Transcript Russia and the West after the USSR, Part II
Russia and the West after the USSR, Part II
The year 2008, the game changer
2008 March : Dmitry Medvedev is elected President of Russia August: The Russia-Georgia war brings tensions between Russia and the West to the highest level since the Cold War October: The global financial crisis reaches its critical point November: Barack Obama is elected US President on a platform of change December: NATO decides to put off further Eastern expansion
“Frozen conflicts” Control of territory: which ethnic group, which state? Dissolution of the multiethnic Soviet Union is the trigger Struggles between nations – or between elites?
Human rights – or property and power?
Fights over the imperial spoils Participants can be pro-Russian or anti-Russian, pro Western or anti-Western, depending on the situation Georgia (South Ossetia and Abkhazia) Armenia-Azerbaijan (Nagorny Karabakh) Moldova (Transnistria)
August 7, 2008: Georgian forces launch a major invasion of South Ossetia
Georgian tanks enter South Ossetia
Bush and Putin were attending Beijing Olympics
Russian forces enter South Ossetia through the Roki Tunnel
Vice President Cheney and Senator McCain argued for a US military strike at Russian forces
SS-21
French President Nicolas Sarkozi mediates an end to the conflict; the war ends on August 12
Scale of conflict 1. Size of forces The Georgian side – 17-20,000 The Russian-Ossetian-Abkhazian side – 20-23,000 2. Casualties, killed South Ossetian - 365 Georgian – 412 Russian – 71 Abkhazian - 1
The war’s impact on Russia’s relations with the West 1. Showed how close to a major war the relationship deteriorated as a result of zero-sum thinking 2. Showed the danger of clients provoking a major war for their own ends 3. Showed that main leaders did not want a major war 4. Showed the danger of further NATO expansion 5. Manifested the need for a major review of relations
The global economic crisis
Changes in Russia’s GDP
Russia reverts to its traditional theme: Modernization This goal boosts Russia’s interest in further integration with the West
Afghanistan
2009-10: THE RESET IN RUSSIA-WEST RELATIONS
1.Improvement of US-Russian relations Containment of Russia no longer key US priority Serious dialog across the board Security and arms control – key area of joint actions Expansion of trade 2.Resumption of cooperation between NATO and Russia Further NATO expansion put off Afghanistan as the main area of common interests Change of US policy and a new dialog on missile defence NATO’s Lisbon Summit 3.New push for EU-Russia integration New governments in Ukraine and Poland move to improve relations with Russia Revival of The Trio – Russia, Germany, France
Continental Europe’s Big Three at the Deauville Summit, October 2010
NATO Summit, Lisbon, Nov. 20, 2010
Lisbon: NATO-Russia Summit
From Statement of the NATO-Russia Council meeting, Lisbon, Nov. 16, 2010: “We … recognized that the security of all states in the Euro-Atlantic community is indivisible, and that the security of NATO and Russia is intertwined . We will work towards achieving a true strategic and modernised partnership based on the principles of reciprocal confidence, transparency, and predictability, with the aim of contributing to the creation of a common space of peace, security and stability in the EuroAtlantic area.
http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/news_68871.htm
Russian public attitudes to the US: balance of positive and negative, 1990 2010* http://www.levada.ru/press/2010111103.html
The problems Cold war legacies, inertia of the past Strategies, weapons, thinking Whither US-Russian relations?
Whither NATO?
Whither Russia?
