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Transcript The Secure World Foundation
The Next 50 Years:
Space Activities
Opportunities and Challenges
Ray A. Williamson
Executive Director
Secure World Foundation
Presentation to the World Academy of Arts and Sciences
26 February 2008
Our Dependence on Space
Applications
• Much of humanity now depends to some extent on
space applications, e.g.,
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Operation of cell phones (precise timing)
Position, navigation (GPS)
Banking
Financial transactions
Credit card gasoline purchases
Natural resources management
Weather, climate predictions
• E.g., reduced costs for electricity generation
– Disaster mitigation and response
The Space Activities Opportunity
• Private spaceflight and tourism are in development,
e.g., Virgin Galactic, Bigelow Aerospace, EADS
Astrium
• Science research and exploration from space
– Advances in weather and climate prediction
– Advances in space weather prediction (effects of the sun
on technological systems)
– Advances in knowledge of the universe
BUT….
• Outer space is a harsh, unforgiving environment
• Objects in orbit tend to stay in orbit (Newton’s Laws)
• Orbital speeds are very high (~7 km/sec in low Earth
orbit)
• Space weather (X-rays, high speed solar particles)
can interrupt satellite operations
The Space Security Challenge
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Increasing crowding in some key orbits
Increasing amounts of orbital debris
Space weather effects
Use of space weapons threaten space environment
Orbital Crowding
• Evolving orbital space activities are
leading to crowding in some key
orbits:
– Polar orbits (Earth observation satellites)
– Geosynchronous orbits (communications
satellites)
Orbital Debris
• Increasing amounts of debris in Earth orbit are
becoming significant safety hazards to spacecraft
− The Chinese Anti-satellite test in January 2007 added about
2500 pieces of “trackable debris” (>10 cm)
– Today, some 18,000 objects > 10 cm orbit Earth (including
operational satellites)
– Even tiny pieces of debris can cause significant damage to a
working spacecraft because impact velocities can exceed 10
km/sec.
Debris Cloud Evolution
Cloud of debris of size
greater than 10 cm after 15
minutes
Debris cloud after 10
days
Working Satellites (Green) and Chinese Asat debris cloud (red)
The Way Forward
• Limiting creation of new debris
– UN Copuos resolution to limit debris adopted by
General Assembly, October 2007
• But voluntary only
– Additional controls on creation of debris needed
• Mandatory within States?
• Research needed on methods to clean up
existing debris
The Way Forward
• Develop an international cooperative approach to
“Space Situational Awareness,” the ability to know
where working spacecraft and major debris are at all
times
– Currently, only the United States has a well-developed SSA
capability; many of those data are classified
– Steps by Europe, Russia, and China to develop SSA systems
may stimulate U.S. interest in a cooperative approach
The Way Forward
• Develop a Space Traffic Management (STM) system—
to prevent satellite-satellite and satellite-debris
collisions
• STM should be established and operated according to
internationally-agreed upon policies, regulations, and
rules
– Could be a well-defined code of conduct
– One possible model as a starting point is the International
Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO)
TRAFFIC
Potential Policy Issues
• Legitimacy of STM organizational body to
implement and enforce rules
• Limitations on freedom of action by all actors
• Reluctance to share data because of privacy
and competitive concerns
• Arenas for arbitration and legal recourse
Space Weapons—
the Ultimate Concern
Development and use of space weapons,
including anti-satellite devices,
threaten current and future space activities
What is a space weapon?
“A space weapon is an “object“ that is designed, tested
or used to destroy or disrupt other objects in space or
on Earth“
Potential Space Weapons
• Space-to-Space (S2S) Systems
– Maneuvrable „Kill Vehicle“
– MicroSats and co-orbital ASATs
– Laser and Microwaves
• Space-to-Earth (S2E) Systems
– Metal Rods and Maneuvrable Reentry vehicles
• Earth-to-Space (E2S) Systems
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BMD- Kill Vehicle and
HE-Laser
Nuclearexplosion at high altitude
Transatmospheric air/space planes
Old Space ‘Weapons‘ US and USSR
U.S.: Air Launched
Miniature Vehicle (ALMV)
USSR: Hunting Satellites
(“Killer Sat.”– Istrebitelny
Sputnik [IS]
Target of IS
(DS-P1-M,
armoured)
F-15-Asat‘
Source:
www.fas.org/spp/military/program/
asat/almv.htm
Early version of IS
Source:
www.russianspaceweb.com/is.htm
Trajectory of the ASAT
Interception
First stage trajectory
G. Forden http:// web.mit.edu/stgs
Chinese ASAT
Test
• The Chinese FY-IC SAT (880kg) was hit by a kill vehicle at 856 km
with v=7.42 km/s
• This was the first ASAT test in 20+ years
• The head on collision is comparable to the US MD Kill vehicle
• After 2 weeks the US SSN observed ~500 fragments >10 cm; So
far ~2500 pieces have been tracked, but there are ~2000 larger
pieces, which might stay several decades in space
• This is an increase of space debris in 850 km alt. of 28%
• The test has increased the chances of an equatorial SAT being hit
by 50 %
• A “chain reaction “ at 900 km might be possible in the future
U.S. A-Sat Test
• National Reconnaissance Organization (NRO) satellite:
USA-193 (NROL-21) – failed to reach its proper orbit
and was falling out of orbit
• U.S. used modified Raytheon-built RIM-161 Standard
Missile used for antiballistic missile tests to destroy it
• “President Bush ordered the action to prevent any
possible contamination from the hazardous rocket
fuel on board”, NYTimes, Feb 15, 2008
A-Sat Test—Debris Issues
• USA-193 strike took place Feb. 22 when satellite was about
210 km high; models estimate that:
– 50% of debris washed out immediately (estimated)
– 99% within 1 week
• Fits UN guidelines on space debris (Dec. 2007)
• Nevertheless, the test provided considerable technical
information that will be of enormous interest to the U.S.
ballistic missile engineers
• Negative reaction from many U.S. analysts and some
countries
– Concern that this is a covert A-Sat test
– Upset space stability and the long term space sustainability
U.S. Asat Simulation
What might be done?
• Military Solutions:
– Passive defense: hardening, maneuvring
– Active defense: Defensive SATS, deny access to space
• Diplomatic solutions:
– Strengthening existing treaties (OST)
• Additional protocol
• OST Review Conference
– “Codes of conduct”/ Confidence Building Measures
– Comprehensive ban on ASAT or SWs
Thanks
http://www.secureworldfoundation.org