Transcript Justify Change - Defense and the National Interest

The Future Personnel System
Flexibility is theme
Evolution is always
Plug and Play
Major Donald E. Vandergriff
Assistant Professor of Military Science
Georgetown University
9th Edition
June 3, 2005
Purpose
The Army is good at understanding Why, the start point,
does good at developing What, the end point, but has
trouble getting there, the How-to, the hard part, the
details of tying Why to What.
I will set the conditions for success, by:




Understanding war
Understanding that incremental changes won’t do anymore
Understanding how to develop and nurture adaptability
Providing a recommendation, how-to, to tie the two after
redefining Why and briefly examining What the Army is doing
now and in the near future.
© 2005 Donald E. Vandergriff
2
Administrative
Notes
 Prepared for delivery, as supplement to “Minority Report,” January 2005 as well as to senior leaders, at all
levels, with new ideas, editions from 1 through 9 were briefed to several groups from January to June
2005.
 This briefing is a detailed summary of the forthcoming book, Raising the Bar: Creating Adaptive Leaders
to deal with the Changing Face of War
 This study reflects the observations and opinions of the author.
 This study in no way reflect the official policy or opinion of the United States Army Cadet Command, the
United States Army, Department of Defense, of the United States Government.

6th and 7th editions were delivered to TRADOC Commanding General, General Byrnes 3 & 17 March 2005

EXSUM delivered to Symposium “The Future of the U.S. Army,” Washington, D.C., 11 April 2005

EXSUM delivered to U.S. Army Strategy Conference, Army War College, 16 April 2005

8th edition was delivered to Cadet Command Commanding General Major General Thrasher 26 April 2005

9th edition was presented to the Army G1 for LTG Hagenbeck on 27 May and 3 June 2005 for presentation to Army
Chief of Staff General Schoomaker
 Will serve as a baseline for further development of a future personnel system
DRAFT – the final version may be different.
Please do not cite this draft version without
permission of the author.
© 2005 Donald E. Vandergriff
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Background: Why I Took This On
 For seven years now, I have been asking myself these questions:




Can we do it better?
Frustrated by saying, briefing and publishing, but do we do it?
Can we still afford to change parts of the Army in isolation?
Are we preparing our future leaders to deal beyond the conventional,
yet out of date view of war?:

The evolution of war to Fourth Generation Warfare?
 Globalization?
 The “revolution in technology”?
 The Army as it evolves to an Expeditionary Army?
 New ways to create Leaders must evolve parallel to the culture-to
succeed-to nurture them as they develop and grow
“Centralized command and control systems produce methodical (i.e., predictable)
Warfighting doctrines premised on the assumption that subordinates should not be
free (i.e., can not be trusted) to make their own decisions while staying within the
broad guidance of a commander's intent.”
Colonel John Boyd, USAF
"Organic Design for Command and Control“
© 2005 Donald E. Vandergriff
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Points of Discussion
 Purpose
 Part I Why-The Generations of War
 Current and future operating environment
 What does it entail for leaders?
 Part II What-Army is doing good things, but
 Factors identified in earlier Army and external studies still exist, despite
current great efforts
 Part III How-to
 What the CSA can do now to begin the evolution
 Parallel Evolution and the culture-evolving together
 Recommendations to move from an Industrial based system to a system
that allows for trust tactics & a move to an Expeditionary Army
 Conclusion
© 2005 Donald E. Vandergriff
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Purpose
To provide a Strategic how-to, including a new personnel strategy and
force structure to move Army cultural transformation
from a Second Generation Force to a Third Generation Force
in order to set the conditions to create, groom and nurture adaptive leaders
to cope with the emerging conditions of 4th Generation Warfare
© 2005 Donald E. Vandergriff
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Purpose-Summary
 The Army is good at:
– Realizing “Why”
– Defining “What”
– But does not know “How”






