Transcript 슬라이드 1 - Stanford University

October 2, 2009
Stanford University
Ⅰ. Development of SK Strategic Thinking
Polarized Cold War Era
 Vigilance - Threat of attack or subversion by NK
Vigilance
&
Dependence
Background
of shift
In Strategic
Thinking
(Transition )
- ensuring military support against NK and its backers
 Dependence
- Choosing sides and depending on one patron
- Necessity to station large numbers of US forces and support
US strategic objectives
 China’s emergence as a third pole (albeit slowly and lesser)
- Since 1971-72 China abandoned autarchy and in 1982 it sought
Equidistance b/w US-USSR.
 Japan’s new insistence on becoming a regional leader
-Since mid-1980s Japan sought some autonomy from the US
USSR’s move to end the cold war
Ⅰ. Development of SK Strategic Thinking
Post Cold War Era
* Vigilance and Dependency still remained
Initiatives
&
Coordination
* Initiatives:
- nordpolitik(북방정책), globalization(세계화), diplomatic diversification
(외교다변화), new diplomacy(신외교), Sunshine Policy(햇볕정책),
NEA era(동북아시대), NEA central state(동북아중심국가),
regional balancer(지역균형자)
* Coordination
-Coordination with US and Japan, seeking strategic flexibility
- Shifts in the foreign policy of China and Russia
* Alliance Framework vs. Multilateral Regional Framework
-Dichotomy b/w traditional bilateralism and emerging regionalism?
- Bi-multilateral cooperative framework?
-(search of multilateralism on the basis of the alliance with the US)
II. SK Strategic Thoughts toward NEA
Challenges
1) The world’s only divide country – confusing the meaning of
nationalism and rapid shifts in views of reunification
2) Unparallel location at the crossroads of 4 great powers
-
: How to operate as a middle power among 4 assertive great
powers and a belligerent NK
3) Strategic thinking intertwining historical legacies and
territorial claims, (+ domestic divide)
-- obstructing forward-looking strategic calculations
III. New Security Governance in NEA?
Asymmetric Governance in NEA
Security
Vs
Economy
 Security
-Entrenched bilateralism (Multilateralism as a compliment rather than
as a substitute for bilateralism)
-U.S. unilateralism  the rise of nationalism
 prevent the development of multilateralism
-Norms - Informal diplomacy, personal contacts, respect
for the principle of nonintervention
 Economy
- The economic crisis  the rise of nationalism & mercantilism
- Need to revitalize the state
IV. Security Implications of Regionalism in NEA
Security Implications of Emergent Regionalism in NEA/EA
 East
Asian Community (EAC) without the US
EAC
w/o
the US
- Ties with China would intensify
- China’s role would increase
A
US
Involvement
Network of Bilateral Alliances
- Assertive rhetoric about universal values
-A Maritime coalition called “Arc of Freedom and Prosperity”
(Aso taro)
- (Positions of China and Russia?)
IV. Security Implications of Regionalism in NEA
Troika vs. G-2
-Joint leadership of the future involving Troika (initiated by Japan)
US-China
-Japan
Troika
-Japan - checking the rise of China
-China - negative about it at first, but began to assess as a valuable
conduit to involve with US
-US - a useful structure to deal with China and Japan at the same time
-Korea – concern about the discussion process in major NEA issues
without including Korea
IV. Security Implications of Regionalism in NEA
Troika vs. G-2
-Joint leadership of the future involving the US and China
US – China
-Preconditions:
1) US recognizes the stronger china’s power and stake and
engage (not contain) China
2) China bears global responsibility and accept the status quo
-Japan : Negative
G-2
-China: Reluctant – G2 idea is a new “China Containment”
The discussion of G2 could increase US and other nations’
weariness about China’s rise
(against its foreign policy of Taoguang Yanghui,
bide our time, build our capacities)
V. SK’s Strategic Thoughts toward Regionalism
-
Cold War: remained ambivalent about the strategic value of
participating in regional multilateral regimes. (한미동맹, 반공)
-
Post Cold War: Advancing regionalism, multilateralism
 SK presidents’ priority issue
given the presence of 4 assertive great powers and complicated
achieving reconciliation (reunification)
V. SK’s Strategic Thoughts toward Regionalism
-
some economic regionalization, but little political or security
regionalism.
-
Roh Tae-woo and Kim Young-sam advocated “open regionalism,”
whether Asia-Pacific, East Asia or Northeast Asia oriented,
-
-
in the context of internationalization and globalization campaigns.
Kim Dae-jung aimed to create an EAC (with open regionalism) by
engineering the ASEAN + 3 formula (more engaged with the region),
while Roh Moo-hyun put priority on addressing Northeast Asian
issues (more inward-directd)
VII. SK’s Strategic Thoughts toward Regionalism
-
Korea’s regional idea in reality
: developed primarily from the perspectives of a geographic domain that includes
Korea, Japan, and China.
-
Successive governments' policies toward regionalism
: inward-oriented and directly related to promoting the development of
-
inter-Korean relations
: adopting a protectionist approach in trade cooperation.
- Regional Initiatives/Cooperation without the US?
VI. SK’s Strategic Thoughts toward Regionalism
-
limits in applying the functionalist approach in NEA.
 the difficulty of enhancing integration through cooperation in
areas of low politics eventually leading to cooperation
on issues of high politics.
-
-
Bi-Multilateral Cooperation Framework
VII. Wither to 6 Party Talks?
The form of Six Party Talks (since 2003)

The prospect of a nuclear North Korea poses a serious concern/threat to
the security of Northeast Asia and East Asia as a whole

