Transcript BOEING/MDC Merger - University of Ljubljana

BOEING/MDC Merger
Commission Decision
97/816/EC
30 julij 1997
Relevantni trg

Produktov
–
–
–
Trg velikih potniških
letal
Ne vsebuje letal z
vzhodnih trgov
(e.g.Illushin)
Trg rabljenih letal je
ločen trg


Krajša življ. doba
Višji stroški
vzdrževanja

Geografski
– Svet
Tržni deleži (obstoječe flote
letal)
2%
24%
14%
60%
Boeing
Airbus
MDC
L'heed
Tržni deleži (naročila)
6%
27%
64%
Boeing
Airbus
MDC
Ekskluzivne pogodbe

American Airlines

– Boeing ekskluzivni
–
–
–
–
dobavitelj letal do leta 2018
Naročena 104 letala
US $ 6,6 MRD
American – fiksne cene za
513 novih letal do 2018
Fiksne cene – v zameno za
obligacijo kupovanja zgolj
Boeingovih letal
Delta Airlines
– Boeing ekskluzivni
dobavitelj letal do leta 2013
– Naročenih 106 letal do leta
2006

Continental Airlines
– Naročenih 35 letal
– Ekskluzivna nakupna
obveznost za vsa velika
letala za 20 let.
Ocena ekskluzivnih pogodb

Dejstvo, da imajo 3 največje letalske družbe
sklenjene (in “zaklenjene”) ekskluzivne
pogodbe za 20 let, kaže, da Boeing ŽE IMA
prevladujoč položaj na trgu velikih
potniških letal!
Ocena ekskluzivnih pogodb

PROS
– Potrošniki imajo manj
stroškov – enaki
rezervni deli, popusti
pri servisih…

CONS
– “Lock-in” učinek
– Rigidnost
pogodbenega odnosa
– Konkurenčni
proizvajalci lahko v
20-ih letih znižajo cene
– potrošniki ne morejo
drugam
– Zaprtje trga
Ocena gibanj na trgu

Boeing
– Tržna moč je omejena
s povpraševanjem in
ponudbo rabljenih letal

EU Komisija
– Povpraševanje po
letalih naj bi se v 20
letih zvišalo za 80%
– Rabljena letala lahko
zadovoljijo le delček
takšnega
povpraševanja
– Širitev trga 
zmanjševanje moči
kupcev
Potencialna konkurenca / moč
kupcev

Boeing
– Potencialna
konkurenca je
intenzivno umeščena v
Rusiji, Indiji in na
Daljnem vzhodu
– Priznavanje visokih
vstopnih ovir

EU Komisija




Potencialna konkurenca
ne zmore pritiska na trg
v doglednem času
Visoke vstopne ovire
Enormni stroški zagona
Strogi varnostni
standardi
Boeingov prevladujoči položaj
Boeing ima PP na trgu velikih potniških
letal
 ZAKAJ?

–
–
–
–
–
Tržni deleži
Število letal v obstoječih flotah
Dolgoročne ekskluzivne pogodbe
Ni potencialne konkurence
Visoke vstopne ovire
Povečanje Boeingovega
prevladujočega položaja

2 glavna faktorja
– Dodatek konkurenčnega potenciala MDC-ja
– spill over učinki
 Preliv sredstev MDC-jevih programov (NASA,
USAF)
Povečanje Boeingovega
prevladujočega položaja

Neposredni učinki prevzema MDC
–
–
–
–
–
Povečanje skupnega tržnega deleža s 64% na 70%
Boeing ima le še enega konkurenta na svetovnem trgu
Povečanje deleža v obstoječih flotah s 60% na 80%
Povečanje kapacitet  usposobljena delovna sila
Še večja moč pri sklepanju pogodb s potrošniki
Povečanje Boeingovega
prevladujočega položaja

Konkurenčni potencial MDC
– No longer an active presence in the market
BUT its competitive potential can be significant
when it merges with B because


if B decides to keep it alive it would arguably be
able to stand in the market
if B decides to close it down, it gains preferential
access to its customer base  leverage factor
Strengthening of Boeing’s
Dominant Position

Competitive potential of MDC - low??
– Contradictory Arguments:
 DAC had a firm backlog of US$ 7 billion!
 DAC lost its core customers American, Northwest
Airlines, Delta and Continental, the four largest
operators of DAC aircraft over the last nine months.
– Because they knew about the merger and signed exclusive
deals with Boeing?
Strengthening of Boeing’s
Dominant Position

Lexecon Study – comparing 52 aircraft
supply competitions from 1994 to 1996:
– MDC presence led to a reduction of over 7 % in
the realized price as compared with the list
price as far as orders placed with Airbus were
concerned.
– No competitive potential???
Strengthening of Boeing’s
Dominant Position

Exclusive Deals easier to obtain after
merger
– Boeing able to offer MDC planes and spare
parts simultaneously
– Boeing will offer “Full-family range” of planes
 “lock-in” effect
– Effects:


Blocking 40% of the world-wide market
Competition only in smaller jets market
Strengthening of Boeing’s
Dominant Position

Effects from the defense & space business
– increase of B’s overall financial resources
– access to publicly funded R&D and IP portfolio
– increase of bargaining power towards suppliers
- possibility of leveraging
– “bundling deals”
– Cross-subsidization
Remedies

Behavioral, not structural remedies
 Incoherent with MR structural basis
 Usual remedies
– spin-off +
– subsequent sale of consolidated companies
Specific Remedies

DAC as a separate
legal entity
– Separate financial
accounts and
statements

Transparency of DAC
business
 Not really effective
– Unable to prevent
cross-subsidizing
– Unable to prevent
future predatory
behavior by Boeing
– Monitoring/
Enforcement??
Specific Remedies

Boeing will not
enforce the exclusive
purchase deals
 Prohibited from
signing new exclusive
deals for 10 yrs

Opening the market
for a new competitor
 However – many
airlines are DAC
customers
 They will probably
stay with DAC 
Boeing
Specific Remedies

Obligatory Licensing
of Patents (R&D)
– Government Funded
– Reasonable Royalty

Transparency of
R&D Projects

Transfer of publicly
funded R&D
 Enforcement?
 Arbitration?
Specific Remedies

Relationship With
Suppliers
– Boeing not to exert
improper influence on
suppliers through
leveraging (particularly
of R&D)

Monitoring?
 Enforcement?
 Not effective