Transcript EPSF - International Rail Safety conference web site

Lessons from an
accident
Marion Segretain, French National Safety Authority
(EPSF)
October 2007
IRSC, Goa (India)
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Contents
• What happened?
• Involvement of the different stakeholders
• Role and interfaces between the
stakeholders
• Conclusions
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What happened ? (1)
• When?
On October 11th 2006 at 11.45
AM.
• Where?
At the border between France and
Luxembourg on the area of the
French city of Zoufftgen.
• What?
A regional passenger train from
CFL and a freight train from
SNCF collided.
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What happened? (2)
• Line equipment:
Double track with fixed equipment for
occasional wrong-track working
(automatic block).
• Circumstances:
One track was closed for
maintenance. The freight train was
normally running on the wrong
line. The passenger train was sent
with a written running order as the
signal remained closed.
• Consequences:
Six persons died, two were seriously
injured and fourteen were
shocked.
Traffic was totally stopped on both
tracks for 5 days.
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What happened? (3)
Immediate conclusions:
• The minister of Transport from Luxembourg declared 4 days later
that the accident was due to a human error in the Bettembourg
station (CFL). However, the investigations were still going on.
• The emergency radio communication was not picked up by the
trains.
• The current safety cut out was to late to be efficient.
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Involvement of the stakeholders
According to French legislation and following the EU directives,
each stakeholder is responsible for his part of the system
related to safety. In the present case, the following parties were
involved:
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
The CFL from Luxembourg
The French RU SNCF
The IM (RFF and SNCF-delegated IM)
The French accident investigation body (BEA-TT)
The accident investigation body from Luxembourg (EEAI)
The ministries of Transport from France and Luxembourg
The French NSA (EPSF)
N.B.: Judicial inquiries made in France and Luxembourg are out of our present
scope.
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Role of the stakeholders and their
interfaces (1)
• The accident occured on the French territory but
both emergency services from France and
Luxembourg were involved.
• In France, the delegated IM took the first
protective measures (closing and lifting the line),
transmitted the advices to the police and
emergency services, to BEA-TT, EPSF and
Ministry of Transport and commanded
immediately an internal technical investigation
on the accident in coordination with the internal
investigation of CFL.
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Role of the stakeholders and their
interfaces (2)
• The ministry of Transport ordered the BEA-TT to
proceed to investigation.
• EPSF asked the IM for information about
specific conditions for traffic re-opening.
• After 5 days, the IM re-started the traffic on the
line with EPSF’ approval on the specific
conditions.
• On October 20th, 9 days after the accident, the
traffic was normally operated on the line with a
special focus on the staff in charge of safety
(EPSF demand). Investigations were still going
on.
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Role of the stakeholders and their
interfaces (3)
Remarks:
• First serious accident since the creation of NSA:
coordination of the new system and information
transmission are functionning well.
• Considering the important technical damages,
the re-opening was quick thanks to the diversity
of safety control levels and to permanent
cooperation between the entities involved.
• The international aspect of the accident has a
slight impact on the resolution of the situation.
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Conclusions (1)
• The official conclusions of the BEA-TT and the
EEAI are not yet published.
• The cooperation between the stakeholders was
good and efficient, especially between the IM,
BEA-TT and EPSF, and the responsibilities are
well defined.
• After the publication of the conclusions from the
accident investigation bodies (BEA-TT and
EEAI), the NSA (EPSF) will be in charge of
controlling the implementation of its
recommendations in France.
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Conclusions (2)
• In France, this accident shows that the new
entities in charge of safety (BEA-TT, EPSF) are
well identified and recognized.
• It also shows that its resolution is quicker and
safer with an increasing number of entities
involved.
• However, there was no concerted return on
experience concerning implementation of
emergency plans from railway point of view.
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Thank you for your attention!
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