Transcript Semi-plenary session: “Role of the state in reduction/amplification of inequality” State retrenchments and class dynamics: the “new” middle class under strain Louis Chauvel Pr at.

Semi-plenary session:
“Role of the state in reduction/amplification of inequality”
State retrenchments and class dynamics:
the “new” middle class under strain
Louis Chauvel
Pr at Sciences-Po University Paris
and Institut Universitaire de France
Site : http://louis.chauvel.free.fr
[email protected]
1
Explaining (some of) the French problem(s)?
Political instability, extreme right wing candidate Jean-Marie Le Pen
qualification for the 2nd turn of presidential elections April 21 2002,
rejection of the European Treaty May 29 2005, anti-globalisation
movements, populist streams, xenophobia, fears, …
« Yes » at two European referendums in France by socio-occupational group (%)
Maastrichttreaty
referendum
20 September 1992
European constitutional
treaty referendum
29 may 2005
Change
Professionals & managers
66
67
1
Self employed
49
Semi prof. and lower managers
55
Routine white collars
47
37
-10
Blue collar workers
43
30
-13
Tot = 51%
Tot = 46%
Diff = 23%
53
46
Diff = 37%
4
-9
Source : My own computation of CEVIPOF 1995 microdata and CSA postelectoral survey 2005.
2
Plan
Europe as a middle-class exception in the world
Objective degree of inequality and class consciousness:
paradoxical dynamics
The middle class dynamics and welfare state retrenchments
Conclusion : toward a sociology of European backlashes ?
3
1. The social specificity of Europe in the world
An affluent and relatively equal club
Europe as a strong middle class (“median class”)
Complex evolutions during the last 20 years…
4
60
Lesotho
Bolivia
Inequality
(Gini coeff)
Honduras
55
Nicaragua
(World
Income
Inequality50
Database)
Brazil
Paraguay
Panama
Ecuador Colombia
Guatemala
El Salvador
Chile
Data 2000
Latin America
Gambia
45
Philippines
Mexico
Peru
Costa Rica
Georgia
y = -5,6712Ln(x) + 88,851
Dom.Rep.
Venezuela
R2 = 0,3085
Thailand
Ghana Cote d`Ivoire
Jamaica
Malaysia
Cameroon
Guyana
Iran
Cambodia
Sri Lanka
Moldova
Russia
Kyrgyz R.
Tunisia
China
Tajikistan
Turkey
Morocco
Mauritania
Estonia Korea R.
Egypt
U.S.
Portugal
India
Israel
Ukraine
Lithuania
SpainU.K.
Bulgaria
Azerbaijan
Italy
Latvia
Greece
Japan
Macedonia Croatia
Bangladesh Indonesia
Ireland
Kazakhstan
Australia
Taiwan
Canada
Switzerland
Hungary
Pakistan
Poland
France
Romania
Belgium
Germany
Belarus
Austria
Luxembourg
Czech R.
Sweden Netherlands
Denmark
Slovenia
Norway
Slovak Rep.
Liberal and
Mediterranean countr.
40
35
Corporatist countr.
30
Nordic countries
25
Transitional Eastern Europe
20
1000
Finland
Development (per capita GDP PPP)
10000
(Penn World
Tables Database)
100000
5
The strobiloid
Income
representation of income distribution
Higher income class = rich
200
Median income class =
« middle class »
100
median income
50
Lower income class = poor
6
Comparisons of national strobiloids : national median
US :
Median
disposable
income per year
per capita :
32.000 $PPP/an
Brazil :
Median
disposable
income per
year per capita
: 6.900
$PPP/an
Gini coef.:
25.2 %
Gini coef.:
34.5 %
Gini coef.:
59.8 %
Median class =
84 %
Median class =
58 %
Median class =
44 %
Sweden :
Median
disposable
income per year
per capita :
23.000 $PPP/an
Median
national income
7
Comparisons of national strobiloids : PPP exchange rate
US :
Median disposable
income per year
per capita : 32.000
$PPP/an
Brazil :
Median
disposable income
per year per
capita : 6.900
$PPP/an
Gini coef.:
25.2 %
Gini coef.:
34.5 %
Gini coef.:
59.8 %
Median class =
84 %
Median class =
58 %
Median class =
44 %
Sweden :
Median disposable
income per year per
capita : 23.000
$PPP/an
8
60
Lesotho
Bolivia
Inequality
(Gini coeff)
Honduras
55
50
45
40
35
30
25
Nicaragua
Gambia
Brazil
Paraguay
Panama
Ecuador Colombia
Guatemala
El Salvador
Chile
Data 2000
Philippines
Mexico
Peru
Costa Rica
Georgia
y = -5,6712Ln(x) + 88,851
Dom.Rep.