Issues between Russia and some of her neighbours
Russian concerns The West wants to undermine the current regime – that is, push Russia back into chaos The West wants to keep Russia down The West wants to control Russia’s resources Russia – in particular, to grab The West is not playing fair NATO continues to expand, despite Russian objections – or even because of Russian objections Conclusion: Russia needs to be strong and vigilant . Confrontation with the West is not desirable, but Russia must be prepared to defend its interests
Both sets of concerns do reflect some realities On both sides, there are forces which see the world through the prism of zero-sum games And they feed on each other And there are vested interests feeding this Manichean view And there is the organizing power of simplistic, binary thinking – Us vs. Them Ironically, both believe in American omnipotence Perhaps, this is the cardinal flaw in this type of thinking – because US power is increasingly limited
The most important trend: The accumulating weight of Western and Russian mutual interests Important changes have taken place, while thinking and policies on both sides were lagging behind these changes Both Russia and the West are better equipped than ever to develop new international policies through joint efforts dialog, negotiations between Russia and the West, Russia and NATO
Pierre Morelle, high-ranking EU diplomat, on Russia-West relations, March 2008: “I am struck by the contrast between our interdependence and the problems in our relations which remain unresolved. It is a contrast between practical cooperation and psychological confrontation . Ties between the two worlds are strengthening on a scale which was unthinkable in the past – and yet psychological tensions remain. Even though experience implies that it is better to learn together – and even if we experience disappointments, we will achieve a lot if we move forward working together.”
Март 2008
:: Пьер Морель. По одну сторону стола. http://sr.fondedin.ru/new/admin/print.php?id=1206353430&archive=1206354399
Do you have favorable or unfavorable view of US, Russia? – Pew Opinion Research, 2007
Country
Russia Ukraine Canada India South Korea China Britain US Germany Israel Turkey
% fav. To US
41% 54% 55% 59% 58% 34% 51% 80% 30% 78% 9%
% fav. To Russia
89% 81% 52% 58% 54% 46% 47% 44% 34% 31% 17%
2000-2008, Pew Research: http://pewresearch.org/pubs/1059/global-opinion bush-years
2008 The lowest point in US-Russian relations in 25 years Then, the Cold War trend is reversed The Russia-Georgia War and its political impact The peak of the global financial crisis Election of new Presidents in Russia and US March 2008: Dmitry Medvedev elected as President of Russia November 2008: Barack Obama elected as US President
Medvedev’s ideology Democratic capitalism as an ideal for Russia Rule of law, a liberal political outlook (rights, constitutionalism, accountable government) Russia as a great power Modernization of the Russian society and economy Close partnership with the West, coupled with Multivector foreign policy
%% of Canadians with favorable attitudes to Russia (Pew Research)
%% of Russians having positive attitudes to America (Pew Research)* http://pewglobal.org/database/?indicator=1&country=181
%% of Russians who believe that the US takes into account other countries’ interests (Pew Research)* http://pewglobal.org/database/?indicator=4&country=181
Russian public opinion on relations with the US, Levada Center*
How would you characterize Russian - US relations?
Oct. 2005 August 2008
Friendly Good neighbours Normal, calm Cool Tense Hostile Hard to say 12% 9% 39% 25% 10% 2% 3% 4% 2% 16% 39% 28% 8% 4% http://webfile.ru/2612342
http://pewresearch.org/pubs/1428/america-seen-less important-china-more-powerful-isolationist-sentiment surges
http://pewresearch.org/pubs/1428/america-seen-less important-china-more-powerful-isolationist-sentiment surges
http://pewresearch.org/pubs/1428/america-seen-less important-china-more-powerful-isolationist-sentiment surges
http://www.worldpublicopinion.org/pipa/articles/interna tional_security_bt/444.php?nid=&id=&pnt=444
No one in 1999 expected that Russia’s resurgence And no one expected that the West would be confronting such a formidable array of challenges as today – from the economic crisis to Afghanistan to climate change – without ready solutions to deal with them So, on the Western side, there has been discomfort and unease about Russia’s coming back as a Great Power And a desire to find ways to delegitimize it (“Russia is not playing by the rules”)
In Russia, there was a recovery of self-confidence And a belief that while being “a Western client” was bad for Russia, putting Russia’s own interests first and driving hard bargains with the West does bring results But also: like winning huge in a lottery and scrambling to find ways to spend the money Assertiveness mixed with insecurity , a fear that this moment is fleeting , that things may change for the worse very quickly
Russia’s resurgence and Western troubles can be too easily pictured as a zero-sum game But it is anything but a zero-sum game Tremendous exaggeration of: The degree of differences between interests And of the ability to succeed without cooperation from the other side Russia cannot, and does not plan to, thrive on Western troubles Neither can the West hope to gain by undercutting Russia’s resurgence Win-win is possible – but both sides do need new thinking
2009-2012: The Reset Prioritizing the US-Russian relationship Resumption of dialog and consultation Rebuilding arms control – New START Shelving NATO expansion Restoration of NATO-Russia ties Changes in the Ballistic Missile Defense plan Different missiles Including Russia Expanding cooperation on Afghanistan – use of Russian territory Closer cooperation on Iran
The Obama-Medvedev statement, London, April 1, 2009: “Reaffirming that the era when our countries viewed each other as enemies is long over , and recognizing our many common interests , we today established a substantive agenda for Russia and the United States to be developed over the coming months and years. We are resolved to work together to strengthen strategic stability , international security, and jointly meet contemporary global challenges , while also addressing disagreements openly and honestly in a spirit of mutual respect and acknowledgement of each other’s perspective.”
