Transcript CHINA’S EMERGING LEADERSHIP ROLE IN ASIA

Willem van Kemenade
Website: www.willemvk.org
E-mail: [email protected]
CHINA AND JAPAN
Partners in Regional Security and Integration
or Permanently Estranged Neighbors ?
Nederlands Genootschap voor Internationale Zaken,
10 oktober 2005
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Essentials of
Chinese
Foreign Policy
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Peaceful Rise - Avoidance of conflict with the US,
and Japan.
Multipolarity – Develop close relations with other
centers of power, especially the European Union.
Give priority to economic development for another
few decades.
Global hunt for oil, gas and raw materials
Tao guang ~ Yang hui: Hide one’s capacities and
bide one’s time (Deng Xiaoping).
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The Great Unknown:
“Whither Koizumi ?”
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PM Koizumi has not given any clear indication how he wants to
handle relations with China for the remainder of his term,
except for saying in a 14 minute speech, he seeks “future
oriented friendly relations” with Asian neighbours.
During the election campaign, China-policy, the most
momentous problem for Japan has not been an issue at all.
On October 1, Japan proposed a "comprehensive and final
solution" to the long-running energy-dispute around the
Diaoyutai/Senkaku islands.
Last week, Rumsfeld “skipped” Japan on a planned Asia tour,
“because the Japanese were not ready to accept US proposals
for redeployment of American forces in Japan, away from
Okinawa”.
Japan is considering to make more forces, ships and airplanes
available for the Bush-Blair War on terror.
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Japan failed to lead East-Asia ~
China is “resuming its pre-eminence”
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“Asia is entering an era in which the dominance of
the US is being increasingly challenged by Japan, by
virtue of its economic might. Governments and
people in Asia are looking more and more to Tokyo
for a lead, rather than to Washington. But it is a role
that Japan is reluctant to play”.
From: Japan in Asia, The Economic Impact on the
Region, published by the Far Eastern Economic
Review in 1991.
Now, 14 years later, China is not inhibited by that
same reluctance and is asserting itself through trade,
aid and soft-power.
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Evolution of a
Friendly Relationship
1972-1989
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Japan could not establish diplomatic relations with the PRC until
after the Nixon Visit in 1972 due to its sub-sovereign status.
Friendly feelings among the Japanese toward China blossomed
during the 1970s and 1980s and reached a high of 79 % in 1980.
The bloody repression of the Tiananmen Square student
rebellion wrecked this euphoric mood.
Japan joined the other G-7 nations in imposing sanctions on
China, but was the first country to lift them in 1990 and help
China out of its international isolation.
Japan’s criticism of China’s human rights record was adamantly
rejected by the Chinese leadership and China started retaliating,
by magnifying World War II issues.
Thus the emotional link between the human rights issue and the
legacy of World War II became a unique feature of the relations
between Japan and China.
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Erosion of the Relationship
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The China-Japan relationship further deteriorated in the mid-1990s
over Taiwan: Lee Teng-hui visit, Japanese support for Taiwanese
democracy, missile tests and strengthening of US-Japan Alliance,
Chinese nuclear tests,
JDA director-general Yoshinori Ono highlighted the case where a
Chinese submarine intruded into Japanese waters in November 2004.
When the American and Japanese foreign and defense minister two
months later declared the peaceful solution of the Taiwan issue a
common strategic objective, this was new evidence for the Chinese of
US-Japanese collusion on Taiwan and further intensification of the USJapan military alliance.
At this point, the Chinese government gave up hope that worsening
Sino-Japanese relations could be turned around any time soon.
The demonstrations coincided with an international petition drive to
collect signatures on the internet opposing Japan’s candidacy for
permanent membership of the United Nations Security Council.
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Japan’s Attempts to lead Asia
stymied for decades by
subservience to the US,
Now by the Rise of China
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Japan has tried to break out of its “satellite-relationship” with the US
several times, but each time external events and American pressure
frustrated this. Koizumi’s announcement in 2002 that he would go to
Pyongyang, just after George Bush had branded it part of the “axis
of evil” was the latest example.
Then Japan tried détente with Russia: getting the Kurile islands
back for a huge pay-out of $ 25 billion. Yeltsin wouldn’t play ball.
