Transcript Parallel Evolution - Defense and the National Interest

Raising the Bar:
Creating Adaptive Leaders to Deal With
The Changing Face of War
Major Donald E. Vandergriff
Assistant Professor of Military Science
Georgetown University
DRAFT
Seventh Edition
March 2005
Agenda (for entire briefing)
This is a 5 part briefing
 To present the case for reforming not only U.S. Army
accessions process (officers), but the entire approach
to changing an organization. This will set the
conditions for success:
 “Part 1 Parallel Evolution,” set conditions with 3-parts to define
a strategic model along people-technology-culture
 “Part 2 Historical Traditions” Are we trapped by out of date
assumptions? This part says yes!
 “Part 3 Why is change hard?” We are also trapped, ironically,
by the U.S. society’s success as well as its isolation.
 “Part 4 New POI” parts 1-3 taken together point to a
revolutionary way to create officers.
 “Part 5 Need some help?” To do this, we are going to need the
U.S. Congress and the Army to do some things—at least
address them and understand that it needs a new leader
development paradigm.
© 2005 Donald E. Vandergriff
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Administrative
Notes
• Prepared for delivery, as supplement to “Minority Report,” January 2005
as well as to senior leaders, at all levels, with new ideas
• This briefing is a detailed summary of the forthcoming book, Raising the
Bar: Creating Adaptive Leaders to deal with the Changing Face of War
• This study reflects the observations and opinions of the author.
• This study in no way reflect the official policy or opinion of the United
States Army Cadet Command, the United States Army, Department of
Defense, of the United States Government.
DRAFT – the final version may be different.
Please do not cite this draft version without
permission of the author.
© 2005 Donald E. Vandergriff
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Background: Why I Took This On
 For seven years now, I have been asking myself these questions,




Can we do it better?
Frustrated by saying, briefing and publishing, but do we do it?
Can we still afford to change parts of the Army in isolation?
Are we preparing our future leaders to deal beyond the conventional,
yet out of date, view of war?:
 The evolution of war to Fourth Generation Warfare?
 Globalization?
 The “revolution in technology”?
 The Army as it evolves to an Expeditionary Army?
 New ways to create Leaders must evolve parallel to the culture-to
succeed-to nurture them as they develop and grow
“Centralized command and control systems produce methodical (i.e.,
predictable) Warfighting doctrines premised on the assumption that
subordinates should not be free (i.e., can not be trusted) to make their own
decisions while staying within the broad guidance of a commander's intent.”
Colonel John Boyd, USAF
"Organic Design for Command and Control“
© 2005 Donald E. Vandergriff
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A Strategic Model
Purpose
Provide decision makers and their staffs a
model of strategic problems with
A holistic view
What
Why
How
Goal: An Expeditionary Army
“People-Ideas-Hardware”
In context of where we want to go shaped
by the current and future environments
Ideas may be revolutionary, but change is
evolutionary, examples do exist
© 2005 Donald E. Vandergriff
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Strategic Model
“What” must occur first?
 Problem: The Army will fail if it tries to change its parts (institutions) in
isolation without changing the culture, particularly in regards to providing the
climate to nurture adaptive leaders and innovators.
 Solution: “Parallel evolution” defines organizational evolution as a holistic
problem in terms of:
 What—Expeditionary Army
Change the culture
Adaptive Leader
through a Strategic “how-to”
 Why—Army to 3rd Generation in order to deal with 4th Generation
 How—Strategic leaders must have plan and execute to change culture
 Defined as: A culture must evolve as the Army moves to change the way it
creates and sustains adaptive leaders,
 So before I go on to parts 2-5 that deal with leadership, “Parallel Evolution”
(parts 1, 1-1, 1-2 & 1-3) sets the conditions through an evolved culture as war
changes
Occurs at
the same
time
 WHY?
 What?
© 2005 Donald E. Vandergriff
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Strategic Model
“Why” the culture as War Evolves
Nuclear
Weapons
Proliferate
Peace of
Westphalia
Precursor activities – going
back to Alexander & Sun Tzu
(and before)
Fall of
USSR
2 GW
1
GW
3 GW
States &
non-states
wage war
maneuver
concepts
State-vs-state—
only “legal” form
of war
New commo &
trans networks
4 GW
Highly irregular / partisan
/guerrilla warfare; terrorism;
criminal organizations, etc.
States & nonstates wage
war
(all technically illegal)
© Dr. Chet Richards
www.jaddams.com
1600
1700
“What” type of Army
& Leaders?
