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2006 Review of Post-Crisis
Multi-Donor Trust Funds:
Key Findings
Joint Donor and World Bank Review
Norway, Canada, United Kingdom, and The Netherlands
World Bank Conflict Prevention and Reconstruction Unit,
Trust Funds Operations Unit, Fragile States Unit
Background
 Increasingly, multi-donor trust funds (MDTFs) used to
mobilize resources and provide flexible financing in postcrisis situations.
 Decision to examine experiences with use of MDTFs in
post-crisis situations, and offer guidance to Bank and
stakeholders.
 MDTF Review = year-long collaboration between the World
Bank and Norway (through Ministry of Foreign Affairs, MFA,
and Agency for Development Cooperation, Norad)
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Subsequently joined by Canadian International Development
Agency (CIDA), Netherlands Ministry of Foreign Affairs and
Department for International Development (DFID) of UK
 Close cooperation with United Nations (UNDGO and
UNDP) – coordinated TORs, UN participation in workshops,
and UN review of draft reports and country case studies.
Process
 May 2006: inception report presented at workshop in
Oslo to discuss preliminary findings from Phase I desk
study.
 December 2006: draft final report incorporating
information and analyses from field visits presented at
The Hague Conference on Post-Crisis MDTFs, cochaired by:
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Aart Jacobi - Director, Human Rights and Peace-building
Department, MFA, The Netherlands
Jon Lomoy - Deputy Director General, Department for
Regional Affairs and Development, MFA, Norway
Kyle Peters - Director, Operations Policy & Country Services,
World Bank
 February 2007: Final report issued, incorporating
comments from the December 2006 Conference.
Objectives and Scope
 Purpose: identify MDTF arrangements that can better address
post-crisis situations, with a focus on cross-cutting issues such
as governing structures, harmonization and coordination,
timeframe for establishment, relationship between UN system
and World Bank, impact of donor policies, role of implementing
agencies.
 Scope: Review considered 18 MDTF examples; 16 in postconflict situations, two in post-disaster settings
 1 proposed post-tsunami MDTF, not created (Sri Lanka)
 12 administered by Bank, of which detailed data and
information were available for all 12
 5 administered by UN (four by UNDP, one by UNICEF), of
which detailed data and information were available for 2
 eight MDTFs were covered in-depth during field visits to
Afghanistan, Iraq, Sudan, Timor-Leste, Indonesia, and
several Great Lakes countries
MDTFs Considered
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Afghanistan Reconstruction Trust Fund (ARTF - Bank)
Afghan Interim Authority Fund (AIAF–UNDP)
Law and Order Trust Fund of Afghanistan (LOTFA–UNDP)
Great Lakes Multi-Donor Demobilization and Reintegration Program (MDRP – Bank)
Indonesia Multi-Donor Fund (MDF – Bank)
UNDG Iraq Trust Fund (UN ITF – UNDP)
World Bank Iraq Trust Fund (WB ITF – Bank)
Multi-Donor Trust Fund for Sierra Leone (MDTF-SL - Bank)
Sri Lanka: Proposed post-tsunami trust fund (not created)
Sudan Multi-Donor Trust Fund – National (MDTF-N – Bank)
Multi-Donor Trust Fund – South Sudan (MDTF-SS–Bank)
Sudan Capacity Building Trust Fund (CBTF–UNICEF)
Trust Fund for East Timor (TFET–Bank)
Consolidated Fund for East Timor (CFET – UNDP)
Timor-Leste Transitional Support Program / Consolidated Support Program (TSP/CSP–Bank)
West Bank & Gaza Holst Fund (Bank)
West Bank & Gaza Reform Fund (Bank)
Technical Assistance Trust Fund for West Bank & Gaza (Bank)
Sources and Outputs
 Sources:
 document reviews and informant conversations
 no cross-fund analysis of performance, speed, or results data
 informants included:
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staff in administrator agencies (World Bank and UNDP, at
head office and in field),
representatives of national recipient governments,
donor officials (head office and in field),
national civil society organizations and international NGOs
 Outputs: inform recipient countries, World Bank, donors, UN
system, other implementing agencies, and civil society on
challenges and opportunities in using MDTFs, discussing policy
implications and trade-offs of different approaches.