The countries in Northeast Asia have finally converged to deal with the problem
 The future of the Six Party Talks is still rather precarious
Wither to the Six Party Talks?  a Northeast Asia Regional framework towards
a Northeast Asian community?
 Bi-Multilateral Cooperative Mechanism is recommendable to deal with NK?
(esp. the Bilateral mechanism between NK and US)
VII. Wither to 6 Party Talks?
 NK: Talks are dead (April 2009).
Never return to 6PT despite the pressures from China and Russia
-
Lee Myung-Bak’s proposal – “5 Way Format/Approach”
US engaging in direct talks with NK after discussion with SK,
China, Japan, and Russia
 China, Russia, Japan – within the 6PT, reluctant to accept the
five way format (SK and the US initiative with them left on the sidelines)
 China- continue to remain cautious, if not reluctant
 Russia – became supportive since the SK-Russia summit in July 2009
VII. Wither to 6 Party Talks?
 NK: willing to resolve its nuclear and other issues through bilateral or
multilateral talks (9.18 to Chinese Special Envoy, Dai Bingguao)
- acceptance of the US premise of bilateral negotiation with the 6PT?
 Kim Jong Il (“Master of Brinkmanship”)
Softening its stance
to US: possibility of bilateral talks (didn’t mention about the 6PT)
to Korea: possibility of summit
to China: possibility of the return to the 6PT
VII. Wither to 6 Party Talks?
NK-US-China Meetings
-Initiated by China and agreed by NK
- China’s position after NK’s nuclear tests
: tensions b/w China’s emerging role as a global actor with increasing
int’l responsibilities and prestige and a commitment to NK as an ally
: NK’s allegiance is important China as a ‘bulwark’ not only against
US military dominance of the region but also against the rise of
Japan’s military
: Concern about the possibility of the rapid progress in NK-US relations,
without including China (giving more leverage to NK)
-North Korea : “sitting on the fence and playing double”
to US: normalization and acknowledgement of US hegemony in the region
to China: need NK to earn time to build power
VII. Wither to 6 Party Talks?
“Korea’s time is Now”
-President Lee Myoungbak (Oct 1, 2009)
His government will take charge of inter-Korean affairs, esp, NK nuclear issue
- It is about time Korea present our own visions and perspectives re. NK
-Grand Bargain proposal
- step-by-step approach on the nuclear standoff is no longer effective
– giving up NK’s nuclear program in return for aid
and security guarantees
- political slogan for domestic purposes? Real message to Nk and outside?
US – “not aware of the proposal” (Kurt Campbel, assistant secretary of state for EA)
- “no conceptual difference b/w a grand bargain and “a comprehensive
package,” backing Lee’s proposal (James Steinberg Deputy Secretary of State)
(Lee: So what if a US official does not know?_
VII. Wither to 6 Party Talks?
How to pursue the five-way format within the 6PT framework?
- resume talks among 5 countries, with open invitation to NK?
-
concurrent UN and individual sanctions against NK?
(UNSCl Resolution 1874)
Direct Bilateral Talks prior to the resumption of the 6PT
- A visible shift in format, but not in substance?
VIII. Domestic Split in Korea
Conservatives vs. Progressives
- Kim Jong-Il's recent conciliatory gestures (“a charm offensive”)
brought about further disputes
-Conservatives:
Opposition to dialogue for denuclearization – “a waste of time”
They argue that NK would never give up nuclear weapons
They believe in the efficacy of sanction (NK giving way to international
pressure)
-Progressives:
No other option to resolve the issue except negotiation
No way to grasp NK intention without the engagement
The dismantlement of NK nuclear program still possible through
an exchange of denuclearization for rewards
IX. Conclusion
1) For the 6Pt to succeed, bilateral US-NK talks are indispensible.
-
Yet, the purpose of the bilateral talks should be limited to bring
NK to the 6PT (not repeating the case of the 1994 Agreed Framework)
2) SK (with other 4 nations) would reject the exclusion from the
-
process of denuclearizing NK
3) With NK’s increased nuclear capabilities, the economic cost of
denuclearization has become much higher
– sharing the burden of cost among 5 participants is wiser
IX. Conclusion
4) NK – no sign of change in NK’s intent to further develop its
nuclear program until it is recognized as a nuclear state
; try distract international coordination regarding NK nuclear
issues. International consensus remain steadfast in rejecting NK as
-
a nuclear power and achieving the denuclearization of the Korean
peninsula
5) NK’s attempt to make deals about nonproliferation (and arms
reduction) instead of denuclearization, in its bilateral or multilateral
talks, should be rejected.
X. Tasks for SK Strategic Thoughts toward Regionalism
Tasks
* Realistically, SK’s success depends heavily on what strategic choice
the North makes and on regional dynamics mostly beyond its control
1) Reentering Asia
-
: historical task including reconciliation with Japan
: geographical realities - reconciling the alliance with the US
with geographical realities of a state sandwiched between
three big powers
X. Tasks for SK Strategic Thoughts toward Regionalism
Tasks
2) Engagement toward the North in light of reciprocal actions
and region-wide developments (reunification as a long-term goal)
3) Alliance with the US as the ‘realistic” foundation for relations
with NK and a significant factor in shaping ties to others in NEA
-
4) East Asian core triangle (managing Sino-Japanese rivalry as the
pivotal third party)
5) Recognize enduring appeal of championing regionalism, building
consensus toward multilateralism
X. Tasks for SK Strategic Thoughts toward Regionalism
6) China continues to have more leverage over NK than any other
countries.
SK should make a “multi-dimensional” approaches
to strengthen SK-US-Japan trilateral coordination (한미일 공조)
to develop SK-China-Japan cooperation (한중일 협력)
-
to initiate SK-US-China trilateral dialogue (Track 1 and Track 1.5)
(한미중 삼각대화)
7) Efforts need to be made to galvanize domestic support
Political reconciliation at home for a clear, consistent strategy