Transcript Need Some Help?

Agenda
Part 5
Part 5- Need some help?
Holistic Change?
Cadet Command Actions
What the Army is doing?
What Congress can do
What does this do for the Army?
1
© 2005 Donald E. Vandergriff
Holistic Change?
COMMAND:
CADRE:
Set up Cadre up for success
Stop focusing on making “mission”
Flexibility to evolve the program
based on lessons from war as long
as it supports principles and end
state
Evolve into a Learning Organization
Set the example, mentor cadets
Select and sustain the right cadre
Commission only the ones that are
prepared for future war
What Does
A Newly Commissioned
Officer Look Like?
CADETS:
Have the desire to become an officer
Have the commitment and self-discipline to
acquire knowledge on their own
Engaging & interactive learning-meet the
cadre half way
Possess the character to make decisions
and act
© 2005 Donald E. Vandergriff
COLLEGES:
Academic rigor (YES!)
Maintain accreditation standards
Student scholarships
Support establishment of a major in
leadership (BA in Leadership)
2
Holistic Change?
Establishes Accession Functional
Area within Institutional Support
Field similar to FA 47 for
Education Command
3
© 2005 Donald E. Vandergriff
Cadet Command Actions
 Decentralize accession process in order to evaluate
the person, not the file
 Cadets will appear in front of brigade boards (no photos)
 Board members will question cadets
 Will grade performance file as well in thirds, consisting of
 GPA and degree
 Performance at LEC
 Performance on campus in ROTC
 Also list and take in consideration, special skills such as hard
languages
 Will make recommendations for duty and branch
 Completed files will then go to Department of Army
for review and branching
 Based on recommendations of boards
 Needs of the Army
© 2005 Donald E. Vandergriff
4
Cadet Command Actions
 Establishing and sustaining a reputation
 “Making-Mission” is subordinated to quality
Using “Goals” instead of “mission” when talking “numbers”
Flexibility to get within a percentage below or above “Goal”
 It is subordinated to how well a program prepared cadets
LEC becomes a “test,” measure of Program as well
How do cadets do at other evaluations and training as well
Positive vice negative view, programs will build “credibility
points” for:
 Honor and distinguished graduates of OBCs and Army schools
 Or, finishing difficult schools like Ranger school
 Sending a number of cadets and finishing summer training
 Percentage of cadets finishing DMG
 Inspections adhere to principles in education, bde/Rgn
sit in on classes, watch instruction or training
5
© 2005 Donald E. Vandergriff
Cadet Command Actions
 Consolidate Programs:
 Continued operation of inefficient units results in:
 Fiscal waste
 Minimum size before it can offer meaningful leadership training to
cadets
 Do not have the opportunities for leadership as cadets at more robust
units
 “Large ROTC Programs Produce Better Leaders”
 Can do multi-echelons of training, so cadet understands role of officer
in the “bigger picture”
 More opportunities to train and learn from other peers
 Mass critical resources
“First, the small size of these units coupled with the ‘inevitable absence of
students because of required collegiate activities’ reduced the effectiveness of
much on-campus military training. Second, a ‘meaningful leadership experience’
was a near impossibility when the number of cadets did not reach a certain
critical mass—which was around 100 students.”
Dr. William P Snyder,
“Leaders for the Volunteer Force”
© 2005 Donald E. Vandergriff
6
What the Army can do?
Create units that are relevant and generate versatile
combat power
Self-contained, sustainable, lethal force packages
Organized with capabilities for the full range of missions
Truly joint interdependent – trained and ready member of
joint force
 Adaptive, competent, and confident Soldiers and leaders
Stabilization and unit life cycles will
Further develop leaders on “What right looks like”
Army will have to educate leaders to deal with the
challenges of cohesion
“Create modular “brigade-based” Army that is more responsive to regional
combatant commanders’ needs, better employs Joint capabilities, facilitates
force packaging and rapid deployment, and fights as self contained units in
non-linear, non-contiguous battlespaces”
Major General Robert Mixon
“The Modular Army” 01 November 2004
7
© 2005 Donald E. Vandergriff
What the Army can do?
