28-Apr-20

Spacepower’s Role in

National Security Space Overview and Issues

Pete Hays, SAIC

George Washington University

Boston University

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National Defense University Spacepower Theory Study

• Originated during 2005 QDR • Feb 06 OSD Letter with TOR to NDU • Study Design

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Yearlong effort: due Summer 07

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Seminars, Workshops, Conferences

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Product: Two Books

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Volume I: Concise Spacepower Theory

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Volume II: Comprehensive Spacepower Theory

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Edited Volume: Comprehensive Spacepower Theory

VOLUME II CHAPTERS AND AUTHORS

Foreword: Implications of Spacepower for Geopolitics and Grand Strategy Section I: Introduction to Spacepower Theory Chapter 1: On the Nature of Theory:

Harold R. Winton

Chapter 2: International Relations Theory and Spacepower:

Robert L. Pfaltzgraff, Jr.

Chapter 3: Landpower, Seapower, and Spacepower:

Jon T. Sumida

Chapter 4: Airpower, Cyberpower, and Spacepower:

Benjamin S. Lambeth

Section II: Spacepower and Geopolitics Chapter 5: Orbital Terrain and Space Physics:

Martin E.B. France & Jerry Jon Sellers

Chapter 6: Space Law and Governance Structures:

Joanne Irene Gabrynowicz

Chapter 7: Building on Previous Spacepower Theory:

Colin S. Gray & John B. Sheldon

Section III: Commercial Space Perspectives Chapter 8: History of Commercial Space Activity and Spacepower:

Henry R. Hertzfeld

Chapter 9: Commercial Space Industry and Markets:

Joseph Fuller, Jr.

Chapter 10: Merchants and Guardians:

Scott Pace

Chapter 11: Innovative Approaches to Commercial Space:

Ivan Bekey

Section IV: Civil Space Perspectives Chapter 12: History of Civil Space Activity and Spacepower:

Roger D. Launius

Chapter 13: Affordable and Responsive Space Systems:

Sir Martin Sweeting

Chapter 14: Space and Environmental Issues:

Eligar Sadeh

Chapter 15: Competing Visions for Exploration:

Klaus P. Heiss & Dennis R. Wingo; Robert Zubrin

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Edited Volume (cont.)

Section V: Security Space Perspectives Chapter 16: History of Security Space Activity and Spacepower:

James Lewis

Chapter 17: Increasing the Military Uses of Space:

Henry F. Cooper, Jr. & Everett C. Dolman

Chapter 18: Preserving Freedom of Action in Space:

Michael Krepon, Theresa Hitchens & Michael Katz-Hyman

Chapter 19: Balancing Security Interests:

Michael E. O’Hanlon

Section VI: International Perspectives Chapter 20: Russia:

James E. Oberg

Chapter 21: China:

Dean Cheng

Chapter 22: Europe:

Xavier Pasco

Chapter 23: Emerging Actors:

Randall R. Correll

Section VII: Evolving Futures for Spacepower Chapter 24: Evolving U.S. Structures:

John M. Logsdon

Chapter 25: Organizational Drivers for Spacepower:

John M. Collins

Chapter 26: Technological Drivers for Spacepower:

Taylor Dinerman

Chapter 27: Building Human Capital for Spacepower:

S. Peter Worden

Afterword: The Future of Spacepower: Appendixes Space Law: Outer Space Treaty, Registration Convention, Rescue and Return Agreement, Liability Convention, Moon Treaty, PAROS Proposals, IADC Orbits and Orbital Mechanics Basics of Space System Design Possibly Bibliographic Essay, Annotated Bibliography (assembled from COP), and Comprehensive Bibliography 4

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Requirements for Concise Spacepower Theory

Account for the structure of the field: • •

the divergent world views of each sector and the dynamics of their interactions

Define the boundary conditions of the theory: • •

Cis-Lunar space as opposed to all of space International perceptions of spacepower and their effect on US policy

Ask the key, fundamental questions regarding the uses and purposes of space to extract underlying principles. • •

Question hypotheses and present conditions.

Test counterfactuals

Construct a framework that integrates divergent points of view and takes into account potential future scenarios.

Roles of Theory: Define – Construct – Explain – Connect – Anticipate

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Upcoming Conference Capstone Symposium: 25-26 April 07, National Defense University, Washington, D.C.