Key Findings: Big Picture
 MDTFs in post-crisis situations:
 have been important instruments for resource mobilization, policy
dialogue, risk and information management;
 are appreciated by host governments;
 are largely in line with Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness and
DAC Pilot Principles for Engagement in Fragile States;
 generate “positive externalities” that other instruments do not.
 MDTF performance has been uneven across country examples, seen
both in objective measures (speed and delivery of outputs, quality of
processes) and in subjective measures (stakeholder perceptions of
success).
 MDTFs operate in high-risk, high-cost environments and require
flexible and adequate funding.
 Growing consensus identifies external factors that affect MDTF
performance and design elements that should be adjusted for specific
characteristics of post-crisis contexts.
 Without exaggerating the importance of MDTFs, donors should
strengthen this largely successful instrument for joint action.
Key Findings: Conceptualization
 Authorizing Environment: preferences of national authorities and
donor governments, availability and interest of potential Administrator(s)
 Considering an MDTF
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Base MDTF in an agreed results matrix (such as TRM from
post-conflict needs assessment)
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Clarify the “why”
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roles: what functions will the MDTF perform?
 “bank account” - mechanism for pooled funding, lowers transactions
costs for donors and lightens burden on national governments
 forum for discussions on strategic priorities and recovery policies
 venue for aid and/or donor coordination
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objectives and priorities: what will the MDTF deliver?
 basic services
 recovery/reconstruction
 capacity-building
Key Findings:
Stakeholders (1)
Stakeholder views on positive aspects of MDTFs
 National Authorities:
national voice in coordinated/harmonized programming
 draws political attention, platform for resource mobilization
 resources usually untied, amenable to national programming
 mitigates individual donor domination or influence
 Donors:
 consistent with Paris Declaration commitments
 administrative costs of managing funds is reduced
 permits resources tracking and reporting back to capitals
 allows small donors to engage when separate bilateral program not
feasible
 complementary vehicle to activities funded bilaterally by larger donors
 information sharing mechanism, forum for inter-donor discussion and
coordination, forum for dialogue with national authorities
 larger facilitating mechanism for dialogue with representatives of local
civil society, provincial and local level authorities
 secretariat provides services/documents donors cannot generate on
own, collects/analyzes data donors would not otherwise get
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Key Findings: Stakeholders (2)
Stakeholder views on negative aspects of MDTFs
 National Authorities:
prefer national mechanism and fear donors may attempt to dominate
discussion and decisions
 risk of donors extracting concessions in return for financing
 absence of a strong peace process to support MDTF
 MDTF unnecessary given existing government capacity
 Donors:
 political importance of supporting own actors on the ground
 general skepticism about efficiency and effectiveness of MDTFs
 no comparative data on own-performance provided
 major home-country commercial and political interests involved, tied to
large investments
 larger donors don't need an MDTF for voice and access; consensusapproach of MDTFs do not cater for concerns donors want addressed
 new or non-traditional donors have other channels for collaboration, not
comfortable with MDTF instrument (seen as DAC donor dominated)
 some donors provide funding from specific budget lines or sources,
difficult to pool funds
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Key Findings: Context and Design
 Consider external factors:
 scope and nature of needs
 commitment by national actors
 capacities of national authorities, non-state actors
 security constraints
 international context of support for an MDTF
 MDTF design considerations
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Objectives (specific needs and roles)
Governance structure, including roles of stakeholders
Choice of Administrator, including fiduciary rules and
mechanisms for collaboration
Structure – one fund with one or more windows, two funds
with overarching governance structure to link them
Channels for implementation and disbursement
Potential implementing partners for MDTF-funded activities
Key Findings: Performance
 MDTF Structure and Functions
 Structure of Bank-administered MDTFs includes up to three levels:
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policy council; funding committee; project committee
last two sometimes combined
Technical Secretariat services these bodies
Choice of Administrator: Bank and UN have different comparative advantages
in specific country contexts, alignment is critical to MDTF performance.
