Transcript Space Security - SETI Institute

Space Security
 Ways forward 
SETI Institute, CA, USA
10.12.08
Will Marshall
Content Overview
1. Introduction
1. Vulnerabilities of satellites
2. Space Debris
2. Ways forward
1. Technical
2. Diplomatic
3. Space Weapons
4. Conclusions
1. INTRODUCTION
Why is space is important to International Security?
Take Iraq:
-
Decision to go in based in part on Satellite reconnaissance and SIGINT
Entire Military Operation conducted from Florida via comms satellite
Military units, ships, tanks, planes and missiles guided by GPS

Modern military functions near impossible without
satellites
PROBLEMS
- Vulnerabilities of critical satellites
- Increasing density of space debris
1. INTRODUCTION
AIM
“Secure and sustainable access to and use of space
and freedom from space based threats.” *
PRE-REQUISITS FOR GENERALS AND POLICY MAKERS
- Keplers’ Laws
- Rocket Equation
* Space Security Index, http://www.spacesecurity.org
1.1. VULNERABILITIES
T1.
T2.
T3.
T4.
T5.
T6.
T7.
T8.
T9.
Electronic warfare, such as jamming or spoofing of satellite communications;
Physical attacks on satellite ground stations;
Dazzling or blinding of satellite sensors;
Radio-Frequency (RF) weapons, e.g. High-Powered Microwaves (HPM);
‘Heat-to-kill’ ground-based laser ASAT weapons;
Pellet cloud attacks on low-orbit satellites;
Attacks in space by micro-satellites;
Hit-to-kill anti-satellite weapons; and
High-Altitude Nuclear Detonations (HAND).
1. Adapted from B. de Blois et al. International Security Fall 2004
1.2. SPACE DEBRIS
•
•
•
•
•
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Millions of pieces of man made debris
Debris >1mm can cause s/c malfunction
But SSN can only track objects >5cm !!
~100,000 pieces that are *untrackable* today and yet
threaten s/c
Potential for going critical
NASA study: even if no new launches, debris continues to
rise
Chinese ASAT
•
3000 debris >5cm
•
Increase of ~20%
•
Conjunctions up >30%
US ASAT
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Less debris
•
Still increased risks
2. WAYS FORWARD
2.1. TECHNICAL
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
Protection of satellites, Communication links and Ground Stations
Space Situation Awareness (SSA)
Operationally Responsive Space (ORS)
Multi-tiered micro-satellite constellations architecture
Space Traffic Management
2.2. DIPLOMATIC
1. Treaties
1.
Prohibit ASATs and other kinetic weapons
- Space is a very transparent domain for kinetic events – for any ASAT event it is easy to (1) detect the
event, and (2) determine who was the perpetrator.
2.
Orbital Space Debris
- Chinese and US ASATs show that ‘guidelines’ are not enough
3.
Space Traffic Management
2. Confidence Building Measures
Multi-tiered microsatellites constellations architecture (MMCA)
Concept
Design a new satellite architecture less vulnerable to threats
Current Architecture:
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Few key satellites
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Many in LEO
•
Each system in single orbital tier

Many places of single point failures
MMCA Features
1. Multi-tiered (several orbital altitudes)
2. Higher altitudes (where attack is harder and including terrestrial layers
where possible)
3. Constellations (disperse)
4. Modular
5. Networked
6. Micro-satellites