To Make a Strategic Plan to
Evolve the Culture in Order to
Shape the Strategic Setting, so
Other Institutional Elements can Evolve
Parallel to one another,
Anticipating 2nd and 3rd Order Effects
© 2005 Donald E. Vandergriff
Goal: An
Expeditionary
Army
Goal: A Culture that
supports a New
Generation Leading an
Expeditionary Army
Goal: To
Integrate
Institutional
Elements’
Efforts to
Achieve
Parallel
Objectives
7
Purpose: Summary
What is Adaptability?
 What is Adaptability?
 Adaptability refers to the process of adjusting practices, processes, and
systems to projected or actual changes of environment, e.g., the climate
or the enemy.
 Adaptability includes the creation of innovative combined arms
organizations, doctrine, systems, and training concepts as demanded by
the environment, allies, and the enemy.
 Adaptive solutions to complex problems in chaotic, unpredictable
situations are based more on intuition than on analysis, deliberate
planning, and doctrine.
“Sun Tzu’s theory of adaptability to existing situations is an important aspect of
his self thought. Just as water adapts itself to the conformation of the ground, so
in war one must be flexible; he must adapt his tactics to the enemy situation.”
John Poole, The Last Hundred Yards
© 2005 Donald E. Vandergriff
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Part I “Why”-The Generations of War
Nuclear
Weapons
Proliferate
Peace of
Westphalia
Precursor activities – going
back to Alexander & Sun Tzu
(and before)
Fall of
USSR
2 GW
1
GW
3 GW
States &
non-states
wage war
maneuver
concepts
State-vs-state—
only “legal” form
of war
New commo &
trans networks
4 GW
Highly irregular / partisan
/guerrilla warfare; terrorism;
criminal organizations, etc.
States & nonstates wage
war
(all technically illegal)
©Dr. Chet Richards
Jaddams.com
1600
1700
1800
1900
2000
“What” type of Army & Leaders?
Dr. Chet Richards
© 2005 Donald E. Vandergriff
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“Why”-The Generations of War
 Evolution into the 4th Generation of War is,
 Non state groups have identified U.S. strengths and weaknesses
 Hierarchal & Centralized units have slower decision-cycles
 Breadth of time and space has no boundaries
 Focused at retaining moral reason to continue
 What does it mean for Army “Transformation”
 “Strategic Lieutenant” (and “corporal”) becoming reality

Pushing more demands/requirements to “lowest levels”

Merging the traditional levels of war-decisions can impact strategy
“What” does this tell the Army?
© 2005 Donald E. Vandergriff
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Why?
The Future is now
Exposure to
And Familiarization
Of Complex
Problems
Line equals at what point does the officer have
to deal with the particular task under the given
type of culture
2GW Time
Moving Up Experience, Earlier line (War)
Operational Art
Grand Tactics
With the use of varying
3 & 4GW
education and training
techniques described in Time line
(All)
this briefing, we will
better prepare our officers
earlier to deal with
complex tasks
2GW
Time line
(peace)
Joint Operations
Dealing w/other Cultures
Nation Building Tasks
Tactical Planning
Co/TM Tasks
Sqd & PLT Tasks
COL
LTC
Major
Captain
Lieutenant
Cadet
Individual Tasks
Time/
Career
Experience
Given our current accessions system, we act like conditions
have not changed.
© 2005 Donald E. Vandergriff
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“Why”-The Generations of War
Influencing the “What”
People-Centric Warfare
Investing in people
What kind of war for the Army?
Large scale operation/small scale contingency
How the enemy fights/operating environment
Not the same culture?
Politically tolerable to have junior “free-thinkers”?
Centers of Gravity for Winning Wars
Changed Culture
How-to?
Flexibility? Which level has the “freedom of action”?
How is the Army
Reacting-with What?
© 2005 Donald E. Vandergriff
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Why?
But? “What” is incomplete?
Senior leaders, professional journals,
and “experts”:
“Change the culture”
 What happens when we define, “what” understand “Why”, but not “How”?
Continue to allow
internal factors to
impact effectiveness
distract from true
focus
The Culture
Present-Strategic
Personal
Efforts from
Below not
Enough must
Have support
From top
Future
Army ?
Reform Officer Education
and Training=New ROTC
Go in with
Less than
required
Some lower level
Leaders, Soldiers
Units do adaptthis is climate, not
culture change
These veterans will help
But full potential not tapped
Due to unchanged culture
© 2005 Donald E. Vandergriff
Current and future
operating environments
Emerging technology
Opponents
Technology
Global conditions
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Part II What?-Army Doing Good Things
• Most dramatic since reforms of Elihu Root (1899-1904)!
• Focused on more than one type of threat
• “17 focus areas” = parallel, systematic evolution - first time in army
history
• Understands need to change career path progression to create
‘pentathlete’ or adaptive leader
Highly exemplary – but you must simultaneously evolve
the CULTURE to support the pentathlete!
BUT?
© 2005 Donald E. Vandergriff
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What?-Army Doing Good Things
 Strategic leaders understand and desire need to evolve
 Stabilization program will assist in changing culture
 Most holistic program in 12 attempts
 Views more than attaining unit cohesion
 Focused across the spectrum of the Army
 First time 2nd and 3rd Order effects analyzed
 Aligned with modularity to
 Establish cyclic unit program
 Brigade Combat Teams (copied off Breaking the Phalanx) promise more flexibility
 OPMS 3 attempting to
 Restructured to correct some old problems, but
 Accommodates new force structure
 Major challenges due to
 "requirements line" of officer manning by grade/length of service over future
years, and the "on hand" line foreseen under present trends
 This gap is the result of years of severe officer losses beginning at the 5-8
years-of-service point, and it is hurting and will hurt the Army
But, then “What” is the problem?
© 2005 Donald E. Vandergriff
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What?-Army Doing Good Things – But?
 Major influences barriers to Transformation
 Mobilization doctrine (Path to Victory)