1800
© 2005 Donald E. Vandergriff
1900
2000
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Strategic Model
“Why” the culture as War Evolves
Nuclear
Weapons
Proliferate
Peace of
Westphalia
Fall of
USSR
2 GW
1
GW
3 GW
maneuver
concepts
New commo &
trans networks
4 GW
Highly irregular / partisan
/guerrilla warfare; terrorism;
criminal organizations, etc.
States & nonstates wage
war
(all technically illegal)
©Dr. Chet Richards
Jaddams.com
1600
1700
“What” type of Army
& Leaders?
1800
© 2005 Donald E. Vandergriff
1900
2000
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Strategic Model
“What”: Negative Leadership Model
Can the Expeditionary
Army do it with these?
What the Army is saying
it wants the Expeditionary
Army to do, led by
Adaptive leaders,
cannot exist with
this type of
Leader
groomed by
today’s culture
Lack of Trust
Method driven
orders
How else will
today’s culture
impact
the future?
Underdeveloped
professionalism
What if the culture does
not change?
© 2005 Donald E. Vandergriff
No initiative
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Strategic Model
Negative Leadership negates Adaptability & Innovation
“Increased centralization generates friction between the
levels of command. Without well-established mutual
trust, the temptation to micromanage overtakes
commanders and slows decision cycles at all levels.
Increased legislation works to create a rigid, mechanistic
structure. All of these factors combine to create a rigid
inefficient, and sluggish organization that is slow to
adapt and ultimately combat ineffective!!.”
Colonel John Boyd
Then “What” ?
© 2005 Donald E. Vandergriff
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Strategic Model
To a Positive Leadership Model
The Army knows what it wants
from leaders in the future.
The culture must
exist to nurture
the traits
of these
leaders.
Okay, good answer,
then “What” ?
Trust
“Objective driven”
or “Mission”
orders
Evolutionary
Tactics
“How-to” Create
and
nurture them?
Adaptive Leaders
“What” for the Future?
© 2005 Donald E. Vandergriff
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Why?
Negative Leadership negates Adaptability & Innovation
“Increased decentralization throughout the organization
harmonizes the rhythm of the slower strategic decision
cycle with those of the faster tactical decision cycles. An
efficient, highly adaptive and pro-active, organic whole
emerges to become a Superior War-fighting
Organization!”
Colonel John Boyd
Then “What” ?
The hard part now!
The Strategic “How-to”
© 2005 Donald E. Vandergriff
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A Strategic Model
Achieve “Parallel Evolution”
Change culture
 What? Cold War Army Expeditionary Army
Adaptive leader
 Why? Fight 2GW well opponents adapt global conditions WMD
4GW
 How? Strategic leaders lead change adjust policies/laws/beliefs
award/protect innovators/risk-takers educate outside influences-Congress
Institutional changes simultaneously evolve toward goal
The Culture
Present-Strategic
Influences all others
Difficult part:
strategy
for getting
there (“how”)
Requires evolved culture
To assist the people in between, those who plan
and execute, this must occur simultaneously
Leadership
Evolve officer education
and training=New ROTC
Cannot have
One without
The other
Goal:
Expeditionary
Army
Adaptive leaders to lead
this Army
doctrine
personnel
Force structure
© 2005 Donald E. Vandergriff
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Strategic Model-Parallel Evolution
What must occur simultaneously
The Three Components of Learning &Growth are NOT ‘Born Equal’
People
Information
Organizational
CD + ED
Capital (IC)
Culture
Potential Value
Strategic Leaders
ED = Social-Emotional
Development
Minority Report
Annex A
of report
Strategy (Map)
CD = Cognitive
Development
The ‘hidden’ dimension of soldiers (CD + ED) determines
how potential value materializes, the realism of the strategy, and the
nature of internal strategic processes
© 2005 Donald E. Vandergriff
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A Strategic Model
A historical model-incomplete
 What? From Tactical to Operational Maneuver continue leader evolution new
force structures new technology
 Why? Could not move beyond tactical zone technology resource competition
 How? von Seeckt critical AAR (1919)
strenuous leadership selection
evolutionary experiments new technology stabilization feedback loops
 Institutional changes simultaneously evolve toward goal
Scharnhorst
reforms
(1809)
Encouraged to
seek
responsibility
Strenuous
leader
selection
Sturm
tactics
Sturm
battalions
Machine
guns, automobile
The Culture
Strategic
Encouraged/protect those
who experiment &
take risks
Doctrine existed as principles
or guidelines- Truppenfuhrer
could be evolved/expanded
Force structure-Panzer Division
Airplane, tank and radio
Feed back loop: AAR (1919) critical of every aspect
of Army performance in WWI
Too isolated from politics
No strategic thinkers?