2012 The Reset is over Tensions over NATO’s missile defence project Middle East revolutions, Russia-NATO rift over Libya, Syria Western support of Russian opposition forces trying to prevent Putin’s election as President Europe moves closer to the US
The Ukraine Crisis
The Ukraine Crisis: main dimensions Forcible overthrow of an elected government Foreign interference in Ukraine’s political conflict (the West, then Russia) Loss of territories, severe economic crisis, the state is shattered A civil war with up to 50,000 dead, 2 million refugees and displaced persons, escalation of all forms of political violence The lowest point in Western-Russian relations since the Cold War Suspension of cooperation between NATO and Russia Economic warfare (sanctions) Propaganda warfare Heightened military activities (deployment of Russ troops in Crimea, deployment of NATO troops on Russ borders, Russian military activities) Crisis in arms control and disarmament A new Cold War? Chances of a hot war bet. Russia and NATO?
Causes Internal Ukrainian International Impossible to separate Conflicts within Ukraine had major international components All Ukrainian forces had external backers Actions of other powers gave the conflict international dimensions Competition between Russia and the West The continuing transition to a multipolar world The Ukraine crisis became an international crisis
Dissolution of USSR in 1991 Main cause - a deal between Russian and Ukrainian leaders to abolish USSR and replace it with 15 independent states based on Soviet republics Breaking the main axis of historical Russia , which started with Kiev as the capital and continued with Moscow Still, Russia lived on as a state with a 1000-year history, firm identity, sense of historical continuity Ukraine was new state with an uncertain future An experimental state The West defined it as its strategic goal to shore up Ukraine as an independent state
Zbigniew Brzezinski: “Ukraine, a new and important space on the Eurasian chessboard, is a geopolitical pivot because its very existence as an independent country helps to transform Russia. Without Ukraine, Russia ceases to be a Eurasian empire.” “However, if Moscow regains control over Ukraine, with its 52 million people and major resources as well as access to the Black Sea, Russia automatically again regains the wherewithal to become a powerful imperial state, spanning Europe and Asia.” The Grand Chessboard, 1997
Stephen Hadley, a Defense Department official in 1991, remarked later: “We had a view that without Ukraine a retrograde Russia would never reconstitute the Soviet Union. It would never become the threat posed by the Soviet Union because of the enormous resources and population and geography of Ukraine . So that would become an important element of US policy – putting aside all the principles that were all-important – from the strategic point an independent Ukraine became an insurance policy”.
Plokhy, Serhii. The Last Empire. The Final Days of the Soviet Union. New York: Basic Books, 2014, p.262
George Friedman: “At the beginning of this year there existed in Ukraine a slightly pro-Russian though very shaky government. That situation was fine for Moscow: after all, Russia did not want to completely control Ukraine or occupy it; it was enough that Ukraine not join NATO and the EU. Russian authorities cannot tolerate a situation in which Western armed forces are located a hundred or so kilometers from Kursk or Voronezh. The United States, for its part, was interested in forming a pro-Western government in Ukraine. It saw that Russia was on the rise, and was eager not to let it consolidate its position in the post-Soviet space.
