Transcript world politics chapter 3

3
Why Are There Wars?
Approaches to the purpose of
War….
• Bargaining Model: anarchy leads to
a world in which military force is often
threatened or used to further state
interests and conflicts are addressed
through bargaining rather than
institutions
• Realists Model: War is the inevitable
result of international anarchy
Approaches to the purpose of
War….
• Misperceptions or mistakes: Wars
occur because decision makers
inaccurately estimate their chances of
wining or the costs that will have to be
paid
• Self Interests: Wars are fought
because they serve the interests of
influential groups within the state
Why Is There So Much Peace
in the World?
• Most countries are at peace most of the
time
• American deaths from
• 9/11: 2,986
• Terrorism: A few dozen per year
• Iraq War: 4,977
• Murder, average year: 15,000
• Car accidents, average year: 42,000
• Lightning, average year: 90
The Percentage of States Involved in
War per Year, 1820–2010
War Is Puzzling
• War is costly
• Blood and treasure
• States would rather get what they
want without going to war
• “In war, the aggressor is always
peace-loving; he would prefer to take
over our country unopposed.”
—Karl von Clausewitz
Why Are There Wars?
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
What states fight over
War as outcome of a failed bargain
War from incomplete information
War from commitment problems
War from indivisibility
How to make war less likely
Why Are There Wars?
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
What states fight over
War as outcome of a failed bargain
War from incomplete information
War from commitment problems
War from indivisibility
How to make war less likely
What States Fight Over
• Territory
Territorial Claims in the
Kashmir Region
What States Fight Over
• National policy
• Regime type
• Ethnic or
religious divisions
Why Are There Wars?
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
What states fight over
War as outcome of a failed bargain
War from incomplete information
War from commitment problems
War from indivisibility
How to make war less likely
War as Outcome of a Failed
Bargain
Alternative explanations for war
1. Anarchy: there is no world
government to prevent war
2. Misperception
3. Domestic politics
War as Outcome of a Failed
Bargain
• Bargaining
• Coercive bargaining (aka “crisis bargaining” or
“coercive diplomacy”)
• “Do what I ask or else!”
• Crisis Bargaining: one actor threatens to use
force
• Coercive bargaining: The use of threats to
influence the outcome of a bargaining
interaction.
War as Outcome of a Failed
Bargain: A Model of War
CASTLE A
CASTLE B
A Model
of War
Castle A
Fertile
farmland
Castle B
A Model of War
Fertile farmland
Castle A
Castle B
• The object of contention (the green
line) can be anything that states are
in conflict over.
A Model of War
Current Border
A
B
Probable new
border if A and
B fight
A Model of War
Costs of
fighting to A
Costs of
fighting to B
A
B
Probable new
border if A and
B fight
A Model of War
Net value of
fighting to A
A
Net value of
fighting to B
B
A Model of War
Current Border
A
Range of possible border
settlements that both A and
B prefer to fighting
B
A Model of War
B's proposal for
a new border
Current Border
A
B
A Model of War
A
B
For any A and B, if
•
War is costly
•
The object of contention is divisible
Then there is always at least one negotiated
settlement that A and B will both prefer to war.
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cs2/ch/03/simulations.aspx
Two varieties of coercive
bargaining:
1. Compellence
• An effort to change the status quo through the
threat of force.
2. Deterrence
• An effort to preserve the status quo
through the threat of force.
Deterrence
Why Are There Wars?
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
What states fight over
War as outcome of failed bargain
War from incomplete information
War from commitment problems
War from indivisibility
How to make war less likely
Wars from Incomplete
Information
• Incomplete information: A situation in
which parties in a strategic interaction
lack information about other parties’
interests and/or capabilities.
• Resolve: The willingness of an actor
to endure some good.
War from Incomplete
Information
• Leads to two bargaining
mistakes:
– Yielding too little
– Demanding too much
Risk-Return Trade-off
• In crisis bargaining, the trade-off between
trying to get a better deal and trying to
avoid war.
• On the one hand a state can generally
ensure peace by capitulating to its
adversary’s maximal demands- peace at
any price may not be an attractive
outcome.
• ( Kuwait/Iraq invasion)
War from Incomplete
Information
• States often do not communicate how capable
and how resolved they are to avoid war- why?
• Incentives to misrepresent themselves (they
may be weak and not let their adversary know)
bluff
• May seek to appear weaker or stronger
• May want to keep adversary guessing
• How can a genuine threat be made believable?
Bluffing
A
B
A thinks that the
probable new border
if A and B fight is here
Bluffing
B says, “No--the probable
new border if we fight is
here.”
A
B
A thinks that the
probable new border
if A and B fight is here
Bluffing
B has a secret weapon, putting
the actual probable new border
if they fight here
A
B
A thinks that the
probable new border
if A and B fight is here
War from Incomplete
Information
• Communicating resolve
–Brinkmanship
–Tying hands
–Paying for power
War from Incomplete
Information
•
Communicating resolve
–Brinkmanship- a strategy in which
adversaries take actions that increase the
risk of accidential war, with the hope that
the other will blink or lose its nerve, first
and make concessions
–Tying hands
–Paying for power
Brinkmanship:
The Cuban Missile Crisis
War from Incomplete
Information
• Communicating resolve
–Brinkmanship
–Tying hands-making threats
in ways that would make
backing down difficult
–Paying for power
War from Incomplete
Information
• Communicating resolve
–Brinkmanship
–Tying hands
–Paying for power- taking
costly steps to increase their
capabilities
Why Are There Wars?
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
What states fight over
War as outcome of failed bargain
War from incomplete information
War from commitment problems
War from indivisibility
How to make war less likely
War from Commitment
Problems
• What if you find a settlement in
the bargaining range?
• Can you trust your adversary
to honor a deal?
War from Commitment
Problems
3 Ways Bargaining can break down
• Bargaining over the future
• Preventive war
• Preemptive war (a war fought with the
anticipation that an attack by the other side is
imminent)
• First strike advantage: when military technology,
military strategies , and/or geography give
significant advantage to whichever state attacks
first in a war.
War from Commitment
Problems
• Preventive war
– A war fought with the intention of preventing
an adversary from becoming stronger in the
future. These wars arise because states
whose power is increasing cannot commit to
not exploiting that power in future bargaining
interactions.
– Germany early 1900’s
– China in the 2000’s
War from Commitment
Problems -Germany 1900’s
Why Are There Wars?
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
What states fight over
War as outcome of failed bargain
War from incomplete information
War from commitment problems
War from indivisibility
How to make war less likely
Indivisibility
• A good is divisible if there are ways to
split it into smaller shares
• An indivisible good cannot be divided
without destroying its value.
• In an all or nothing bargaining
situation, one state must get nothing.
And if both states prefer war to
getting nothing, than war ensues.
War from Indivisibility
Why Are There Wars?
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
What states fight over
War as outcome of failed bargain
War from incomplete information
War from commitment problems
War from indivisibility
How to make war less likely
How to make war less likely
•
•
•
•
Raise costs
Increase transparency
Outside enforcement
Divide indivisible goods
Dividing Apparently
Indivisible Goods
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