•

Japan’s Foreign Policy towards Asia: Confused Decade…?

One concept pops-up, then replaced by another.

•

“Expanded East Asian Community”: PM Koizumi’s Singapore speech (2002)

•

“Arc of Freedom and Prosperity”: FM Aso (2006-07)

•

“East Asian Community”: PM Hatoyama (2009-10)

•

“Economic Diplomacy”: FM Maehara (2010-11)

•

“Networking Diplomacy”: FM Genba (2011-) What’s next !?

7 Prime Ministers , 9 Foreign Ministers, 12 Defense Ministers in past 10 yrs

•

Since 2010:Japan’s foreign policy pro-activism towards Southeast Asia?

•

ASEAN-Japan Summit (Nov 2011): $25 billion flagship projects for ASEAN connectivity

•

Mekong-Japan Cooperation (Apr 2012): $7.5 billion ODA in next 3 years

•

Proposal for Maritime Security Forum Expansion (Oct 2011)

•

Proposal for ASEAN-Japan Special Summit on Maritime Security (Jul 2012)

•

New bilateral initiatives: Philippines, Vietnam, Indonesia…etc

Abe’s ASEAN Shuttle Diplomacy (2013-)

Myanmar May 25, 2013 Nov 12, 2014 Vietnam Jan 16, 2013 Thailand Jan 17, 2013 Malaysia July 25, 2013 Cambodia Nov 16, 2013 Laos Nov 17, 2013 Philippines July 27, 2013 Brunei Oct 9, 2013 Singapore July 26, 2013 May 31, 2014 Indonesia Jan 18, 2013 Japan-ASEAN Special Summit Meeting (Tokyo, Dec 14, 2014)

Five Principles for Japan’s ASEAN Diplomacy

(Tokyo, Jan 18, 2013)

Vision Statement on ASEAN-Japan Friendship and Cooperation

(Tokyo, Dec 24, 2013)

• Most reasonable explanation is, undoubtedly, the “Rise of China”. The rapid change in the distribution of power brings about… • The United States: Uncontested Primacy to Contested Primacy • Japan’s optimum policy mix between ‘deterrence’, ‘balancing’ and ‘integration’: but with whom? > seeking for new partnerships • Case for ‘collective balancing’ against China? Or patient and constructive ‘community building’ with China? > ‘Assertive China’ in 2010- has considerably weaken the latter.

• In either case, Japan began to see Southeast Asia (ASEAN) as a crucial strategic partner to seek for favorable balance of power in Asia.

• In this context, Japan’s new direction in engaging Southeast Asia is driven by… • Networking for Enhancing Regional Security •

Strategic Financing

•

Capacity Building

Cf. Ken JIMBO “Japan and Southeast Asia: Three Pillars of a New Strategic Relationship” (Tokyo Foundation, 2013) • Before getting into “three pillars”, let’s take a brief look at Japan’s security policy and its priorities of today.

Japan’s Defense and Security Policy Developments Under the Abe Administration

National Security Strategy National Defense Program Guideline (2013.12) Three Principles of Transfer of Defense Equipment and Technology (2014.4) Cabinet Decision on Development of Seamless Security Legislation (2014.7) New U.S.-Japan Defense Cooperation Guideline (2015-)

Japan’s National Security Strategy (December 2013) Says…

Global Challenges 1. Shift in the Balance of Power and the Rapid Progress of Technological Innovation 2. Threat of the Proliferation of WMD and other Related Materials 3. Threat of International Terrorism 4. Risk to Global Commons (sea, outer space, cyberspace) 5. Challenges to Human Security 6. Global Economy and its Risks Challenges in the Asia Pacific Region 1. Shift in the Balance of Power plus Emergence of “Gray-Zone” Situations 2. North Korea’s Military Buildup and Provocative Actions 3. China’s Rapid Rise and Intensified Activities in Various Areas

1 600 000 1 400 000 1 200 000

Military Expenditure of U.S., China and Japan (2010-2030 Projection)

1,055,476 Unit: Million USD (Currency Rate as of 2012) (% of GDP)

USA (4.6%)