The success of the pro-Western forces in Ukraine would allow the U.S. to contain Russia. Russia calls the events that took place at the beginning of this year a coup d'etat organized by the United States… One party wants a Ukraine that is neutral. The other wants Ukraine to form part of a line of containment against Russian expansion . One cannot say that either party is mistaken: both are acting based on their national interests. It's just that these interests don't jibe... The bottom line is that it is in the strategic interests of the United States to prevent Russia from becoming a hegemon. And it is in the strategic interests of Russia not to allow the United States to come to its borders.” Stratfor Chief's "Most Blatant Coup in History" Interview Translated in Full.
Russia Insider
, January 20, 2015 http://russia-
Two different European integration projects (Sakwa) “Wider Europe” project is aimed at further enlargement of the European Union on its own terms irrespective of Russia’s objections or preferences. “Greater Europe” accommodates Europe’s existing polycentrism of power and seeks to build integrative ties with Russia as a close partner whose interests are respected on a par with those of other European countries “Instead of concentric rings emanating from Brussels, weakening at the edges but nevertheless focused on a single centre, (Greater Europe) posits a multipolar vision, with more than one centre and without a single ideological flavour. This is a pluralistic representation of European space , and draws on a long European tradition: the vision of pan European unification…” Sakwa, Richard. Op. cit., Kindle Locations 752-755
A zero-sum game between Russia and the West destroys Ukraine Why the zero-sum game?
Because of a change in the global balance of economic (and political) power Transition to a multipolar world The West’s power is on the wane Other centres of power are growing Ukr should not have been forced into an either-or choice
Russia remains in the Western orbit But it has been Rebuilding links with neighbours SCO and BRICS Increasing its degree of sovereignty Not a systemic alternative to the West – but a more balanced relationship with the West Western punishment is aimed not just at Russia, but at anyone who would dare to challenge the West
So, Russia adopts a defensive posture on its Western frontiers -And expands and deepens its relations with Eastern partners So – the crisis precipitated by the ongoing shift becomes an additional catalyst for that shift Which angers the West even more
Western options: More sanctions, get ready for war if the crisis escalates The current policy What is the plan?
That the economic pain will lead to regime change But there is no sign of this happening So, what to do?
Increase pressure on Russia or Negotiate a deal MUCH WILL DEPEND ON WHAT HAPPENS IN UKRAINE
The world order in flux Every political order rests on a balance of power If the balance changes, the order is challenged After the shift in the balance, some elements of the order undergo change It could take a decade or two It may lead to a big war Hopefully, we can muddle through without a big war
Steady efforts to draw Ukraine into the Western sphere of influence, to reduce Russia’s influence to a minimum Russia – resisting the Western pull, but not actively until 2013-14 Ukr elites balancing between Russia and West, seeking to gain as much as possible from both sides In Ukraine itself – divisions between pro-Russian and pro-Western segments of the population, Crimea the most pro-Russian Ukrainization
Why did it explode in 2013-14?
Eastern Partnership policy of the EU, supported by the US Stepped-up efforts to prepare Ukraine for NATO membership Ironically , these trends acquired greater momentum under President Yanukovich , elected in 2010 with the overwhelming support of pro-Russian voters But – he wanted a balance And that was unacceptable to the West
The West was playing a zero-sum game ag. Russia What about Putin?
Status quo, a neutral Ukraine Putin counters by offering incentives and warning of trade barriers President Yanukovich turns to West for help (needs $150 bln.) The EU can give only $1 bln.