Initial presentation of Concise Spacepower Theory

For more info or to sign up: www.ndu.edu; [email protected]

Community of Practice Website:

http://groups beta.google.com/group/spacepower-theory 6

Soviet Space Systems and Co-Orbital ASAT RORSAT Co-Orbital ASAT EORSAT Energia carrying Skif DM (Polus) prototype “battle station” DS-P1-M Target Satellite

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Soviet Space Systems and Co-Orbital ASAT

• • • • • •

Many details about this system remain classified or are lost to history. The system used two types of satellites: co-orbital active killers (Istrebitel or killer) and passive targets The first tests, Polyot-1 and Polyot-2, were conducted in 1963 and 1964. There were subsequently 19 target satellite tests and 22 killer satellite tests. The system reached full operational capability in 1972. The last test was on 18 Jun 1982 Killer satellites tested in the 1970s were ready for launch within 90 minutes (using a Tsiklon booster) and could close within less than one kilometer of target satellites within 40-50 minutes On 23 Mar 1983 Yuri Andropov announced a moratorium on design, construction, and testing of the system; the moratorium ended in Sep 1986 In May 1987 Michael Gorbachev visited Baikonur and saw the co-orbital killer satellite and the prototype of the anti-satellite and anti-missile platform called Narvad (Guard). General Zavalishin, who escorted Gorbachev, used the opportunity to advocate resumption of testing. Zavalishin pointed at similar developments in the US and promised to cover up ASAT launches so no one would suspect tests were taking place. As Zavalishin recalls, “...Gorbachev issued incoherent and wordy explanations, which concluded with a polite, but resolute refusal.” Ironically, only few days after this conversation, on 15 May 1987, the first heavy-lift Energia rocket blasted off from Baikonur, carrying Skif DM (Polus) spacecraft, which was later described as a prototype “battle station” in space. Due to a software glitch, the 90-ton-class spacecraft never made it into orbit

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US ASAT Systems and Residual Capabilities

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US ASAT Testing and Systems

• • • • • •

Bold Orion air-launched, nuclear-tipped ASAT tested in late 1950s; world’s first known test 19 Oct 1959 Programs 505 and 437 ground-launched, nuclear-tipped ASATs operationally deployed 1963-70 NSDM 345 in Jan 77 called for development of air launched KEW ASAT MHV ASAT successfully tested on 13 Sep 1985; Congressional restrictions led to cancellation in 1989; KEASAT was follow-on system MIRACL tests in Oct 1997; highlighted satellite vulnerability to DEW ASAT potential of BMD systems: BP and ABL

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ASAT Arms Control Efforts

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Development and testing of ASAT capabilities not covered by OST or other space agreements Two-Track Diplomacy with three rounds of US-USSR ASAT negotiations 1978-79 USSR testing moratorium 1982-86; Congressional restrictions on MHV ASAT testing DST was only “bucket” of AC that did not lead to agreements during 1980s-90s PAROS efforts at CD and UNGA Resolutions

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A Space Enabled Reconnaissance-Strike Complex: The New American Way of War

KTO, 1991 (Desert Storm): 37 Days 1 Mbps/5K Forces Unguided Laser/EO-guided

245,000 20,450 92% 8%

Serbia, 1999 (Allied Force) 78 Days; 24.5 Mbps/5K Unguided Laser/EO-guided GPS-guided

16,000 7,000 700 66% 31% 3%

Afghanistan, 2001-02 (Enduring Freedom) 90 Days; 68.2 Mbps/5K Unguided Laser/EO-guided GPS-guided

9,000 6,000 7,000 41% 27% 32%

Iraq, 2003 (Iraqi Freedom) 29 Days; 51.1 Mbps/5K

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Unguided Guided

9,251 19,948 32% 68% 12

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Growth in SATCOM Demand

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Military Satellite Communications Grids

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Four Defense Space Mission Areas

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Space Support

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Force Enhancement

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Space Control

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Force Application

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Force Enhancement Missions, Primary Orbits, Major Systems Environmental Monitoring Communications Position, Navigation, and Time Polar LEO Defense Meteorological Support Program (DMSP) ---------------------- National Polar Orbiting Operational Environmental Satellite System (NPOESS) Geostationary Orbit (GSO) Semi synchronous Orbit Defense Satellite Communications System (DSCS) II, DSCS III, Ultra-High Frequency Follow-on (UFO), Milstar, Global Broadcast System (GBS), Iridium, commercial systems ------------------------------------ Advanced Extremely High Frequency (AEHF), Wideband Gapfiller System (WGS), Mobile User Objective System (MUOS), Polar Military Satellite Communications System, Transformational Communications System (TSAT) Global Positioning System (GPS) GPS II GPS IIR GPS IIR-M ------------------ GPS IIF GPS III Integrated Tactical Warning and Attack Assessment GSO and LEO Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance (ISR) Various Defense Support Program (DSP), GPS ----------------- Space-Based Infra-Red System (SBIRS) High, Space Tracking and Surveillance System (STSS) Imaging (IMINT) Satellites, Signals Intelligence (SIGINT) Satellites, commercial systems ------------------------- Future Imagery Architecture (FIA), Integrated Overhead SIGINT Architecture (IOSA), Space Radar