Then the first North-Korean nuclear crisis in 1993-1994 pulled
Japan back into the American orbit. China’s firing of missiles close
to Taiwan in 1995-1996 further re-strengthened the US-Japan
alliance.
During the Asian Financial Crisis in 1997, the US, followed by China,
torpedoed a Japanese plan to set up an “Asian Monetary Fund” that
would help Asian countries not according to the IMF criteria of the
Washington Consensus, but according to “Asian Values” with Japan
in the lead.
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“China Rebuilding Traditional Sphere of
Influence: The China-ASEAN FTA”
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After its WTO-accession in 2001, China immediately moved
towards establishing a FTA with ASEAN – CAFTA -- at the Pnom
Penh Summit in 2002. PM Koizumi was shocked.
China’s drive to integrate with ASEAN motivated by triple strategic
design:
– Soothe ASEAN for sucking investment from SE Asia to China
– Marginalize Japan further as regional leader
– Downsize the importance of Taiwanese trade and investment in SEA.
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Trade figures show how decidedly China is replacing Japan as the
trade hub of the region. China’s share of Asian imports rose from
10.5 per cent in 1995 to 23.7 per cent in 2003 and Japan’s share
declined from 26.7 per cent to 22 percent during the same period.
Japan is much less willing to engage in trade liberalization,
especially in the highly protected agricultural sector.
Japan is viewed as a “non-Asian” protectionist partner of the
United States.
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China: A Regional Power with some Global Influence
and the Ambition to become a Two-Ocean Country
Gwadar
From: Zbigniew Brzezinski, The Grand Chessboard:
American Primacy and its Geostrategic Imperatives,
Washington DC, 1997
China-Japan-Korea FTA:
Non-Starter for Now
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Following Pnompenh, the leaders of Japan, China and Korea, agreed
three years ago to initiate a study group of thinktanks to explore
prospects for closer cooperation among the three countries.
China wanted to upgrade the study group but Japan wanted an
investment treaty first.
According to the Koreans, Japanese reluctance to enter into an FTA
with China is political: Senkaku, energy-exploration, the history issue,
capped by Japanese anxiety that China is becoming more and more
prominent in trade and investment in the region.
China has its FTA with ASEAN ready and has positive relations with
South-Korea. South-Korea has its own negotiating relationship with
ASEAN and Japan, and Japan is negotiating with ASEAN and Korea as
well, but the big missing link is between China and Japan.
Although there is no specific agreement yet on forming a region-wide
FTA, a web of bilateral FTAs is now in the pipeline. As a Chinese official
put it: “There is no ASEAN + 3. In fact there are only “Three ASEAN’s
plus One”.
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The Coming East Asia Summit
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The East Asia Summit is scheduled for December 14 in Kuala
Lumpur as a first step to establish an East Asian Community.
Since China and Japan cannot lead because they don’t accept
each other’s leading role, ASEAN is in de drivers’ seat and will
chair the Summit with the ASEAN 10 + 3 – China, Japan, South
Korea, plus India, New Zealand and Australia.
Australia, one of the deputy sheriffs of the US has been trying
to rally support for US participation, but there is a consensus to
keep the US out.
Koizumi is expected to move forward with constitutional revision,
fully remilitarize Japan as the uninhibited global junior military
ally of the US and be very lukewarm about Asian
“mulitlateralism”.
In the anti-China prism of the US and Japan, China is planning
to use the EAC as an instrument to limit US influence in Asia by
establishing its political, economic and military dominance in the
region.
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South-Korea’s
Warming Relationship
with China
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South-Korea has to heed the responses of all sides to China’s
Rise, particularly Japan and the US.
Korea’s close historical relationship with China is deepening as
the Cold War relationship with the US is further cooling, after
Bush’ derailing of the “Sunshine” policy and the “Axis of Evil”
rhetoric. Bush may go down in history as the president who lost
Korea.
An ancient history issue cooled the relationship in 2004 when
Chinese scholars asserted that the ancient kingdom of Koguryo
(57 BC – 668 AD) was part of Chinese history.
