Transcript Imperative for Change

Agenda
Part 1 of 3
A holistic view
What
We say we know
We know what to write
Why
How
© 2005 Donald E. Vandergriff
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What?
Guidance begins at the Executive level
Our military culture must reward new
thinking, innovation, and
experimentation.
President George W. Bush, Citadel
Speech, 23 SEPT 1999
© 2005 Donald E. Vandergriff
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What?
Guidance from the top of the Army
To win this war and to be prepared for any other task our
Nation may assign us; we must have a campaign quality Army
with a joint and expeditionary mindset. A fundamental
underpinning of this mindset is a culture of innovation. "Adapt
or Die" contains important ideas that clearly describe some
significant challenges to innovation in our institutional culture,
as well as the behaviors we seek to overcome them. Equally
important, the authors question the status quo. We must be
prepared to question everything. As this article states,
"Development of a culture of innovation will not be advanced
by panels, studies, or this paper. Cultural change begins with
behavior and the leaders who shape it." We have the talent to
establish the mindset and culture that will sustain the Army as
ready and relevant, now and into the future.
GENERAL Peter J. Schoomaker,
Chief of Staff, Army
© 2005 Donald E. Vandergriff
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What?
Everywhere you look-cries for change
“Cognitive Reform Is Hard
A process of cognitive and cultural transformation cannot be
accomplished in uncoordinated bits and pieces as it is today. If done
right, it might well demand change as sweeping and revolutionary as
the Goldwater-Nichols Act. The end state of this effort should be
nothing less than a revolution in learning throughout the Department
of Defense. This much is clear from past efforts, however: reform of
this magnitude is essential, long overdue, and undoable without the
commitment of the entire military intellectual community.”
“Culture-Centric Warfare”
Major General Robert Scales, Jr.
U.S. Army (Retired)
Proceedings, September 2004
© 2005 Donald E. Vandergriff
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What?
Do we really know?
 We know what we think we want
 We write and brief great sounding buzz words
 We put it out there almost as it should happen
without having to change anything else
 Seems we hope it changes, but we can also
keep the “good ole days”
 COHORT in the 1980s of major change but
isolated from other institutions
 Is this occurring now?
© 2005 Donald E. Vandergriff
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What?
“Do we really know?”
 How many times have you seen or heard these
words or statements? The Army must,
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“Change the culture”
“Create adaptive leaders”
“Adjust how we train leaders”
“Create an environment that promotes innovation”
“Change the personnel system”
“Have the best leader development system in the world”
“Have a world class leadership program”
 But, after coming back to reality you think
 “Do these people really know what it means to implement
these ideas?”
 “It’s all talk and I have seen this before; only the names have
changed …”
© 2005 Donald E. Vandergriff
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What?
The Army has defined the Culture
 First the National Command authority, Joint Staff and
the Army =Strategy defines end state = Expeditionary
Army
influenced by society & resources
 We start with the strategic problem = the culture
Culture
Cold War Army
One of many institutions
that must evolve
Generations
Of
War
Leadership
I define as the one
most impacted by
culture
What type of
Culture is
needed too?
Expeditionary Army
What type of
Leader is
needed?
 We know what we want, or do we think we know?
© 2005 Donald E. Vandergriff
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What?
Expeditionary Army = new culture
Cold War Army
Individual replacements
Doctrine of attrition-massive
firepower
Top-down hierarchy & informationcentralization
Analytical planning defines result
Heavy and complex tail
Complex, short-shelf life equipment
High training-tempo to offset high
personnel-tempo
Joint is “special duty”
Expeditionary Army
Stabilization—unit manning
Maneuver Warfare doctrine
“Trust-tactics”
Networking-decentralization
Results driven
Innovation enables constant
modification to doctrine,
tactics and force designs
Task organizes lower level
Training & education determined
by cyclic unit management
Joint is accepted as norm
© 2005 Donald E. Vandergriff
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What?
Cultures are different?- “Adapt or Die”
Today’s Culture
Stress “process”
Forecasting
Risk aversion
Bureaucratic
Top-down
Rank equals success
Change is criticism
=>adherence to process
ensures success
Future Army Culture
Stress “innovation”
Experimentation
Prudent risk-taking
Agility
Feedback loops
Contribution valued
Change is evolutionary
=>as long as objectives are
achieved
© 2005 Donald E. Vandergriff
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What?
Army defines what?
Future leaders will have a higher level of doctrine-based
skills, knowledge, attitudes, and experience …In fact, the
complex nature of future operations may require leaders of
greater experience and rank commanding at lower levels
than ever before.
TRADOC Pamphlet 525-5: Force XXI Operations
(October 2001)
The extraordinarily high quality of the Army’s human
dimension …must rise to an even higher level in the
increasingly complex operating environment of the 21st
century…particularly…at the level of the combat battalion.
TRADOC Pamphlet 525-3-19
Objective Force Maneuver Unit of Action Concept
(October 2003)
© 2005 Donald E. Vandergriff
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What?
TRADOC defines what?