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Major Military Space Program Investments (Millions of 2006 dollars)

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Gain or Maintain Space Control

Provide Freedom of Action in Space for Friendly Forces PROTECTION Employ active and Passive defensive measures to ensure US and friendly space systems operate as Planned SURVEILLANCE Detect, identify, assess, and track space objects and events Deny Freedom of Action in Space to Enemy Forces PREVENTION Employ measures to prevent adversary use of data or services from US and friendly space systems for purposes hostile to the US NEGATION Disrupt, deny, degrade, deceive, or destroy adversary space capabilities

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Teets, Mar 05: Top National Security Space Priorities

• • • • •

Achieve Mission Success in Operations and Acquisition Develop and Maintain a Team of Space Professionals Integrate Space Capabilities for National Intelligence, Warfighting, and Homeland Security Produce Innovative Solutions for the Most Challenging National Security Problems Ensure Freedom of Action in Space Sega, Mar 06: Top National Security Space Priorities Improve the integration of space capabilities across the national security space community Get “back-to-basics” in space acquisition Ensure the viability and proficiency of our space professional and S&T workforce

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Intelligence Sector Drivers

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Horizontal Integration

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Role of DNI, NRO, NGA, USD(I) Young Report: Future Imagery Architecture

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Costs and Capabilities Issues Space Radar, AESA

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DTED, SAR, and SMTI

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Defense Sector Drivers

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Increasing Reliance on Commercial Satcom: 80% in OIF

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Transformational Communications Architecture: AEHF, WGS, TSAT, COTM

Young Report: SBIRS High and EELV Space Radar Space Commission Implementation

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Space Cadre

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Sanctuary Survivability Control High Ground

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Attributes of Military Space Doctrines

Primary Value and Functions of Military Space Forces Space System Characteristics and Employment Strategies Conflict Missions of Space Forces

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Enhance Strategic Stability Facilitate Arms Control Above functions plus:

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Force Enhancement

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Control Space Significant Force Enhancement Decisive Impact on Terrestrial Conflict BMD

                

Limited Numbers Fragile Systems Vulnerable Orbits Optimize for NTMV Terrestrial Backups Distributed Architectures Autonomous Control Hardening Redundancy On Orbit Spares Crosslinks Maneuver Less Vulnerable Orbits Stealth Attack Warning Sensors 5 Ds: Deception, Disruption, Denial, Degradation, Destruction Reconstitution Capability Defense Convoy

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Limited

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Force Enhancement Degrade Gracefully

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Control Space Significant Force Enhancement Surveillance, Offensive, and Defensive Counterspace Above functions plus: Decisive Space to Space and Space to Earth

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Force Application BMD

Appropriate Military Organization for Operations and Advocacy

NRO Major Command or Unified Command Unified Command or Space Force Space Force

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Space Doves

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“Unlike the strategy for nuclear weapons, there exists no obvious strategy for employing space weapons that will enhance global stability. If the precedent of avoiding destabilizing situations is to continue —and that is compatible with a long history of US foreign policy —one ought to avoid space based weapons.”

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Lt Col Bruce M. Deblois, “Space Sanctuary,” APJ, 1998

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Militarization Realists

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“fighting into space looks feasible and we should plan for the eventuality. Fighting in space shows little promise, while fighting from space looks impractical for the foreseeable future, with or without treaties.”

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Maj William L. Spacy II, Does the United States Need Space-Based Weapons, 1999

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Inevitable Weaponizers

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“we know that every medium—air, land and sea —has seen conflict. Reality indicates that space will be no different. Given this virtual certainty, the United States must develop the means both to deter and to defend against hostile acts in and from space.”

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Space Commission Report, 2001

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Space Hawks

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[concerted development of space weapons by the United States] “will buy generations of security that all the ships, tanks, and airplanes in the world will not provide. . . . Without it, we will become vulnerable beyond our worst fears.”

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Sen Bob Smith (R NH) “Challenge of Space Power,” APJ, 1999

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Five Potential Paths to Use of Space Weapons High-Altitude Nuclear Detonation Slippery Slope Boost-Phase BMD Flag Follows Trade Astropolitiks

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High-Altitude Nuclear Detonation

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Potential to Disable all Nonhardened LEO Satellites Prompt Kill for LOS; Effect falls with 1/R 2 Gradual Fatal Dose in Weeks to Months Potential for $50B+ in Damage Starfish Test July 1962; 1.4 MT Hardening Possible for 2-3% System Costs

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DTRA HALEOS Study, April 2001

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Slippery Slope

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Range of “weapon-like” options: 5Ds, EW, Laser “Dazzling,” Space Mines, Many Residual Capabilities “If force application is construed broadly enough to include terrestrial based applications of military force aimed at affecting orbital systems and their use, one can argue that space warfare has already arrived even though no space-based weapons are currently deployed.”