China fever epitomizes the country's enthusiasm for its
neighbour. Chinatowns are springing-up in cities, language
schools report surging demand for Chinese lessons and tourist
destinations are targeting the growing China tourism market.
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America yields to
Chinese
leadership on
North-Korea
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After 13 months absence, North Korea returned to Beijing on
July 27 for another round of the “Six Party Talks” to end its
nuclear weapons programme.
A meaningful step forward was taken when the United States
after years of public insults and threats, conveyed to Pyongyang
that it recognized North Korea as a sovereign country and had
no intention of invading it.
By September, China intensified the pressure on the US to
extend some trust to North Korea, backing Pyongyang's right to
a peaceful nuclear energy programme once it dismantles its
weapons and returns to the international nuclear nonproliferation treaty.
Then on September 19, North-Korea agreed to give up all its
nuclear weapons programs in exchange for oil and food aid and
diplomatic recognition by the US and Japan.
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Is War over Taiwan
imaginable ?
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Majorities in the US, Japan and Taiwan probably prefer the
status quo of “no independence, no reunification, no war, joint
economic development and some integration”.
The US wants to maintain its dominance over both Japan as a
satellite ally and Taiwan as an unrecognized protectorate, as the
twin pillars of its military hegemony in Northeast Asia.
On all sides there are vocal minorities and interest groups who
think they will benefit from a war, which they reflexively assume,
the US/Japan/Taiwan will win.
One Japanese pro-Taiwan hardliner: “In the coming years, public
opinion and the Congress of the US will be the ‘dictator’ of the
world, stronger than the president.”
No legal instruments mandate Japan to support the US in case
of war.
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A Role for Europe ?
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The Chinese want to learn from the European
experience with multilateral diplomacy, how to
counter the US-Japanese scheme to freeze the Cold
War status quo in East Asia and how to advance their
“core interest”, the peaceful reunification with Taiwan
on the basis of some vague, flexible long-term
formula.
The Chinese also want Europe to advise them how to
develop a permanent regional security cooperation
mechanism.
As the Shanghai Cooperation Organization emerged
from the “border-talks” after the disintegration of the
Soviet Union, there is hope now, that the Six Party
Talks Process could evolve towards such a
mechanism.
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A European Role in Sino-Japanese
Reconciliation vis-à-vis WWII Issues ?
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A third issue on which the Chinese would welcome European
help is the legacy of WWII with Japan.
“We Chinese, naturally compare Japan with Germany.
Germany’s attitude towards historical WWII issues has been
exemplary. Atonement, apologies, compensation etc.
Japan has spectacularly failed to do anything comparable to
Germany and the US has always been quiet about this.
Whenever we discuss this with American academics, they
always blame China. One very prominent American East Asia
scholar went even as far as putting Koizumi’s Yasukuni visits on
a par with asking the American government to stop paying
homage to Arlington National Cemetery.
So it would be very important if Europe would add an
independent voice, in this case, how to examine this dispute and
how to conduct the current debate on this Sino-Japanese
conflict. This could have a significant positive impact.”
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An East Asian Cold War
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Senior figures in Japan openly express hope that China will
disintegrate: “If Taiwan is not integrated into China, that will be a
great favor to our defense”.
“We will definitely support US intervention to defend Taiwan …..
If we have to choose between the US and China, Japan will
choose the US. That’s the worst situation to arise”.
“Tensions will continue for some time. I cannot see even ten,
twenty years from now, we will become good friends. We will
have huge trade, summit meetings etc. but tension will continue.
Like during the Cold War, the Soviet Union and the United
States, two very different powerful empires. They could never
get really close. But there was détente, disarmament, reduction
of tensions etc. They managed to be able to coexist, without
fighting. Maybe something like that can develop between China
and Japan.
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Prospects
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The hottest issue at this moment is the tension between
Beijing and Tokyo over gas reserves in the East China
Sea. The Japanese Defense Agency revised its security
strategy in late 2004 on the assumption that conflicts over
resources could escalate into war.
However, on October 1, Japan proposed a
"comprehensive and final solution" to the long-running
dispute.
The first round of Sino-Japanese negotiation on this issue
is scheduled before the end of October 2005.
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