Transcript Slide 1

Chapter 1: Introduction
Early police officers had to
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Avoid getting into trouble
Inhibit offenders
Reassure victims
Since the 1960s
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Criminals developed new ways to commit crime
Public expectations changed
Public relationship with the police changed
These changes resulted in the investigative, reactive
model of policing still popular today
The move from prevention
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Early 1990s survey of one UK police force
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40% of personnel assigned to investigation
1% assigned to crime prevention
Audit Commission. (1993). Helping With Enquiries: Tackling Crime
Effectively . London: HMSO. Page 14.
Since the 1960s
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Community policing
Problem-oriented policing
CompStat
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And now… Intelligence-led policing
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Analysis-driven models
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As one of the latest analysis-driven models,
intelligence-led policing has commonalities with
problem-oriented policing and targeted, proactive
policing.
These strategies attempt to be ‘strategic, future
oriented and targeted’ in their approach to crime
control and are more than just catchy phrases; they
are representative of a significant and widespread
change in the business of policing’
Maguire, M. (2000). Policing by risks and targets: Some dimensions
and implications of intelligence-led crime control. Policing and
Society, 9(4), 315-7.
Not just about information sharing
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The challenges for information sharing - arguably a
component of a strategic, intelligence-led crime
control strategy – are substantial
But intelligence-led policing is not just about better
information sharing or information collection
It is about better resource allocation, priorities and
crime reduction decisions
Origins
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Kent Police (UK) and Sir David Phillips
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Moved resources from reactive, crime investigation
departments to proactive units
Began tactical operations directed by criminal intelligence
analysis
Promoted greater intelligence gathering
First to practice ‘genuine’ intelligence-led policing
Developments
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From a business model required to manage crime
analysis and criminal intelligence…
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To a broader management model for policing…
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To the UK National Intelligence Model
Definition
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Intelligence-led policing is a business model and
managerial philosophy where data analysis and
crime intelligence are pivotal to an objective,
decision-making framework that facilitates crime and
problem reduction, disruption and prevention
through both strategic management and effective
enforcement strategies that target prolific and
serious offenders.
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Ratcliffe, JH (2008) Intelligence-Led Policing, Willan
Publishing, page 89.
What’s in a name?
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Intelligence-led policing, not intelligence-led police
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It is theoretically possible to conduct intelligence-led
policing without a traditional police service
Some people assume the word intelligence has
negative connotations, suggesting activity that is
secretive, subversive and possibly illegal
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Intelligence-led policing actually evolves data and
information analysis into crime intelligence processes
‘The word intelligence needs to be reclaimed from the
secret world, made less threatening to communities and
used in their service’ (Grieve, 2004: 26)
Further features
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Less investigative, more strategic resource allocation
Seek a holistic perspective that measures the social
harm of threats
Closer integration of crime analysis and criminal
intelligence
Concentration on prolific offenders rather than crime
A holistic approach to crime control
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Instead of tackling crime one laborious investigation
at a time, never truly having an impact on the more
expansive criminal opportunity structure, the
capacity to step back and place threats and risks into
a holistic perspective that assesses the social harm of
criminality may allow policing to prevent crime
across a wide area rather than solve a single event
that has already occurred.
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Ratcliffe, JH (2008) Intelligence-Led Policing
Willan Publishing, page 8.
Case study: Operation Nine Connect
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New Jersey State Police (USA)
Numerous law enforcement partners
Bloods street gang
Nine Trey Gangsters
Strategic assessment of organized crime threats
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A 2004 survey of law enforcement agencies in the US
state of New Jersey found there were an estimated
148 gangs in the state, and nearly 30 gangs that had
over 100 members
For a strategic assessment of the situation, New
Jersey State Police analysts drew on
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Information from 300 intelligence reports
Data from 177 municipal police departments
Over 50 media articles
Covert information gathered from nearly 100 confidential
informants
Strategic assessment
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Concluded that the Bloods street gang were the
major threat to public safety.
A subset of the Bloods, called the Nine Trey
Gangsters, was identified as an emerging threat.
Under the leadership of David ‘Duke’ Allen from his
cell in Trenton State Prison, they were
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Actively recruiting, and
Attempting to coordinate Bloods’ activities and crime
across different counties and police jurisdictions
Operation Nine Connect
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July 2006 arrest of 60 Nine Trey Gangsters
Subsequent arrest of a further 30
Many remain in custody