The Impacts of Fukushima Dai-ichi on the Nuclear Industry and the Licensing of New Nuclear Power Plants

American Bar Association 2011 Annual Meeting August 4-9, 2011 - Toronto, Canada

Event: Japan Earthquake and Tsunami

Event: Japan Earthquake and Tsunami

 Earthquake 9.0 - 15 miles offshore from Sendai  March 11, 2011 – 14:46 Japan standard time      Knocked out offsite power The 3 operating Fukushima Dai-ichi reactors automatically shut down due to the earthquake: Fukushima Dai-ichi 1, 2, 3  9 other reactors also automatically shut down:  Fukushima Dai-ni 1, 2, 3, 4,  Onagawa 1, 2, 3  Tokai 2 All 12 Emergency Diesel Generators started – 2 per plant Standard seismic ground motion exceeded at Units 2, 3, 5.

Unit 4 had just offloaded spent fuel to the Unit 4 pool  Normal facility response to the seismic event

Event: Japan Earthquake and Tsunami

 Tsunamis (~40 minutes later)  45 feet high at Fukushima Dai-ichi     Exceeded design-basis at all Units by 27 feet Loss of emergency AC power (11 EDGs down; 1 at Unit 6 up)   Station Blackout (SBO) at Units 1-5.

Unit 5 cross-tied with Unit 6 EDG  safe shutdown condition Backup systems: DC Batteries, turbine-driven pumps, diesel-driven pumps  some system failures Time until cooling to the core was lost:    Unit 1 – several hours Unit 2 – 71 hours Unit 3 – 36 hours Fuel damage shortly after loss of cooling

Units 1-4

Credit: NuclearStreet.com

Taken from the South side of Unit 5

Credit: world-nuclear-news.org

Credit: world-nuclear-news.org

Event: Japan Earthquake and Tsunami

  Explosions – Units 1, 2, and 3   High temperature fuel cladding at Units 1, 2, and 3 resulted in hydrogen gas (Zr + 2 H 2 O  ZrO 2 + 2 H 2 ) Hydrogen migrated from the drywell into the secondary containment.

 Explosions in secondary containment  Some release of radioactive materials Explosion – Unit 4  Source of explosive gases is unclear

Event: Japan Earthquake and Tsunami

 Spent Fuel Pools  Operators were unable to monitor the condition of and restore normal cooling flow to the Unit 1, 2, 3, and 4 spent fuel pools.

7/12 – Task Force 90-day report – NEW PLANT RECOMMENDATIONS

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Recommendation 4:

 Strengthen station blackout (SBO) mitigation capability for external events 

Recommendation 4.1

Revise 10 CFR 50.63:   (1)

8-hour coping time

for a loss of all ac power, (2)

72 hour coping for “extended loss of all ac”

training necessary to maintain core and spent fuel pool cooling and for reactor coolant system and primary containment integrity - equipment, procedures, and  (3)

offsite resources

significantly-degraded offsite infrastructure associated with significant natural disasters.

- preplan and prestage equipment for delivery and use with a    AP1000 and ESBWR passive designs have inherent 72-hour coping capability. Certification is recommended without delay.

COL applicants need to address prestaging of equipment beyond 72 hours (ITAAC).

ABWR design certification renewals applications – NRC should impose Recommendation 4.1 in accordance with 10 CFR 52.59(b)(1)

7/12 – Task Force 90-day report – NEW PLANT RECOMMENDATIONS

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Recommendation 4.2

  Order licensees to protect 10 CFR 50.54(hh)(2) equipment from design-basis external events Order licensees to add equipment to address multiunit events

7/12 – Task Force 90-day report – NEW PLANT RECOMMENDATIONS

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Recommendation 2.1:

 2.1 Order licensees to reevaluate the seismic and flooding hazards against current NRC requirements and guidance  update the design basis and SSCs important to safety, accordingly   All current ESPs already meet this All current COL and design certification applicants are addressing this adequately

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7/12 – Task Force 90-day report – NEW PLANT RECOMMENDATIONS

Recommendation 8 -

Integration of EOPs, SAMGs, and EDMGs  

Recommended as a programmatic ITAAC

 Programmatic ITAAC disfavored by Commission (SECY-02-0067) The results of TI 2515/184 (SAMG inspections) supported making SAMGs a requirement    EOPs   Required Implemented in by operators in control room until point of loss of cooling SAMGs    Not currently required Implemented by plant technical staff in TSC to to deal with beyond EOP conditions Created after TMI EDMGs    Required strategies for dealing with loss of large areas of the plant due to fire of explosion Created after 9/11