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Barry D. Watts, The Military Use of Space, 2001

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Boost-Phase BMD

• • • •

Space is Best Basing Mode for Global Boost-Phase Coverage; No Crisis Deployment or Contested Airspace/Littoral Limited Engagement Window (70-300 sec); Predelegation or Man-in-the loop?

Even Limited BMD System can have Significant ASAT Capability Crisis Stability; Expense; Technologies

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Flag Follows Trade

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Neomercantilist Military Protection of New Economic and Strategic Center of Gravity “Our investment in space is rapidly growing and soon will be of such magnitude that it will be considered a vital interest —on par with how we value oil today . . .” “it is not the future of military space that is critical to the United States —it is the continued commercial development of space that will provide continued strength for our great country in the decades ahead. Military space, while important, will follow.”

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General Howell M. Estes, III, 1998

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Astropolitiks

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Withdraw from current OST-dominated space regime; establish benign free-market sovereignty in space Use current and near-term capabilities to seize military control of LEO Establish “a national space coordination authority” to “define, separate, and coordinate the efforts of commercial, civilian, and military space projects.

”

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“The ultimate goal . . .is not the militarization of space. Rather, the militarization of space is a means to an end, part of a longer-term strategy. The goal is to reverse the current international malaise in regard to space exploration, and to do so in a way that is efficient and that harnesses the positive motivations of individuals and states striving to improve their conditions. It is a neoclassical, market-driven approach intended to maximize efficiency and wealth.

”

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E verett C. Dolman, Astropolitik, 2001

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Backup Slides

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Missile Defense Share of Total DoD Budget and R&D Budget

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Three Major Objectives of Current U.S. Missile Defense Program 1) “ Maintain and sustain an initial capability rogue attacks.” MDA plans by 2013 to: to defend the U.S., allies, and our deployed forces against Complete fielding of Ground-Based Interceptors (GBI) in Alaska and California Enhance Early Warning Radars in Alaska, California, and United Kingdom Field Sea-Based X-Band Radar in the Pacific Field a forward-transportable radar in Japan Expand command and control, battle management, and communications capabilities Augment GBI midcourse defense capability by deploying Aegis BMD interceptors and engagement ships 2) “ close the gaps and improve this initial capability ;” MDA plans by 2013 to: Add more Aegis BMD sea-based interceptors Field four transportable Terminal High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD) units Introduce land and sea variants of the Multiple Kill Vehicle program Upgrade the early warning radar in Greenland Establish a GBI site and corresponding radar capability in Europe 3) “ develop options for the future ;” MDA plans to: Continue development of the Space Tracking and Surveillance System (STSS) Maintain two programs, the Kinetic Energy Interceptor (KEI) and the Airborne Laser (ABL), one of which is to be selected as the boost-phase missile defense element by 2010 Develop a Space Test Bed to examine space-based options for expanding the coverage and effectiveness for future BMD systems

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U.S. Missile Defense Programmatic Issues and Challenges European third site for GBI and associated radar $206M requested for FY08 but Congress cut funding last year; political issues in host nations; objections raised by Russians Airborne Laser Fully funded at $632M in FY07; FY08 request is $549M. Initial airborne attempt to intercept boosting missile pushed back to last quarter of FY09 Kinetic Energy Interceptor Congress cut FY07 request of $406M by $48M; program restructured and scheduled for FY08 flight test but may not offer a significant new capability such as boost phase intercept capability or a mobile launcher Multiple Kill Vehicle FY07 funding request of $165M was cut by $20M; $271M requested for FY08; program refocused on developing two separate payload configurations Testing $597M appropriated in FY07 and $586M requested for FY08 but concerns remain about breadth and scope of testing Space Request for Space Test Bed for FY08 is $10M and is projected to grow to $15M for FY09

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Balancing Issues and Challenges for Space and Missile Defense Desire for constantly deployed, global boost phase missile intercept capabilities via space basing of kinetic and/or directed energy weapons versus concerns over “weaponization of space” Desire for robust global capability to dissuade, deter, and defend against rogue actors versus concerns with undercutting strategic stability with Russia and China Desire to test base-based missile defense components versus concerns with “weaponization of space” and space debris Development of non-space based boost phase missile intercept capabilities (e.g. ground-based interceptors, ground-based lasers, and Airborne Laser) versus their significant anti-satellite capabilities

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