combat operations in,
through, and from space to influence the course and
outcome of conflict
*United States Strategic Command Fact File, http://www.stratcom.mil/factsheetshtml/spacemissions.htm
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Space Control
Protect
Surveil
• Detect, Identify and Track Man-made
Space Objects
• Worldwide Network
• Radar
• Optical Trackers
• Infrared
• Ensure Use of Space Assets
• Enhance Survivability
• Maneuver
• Harden
• Redundancy
Prevent
Prevent Adversaries From Exploiting
US or Allies Space Services
Negate
Disrupt, deny, degrate, deceive or
destroy adversary space capabilities
GROUND SEGMENT
• Encryption
• Shutter Control
SPACE SEGMENT
Assure Freedom of Action in Space and Deny Same
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Space Control: ASAT Concepts
ASAT Systems
Direct Ascent (Ballistic Trajectory)
 Ground-launched
 Air-launched
Co-orbital
 Interceptor
 Space mine
Directed Energy Weapons
 Ground-based
 Air-based
 Space-based
Electronic Warfare
 Ground-based
 Space-based
Types of Negation
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Conventional explosive
Nuclear warhead
Pellet cloud
Aerosols
Hit-to-kill
Induced fragmentation
Component burnout
Power disruption
Jamming
Takeover
Physical tampering
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Source: Nicholas L. Johnson, Soviet Military Strategy in Space, Jane’s, 1987, p. 138.
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Legacy ASAT Development
Project SAINT (SAtellite INTerceptor) (1950s-1962)
 Early Spring: conventional ASAT, Polaris launch (1960s)
 Program 505: prototype Nike Zeus DM-15S ABM (1962-1966)
 Program 437: Thor launch, Mk 49 nuclear warhead (1964)
 Program 922: Thor IRBM launch, non-nuclear suborbital ASAT in development
(late 1960s)
May 1972 signing of SALT I Treaty prohibited interference with NTM
 SPIKE: suborbital conventional ASAT air-launched from F-106; MHV with nonnuclear kill capability (1970s)
 Conventional ASAT: low-risk, off-the-shelf technology alternative using pellets
(1970s)
 USB: platform for space-borne weapons, crewed, Proton launch (late
1970s/early 1980s)
 Air-Launched Anti-Satellite Missile: F-15 launch, 2-stage + MHV, successful
intercept 1985 (1977-1980s)
 Terra-3: ground-based laser, Sary Shagan (1970s-1980s)
 RP: space-based rocket interceptor (similar to US Brilliant Pebbles) (1980s)
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US Activity
USSR Activity
Other
Note that dates are approximate
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Legacy ASAT Development (Cont.)
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Zenith Star: prototype space combat satellite using Alpha laser (1987)
KS: space station with military free-flying autonomous modules dispensing
nuclear warheads (1980s)
Polyus: combat satellite testbed using Energia launcher; launch failure in
1987 (1985-1987)
KE ASAT: Army direct ascent kinetic energy ASAT, with kinetic kill vehicle
launched by rocket booster (1989-1990s)
Gun-launched ASAT: supergun design by Gerald Bull for Iraq, for blinding
Western satellites (1995)
Star Lite: space laser concept, to be launched on Titan 4 (1991)
HERTF: High Energy Research and Technology Facility, Kirtland AFB, NM,
high-powered microwave and advanced technology weapon system
development
Space-Based Laser: Operational SBL Orbital Vehicle, chemical laser
system, part of SDI program (1996)
Space Laser Demo: concept (1996)
US Activity
USSR Activity
Other
Note that dates are approximate
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Polyus (USSR)
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Space Control: Protecting Space Assets
Operational Needs
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Detect and report
threat/attacks
Identify, locate, and classify
threats
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Withstand and defend
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Reconstitute and repair
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Assess missions impact
Functional Capabilities
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Hardening/shielding of system
components
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Developing robust battle management
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Improving system maneuverability
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Attaining adequate force protection
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Developing adequate defensive
information operations
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Threat warning and assessment
reporting
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Space weather sensor systems
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Mobile mission processors
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Diagnostics and repair technology
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Quick launch recovery
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Modeling and simulation
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Space Force Application
• Currently no weapons in
Space
• DoD Space Policy (1999)
tasks US military to plan
for Force Application from
space
• International law & treaties
prohibit weapons of mass
destruction in space
• “Conventional” weapons
are not prohibited
Apply Force From Space
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Space Force Application:
Influencing the Terrestrial Battlespace
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Defined as:
 “…things intended to cause harm that are based in
space or that have an essential element based in
space. The degree of harm…may range from
temporary disruption to permanent destruction or
death.”*
Generic alternatives:
 Space-based directed-energy and kinetic-energy
weapons against missile targets
 Kinetic-energy weapons against ground targets
 Conventional weapons against ground targets
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*Preston, et. al., Space Weapons Earth Wars, RAND, 2002, p. 23.
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Comparison of Weapon Types and
Their Operational Utility
Mass-to-Target Weapons
Directed Energy
Laser, RF, particle
beam, etc.
Targets
Effects
Kinetic energy against
surface targets
Space-based
conventional weapons
Soft, located
from the surface
to space, any
speed
Hardened targets
above 60 km
moving at great
speed
Hardened fixed
or slow-moving
targets on Earth
Hardened targets,
either fixed or
moving at moderate
speeds, surface or
air
Range from
nonlethal jamming
to lethal heating;
finite, inherently
“thin” defense
Lethal impact
Vertical, limiteddepth penetrator
Inherited from
conventional
munitions
A few minutes
A few hours
About 10 mins plus
time it takes weapon
to reach target after
delivery from space
Several dozens
for each needed
to reach a
particular target
in desired time
About 6 in
reserve for each
needed to reach
a particular
target in desired
time
About 6 in
reserve for each
needed to reach
a particular
target in desired
time
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Responsiveness Seconds
Number of
Weapons in
Constellation
Kinetic energy against
missile targets
Several dozens
Source: Preston, et. al., Space Weapons Earth Wars, RAND, 2002.
Agenda