Despite
 Modularity: too weak, still too much overhead
 Stabilization
 Hierarchy remains reminiscent of Napoleonic and Cold War (9 levelspushing down-IO (e-mail) accelerates this)
 Culture of Management Science

Evolution of the training and evaluation process of Frederick Taylor
 Focus on “fundamentals,” “there is time to learn the rest,” “academicsfirst,” “crawl-walk-run”-out of box seen as “fun” or “too-advanced” not
training
 Leadership evaluations focused on “checking-the-block”
Influence of Management
Science leads too?
© 2005 Donald E. Vandergriff
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What?-Army Doing Good Things – But?
 Factors identified as negative factors in past studies remain at
base of culture:
 Such as,
 The “up or out” promotion system
 Scientific management theme in manning approaches
“Production” of officers
 “Making-mission”

 Leaders and Soldiers have been conditioned to accept non-traditional
Army norms by centralized, functional specialization and selection
systems that will continue too

Emphasize competition
 Individual replacements
 Generalist, career model
What does this do to adaptive leaders?
© 2005 Donald E. Vandergriff
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What?-Army Doing Good Things – But?
 Research has shown that individual performance appraisal and selection
systems are,

Inaccurate
 Unscientific
 Prone to sub-group subversion?
 More than half of any rating variance is due to “idiosyncratic rater
effects” such as,





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
How much the rater likes the ratee
Whether they have similar personalities
Their views on performance
Sterotypes on gender, race and ethnicity
Self-interest
Sub-group factional interests
Variations in work context
What does this lead too?
© 2005 Donald E. Vandergriff
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What?-Army Doing Good Things – But?
 Most importantly, centralized transfer promotion queues will continue to
lead too,




Frequent, expensive moves will still occur
Reduce social capital
Erode trust
Add to careerist credentials
 An “annual promotion tournament” will continue too,
Shift people between units, as if robbing “Peter to pay Paul,” primarily to
reward the winners
 Team improvement suffers
 Legitimacy and commitment suffer because almost everyone not promoted to
senior officer and non-commissioned officer rank is dissatisfied with the
current system

 Those who are promoted and in control will dismiss the dissatisfaction as
“sour grapes”
In Sum, the Problem?
© 2005 Donald E. Vandergriff
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What?-Army Doing Good Things – But?
The result
The Army’s response to:




current shortages
future field grade short falls
force structure changes,
i.e., increase of Units of Action
Strategic, operational &
tactical impacts
To meet the cycle of decline
Increase “mission”
“The Army “machine” equates 2LTs with
ZERO years of experience to Captains with 10
years of years.” (PERSORSA)
Mark Lewis “Army Transformation meets the junior officer exodus””
© 2005 Donald E. Vandergriff
But in reality:
 Experience goes down
 Quality decreases
 Competence suffers
 Retention pays
 EXAMPLE—Non-BQ CPTs
as APMS to schools
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What?-Army Doing Good Things – But?
In sum
 Army is adapting, but by climate, not culture
 After the need goes away, so do the positive climates?
 Cultural engines identified by Army Training and
Development Panel (ATLDP) of 2001 remain



Leadership
“up or out” promotion (1916)
Production line accessions=quantity trumps quality (1900)
Bloated officer corps, driven by short-term measures (1947)
 Culture must evolve slightly ahead of other institutional changes in
order to be in place,
 To nurture traits of desired behavior
 Sustain changes brought about to ensure success
 The hardest part to develop is the details in a Strategic how-to to
move from here to there
What is the Solution?
© 2005 Donald E. Vandergriff
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What?-Army Doing Good Things – But?
Conclusion
 Army is adapting, but by climate, not culture
 After the need goes away, so do the positive climates?
 Cultural engines identified by Army Training and
Development Panel (ATLDP) of 2001 remain