Yanukovich takes time out, meanwhile accepting Putin’s offer, hoping to bargain with the West Vilnius, Nov. 28-29 Martin Schultz, Stefan Fule: OK, we’ll sign it with the next Ukrainian govt
EU and US go ballistic See it as Russia’s geopolitical victory Determined to overturn it Encourage Ukrainian opposition to go for regime change The opposition launches a “revolution of dignity” Mass demonstrations, takeover of government buildings, battles with the police The main strike force – ultranationalists After a 3-month confrontation – the Yanukovich government is overthrown Over to internal causes
Result of the “revolution of dignity” - the collapse of the Ukr state in the form in which it was officially proclaimed 23 years ago The events of last winter were merely the straw that broke the camel’s back Crony capitalism + Ukrainian nationalism did it in Crony capitalism has impoverished Ukraine The mass protests were driven by despair over the regime and the entire system But more importantly, it was a battle between oligarchs , in which pro-Western groups deployed Ukrainian nationalism as their main weapon
The foundation of Ukraine – not a nation, but a territory populated by ethnically diverse population cobbled together by Lenin and Stalin as a purely administrative unit To paraphrase Massimo d’Azeglio, 1861: “We’ve made Italy. Now we must make Italians” “The Communists made Ukraine. Now we must make Ukrainians” The Ukrainian national project Creating a Ukrainian identity Competition with a much deeper and stronger Russian identity in Ukraine
The Russian identity vs the Ukrainian project If the project had been successful… But it has fared very poorly Mostly because of crony capitalism Meanwhile, Russia has experienced a partial recovery since 2000 The attraction of Russia The influence of Russia Language Culture Economy Russia’s fundamental presence in Ukraine Clash of projects – Ukrainian Nation vs. Russian World
Convergence of interests: The West Ukr oligarchs Ukr nationalists Make Ukraine independent of Russia Anchor it in the West A massive challenge to the pro-Russian parts of Ukraine Triggering off a wave of protests in Eastern and Southern parts of Ukraine – an uprising, first peaceful, then armed
Pro-Russians : federalization!
Nationalists : we can’t allow the state to break up Sticking to the unitary and ethnocratic model Use of force Reliance on the ultranationalists Pro-Russians: reject the Ukrainian project altogether, fight for independence, try to rejoin Russia
An unmitigated disaster For the sake of tearing Ukraine off from Russia, Destroy the state?
Provoke a civil war?
Do the ends justify the means?
Domestic forces and Russia’s aid The pro-Russian sentiment in Eastern and Southern Ukraine is widespread, exists in other regions as well But opposition forces managed to mobilize it politically only in Crimea and Donbass Still, even there, the oppositionists would have been most likely crushed by the govt and their paramilitary battalions – at enormous cost in lives and property – if Russia had not intervened But it is also true that they would have been crushed if they had not had strong popular support
Putin Helping the rebels in various ways short of full-scale intervention Costs for Russia Motives: Geopolitical contest for influence over Ukraine Could not allow Kiev to drown the uprising in blood The Eastern rebellion in Ukraine has evoked mass sympathy in Russia The war unleashed by the Ukr govt on Eastern Ukraine has generated strong feelings Putin cannot ignore it politically
Different approaches to Crimea and Donbass Crimea: strongest pro-Russian sentiment strategic value for Russia No plan to annex, the drift of events, referendum crucial Donbass: Discouraging sovereignty, no interest in annexation Intention to use the uprising as leverage on Kiev Recognized Ukr’s new govt Opposed to Ukraine’s breakup – minus Crimea Advocates federalization
What are the possible scenarios?
--Worst case: escalation with direct involvement of Russian and NATO forces?
Seems unlikely, but cannot be excluded --One side winning over the other?
Possible, but extremely dangerous --A reconciliation?
Unlikely in the near future --Freezing the conflict? The most realistic and less dangerous prospect, precedents exist Minsk is holding, despite the challenges
Terms on which the conflict can come to an end Terms on which Russia and the West can agree Change Ukr from a unitary state to a federation Guarantee its neutral status – no NATO Association with EU on terms which would not cut Ukraine economically from Russia
The Ukraine conflict cannot be frozen until the West and Russia stop treating the crisis as a zero sum game Whether both sides muster enough sense of realism to do so remains to be seen EU: Germany, France, Italy, etc.
vs Poland, Baltic states, Sweden Obama Deadlock
http://www.gallup.com/poll/181568/americans-increasingly-russia threat-top-enemy.aspx?version=print
Global opinions of the US, 2014, Pew: http://www.pewglobal.org/database/indic ator/1/