P

ARTICIPATION IN

I

NTERNATIONAL

P

EACEKEEPING

: A

NALYTICAL

F

RAMEWORK

Norihito KUBOTA Visiting Scholar, University of Toronto National Defense Academy Japan

T

ABLE OF

C

ONTENTS     Current situation of troop contribution for international peacekeeping Purpose of study Analytical framework: “who persuade who” Application(Fiji, Canada, and Japan)  Conclusion *The views or analyses shown in this presentation will represent neither those of Japanese government nor the organization which the presenter belongs to.

M

ILITARY

P

EACE

O D

EPLOYMENTS IN PERATIONS

G

LOBAL

(Source: CIC NYU, 2009)

T

OP

T

WENTY

M

ANDATED

O T

ROOP

C

ONTRIBUTORS TO PERATIONS

: 31 O

CTOBER

UN 2008

Source: CIC NYU, 2009.

P

URPOSE OF

S

TUDY  To establish general but meaningful framework of analysis of states’ participation in international peacekeeping   Previous research of supply-side of peacekeeping  Country specific explanation ->Lack of generality, unable to expand to other cases  Theoretical/Large-N statistic analysis ->Lack of meaningful implication Research Strategy   Comparative analysis of countries (limited numbers) Using previous country specific analyses (Canada, Ireland, Fiji, India,…)

D

EFINITION OF

P

EACEKEEPING     “in-country operations that are authorized by a multilateral body, that are multinational in their composition, that have a substantial military component, and that are deployed principally in support of a peace process or conflict management objective”(CIC NYU Annual Review of Global Peace Operations) Including both UN-led and non-UN-led operations(i.e. UNFICYP, ISAF) Excluding war fighting (i.e. OEF, OIF), small political mission, unilateral intervention.

Although the roles of civilian and civilian police in operation are getting more important due to the evolution of complex operations makes, this study mainly focuses on military.

A

NALYTICAL

M

ODEL

“W F

RAMEWORK HO PERSUADE

/ : T

HREE

A

CTORS ENFORCE WHO

?”

 Second-level analysis, Foreign policy model   Government (Prime Minister/Foreign Office, etc) Military Institution(Army, SDF,…)  Public (Public Opinion) Preference Government (+-) Relation Public (+) Military (+)

P

REFERENCE OF

M

OTIVATION IN

R

ELATIONS

G

OVERNMENT

(1/2) D

IPLOMACY AND

F

OREIGN  A Condition to be a member of certain diplomatic group or status  Permanent Membership in SC of UN, member of NATO/EU  Competition with rivaling country over regional hegemony  Linkage of other issue (in relation with the US)  BMD for Canada in Afghanistan  North Korean issue for Japan in Iraq  Helping allies in trouble  Geostrategic interest (influence over the area in conflict)  Reimbursement from the UN is good source of foreign currency in developing country (troop)

P

REFERENCE OF

M

OTIVATIONS IN

G

OVERNMENT

D

OMESTIC

P (2/2)

OLITICS    A tool for “Rally round flag” effect (national unity) and diversionary effect A method in which government can export unpopular militaries during transition from military regime to democracy (Argentina) Measure against unemployment (Youths were sent as reserves)

P

REFERENCE OF

M

ILITARY      A good rational for size of military in peace time A good rational for maintaining/increasing defence budget(remodel of weapon system) Occasion for multilateral military exercise Ameliorating image of military which was damaged in previous history Source of foreign currency (MO in UN operations)   Generally reluctant, because it is not the main job of national defence Distance matters (logistics, communications)

P

REFERENCE OF

P

UBLIC  Being “do-gooders” in international community   Sense of independence from super powers (support for middle power diplomacy) Compassion for the people under conflict (“we have to do something”)   Can be casualty sensitive Distance matters (cultural and ethnic similarity influences on their preference)

A

PPLICATION

: F

IJIAN

C

ASE

,

PROBLEMS  Reimbursement matters?

 Two problems  In 1979, payment of reimbursement was uncertain  Fiji has sent military not only as Troop (reimbursement is paid through government), but also as Military Observers (salary and allowance are paid to individual).  ->MO is not beneficial to government who is motivated by receiving foreign currencies

A

PPLICATION

: F

IJIAN

C

ASE

, E

XPLANATION  Before the Coup 1989  After the Coup Government (+) Government (+-) Public (+-) Military (-) 60% were reserves Participated only as Troops Public (+-) Military (+) 60% were regular force Participated as MO and Troops

A

PPLICATION

: C

ANADIAN

C

ASE

(1/2)

 During the Cold War and early 90’s Government (+-) Public (+) Military (-)

A

PPLICATION

: C

ANADIAN

C

ASE

(2/2)

 Late 90’s thereafter  UN Peacekeeping  Non UN operations Government (+-) Government (+-) Public (+-) Military (-) Public (+-) Military (+)

A

PPLICATION

: J

APANESE

C

ASE

(1/2)

 During the Cold War  After the Cold War Government (+-) Government (+) Public (-) Military (+-) Public (+-) Military (+-)

A

PPLICATION

: J

APANESE

C

ASE

(2/2)

 Late 90s thereafter  UN Peacekeeping  Non-UN operations Government (+-) Government (+) Public (+-) Military (+-) Public (+-) Military (+)

C

ONCLUSION    The three-actor model can be valid to explain behaviour of various types of countries (empirical verification required) If we need to keep up with demand for peacekeeping, we have to encourage countries to participate in operations with paying attention to whose and what kind of benefit should be presented to them In this framework, the present patterns of persuasion is similar between Canada and Japan