Leadership
“up or out” promotion (1916)
Production line accessions=quantity trumps quality (1900)
Bloated officer corps, driven by short-term measures (1947)
 Culture must evolve slightly ahead of other institutional changes in
order to be in place,
 To nurture traits of desired behavior
 Sustain changes brought about to ensure success
 The hardest part to develop is the details in a Strategic how-to to
move from here to there
© 2005 Donald E. Vandergriff
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Part III How to-What Do We have?
OPERATIONAL
PRINCIPLES
STRATEGIC LEADERSHIP
TRANSLATION
OPERATIONAL
PRINCIPLES
CHANGED
ARMY CULTURE
∆
VALUES
DOD – ARMY CULTURE
VALUES
© 2005 Donald E. Vandergriff
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How to-What Do We have?
A modern, military bureaucracy
 A modern bureaucracy that is,
 Tends to repeat the same solutions
 React late under pressure
 Remain tied to narrow goals of cost reduction and incremental
productivity
 Translates into a culture that will continue too
 Inhibit innovation
 Have difficulty accommodating other philosophies, such as the
professional military ethos
 Institutional issues surrounding professional expertise, jurisdiction
and legitimacy fall outside the decision making routine of military
(Army) bureaucracy
Translation Needed Hard to Do!
© 2005 Donald E. Vandergriff
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How to-Translation?
 Army Strategic Leaders must,
 Define operational principles & values apart from general society’s:
humanistic, not materialistic!
 Be coincident– “Live along Side” general societies!
 Be service, not “stuff” oriented!
 Adapt “postmodernism professionalism”
 Set the example!
Get at change!
© 2005 Donald E. Vandergriff
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How-to: Suggestions to Get Started
 Form an Ad-hoc, but sanctioned TF to take a Holist, System’s (Not
‘Pieces’) Institutional view and define what we must DO & HOW to
Implement = CSA TF
 Publicly Award & Assign RESPONSIBLE “Adaptive,” “Innovative”
Leaders – Set the Value Example from the Top (Did they impact the
Organization Positively?)! = CSA TF/G1
 Shape the Executive & Legislative Branches’, Private Sector’s, and
Public’s support for Army Cultural Evolution = CSA TF/PAO
 Shape the Internal Environment – Get the Strategic and Senior
Leader Cadres behind the Movement – They must support to make
progress possible = CSA
 Do all of these at the Same Time! = CSA TF/G3
© 2005 Donald E. Vandergriff
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How-to: Suggestions to Get Started
 Adopt “Trust tactics” — five principal facets to achieve decision
cycle dominance over potential 4GW enemies through the
successful and independent decision-making of subordinate
commanders




The first of these is scope for initiative.
The second is prudent risk-taking.
The third facet concerns the commander's intent to “trust tactics.”
Fourth, superior-subordinate relations must be characterized by
mutual trust.
 Fifth, directive control presupposes subordinate initiative and feedback.
Now, it is time to implement changes to officer accessions
© 2005 Donald E. Vandergriff
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How-to: Suggestions to Get Started
 Create the environment required to create and support adaptive
leaders:
 Publicly praise and award signs of adaptability & innovators

Work with Army Times and AUSA to highlight their actions

Put on army.mil with message talking about such people
 Form a task force composed of such people despite the fact that
their careers may not appear to be “fast-tracked” as reflected
officially in their files

The group advises and recommends the Army CSA on the necessary
cultural changes to support the 21st Century Army

Continues to search for more examples of adaptability and innovation
 Take these people and make them instructors in ROTC or at
West Point
© 2005 Donald E. Vandergriff
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How to-Get Δ Change?
Reinforce Statement of
Values, Principles & Actions
Strategic Leaders’
Stated Values &
Operational Principles
(V&OP)
Society's V&OP
Translated into Army
Policy, Doctrine,
Operating Policies &
Procedures = ARMY
CULTURE ∆ =
“How we want to do
Business!”
How we actually
Do Business –
Operational Reality
Monitor Δ of Intent
Vs Outcome
© 2005 Donald E. Vandergriff
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How to-Who belongs and can build?
How we want to do business: Moving to the details
 Four categories of professional and psychological maturity:




Stage 1: Not yet members of the profession
Stage 2: Limited members of the profession
Stage 3: They are true professionals
Stage 4: Lead the Army profession
 The personnel strategy and force structure reforms proposed
here aims to stream personnel into four main roles according to
their level of professional maturity.
© 2005 Donald E. Vandergriff
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How to–Change The Way We Do Business
THE STRATEGIC CHANGE
MODEL: What we must DO!
Define Present – Redefine – Build a Future
“Picture” - Develop a Viable Plan to get There!
Where
Must WE GO?
Such As?
Preserve the Past, Build on the Present, Create the
Future
Expeditionary Army
•
Error Tolerance –
Surprise isn’t Bad
• Equal Tec & People
• More ‘WE’ less ‘ME’
• More Service – Less
Stuff
Where are
WE?
Such As?
Cold War – Legacy
•
Zero Defects
• ‘More’ Stuff
• Technology Focus
• Individual Focus
© 2005 Donald E. Vandergriff
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How to: The Bridge – Parallel Evolution
OPEN, HONEST, APPRAISAL
Move Beyond Rhetoric!
Present Culture
Future Culture
Adaptive Leaders to Lead
this Army
The Bridge How to Get
There?
Goal:
Leadership
Evolve Officer Education
and Training = New ROTC
Expeditionary
Army
Doctrine
Other Cultural Systemic
Factors
Personnel
Force Structure
17 Focus Groups Evolving
Together - Must Anticipate 2nd
and 3rd Order Effects!
© 2005 Donald E. Vandergriff
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How-to: More Details
What must occur simultaneously
The Three Components of Learning &Growth are NOT ‘Born Equal’
People
Information
Organizational
CD + ED
Capital (IC)
Culture
Potential Value
Strategic Leaders
ED = Social-Emotional
Development
Minority Report
Annex A
of report
Strategy (Map)
CD = Cognitive
Development
The ‘Hidden’ Dimension of Soldiers (CD + ED) Determines
How Potential Value Materializes, the Realism of the Strategy, and the Nature
of Internal Strategic Processes
© 2005 Donald E. Vandergriff
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How-to: More Details
What must occur simultaneously
Repeat, the 17 Focused area Transformation needs to continue,
with these adjustments but culture changes are guided by
New Unit of Action
(within new
Stabilization)
Operational Staff
Specialists
(makes changes to
(makes changes to
OPMS 3)
OPMS 3)
Institutional Staff
Potential Value
Changed Culture
New Accessions &
Strategic Leaders
Education System
How Potential Value Materializes, the Realism of the Strategy, and the Nature
of Internal Strategic Processes
© 2005 Donald E. Vandergriff
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How-to: More Details
What must occur simultaneously
Today’s Culture
Future Army Culture
 Stress process
 Stress innovation
 Forecasting
 Experimentation
 Risk aversion
 Prudent risk-taking
 Bureaucratic
 Agility
 Top-down
 Feedback loops
 Rank equals success
 Contribution valued
 Change is criticism
 Change is evolutionary
 = adherence to process
 =as long as objectives are achieved
ensures success
© 2005 Donald E. Vandergriff
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How-to: More Details
The Personnel System
 New promotion system





Fill vacancies with or without a promotion
Holds competitions open only to Soldiers serving in that unit
Transfers and promotions not in sequence
Not from central selection list
Does not involve transfers from one BCT to another
 Personnel specialists do selecting
 Freedom to select, weigh and interpret complex and detailed data
according to professional standards, the vacancy and
circumstances of unit
 Local competitions may be less costly than current,
counterproductive, centralized, selection and promotion systems
© 2005 Donald E. Vandergriff
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How-to: More Details
The Personnel System
 Specialists for personnel, social science and personnel
management have sole authority for selection
 Observers from Army have veto but cannot force selection
 Chain of command has no vote, veto or otherwise
 Based on information collected throughout career within a stable
market of reputation and 360-degree view
 Source of information on candidates can come from:




Chain of command
Peers
Subordinates
Stakeholders in other units
 Information is not limited to surveys or performance reports
© 2005 Donald E. Vandergriff
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How-to: New Combined Arms Unit
 All arms, all supporting brigade sized unit
 Known by single name
 No permanent unit, branches, corps occupations or affiliations
that would sub-divide the BCT
 Reduces resistance of competing affiliations and weapons
systems to innovation and evolution
 Provides sub-units for matrix organizations and networking for an
array of mission
 Regional recruited and based
 Flexibility to assume role based on mission and campaign planfight one mission as infantry, rotate back and act as military police
(after training and equipment switch)
© 2005 Donald E. Vandergriff
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How-to: New BCT
The people
 Officers and Soldiers spend entire life with BCT (Stages 1-2: see
slide 27)
 Key is to promote learning organization, innovation and
adaptability as a unit
 Stability brings this about by building trust
 Can continually experiment
 Accessions of officers and enlisted are by need basis, allowing
for strenuous professional entrance standards
 Moving to more mature Soldiers-leader and led
 More attuned to 4GW
© 2005 Donald E. Vandergriff
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How-to: New BCT
Capabilities
 Unit can evolve over time, can be switched to different types of
mission over time
 Instead of specific branches, assign changing mission to cohesive, longstanding unit led by vastly better educated and experienced leaders
 Develops broad outlined doctrine that evolves based on lessons
learned and experience of long serving members of UA
 Similar to German Jager Infantry culture which was foundation for Sturm
units used in World War I, and then evolved to Panzer units in WWII
 Manages Stage 1 & 2 of Soldiers
© 2005 Donald E. Vandergriff
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How-to: Operational Staff
 Not a “General Staff”
 Selection and entrance into after experienced gained in stages 1 & 2
 Selection built upon based on reputation over time
 Experts and understanding of evolution of war
 Advise levels above BCT, such as Corps Group, to free BCT of
operational and strategic concerns
 Are not bureaucratic staff officers
© 2005 Donald E. Vandergriff
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How-to: Operational Staff
 Mid-point of career is first opportunity, equals 10-15 years of
service
 Actual initial selection into Operational Staff, competition opened
directly to members operational staff to fill vacant positions
 Filled with major to Major General
 One distinguishing badge and uniform
© 2005 Donald E. Vandergriff
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How-to: Specialists
 Evolved from Social and Human sciences professions
 Military law, chaplain, IG, human resources, social work, social
science, counseling and family services, medical and dental care,
etc….
 Stage 3 & 4
 Monitor and assist BCTs so they can focus on tasks to perform
effectively in 4GW
 Separate badge for entire corps as well
© 2005 Donald E. Vandergriff
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How-to: Specialists
 Are not CS or CSS, these are included in BCT as one Soldier
 Only Stage 2 to 3 Soldiers allowed to enter to take advantage of
experience (mid-service)
 Focused to the human and social sciences that shape the
cultural assumptions and behavior of the Soldier
© 2005 Donald E. Vandergriff
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How-to: More Details
Leader Education and Accessions
Favors
Centralized
Training with
resources,
ranges,
personnel, time
Baseline
Resources scale
In sum:
•Favor strengths
•Educate early
•task-train as
necessary
•to enhance
decision making
•as cognitive skills
established plug in
task training
Force-on-Force,
Free-play exercises
Complex Unit Tasks
Weapon Tasks Training
Tasks Training:
“What to think”
Favors Campusbased Education,
mental resources
Strategy
Education:
“How to think”
Individual Tasks
Administrative Tasks
Cognitive development
Language (s)
Tactical Decision Games
Learning Theory
Complexity scale
Cognitive
Skills education
© 2005 Donald E. Vandergriff
Task
Training
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How-to: More Details
Education and Accessions
 “Learning organization” exposes cadets-classical education- they find answers
 Experiencing the emotional trauma of failing within a safe, face saving environment that
is needed to promote ED
 Once cadets finds the answers themselves these lessons are emotionally marked in
time
 CD and ED need to be developed in synchrony
 in order to maximize knowledge development, KD
 CD lays open to the individual a landscape of choices
 ED determines whether he or she makes the RIGHT CHOICES under prevailing
circumstances
 Tools to assist good teachers




Tactical decision games (TDGs) key
Intensive confidential individual assessment, feedback, and development planning
360-degree double loop feedback
Establishing the blend of instructional technologies to use, particularly in the institutional
setting, is critical to promoting synchronous growth in CD, ED, and, consequently, KD
 Force on force, free play exercises against a thinking enemy
© 2005 Donald E. Vandergriff
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How-to: More Details
Begins with tough screening
Baseline
Education and Accessions
Task Training
Cognitive
Skills education
Academic Rigor
begins here!
First tough cut
comes here,
needs to come
earlier than later
Rite of
Passage
BOLC I
Establishes the
foundation in
cognitive skills
“how to think”
sets the foundation
First
unit
Ft Benning
IN
AR
FA
AV
Ft Bliss
AD
EN
MP
CM
Ft Knox
SC
MI
TC
MS
Ft Sill
QM
OD
AG
FI
BOLC II
“Culturalize”
Brings together
those who passed
through the “gate
of commissioning,”
creating bonds
BOLC III
Specialized
training, and
administrative
tasks
© 2005 Donald E. Vandergriff
Functional
Training
(ABN/Ranger,
Scout Leader)
These may
be offered
earlier
Learning from
the platoon
sergeant/NCOs,
COs, many
tasks can be
learned here
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How-to: More Details
Education and Accessions
 “Mental Preparation” is a long term investment, “we want to plant Oak trees,
not Pine trees,” CSA April 11, 2003
 BOLC is good start, with Phase II bonding/building trust early; BOLC III should favor
task training