Not beyond operations?
Majority foot-driven
No standard-too complex
© 2005 Donald E. Vandergriff
Goal:
Army that
moved from
tactical to
operational
maneuver
(still neglected)
strategy?)
Germans understood
the value of rapid
decision-making through
strength of character
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A Strategic Model
What happens when only parts change?
 What? AirLand Battle doctrine Agility-Initiative-Decisive-Synchronization
Division 86 “The Big Five” M1, Apache, Patriot, MLRS, Hummet
 Why? Beat Soviets quickly Low casualties short wars fragile & complicated tail
 How? DuPuy/Starry/Meyers/Ulmer volunteer Army quality of life but did not
evolve the foundation of demise in Vietnam (the culture of management science)
 Institutions did not change simultaneously toward goal
Mobilization doctrine
(Elihu Root &
George Marshall)
1970 War
College Report
on Army culture
Never ending
make or break
professionalism
Attrition
Warfare
ROAD
Mass-production
standardization
The Culture
Strategic
Changes called for by
1970 report did not occur
First major reform of ROTC (Wagner),
training Revolution (NTC), attempted
COHORT (unit vice individual)
First time in history went to
Maneuver doctrine-FM 100-5 (82);
“Synchronization” conflicted with it
Policy adjustments helped
Climates but not culture
i.e., longer cmd tours, COHORT
etc…
Goal:
Move U.S. Army from
attrition doctrine
to
maneuver doctrine
to win first battle of
next war decisively
Force structure-Division 86, but
retained top down hierarchy
Precision weapons, improved
Protection, mobility, communication
Feed back loop: Veterans of Vietnam did not want to
repeat experience of Vietnam; infusion of Reagan build-up
© 2005 Donald E. Vandergriff
Achieved goal when
fighting another 2GW
enemy that was/is
even more centralized 16
A Strategic Model
Has ability
To understand
& deal with it
3GW to cope with 4GW?
What? Expeditionary Army
Why? 4GW
5GW(?)
Culture
4GW
3GW
rigorous education & hard training=bond
understanding of culture/language
leads to cognitive excellence-networking
2GW(state)
Culture
4GW
3GW
Quality over
quantity
Once- untouchable
laws, policies &
beliefs are finally
addressed
Action begins to
replace rhetoric
Early rigor=
common language
Modularity
UA/UE FM 1-0 Neo-Taylorism
FM 3-0
“Adaptive Leader”
Tank, precision
FM 7-0 career model
replaced by
Strike, jet/helo
Demming
Army
Transformation
10 layers C&C
(2005-?)
Executes
“how-to”
What?
change culture
Networked Army(?)
Strategic leader(s) publicly awarding/praising members
School/train/cross-fertilize with Government agencies networked teams
Continue to evolve policies free-play/force-on-force cyclic units
The Culture
Strategic
Contribution & seeking
responsibility
Service oriented leaders
Rank structure flattened to
Success=professionalism
four areas: tactical, operational,
strategic and technical, “perform or
out” replaces “up or out”
Doctrine is in terms of principles to
Decisiveness at
enhance evolution based on feedback loop
objective type orders
Hierarchal force structure flattened
To four areas: tactical, operational,
Strategic and technical-Command (control
taken out).
Future combat system fielded/non-lethal,
hand-held computers, time now
information,
Feed back loop: Bottom up encouraged by vertical
Culture, i.e., companycommand.com
© 2005 Donald E.
Vandergriff
right time
Goal:
Networked
Army that works
seamlessly with
other services
government
agencies in order
to perform array of
missions
Leaders have ability to
multi-task, understand
merging levels of war in a
flat, matrix, networking
force structure; Education
& Training extensive
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Part I Agenda
Explained in three parts
Setting conditions for success
Part 11- “What”
Part 12- “Why”
Part 13- “How”
Goal: An Expeditionary
Army
3GW culture to understand
And deal with 4GW.
Leadership is key.
Culture is evolved and shaped to
enhance people-centric warfare.
© 2005 Donald E. Vandergriff
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Part I
Conclusion
 The Army is
 Part 11- Good at defining “What”
 Part 12- At realizing “Why”
 Part 13- but does not know “How”
 To make a Strategic plan to
 Evolve the culture in order to
 Set the strategic setting, so
Goal: An Expeditionary
Army
Goal: A Culture that
supports the
leadership of an
Expeditionary Army
 Other institutions can evolve,
 Parallel to one another,
 Adjusting to 2nd and 3rd order effects
© 2005 Donald E. Vandergriff
Goal: To
combine
institutions
at goal
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