Characterizing the “space weaponization” debate

National space policy and the importance of
space to the U.S.

Space Control and Force Application missions

Decision-making rationale and factors for space
weapons acquisition by U.S. and/or others

Policy choices and conclusions
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Emergence of Space Competitors?
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Currently, no peer in space to threaten U.S. national interests
However, concern for developments in:
 China
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Human spaceflight
Navigation, communications, remote sensing, weather, oceanography,
microgravity, science and astronomy, and microsatellites
KE ASAT, jammers, “parasite” satellites, ground-based lasers
Russia: long-standing interests and capabilities
 Nuclear proliferation and weapons delivery programs in North
Korea, Iran, Libya, Pakistan
 Continued transfer of ballistic missile-related technology by
Russia and China
Bottom line:
 Technically challenging but doable
 Legal constraints on WMD do not prohibit space weapons
 Countermeasures are possible – asymmetric strategies by
competitors, allowing competition without having to become
space-faring nations
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Concern for Vulnerability of
U.S. Space-Based Assets
“If U.S. is to avoid a “Space Pearl Harbor” it needs to take
seriously the possibility of an attack on U.S. space systems”*

What might be a “Space Pearl Harbor”?
 Lethal actions, such as:
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Debilitating/destroying attack on U.S. and allied space
assets through electromagnetic pulse (EMP) event staged
by hostile forces in orbit
Non-lethal actions (i.e., for a limited period of time, for
specific objectives)

Jamming, spoofing, blinding
*Report of the Commission to Assess United States National Security
Space Management and Organization (January 2001)
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If the U.S. Were to Acquire Space Weapons,
How Might It Happen?
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Under what circumstances might the U.S. decide to
acquire?
 Deliberately
 Incidentally
Once the decision is made, how might the transition
occur?
 Possible strategies
 Possible consequences
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Possible Circumstances Requiring Purposeful
Decision-Making