But…Phase I needs to develop cognitive development (CD) early, social emotional
development (ED), Perceptual & Learning process (P&L), and Knowledge development
(KD) is the sum of the first two.
 Plan must favor strengths, understand-avoid weaknesses (summary)
Major
Factors
Strengths
Weaknesses
Action/Plan
ROTC
(today’s
Army)
Bridge with society; located
w/intellectual capital; good at
training; public more supportive
of changes
Resource poor; training
vice education; view of by
Army culture;
CD early-45-50 TDGs in four
years, reading list; free play
force on force; task-training
consolidated joint resources
Y-Gen
Most educated/earlier; like
mental challenges; seeks
autonomy; impatient, expects
more out of chain of cmd
Focused present; physical
durability; removed from
harsh reality of world (U.S.
society)
CD is more advanced, ED is
delta, give ldr spots earliermentor; 4 yrs-excitement;
include more interaction
Expeditionary
Army
Speed, no-notice; calls for
more at lower levels; no build
up and train up; Stabilization”what right looks like”
Conflict with personnel
system; conflict with force
structure; still too
technologically focused
Culture create & nurture
adaptability & innovation; create
systems that support abovepromotion, evals, select.
Non-state harder to target;
access to “off-the-shelf”;
merging levels-of-war
“Strategic lieutenant” vice
“intern”; 9-layer hierarchy
slows OODA-loop
Must prepare ED and KD
through painful, but safe CD
and P&L
War
(how does it
favor U.S?)
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How-to: More Details
Education and Accessions
Commissioning
Based on
forecasted UA needs
not cohort numbers
by law
BA Decisive
Leadership
Army loan forgiven
© 2005 Donald E. Vandergriff
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How-to: More Details
Other Considerations-Pay
 Supports new force structure and personnel strategy, evolve together
 Pay remains stratified by rank, but overlap to provide annual increases
that reward accumulated military experience and commitment,
regardless of degree of specialization
 Personnel specialists in the Specialists corps manage a local system
to support each BCT, Corps Group and Operational Staff
© 2005 Donald E. Vandergriff
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How-to: More Details
Other Considerations-Career paths
 All into BCT
 At mid-point of career (after Stage 2), they can remain in BCT,
acquiring additional abilities (with technology)
 Or they can migrate to Specialist or compete to enter Operational
staff
© 2005 Donald E. Vandergriff
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How-to: More Details
Other Considerations
 Personnel management by competencies, lead to the ability to
have a matrix organization
 Effectiveness of BCT determines missions
 Specialist corps acculturate and manage supply and demand of
personnel
 Problems must be solved, and not wait out a bad commander or
passed on later
 BCT forced to develop human resources at hand
The Results!
© 2005 Donald E. Vandergriff
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How?
Strategic Model – As I define What
The Cold War Army (2nd GW)
ROTC trains officers for the Major
Power War, where:
 They operate within boundaries
established by fixed chains of
command, fixed doctrine, fixed force
structure, & known threat
 They train for certainty within these
boundaries to fixed tasks,
conditions, standards
 Their decision making process
assumes linearity with clear cause
and effect relationships
”
John Tillson “Training for Adaptability
Future, Expeditionary Army
(3rd GW—to Deal with 4GW)
Instead, ROTC needs to educate
and train the new officer to deal
with Small Wars, to:
 Operate with flexible chains of
command, beyond doctrine, with
variable force structure, & unknown
threat
 Train for uncertainty with no
boundaries to uncertain tasks, in
uncertain conditions, with uncertain
standards
 Solve asymmetric warfare problems
that are non-linear and whose
solutions lie outside the defined
boundaries
© 2005 Donald E. Vandergriff
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Conclusion
What this does for the Army
 In terms of the Generations of war, the Army is very good at Second Generation Warfare,
but needs to move to a culture that can fight 3rd Generation Warfare in order to
understand and cope with Fourth Generation Warfare.
 This study is not meant to imply criticism of our leaders and Soldiers, but of some of the
way we do things now (culture).
 Expeditionary (3GW-Maneuver), is a complete culture; it cannot be effectively adopted
piecemeal, and without the dislocations that necessarily accompany true paradigm shifts.
Current Army doctrine is not "broken," but even "whole," it may still be improved (better
supported by our military culture).
 Evolving doctrine will be effective, but words and goals are not as fully supported by our current
"Methodical" culture as it could be.
 A 3GW culture could provide advantages in training, administration, logistics, and operations that
would enable current doctrine to achieve its full potential on the battlefield.
 Countries have two very different military forces: one for peacetime, and one for war.
These forces differ in size, structure, and most important of all, culture.
 For all of the Army’s talk of "train the way you fight" and "Battle-Focus," the Army
invariably trains using "peacetime" techniques and standards.
 In the past mobilization and the early phases of war, we usually waste time and blood
struggling to reorient ourselves to the inevitably different demands of war. This expensive
process is, at its root, a cultural transformation. Wars often end before this transformation
is completed.
© 2005 Donald E. Vandergriff
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Conclusion
The Army of tomorrow!
What? Expeditionary Army
Why? 4GW
5GW(?)
Culture
4GW
3GW
rigorous education & hard training=bond
understanding of culture/language
leads to cognitive excellence-networking
2GW(state)
Culture
4GW
3GW
Quality over
quantity
Once- untouchable
laws, policies &
beliefs are finally
addressed
Action begins to
replace rhetoric
Early rigor=
common language
Modularity
UA/UE FM 1-0 Neo-Taylorism
FM 3-0
“Adaptive Leader”
Tank, precision
FM 7-0 career model
replaced by
Strike, jet/helo
Demming
Army
Transformation
10 layers C&C
(2005-?)
Executes
“how-to”
What?
change culture
Networked Army(?)
Has ability
To understand
& deal with it
Strategic leader(s) publicly awarding/praising members
School/train/cross-fertilize with Government agencies networked teams
Continue to evolve policies free-play/force-on-force cyclic units
The Culture
Strategic
Contribution & seeking
responsibility
Service oriented leaders
Rank structure flattened to
Success=professionalism
four areas: tactical, operational,
strategic and technical, “perform or
out” replaces “up or out”
Doctrine is in terms of principles to
Decisiveness at
enhance evolution based on feedback loop
objective type orders
Hierarchal force structure flattened
To four areas: tactical, operational,
Strategic and technical-Command (control
taken out).
Future combat system fielded/non-lethal,
hand-held computers, time now
information,
Feed back loop: Bottom up encouraged by vertical
Culture, i.e., companycommander.com
© 2005 Donald E. Vandergriff
right time
Goal:
Networked
Army? that works
seamlessly with
other services
government
agencies in order
To perform array of
missions
Leaders have ability to
multi-task, understand
merging levels of war in a
flat, matrix, networking
force structure; Education
& Training extensive
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Back ups
© 2005 Donald E. Vandergriff
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How?
How to facilitate these traits
How to do it
Future Army Culture
 Stress innovation
 Stabilization and unit manning will
 Experimentation
achieve “what right looks like”
 Army schools need to also
become centers of
experimentation evolving tactics
and techniques
 Contributions need to be
highlighted and rewarded
 Evaluation reports need to focus
on short-term as well as long term
contributions to the larger
organization up to the Army
 Prudent risk-taking
 Agility
 Feedback loops
 Contribution valued
 Change is evolutionary
 = as long as objectives are
achieved
© 2005 Donald E. Vandergriff
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How?
How to facilitate these traits
In order to get here





