Transcript Metropolitanization, Globalization and Governance – New

Metropolitanization, Globalization and
Governance – New Regionalism, Old
Regionalism or No Regionalism in Israel
Eran Razin
Department of Geography, The Hebrew University
of Jerusalem
IMO – Montreal, April 24-25 2006
The Argument
• An assumed link: metropolitanization processes in an era
of globalization and pressures on the welfare state lead to
‘new regionalism’ forms of governance.
– New regionalism – complex horizontal networks, partnerships,
ad-hoc coalitions and modes of cooperation in a competitive
economy.
– ‘Old regionalism’ – a focus on reforming formal hierarchical
administrative-territorial structures.
– No regionalism
• Public choice – competition within a fragmented pattern.
• Centralization – prominence of upper levels of government
diminish the significance of debates over local and metropolitan
governance.
However….
• A move ‘from government to governance’ – partnerships,
cooperation, networks – does not imply a diminishing
role of the central state and of territorial hierarchical
structures, but rather a more pluralist mode of decision
making – changing “rules of the game”.
• The central state practically backs-off from fulfilling
some of its responsibilities, but does not cede its legal
powers.
• Seemingly ‘new regionalism’ attributes of governance can
in fact serve as tools of central control, in an environment
of a neo-liberal move towards privatization associated
with centralization.
• New regionalism evolved in Israel only to a limited
extent, ‘old regionalism-type’ reforms hardly ever tookoff. Thus, the main direction of change has apparently
been from a centralized version of ‘no regionalism’ to a
slightly more decentralized version of ‘no regionalism’
with some components that can be regarded as new
regionalism.
The Global Context
• The crisis of the welfare state
– Pressures on the welfare state: globalization, etc.
– Political-ideological responses.
• Implications on local/metropolitan governance
– Urban entrepreneurialism, privatization, NPM.
– A move from ‘old regionalism’ to ‘new regionalism’.
• Reservations on the assumed shift from government to
governance
– Major territorial reforms.
– Critique on the neglect of the central state in the urban regime, urban
entrepreneurialism and new regionalism literature.
– Crisis conditions: a window of opportunity to impose reforms.
• The rise of the post-welfare state can lead metropolitan
governance in diverse paths
– Decentralized horizontal networks.
– Centralized imposed/encouraged from above networks of governance.
• Erosion of the welfare state and the crisis of (local) democracy
– Declining turnout, fragmentation, limited participation in civil society.
– Possible influences of new regionalism: lower accountability? From
majority decisions to deliberative democracy?
Metropolitan implications
The Israeli Context
• Cycles of growth and recession.
• The rise of urban entrepreneurialism, 1980s-1990s.
• The Israeli type of decentralization:
– The emergence of the courts as a major arena for societal conflicts.
– The act of the state as several stakeholders.
• Recession and crisis of the early 2000s serves also as a
window of opportunity to impose changes on the local
government system.
Higher Education: Diminishing or Changing Role of
Central Intervention
Gillad Rosen and Eran Razin
• Regulation and support a monopoly of the central government through the
Council of Higher Education.
• Early 1990s – the system opens for the establishment of new colleges; local
authorities compete of their location, despite being formally excluded from
the system.
• Growing municipal entrepreneurialism does not indicate diminishing
central state regulation but changing nature of central intervention:
– Greater pluralism and exposure to external pressures from both private
and and public sectors.
– Politicization: growing intervention of politicians of the central state.
Erosion of power of bureaucrats/professionals at the Council of Higher
Education?
– A problem of over-investment and unwillingness of local authorities to
cooperate, except occasionally in weak peripheral regions.
Joint Planning Commissions: Coordination, Cost
Savings or Central Control
Michal Dachoach-Halevi and Eran Razin
• An institutional framework established in the 1950s:
cooperation imposed from above, intended to achieve
coordination and economies of scale.
• Prevailing cooperation in practice: “don’t meddle in my affairs
and I will not interfere in yours”.
• Economies of scale – likely only when very small local
authorities are involved.
• Tool of control:
– An effective tool for intervening in local planning decisions
(particularly of Arab local authorities) in the past.
– At present, mainly provides opportunities for centrally imposed
appointments.
Joint Industrial Areas and Tax Base Sharing: A Local
Initiative Transformed and Utilized by the Central State
Eran Razin and Anna Hazan
• Emerged on the agenda as a result of the growing share of selfgenerated revenues in local government finance in the late
1980s, and of the substantial cuts in central government
transfers in the early 2000s.
• Non-residential local property tax (Arnona) – a major source
for fiscal disparities.
• The breakthrough in 1992 – an outcome of local initiative of
two mayors.
• Supportive attitude of the Ministry of Interior. The Ministry of
Industry and Trade provides support in priority zones after
1997, as a tool to rationalize investment in infrastructure and
to market land in industrial parks.
• 2000 – An amendment to the Local Government Law enables
the Ministry of Interior to approve agreements for sharing
local taxes and levies on non-residential land uses.
• Early 2000s – Attempts of the Ministry of Interior to impose
revenue distribution face substantial difficulties.
• 2003-2006 – Support of the Ministry of Industry and Trade
ceases due to lack of funds. Public incentives provided to
encourage cooperation between Arab and Jewish local
authorities.
• 2004 – A Ministry of Interior appointed commission examines
the option to redistribute a portion of non-residential property
tax. A negative recommendation also because of mistrust in the
Ministry of Finance.
• Mid 2000s – Mechanism adopted by the national Planning
Administration. Land use plans can require inter-municipal
cooperation and revenue distribution as preconditions for
approval of industrial and commercial uses.
• 2005-2006 – Proposed amendment to the law enables the
Ministers of Interior and Finance to impose revenue
redistribution among adjacent (but not necessarily bordering)
local authorities.
• In sum, a ‘new regionalism’ local initiative, at first gains the
support of the central state, then adopted by the central state to
impose policies in line with its own agenda: sustainable
planning? distributive justice? Budget cuts?
• The desirable limits to central control: ‘gentle imposition’
subject to clear checks, attempt to retain an image of a fair
broker; or bitter conflicts, decisions motivated mainly by a
desire to solve short-term budgetary problems of the central
state.