Same capabilities as the few key satellites do today
Less vulnerable to attack
Using Existing technologies
Similar or lower cost
Transition
Through replacement of existing system as it fails/is retired/becomes obsolete
Multi-tiered microsatellites constellations architecture (MMCA)
Main functions of military satellites
1. Early Warning of Missile Attack
–
–
Early Warning of Missile Attack
Detection of nuclear explosions
2. Reconnaissance (Photo and Synthetic Aperture Radar)
–
Imagery Intelligence
3. Signals Intelligence (SIGINT)
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Listening to Communications (COMINT), Radar (ELINT), Telemetry of
missiles/rockets (TELINT)
4. Communications
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Military-to-military communication
5. Navigation
–
–
Military navigational information
Rocket guidance
Multi-tiered microsatellites constellations architecture (MMCA)
Example: Early Warning Satellites
Difference of MMCA:
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More satellites
Multiple layers (GEO
and MEO layer)
Smaller Infra-Red
telescope
Telescope and
other instruments split
into two satellites
Example: Topsat bus
(SSTL) or Spiralle (CNES)
SPACE TRAFFIC MANAGEMENT
Collision avoidance:
Conjunction Analysis
Manoeuvre
SSO slots
12 altitudes
42 planes
>1000 slots minimum
Up to 12000 slots max.
(Currently ~300 SSO
Satellites in operation)
3. SPACE WEAPONS
Part of the Solution or Part of the Problem?
Why relevant at all? - Some propose SW to reduce s/c vulnerabilities!
Questions:
1.
Can Space Based Weapons reduce Satellite Vulnerabilities?
2.
Can Space Based Weapons ensure continued Secure access to space?
Net Security Analysis:
Security Benefits
Security Costs
1.
2.
3.
4.
1.
5.
Missile Defense
Protecting Space Assets
Prompt Global Strike
Space Defense/Attack Capability (space
control)
Secondary Security Benefits
1.
Arms race --> bankrupting adversary
2.
Maintaining Aerospace Workforce
3.
Stable domination
2.
3.
Arms Race --> more vulnerability of space
assets, asymmetric means found by
adversary, out competed
Harming the Environment (space debris)
Long-term impact on security; inability to
retract that system if destabalizing
6. SPACE-BASED WEAPONS
Example: Space Based Interceptor for Missile Defense
Advantages:
- Potential to intercept missiles from rogue states
Disadvantages:
- Technical Difficulty  V. Large cost
- Other nations may do asymmetric capabilities to negate
missile defense e.g. ASATs
- Missile Defense is provocative for many nations (e.g.
Russia)
4. CONCLUSIONS
Satellites are important and yet vulnerable
Main ways forward that need more energy:
1. Technical
1. Multi-tiered micro-satellite constellations architecture
2. Space Traffic Management
2. Diplomatic
1. Treaty Prohibiting ASATs and other kinetic weapons
Space Weapons:
In my analysis, Space based weapons reduce US security principally because of
relative technical ease of countermeasures.
MORE INFORMATION
1.
Space Security Index -- annual review of military space developments
“Military Balance for Space” -- www.spacesecurity.org
2.
Space Traffic Management -- International Space University Study
-- www.isunet.edu + small study team at NASA-Ames
3.
US National Space Policyhttp://www.ostp.gov/galleries/defaultfile/Unclassified%20National%20Space%20Policy%20--%20FINAL.pdf
4.
W. Marshall, “Reducing the Vulnerability of Space Assets: A Multitiered
Microsatellite Constellation Architecture”, Astropolitics, Volume 6, Issue
2 May 2008 , pages 154 - 199
QUESTIONS?
[email protected]
Back up Slides
TYPES OF SPACE WEAPON
Category
Specific weapons
Past
Use
Primary Task
(secondary)
1. Space-toMissile
1. Space-based Interceptor
U
Missile Defense
(protection/control)
2. Space-based Laser
(U)
Missile Defense
(protection/control)
2. Space-toEarth
3. Orbital Bombardment System (Long Rod
Penetrator or Space-based Common Aero Vehicle)
Ground Attack
(control)
3. Space-toSpace
4. Space Mine (Space-based ASATs/DSAT)
(U)
4. Earth-to-Space
Ground-based ASATs (KK or pellet cloud)

Laser Blinding

Laser Dazzling

Control (Protection)
Radio-frequency (RF) weapons e.g. high-power microwave (HPM)
5. Earth-to-Spaceto-Earth
Key
Radio communications jamming/spoofing

High Altitude Nuclear Detonation

Inter-Continental Ballistic Missile

Fractional Orbital Bombardment System

(U) = formerly under development but programme largely
discontinued
 = developed and tested
U= under development
1. HOW CAN SPACE-BASED WEAPONS EFFECT NATIONAL SECURITY
Security Benefits
1. Missile Defense
2. Protecting Space Assets
3. Prompt Global Strike
4. Space Defense/Attack Capability (space control)
5. Secondary Security Benefits
1. Arms race --> bankrupting adversary
2. Maintaining Aerospace Workforce
3. Stable domination
Security Costs
1. Arms Race --> more vulnerability of space assets,
asymmetric means found by adversary, out competed
2. Harming the Environment (space debris)
3. Long-term impact on security; inability to retract that
system if destabalizing