 Performance of Bank-administered post-crisis MDTFs
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Conclusions drawn from wide range of country examples
On-budget government-implemented projects, generally good
Off-budget and small-scale projects often experience delays, severe
problems in Sudan in speed of delivery and in using UN agencies
Staffing issues: deploying quickly with right skills mix, access to lessons
learned and HQ support/facilitation/troubleshooting
 Performance of UN-administered post-crisis MDTFs
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Few country cases; most conclusions drawn from UN Iraq Trust Fund
Rapid disbursement in highly challenging circumstances, able to use multiple
channels including non-government and UN direct execution
Concerns about government ownership and capacity building; allowing donor
earmarking violates principles of harmonization
Recommendations for Designing MDTFs
 Choice of Administrator must take into account the relevance of the
organization's mandate, procedures, capacities and resources to the
context, and discussions about these factors must be country-specific, not
global.
 Decisions on Administrator explicitly involves the preferences of both
national actors and lead donor countries.
 Governance structures of MDTFs should explicitly take into account the
range of roles that stakeholders expect them to play: pooled channel
for funding, donor/aid coordination venue, stakeholder consultation and
information-sharing
 Membership (both voting and non-voting advisory) in different levels of
the tiered governance structure (oversight, policy and resource allocation,
project approval) should be aligned with roles and should build in
mechanisms for avoiding appearance of conflicts of interest
 Once overall design parameters are ‘roughed in’, and choice of
Administrator(s) is determined, core group (with support from central
MDTF ‘one-stop-shop’ or operations team) should begin framing the
draft Operations Manual so that refinement, approval, and publication
can happen as soon after the MDTF is established as feasible
Recommendations for Launching MDTFs
 MDTF secretariats should be staffed up early with critical
skills that include trust funds management, legal,
procedural, procurement and financial management.
 Administrator should ensure rules and regulations in
key areas (procurement, recruitment, disbursement) are
appropriate to post-conflict or post-disaster situations.
 Administrator should have a "one-stop-shop" or
clearing-house mechanism where MDTF staff can turn
for institutional memory, senior skills, standardized
instruments, and other forms of operational support.
 As two key international partners whose different
comparative advantages are both required in post-crisis
recovery, UN and Bank should endeavor to improve
mechanisms for collaboration and reduce barriers to
“inter-operability” through framework agreements.
Challenges
 Managing expectations
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Make objectives explicit and shared
Monitor perceptions
Focus on communication
 Working with partners
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Instruments and frameworks not yet available for Bank to
work smoothly with all UN entities
 Managing time pressure
 Streamline processing allows precious time to be used on
critical interventions and reduce “churning”
 Prioritizing and sequencing required to deliver visible
results while setting processes in play to also deliver
“invisible” policy and institutional / capacity building results
World Bank Response to
MDTF Review Recommendations
Recommendations from February 2007:
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update the relevant Operational Policies and
Bank Procedures that will improve its ability to
act efficiently and effectively in post-crisis
situations.