Why BOLC*
Provide officers with a rigorous framework for leadership
Produce adaptable leaders who embody the Warrior Ethos
Establish a common standard and shared experience built on overcoming
adversity and developing respect / confidence with their combined arms
peers to produce:
• competent warrior leaders
• grounded in combat Soldier tasks
• capable of leading Soldiers in today’s COE
*TRADOC’s basic officer leaders course
© 2005 Donald E. Vandergriff
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What?
Cadet Command defines what?
• Capable of fast-paced action
• Responsive to changes measured
in seconds
• Extremely flexible
• Mentally agile
• Capable of independent
operations
• Technologically proficient
• Warrior Ethos
Lieutenants of the Future Force will have to enter the Army
already equipped with a sufficiently wide and deep base of
knowledge, intellectual skills, and mental capabilities.
© 2005 Donald E. Vandergriff
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What?
Cadet Command check-list response
The bureaucratic understanding of leadership, a checklist:
 Skills:
 Attributes:
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 Actions:
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Decision Making
Interpersonal
Analytical
Synthetic
Computer
Oral and Written
Communication
 Information Filtering
 Research
Mental Agility
Flexibility
Adaptability
Physical hardiness
Emotional hardiness
Followership
Dominance
Team Building
Decision Making
Values:
Selfless Service
Respect
“…processes and structures that lend required order and routine to our lives
can also hinder innovation. Examples include human resource policies that
manage people as inputs rather than outputs, labyrinthine organizational
structures that frustrate interdisciplinary networking, and reporting procedures
that focus more on things then on ideas.”
BG David A. Fastabend and Mr. Robert H. Simpson “Adapt or Die”
The Imperative for a Culture of Innovation in the United States Army 13
© 2005 Donald E. Vandergriff
What?
Break the down the goal further

Leadership is one part, but the most important part
What type of
Culture?
Culture
Expeditionary Army
Cold War Army
Leadership
What type of
Leader?
 But this is what this entire study is about, how to
create new leaders
© 2005 Donald E. Vandergriff
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What?
Second but important part-New Leaders
 The most important aspect is how we lead (command)
the Expeditionary Army=“adaptive leaders
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What does the lieutenant of the Expeditionary Army look like?
How do we recruit them?
How do we challenge them?
How do we create them?
How do we educate & train them?
Big question
How do we evaluate them?
remains?
How do we compensate them?
How do we sustain them in the Army?
What type of culture
must exist to act as a
catalyst toward
Evolution?
© 2005 Donald E. Vandergriff
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What?
What if it is all talk?
 What happens when “Why” moves on, but not we don’t?
VISION
Senior leaders, professional journals,
and “experts”:
“Change the culture”
Guidance/directives to plan for change
Resistance to cultural change
is incredible-many are based on
out-date-assumptions
Expeditionary
Army
Proclamations
made, superficial
policies made, but
beliefs, laws, regulations
not changed
The Culture
Present-Strategic
When these do not occur
Simultaneously people in
between become frustrated
=ATLDP 2001
Goal:
Something
less than planned
achieved,
if anything
Reform Officer Education
and Training=New ROTC
Maybe an
Army
not ready for
the next
real threat
“Why”
Limited changes
may occur, some
improvements, but
vision is
not achieved
An Incredible amount of energy
is expended in planning and resources
to make this happen
© 2005 Donald E. Vandergriff
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What?
More details, more questions?
 To provide decision makers and their staffs:
 A thorough analyses
 A different prospective on leadership and how to create it
 A tool to quantify and understand overused statements seen on
briefs:
 “change culture”
 “adaptive leaders”
 “education, vice training”
 In order to:
 Understand that of all the good things the Army is doing,
 Leadership development and creation is the least understood
 Leadership development must evolve
 Leadership development is being restricted by out of date
assumptions
 Recommend holistic reform of how the Army prepares future
officers
 Because if we don’t start honestly addressing these issues
now, we (the Army and the country) will be in trouble in the
future
© 2005 Donald E. Vandergriff
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What?
Conclusion should lead to more questions?
 Okay, we say what? but leads to other questions:
 Are willing to reexamine:
 The concept of “officer”?
 The force structure that demands so many officers?
 Laws and policies that support a bloated top-heavy officer
corps?
 A culture that awards those that intelligently challenge the status
quo?
 Are we willing not to
 “make mission” to achieve quality?
 Change Neo-Taylorism terms like “production,” “make mission,”
and “checklists” in the way we evaluate?
 Create the type of accessions system that will cater to, and
continually challenge the types of people that fit these terms?
© 2005 Donald E. Vandergriff
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What
Conclusion
 The Army is good at defining “What”:
 Admits that our traditional view of war is out of date
 War and stability operations have merged, creating a need for:
 A cadre of officers that must be able to deal with both
 Begins the process toward creating the “strategic lieutenant”
 Revisits how we define (and conflict with) the concept of selfless
service for the Army and the nation
 We have to overcome myths when revising our education
and training for cadets:
 ROTC (leadership development) cannot remain subordinate to the
more traditional and accepted on-campus academic disciplines.
Instead, it must:
 Begin exposing them to complex problem solving, cognitive
development earlier
 Reform every institution that deals with some aspect of creating officers
© 2005 Donald E. Vandergriff
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