 Encourages:
 Mutual trust among leaders based on each leader's intimate
personal knowledge of the capabilities of the others.
 Training and organization in everything the Army does to
reinforce the primacy of the judgment of the man on the scene
(decentralization)
 A willingness to decide and act on the part of all leaders and
those who aspire to be leaders
 Simple, commonly accepted and understood operations concepts
 Army must evolve in order to expect:
 That a subordinate's failure to act in the absence of orders was
"illegal" and, at the very least, inexcusable in the eyes of his
superiors and peers
 A cadet has to be taught to expect to act on the situation as he
see it
 As a result, action in the face of uncertainty and responsibility for
that action should be developed into a social norm
© 2005 Donald E. Vandergriff
8
What the Army can do?
 Trust between superior and subordinate is the cornerstone of
mission-oriented command
 Superior trusts subordinate to exercise his judgment and
creativity
 To act as the situation dictates to reach a specified goal
 Subordinate trusts that his superior supports whatever action he
takes in good faith to contribute to the good of the whole
 Empower and expect Commanders to continue development:
 Responsibility for junior officer training and development
 Knows who to trust to execute a mission on the basis of
broad orders
 Who needs more detailed instructions, but knows each will
act
 Subordinate exercises his judgment during periods of great
stress with no additional instructions once the action
started
 Constantly nurturing this willingness allowing for mistakes
of detail or method and by permitting errors of judgment
during training
© 2005 Donald E. Vandergriff
9
What the Army can do?
 These recommendations create:
"A leader who can influence people -- by providing purpose, direction,
and motivation -- while operating in a complex, dynamic environment of
uncertainty and ambiguity to accomplish the mission and improve the
organization.”
 And who has the following traits:





Decisive
Can balance human leadership dimension with technology
Comfortable with uncertainty (agile and flexible)
Focused, quick learner
Empowering and decentralized leadership allowing for
"initiative within intent."
 Good communicator
 Can build cohesive, trusting teams with candor
 Can use force across the full spectrum of conflict
10
© 2005 Donald E. Vandergriff
What Congress can do?
 Congress can:
 Consider a Goldwater-Nichols II on personnel reform
 Help change a “numbers-driven” program (“neo-Taylorism”) by
 Assisting the Army by reexamining “requirements”
 Prioritize remaining “requirements,” alleviating demands
 Not allowing the Army to undermine quality to meet “requirements”
 Support Army in consolidating ROTC programs to
 “Mass” resources
 Provide more leadership opportunities
 Enable Army flexibility to put right people with cadets
 Create laws supporting Army loan and initiative programs
“…the most critical task is to produce imaginative, adaptive
commanders and staff officers.”
Leonard D. Holder Jr., and Williamson Murray
“Prospects for Military Education,” Joint Forces Quarterly (Spring 1998)
11
© 2005 Donald E. Vandergriff
What Congress can do?
Understand that some requirements undermine?
The Army accesses and trains
to 148% of its AC lieutenant
requirements, driven by internal
and external requirements. We
are undermining the experience
of our youth!
5000
4500
15,197
4000
3500
Population
3000
REQUIRED
17,843
2500
2000
INVENTORY
1500
6,916
1000
500
6,058
2,311
0
1
FILL%
2
3
148%
4
5
6
7
8
9
106%
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
Years of Service
67%
18
19
20
21
97%
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
103%
12
© 2005 Donald E. Vandergriff
What Does This Do for the Army?
Conclusion
 Evolution into the first step of a new learning
environment “lifecycle,” preparing our leaders for the
emerging operating environment
 The professional "lifecycle" should be:
Tactical (implementation stage)
Operational (formulation and legitimization stage)
Strategic (agenda setting stage) oriented
 Focus is on more than training (only one leg of a triad
of warrior learning), but also:
On formal education ("academics")
Experienced-based learning (simulated; real-world).
 Three "domains" of warrior learning need to be "fullspectrum"—civil and military oriented ("its all war" being
the idea here)
13
© 2005 Donald E. Vandergriff