Transcript Real-Time Relationship Analysis

Major Communications Cables
- Points of Convergence ATT
Verizon
New York
Chicago
Los Angeles
Salt Lake City
Denver
Phoenix
Kansas City
Atlanta
Miami
Washington DC
Seattle
San Francisco
Dallas
New York
Chicago
Los Angeles
Salt Lake City
Denver
Phoenix
Kansas City
Atlanta
Miami
Washington DC
Seattle
San Francisco
Dallas
British Telecom
New York
Chicago
Los Angeles
Salt Lake City
Denver
Phoenix
Kansas City
Atlanta
Miami
Washington DC
Seattle
T-Mobile
New York
Chicago
Los Angeles
San Francisco
Dallas
Major Cable Convergence Points (Cont.)
ATT
Verizon
San Jose
San Diego
St Louis
Orlando
Boston
Newark
San Jose
San Diego
St Louis
Orlando
Boston
Nashville
Cleveland
Houston
Philadelphia
British Telecom
T-Mobile
Newark
Houston
Philadelphia
Portland
San Diego
Las Vegas
Detroit
Charlotte NC
Richmond
Sunnyvale
Burbank
Tucson
Tampa
Eckington
Major Cable Convergence Points (Cont.)
ATT
Amsterdam
Frankfurt
Paris
London
Tokyo
Hong Kong
Singapore
Sydney
Toronto
Redditch
Sophia
Antipolis
Bangolor
Shanghai
Verizon
British Telecom
Amsterdam
Frankfurt
Paris
London
Tokyo
Hong Kong
Singapore
London
Tokyo
Hong Kong
Singapore
Stockholm
Sydney
Buenos Aires
Rio De Janeiro
Santiago
Lima
Mexico City
Bogota
Mumbai
T-Mobile
Amsterdam
Frankfurt
Paris
London
Tokyo
Stockholm
Copenhagen
Marseille
Hamburg
Hanover
Nuremberg
Zurich
Vienna
FISA Amendments Act
Section 702 Operations
FAIRVIEW Sites
3
Global Public Service Telephone
Network Switching System
The Phone System Knows What It’s Doing –
Why Don’t U.S. Officials?
PHONE CALL (LANDLINE OR CELL)
REQUIRED PREFIX
FOREIGN TO FOREIGN
00
FOREIGN TO UNITED STATES
00
UNITED STATES TO FOREIGN
01 or 011
UNITED STATES TO UNITED STATES
1
STELLAR WIND
Both IPv4 and IPv6 addresses are generally assigned in a
hierarchical manner. Users are assigned IP addresses by Internet
service providers (ISPs). ISPs obtain allocations of IP addresses
from a local Internet Registry (LIR) or national Internet Registry
(NIR), or from their appropriate Regional Internet Registry (RIR):
Registry
Area Covered
AfriNIC
Africa Region
APNIC
Asia/Pacific Region
ARIN
North America Region
LACNIC
Latin America and some
RIPE NCC
Europe, the Middle East, and Central Asia
Target Development and Discovery
Focus of Analysis:
One Degree and Two Degrees of Separation
Known Bad Guy
Suspected Bad Guys
Encryption – The key to Protecting the
Privacy of U.S. Citizens
Using encrypted identifiers of US individuals
 Relationships can still be mapped
 Communities can still be determined
 Connections with known US or foreign targets can be traced
 IC and/or LE analysts can look at any relationships without
identifying protected persons
 IC analysts cannot purposefully or accidentally access and analyze
protected citizen data without probable cause
 Identifying data can be decrypted for targeting, once criteria
constituting probable cause are met
 Civil liberties are protected while preserving the ability to detect
terrorists and/or other activities
Discovering and Protecting
- Guarding Privacy While Finding the Threat Mullah Omar
Kandahar,
Afghanistan
Mustafa Alhawsawi
Dubai, UAE
Nawaf Alhazmi
San Diego, CA
Ramzi Binalshibh
Hamburg, Germany
Marwan
<#(!}| ?%#*&”:>
Alshehhi
Hollywood, FL
E
Khalid Almihdhar
San Diego, CA
WANTED
U.S. WANTED
UNKNOWN
U.S. PROTECTED
Mohamed?<|{
(#@&^:”
Atta
Hollywood, FL
Hani
+^#* Hanjour
?<“|{@$
Hollywood, FL
Majed
){;?] %)/’|
Moqed
Daytona Beach, FL
Community Transaction Timeline
Illegal Use of Private Information
U.S. Drug Enforcement Agency/Special Ops Division
http://rt.com/usa/dea-agents-nsa-evidence-067/
Illegal Use of Private Information
- Masking the (Illegal) Source -
http://rt.com/usa/dea-agents-nsa-evidence-067/