How to
Stabilization and unit manning
will allow time to get to achieve
what right looks like
Army schools need to also
become centers of
experimentation evolving tactics
and techniques
Contributions need to be
highlighted and rewarded
Evaluation reports need to focus
on short-term in present duties
as well as long term
contributions to the larger
organization up to the Army
Encourage networking and
matching the right teams




© 2005 Donald E. Vandergriff
Doctrine manuals are short,
concise and on principles
Let personnel homestead, and
rotate to TDA back to unit
assignments
After command or primary staff
positions, duty as an instructor at
Army school, ROTC, or West
Point is sought after, larger units
even oversee these places in
their regions allowing for rotation
to and from and hosting
Change cultural definition of
success, address rank structure
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How?
How to facilitate these traits
To get here
How To
 Doctrine manuals are short,
 Award innovators like those who
concise and on principles
 Let personnel homestead, and
rotate to TDA back to unit
assignments
 After command or primary staff
positions, duty as an instructor at
Army school, ROTC, or West Point
is sought after. Larger units even
oversee these places in their
regions allowing for rotation to
and from and hosting
started and run
Companycommand.com as a way to
network and run a feedback loop
 With units on cycle, they will rotate
to and from places giving Soldiers
array of experiences
 Admit that each traditional level of
war is complex and takes longer
and more knowledge to master
 Reduce bureaucratic staffs and
flatten the organization see notes
below
Now we can address
how to develop our leaders
© 2005 Donald E. Vandergriff
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How?
How to facilitate these traits
How To
To Get There
 Award innovators like those who
started and run Company
command.com as a way to network
and run a feedback loop
 With units on cycle, they will rotate
to and from places giving Soldiers
array of experiences
 Admit that each traditional level of
war is complex and takes longer
and more knowledge to master
 Reduce bureaucratic staffs and
flatten the organization see notes
below






Convince Congress to pass a
Goldwater-Nichols for personnel
reform
Move from up or out to perform
or out, but much more must be
done to make that work
Access far fewer officers
Make it tougher to commission
Raise the pay of lower ranking
leaders so they can afford middle
class living, focus on profession
New educational and training
requires a different instructional
technology than that used in
conventional E&T establishments
© 2005 Donald E. Vandergriff
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