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improve internal capacities to support MDTFs:
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further develop standardized instruments for
operating MDTFs:
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ensure intensified senior management
support to MDTFs
provide s sufficient resources from Regions
to allow MDTFs to staff up quickly with
necessary skills in critical fields
establish a "one-stop-shop" that provides
access to its "best practice" and "lessons
learned", and an inventory of key personnel
for advice and guidance
revise human resources policies on hiring/
secondment, promotion and incentive
schemes so qualified and committed staff are
identified and supported for MDTF postings
standardized donor funding agreements;
staffing profiles and job description
templates;
staff training program
standard operational documents
simplified criteria for acceptable
administrative and accounting systems and
capacities for non-Government implementing
agencies on smaller off-budget projects
Bank and UN should establish senior-level
working group to review issues with MDTFs
Actions as of May 15, 2007:
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New Rapid Response Policy Framework (8.0) replaced
OP/BP 8.50 on March 1, 2007; Trust Funds OP/BP
14.40 to be revised in CY 2007
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Range of new and strengthened institutional response
mechanisms approved on Feb 27 2007; together with
OP/BP 8.0, these provide
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Standardized instruments and templates
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streamlined processes with much shorter turnaround
times
new incentives and support for staff serving in fragile
and conflict –affected states
automatic waiver of some budget and HR restrictions
and streamlining of key HR processes
corporate and regional Rapid Response Committees
with authority to move human and financial
resources and waive restrictions
designated emergency specialists in key fiduciary
and support units – financial management,
procurement, legal, disbursement, HR
donor agreements exist;
development of staff training programs both through
TFLAP and OPCS are underway;
template operational documents, staffing profiles,
and job descriptions/TORs not yet completed
new checklists developed with simplified criteria for
assessing systems and capacity of NGOs and nonGovernment agencies
Working Group established March 2007 on Global UNBank Fiduciary Framework
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to cover Procurement, FM, Audit, Sanctions and
Remedies; target completion of first draft for legal
clearance July 2007
Active Follow-Up to MDTF Review
 Reconfiguring HQ support based on experience:
 a post-conflict MDTF is never “just a bank account” –
critical aid coordination & policy dialogue instrument
 TFO and OPCS provide upstream support to country
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teams on pre-MDTF design discussions
Rapid Response Committee is forum for countryspecific engagement and MDTF guidance
TFO will add a MDTF sub-module into the Trust Funds
Learning and Accreditation Program;
new OPCS Core Learning Course will include module
on MDTFs
New guidance will be added into revised OP/BP 14.40
and Trust Funds Handbook
Conflict Sensitivity in MDTFs (1)
 Finding from the MDTF report:
 MDTFs operate in high-risk, high-cost environments;
 Lack of conflict analysis (i.e. as part of MDTF risk
management) in past MDTF design is of concern.
 Conflict sensitivity* − capacity of an organization to:
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Understand the conflict context in which it operates;
Understand the interaction between its operations and
the conflict context; and
Act upon the understanding of this interaction in order to
avoid negative impacts and maximize positive impacts
on the conflict context of the interventions.
* Conflict sensitive approaches to development, humanitarian assistance and peace-building,
Safer World/International Alert, Center for Conflict Resolution, Africa Peace Forum, and
Consortium of Humanitarian Agencies, 2004.
Conflict Sensitivity in MDTFs (2)
 Both the UN and the World Bank have well-developed
frameworks for conflict analysis, but neither capacity has
been consistently tapped when serving as MDTF
Administrator
 World Bank’s Conflict Analysis Framework (CAF)
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Seeks to enhance conflict sensitivity and conflict prevention
potential of Bank assistance by
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Examining sources & consequences of violent conflict; and
Examining a country’s resilience to violence and ability to
manage it.
Doing this will help
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Increase sensitivity to conflict in strategies for poverty reduction
and development;
Identify and analyze sources and problem issues related to
conflict;
Highlight linkages between conflict and poverty; and
Strengthen resiliency to conflict via appropriate development
interventions and poverty reduction measures.
Linking Conflict Analysis to MDTFs
 Conflict in Somalia: Drivers and Dynamics
(2005)
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informed the Somalia Joint Needs Assessment (JNA), the
Somali Reconstruction and Development Framework (2006),
and the “Financing Options for Reconstruction and
Development in Somalia (2007)
 Aid, Conflict and Peace-building in Sri Lanka:
2001-2005
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useful to the development community in general programming
considered in upstream planning for a Tsunami
Reconstruction Fund, planned but not implemented due to
peace process difficulties