1,379,567

USA (3.0%) CHN (2.1%) Russia (4.2%) JPN (1.0%) 1 000 000

US High Estimate (4.6%) 878,565

800 000

668,841 688,354

600 000

US Low Estimate (3.0%) 809,813 X11.4

374,095

400 000

321,543

200 000 0

157,603 China (2.1%

）

158,875 X6.1

Russia (4.2%

）

70,608 90,646 59,242 Japan (1.0%

）

60,618

20052006200720082009201020112012201320142015201620172018201920202021202220232024202520262027202820292030 Source: SIPRI Military Expenditure Database 2013 (Modified)

350 000 300 000 250 000

Military Expenditure of Emerging States in Asia (2010-2030 Projection)

Unit: Million USD (Currency Rate as of 2012) (% of GDP)

ASEAN5>KOR(2028) IND (2.7%) ASEAN6 KOR (2.7%) JPN (1.0%) AUS (1.9%) Taiwan(2.1%) ASEAN5>JPN (2025) 200 000 KOR>JPN (2024) 150 000 100 000 ASEAN6>AUS (2012) IND>JPN (2015) ASEAN6>JPN(2021) 50 000 0 Source: SIPRI Military Expenditure Database 2013 (Modified)

• •

Military (Para-Military) Dimension

•

Gray-Zone Coersion

• •

Low Intensity Conflict A2/AD Challenges

Q. How can we envision the stable maritime security order in East/South China Sea?

Non-Military Dimension

•

Politics

: ‘Status-quo’ management; confidence building; rule/norms-making (eg.DoC

 CoC/CUES); consensus building in multilateral forum (ASEAN) •

Economics

: managing economic interdependence, securing safety of SLOCs, joint development of underwater resources •

Legal

: Diverging interpretation regulations; utilization of ICJ and PCA on UNCLOS/EEZ; legal foundation of territorial claims; ADIZ; application of domestic

Maritime Security Challenges: Three Domains

• Gray-Zone Coercion

– Challenges: Infringements of territory (water/air-space) without crossing the military threshold (NDPG, 2010/13) – Need to: develop, field, and operate military and paramilitary forces to contest Chinese control of disputed air and maritime areas, without necessarily causing casualties: 

(possible) symmetric competition

• Low-Intensity Conflict

– Challenges: Accidental crushes, limited military assaults – Need to: develop and field systems to deny Chinese control of disputed air and maritime areas 

asymmetric competition (China vs neighbors)

• A2/AD Challenges

– Challenges: High-end military confrontations – Need to: develop counter-A2/AD capability (operational access), missile defense, enhance resiliency, develop dispersal options 

asymmetric competition (US-China)

Operational Scope in the East China Sea (Northeast Asia)

• Gray-Zone Coercion

– Challenges: “swift and robust responses are required…even when an armed attack against Japan is not involved” (U.S.-Japan Defense Cooperation Guideline Interim Report, 2014.10) – Achieve: “Seamless response in all phases of a conflict” (reject ‘role sharing’ model and enhance U.S.-Japan alliance dynamics)

• Low-Intensity Conflict

– Achieve: Dynamic Joint Defense Force (NDPG, 2013); Seamless Escalation Control; Bilateral CBMs (Japan-China Maritime Communication Mechanism)

• A2/AD Challenges

– Achieve: Counter-A2/AD capability (JOAC: operational access), missile defense, enhance resiliency, develop dispersal options

Operational Scope in the South China Sea (Southeast Asia)

• Gray-Zone Coercion

– Achieve: Cost-Imposing Strategy “how bad behaviors might be met with appropriate and effective penalties or costs” (CNAS, 2014)

• Low-Intensity Conflict

– Achieve: Flexible Deterrent Options (FDO) “FDOs are preplanned, deterrence-oriented actions carefully tailored to send the right signal and influence an adversary’s actions. They can be established to dissuade actions before a crisis arises or to deter further aggression during a crisis” (US JCS,

Joint Operational Planning

, 2011)

• A2/AD Challenges

– Achieve: Counter-A2/AD capability (operational access), enhance resiliency, develop dispersal options  Guam, Philippines, North and West Australia Basing Options

Thomas G Mahnken ed. Competitive Strategies for the 21 st Century (2012) Patrick Cronin, The Challenge of Responding to Maritime Coercion (CNAS, 2014)

Counter Measures and Policies for Imposing Costs (CNAS, 2014)

Source: Patrick Cronin, “The Challenge of Responding to Maritime Coersion” (CNAS, September 2014)

Source: Zack Cooper, “US-Japan Cooperation to Enhance Regional Security”

Regional Security Architecture in Asia-Pacific

Note: This figure reflects examples of security cooperation in the region as of in 2014. It does not fully reflect existing arrangements.

