Transcript The case for scenarios in London Planning: the example of migration policies

The Case for Scenarios in London Planning:
the example of migration policies
Ian Gordon
LSE London and Spatial Economics Research Centres,
HEIF4 Development Workshop on
‘London’s Future: a Scenario Approach’
LSE, 29th October 2010
‘Making a Drama out of a Strategy’ –
or ‘keeping to the script’ ?
• A decade of Mayoral planning in London
→ recurring pleas for consideration of alternative futures
– first as reaction against Livingstone Plan’s:
• deterministic high growth assumptions (‘vision’)
• and lack of Plan B if infrastructure funding was unavailable
– now – more vocally – at EiP on Johnson DRLP:
• in relation to potential long term impacts of financial crisis
• anticipated cuts in pub. exp. + ‘smaller state’
• limits on immigration from outside EU (less emphasised)
• Arguments so far brushed aside, because:
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current assumptions are the best available
previous experience with scenarios added nothing
‘plan, monitor, manage’ (PPM) will provide all necessary flexibility
Plan needs to provide certainties
• to investors / funders / neighbours / CG
Why Scenarios are Needed for
Strategic Planning
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Case for thinking (hard) about alternative scenarios is not just:
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But that a strategic approach going beyond simple accommodation of
immediately observable trends (now or later via PPM) involves:
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– that there is an inbuilt expansionist bias in LP’s reading of trends;
– or that recent economic/political shifts may have big LT implications
– A wider perspective, on fundamental processes, situations that may have to
be faced and how planned actions could impinge on these
– Clarifying relation between goals, fundamental values/ priorities and
(uncertain) reality judgements about change and impacts of actions
– Analysing how separate interventions / policies are liable to interact – via
the ways that private individuals / firms respond to these
To do this requires a set of coherent ‘stories’ about how different paths
of development (not just trends) might emerge, via both:
– serious exercises of imagination (distinct from default internal view) +
– An evidence-based understanding of how key cause-effect relations work
Even more these would be pre-requisites for any more democratic
approach to long-term planning in London
Some Issues Needing Attention
• Baseline scenario:
– As best guess still prob. too ‘optimistic’ about scale of London growth
(in jobs at least – cf. productivity) but key to recognise:
• Likely repetition of strong boom-bust cycles (despite mild present one)
• Continuing wide margins of uncertainty about trend (± 100%)
• Some ‘canonical variations’
– A set of threats to underlying conditions particularly boosting
London’s competitive position over past 20 years (LPUK 2009):
• Financial re-regulation; a more sustainable UK macro/trade -strategy;
northern revanchism in reaction to cuts vs City bailout
– Two Coalition policy emphases with potential LT implications;
• From big state / welfare to big society (in relation to regeneration and
social geography of London housing (cf. Blair CabOff report)
• Major curtailment of immigration into UK – will take as example since
(think) connects with some of problems underlying neglect of scenarios
Thinking Strategically about London
Impacts of Tighter Migration Controls
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Coalition policies involve an annual limit on non-EU econ migrants
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But components of population change in London are complex:
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– Conservatives at least expect reduction of UK net flow below 100,000 p.a. as in
(most) 1990s rather than c. 200,000 as in 2000s
– Potentially major impacts on London housing and labour markets
– Births have become largest (positive) element
– Substantial continuing (net) outward migration to rest of UK /GSE
– Very uneven effects by age & all components causally linked:
• Out-moving families reduce impact of London births
• Out-moving older people die somewhere else
• International migrants effectively displace 50% as many domestic migrants
Plan attributes upsurge in population growth since 1988 to impact of inmovement of people of child-bearing age on births
– May be politic
– But key element in acceleration has been international migration in young
working age groups
• And this is key to housing, labour market and planning implications
What Might a Reversal of this Change Imply?
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Non-EU flow already cut back by drop in refugee admissions:
– Effectively reversing rest of growth cannot be taken for granted
– But simple arithmetic implies gross reduction of 50k p.a.
• If 50% displacement rate continued for new arrivals (?) would imply a net change
over Plan period of c. 650 k
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So potentially very large effect – but how it actually plays out depends on
(scarcely examined) set of housing market processes
– Also true of repercussions for child population numbers
– And of developments at bottom end of London labour market
• Where induced fall in wages seems to have induced job growth
• But also (probably) contributed to level of voluntary worklessness in London
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One candidate then for serious examination in scenario terms
– But lack of attention so far exemplifies two rather general points:
• Issues may be neglected because it is impolitic to address them directly;
• Needs much more effort to uncovering cause-effect connections and their strengths
to get anywhere useful
Conclusion
• Many different reasons to give more attention now to serious
scenario work for London planning
• Even if, as I tend to think:
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short-medium term impacts of cuts on economy likely to be much
worse elsewhere; and
– long term prospects for city remain pretty good
• Given the political functions of the Plan:
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may be bit naïve to expect any version of to give great attention to
potential down-sides or many alternative views
• But PPM is not an adequate/strategic response to real /
continuing uncertainties:
– this needs serious wotk on some ‘canonical’ alternatives
– especially if anything is to be done about the major ‘democratic
deficit’ for this - primarily strategic - authority