Responding to threat(s) by undeterred adversaries
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Responding to another nation’s decision to acquire,
whether adversaries or allies
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With another nation(s), to forestall, control, or
influence their independent acquisition of space
weapons
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Unilaterally, in absence of compelling threat, to
demonstrate global leadership, protect U.S. and allied
economic investments, improve efficiency and
effectiveness of military capabilities, etc.
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Possible Circumstances Involving Incidental
Decision-Making
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Commercial or civil development of technologies
with applicability to military purposes
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Incremental decision – hedging strategy as way to
shape security environment
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Monolithic decision and implementation – reactive
strategy to deal with emerging threat that may be
defensive and stabilizing in nature
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Transition Period (1)
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Ideally, no consequences for U.S. deployment
Worst case:
 Adversaries take lethal action to deny U.S. ability to
launch and deploy first space weapon
Adversary’s options are numerous
 Deterrent capability, possibly nuclear, leading to
possible launch on warning/launch under attack policy
 Physical attack – on launch sites
 Burying targets
 Developing/deploying “silver bullets,” such as ASATs
 “Seize moral high ground against U.S. hegemony”
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Transition Period (2)
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Responses by allies
 Potential political pressure
 Potential fallout in other non-space-related areas (e.g.,
foreign policy issue of great importance to U.S. interests)
 Adversary attempt at coercive behavior to influence ally
 Commercial companies’ reaction to possible orbital
debris that, depending on orbits, may last forever
World may view U.S. acquisition and deployment decision
as risky behavior, with long term consequences for U.S.
global leadership
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Policy Context for Deciding to Acquire and
Deploy Space-Based Weapons
• From a narrow, operational
viewpoint:
– Technical feasibility
– Strategic desirability
– Cost
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• However, other sensitivities:
– Political will
– Legal restrictions and
ramifications
– Reactions of allies, neutrals,
and adversaries
Some sensitivities have underpinning them the notion of space as
a sanctuary:
 U.S. has most to lose because of dependence on space assets
 Absence of imminent threats to U.S. freedom of space could
lead to perceptions of U.S. aggressive behavior
 Potentially trigger arms race in space
Others argue that U.S. inhibitions against space weapons
deployment do not necessarily apply to others
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 U.S. needs to press ahead with development and deployment
What If Others Decide to Acquire Space Weapons?
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Range of “others”
 Peer competitors
 U.S. friends and allies
 Non-peer competitors
 Neither friend nor foe
 Non-state coalition of entities (possibly state-assisted)
Decisions will be driven by national interests
 Security, e.g.:
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Regional threats requiring long-range force projection
Overcoming competitor’s military strengths
Economic and technological
Political:
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National prestige, peer recognition
Global reach and power projection
Enhanced freedom to act regionally/globally
Promotion of internal security
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Agenda

Characterizing the “space weaponization” debate

National space policy and the importance of
space to the U.S.

Space Control and Force Application missions

Decision-making rationale and factors for space
weapons acquisition by U.S. and/or others

Policy choices and conclusions
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Policy Choices Facing the United States

Continue to maintain consistency in long-held spacerelated principles, yet be prepared to acquire and deploy
space-based weapons should circumstances change

Move now, through explicit policy, programmatic, and
budgetary decisions, to deploy space-based weapons
based on national interests and emerging threats

Prepare for the inevitable: pursue a deliberate, longterm hedging strategy
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Impact of Security Challenges Facing U.S.
Defense Planning in 2006 QDR
Higher
VULNERABILITY
Irregular
Catastrophic
 Unconventional methods adopted
and employed by non-state and state
actors to counter stronger state
opponents. (Erode our power)
Lower
 Acquisition, possession, and possible
employment of WMD or methods producing
WMD-like effects against vulnerable, highprofile targets by terrorists and rogue
states. (Paralyze our power)
Traditional
Disruptive
 States employing legacy and advanced
military capabilities and recognizable
military forces, in long-established, wellknown forms of military competition and
conflict. (Challenge our power)
Higher
 International competitors developing and
possessing breakthrough technological
capabilities intended to supplant U.S.
advantages in particular operational
domains. (Marginalize our power)
Lower
LIKELIHOOD
Do space weapons contribute to “filling the gaps” in capabilities to respond?
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Conclusion

Space will become yet another environment for the full
spectrum of human activities, including conflict

Not a matter of should space weapons be deployed, but
when

Prudent approach to protect U.S. national interests is a
proactive strategy for shaping political, technological,
diplomatic, and security environment
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