MDA with U.S.

MDA Suspension Intra-Spokes Coop Sec Coop with CHN Intra-ASEAN Coop

• •

Joint Military Exercises

• • • Cobra Gold (2005 - ) ARF DiREx (2009-) Pacific Partnership (2010-) • • • Kakado (2010-) Pacific Reach (2010)…hosted in SIN Balikatan (2012-) •

Bilateral Defense Dialogue

• • • • • Singapore (2000-) Thailand (2001-) Vietnam (2004-) Philippine (2006-) Indonesia (2007-)

Multilateral Forum

• ARF (1994-) • Tokyo Defense Forum (1996-) • Chief of Defense Dialogue (1998-) • Shangri-la Dialogue (2001-) • ADMM Plus (2010-) •

Japan-ASEAN Defense Dialogue (2009-)

• • Cambodia (2009-)

Japan-ASEAN Defense Minister’s Meeting (2014-)

•

‘Strategic Partnerships’

• • • • Japan-ASEAN (2003-) Indonesia (2006-) Vietnam (2009-) Philippine (2009-)

• Japan’s ‘Strategic Use ODA’ (2012) …the U.S. Government plans to continue to help allies and partners in the region to build their capacity with training and exercises. The Government of Japan, for its part, plans to take various measures to promote safety in the region, including strategic use of official development assistance, for example through providing coastal states with patrol boats.

Joint Statement of US-Japan SCC, April 27, 2012 • Project Finance for Major Infrastructures • ASEAN's critical infrastructures such as airports, ports, roads, power generation stations and electricity supply, communications, and software development are important, and often highly compatible, components of their security sectors.

• Enhancing Public Private Partnership (PPP) • JICA + JBIC: credit guarantee, viability gap funding

• • MOD Capacity Building Starting from FY2012, the Ministry of Defense will embark on an assistance program for security capacity-building in ASEAN countries in such fields as humanitarian assistance, disaster relief and counter-piracy operations. Although the current budget is rather small, it is expected to expand over the longer term.

• Defense Equipment Transfer to ASEAN Coastal States?

• • • Japanese Government will provide the patrol vessels (10) to Philippines Coast Guard and maritime communications systems through ODA. (JPN-PHI MoU, Dec 13, 2013) Japan is also planning to provide patrol vessels to Malaysia and Vietnam (Sankei, April 29 th ) Building upon the eased restrictions, Japan is gearing up to consider exporting patrol vessels, aircraft and multi-purpose support ships to enhance ASEAN's maritime security capabilities

• • • • • • The rise of China and the rapid change in the distribution of power are challenging long-standing premise of Japan’s foreign and security policy. With the U.S. primacy is more contested, Japan is seeking for an optimum mixture of deterrence, balancing, and integration by expanding security partnerships.

In this context, strategic importance in Southeast Asia (ASEAN) is increasingly recognized in Japan’s foreign policy circle.

Japan’s new direction in engaging Southeast Asia is driven by ‘networking for defense and security’, ‘strategic financing’ and ‘capacity building’.

These reflect Japan’s strategic interests in maritime security. Japan wants to see ASEAN cultivate minimum credible defense vis-à-vis Chinese maritime assertions, for not enabling its creeping expansion to gain the

fait accompli

in maritime management. > Asymmetrical Equilibrium? On the South China Sea disputes, Japan favors the settlement of legally-binding code of conduct and dispute management mechanisms among concerned parties.

Japan favors “strong, resilient and integrated” ASEAN amid rapid change of balance of power in Asia.