Venezuela
R2 = 0,3085
Thailand
Ghana Cote d`Ivoire
Jamaica
Malaysia
Cameroon
Guyana
Iran
Cambodia
Sri Lanka
Moldova
Russia
Kyrgyz R.
Tunisia
China
Tajikistan
Turkey
Morocco
Mauritania
Estonia Korea R.
Egypt
U.S.
Portugal
India
Israel
Ukraine
Lithuania
SpainU.K.
Bulgaria
Azerbaijan
Italy
Latvia
Greece
Japan
Macedonia Croatia
Bangladesh Indonesia
Ireland
Kazakhstan
Australia
Taiwan
Canada
Switzerland
Hungary
Pakistan
Poland
France
Romania
Belgium
Germany
Belarus
Austria
Luxembourg
Czech R.
Sweden Netherlands
Denmark
Slovenia
Norway
Slovak Rep.
Finland
20
1000
Development (per capita GDP PPP)
10000
100000
9
45
Malaysia
Inequality
(Gini coeff)
y = -16,122x + 101,38
R2 = 0,3387
Russia
Data 2000
Tunisia
Turkey
40
Korea R
Portugal
35
Israel
Spain
Greece
30
Taiwan
Hungary
Poland
U.S.
U.K.
Italy
Ireland
Japan
Australia
Canada
France
Switzerland.
Belgium
Germany
Czech R. Sweden Austria
Norway
Slovenia
Denmark
Slovak Rep.
Finland Netherlands
Romania
25
Development
log10(per capita GDP PPP)
20
10
3,6
3,7
3,8
3,9
4
4,1
4,2
4,3
4,4
4,5
4,6
45
Costa Rica
Inequality
(Gini coeff)
Mexico
Malaysia
Russia
Tunisia
From early 1980’ to 2000
Venezuela
Tunisia
Turkey
40
Korea, Republic of
Greece
Korea, Republic of
Portugal
U.S.
Portugal
35
Greece
Ireland
Spain
Israel
Hungary
Poland
30
Hungary
Romania
Poland
Taiwan Russia
25
Israel
Spain
U.K.
Italy
Ireland
Japan
Canada
Australia
Switzerland.
Italy
Canada
U.S.
Taiwan
France
France
Australia
Switzerland.
Belgium
Japan
U.K.
Germany
Austria
Czech R.Netherlands
Denmark Sweden Norway
Slovenia
Netherlands
Germany
Slovak Rep.
FinlandDenmark
Luxembourg
Slovenia
Austria
Belgium
Norway
Sweden
Finland
Czech R.
Development
log10(per capita GDP PPP)
20
11
3,6
3,7
3,8
3,9
4
4,1
4,2
4,3
4,4
4,5
4,6
45
Costa Rica
Inequality
(Gini coeff)
Mexico
Malaysia
Russia
Tunisia
From early 1980’ to 2000
Venezuela
Tunisia
Turkey
40
Korea R
Greece
Korea R
Portugal
U.S.
Portugal
35
Greece
Ireland
Spain
Israel
Hungary
Poland
30
Hungary
Romania
Poland
Taiwan Russia
25
Israel
Spain
U.K.
Italy
Ireland
Japan
Canada
Australia
Switzerland.
Italy
Canada
U.S.
Taiwan
France
France
Australia
Switzerland.
Belgium
Japan
U.K.
Germany
Austria
Czech R.Netherlands
Denmark Sweden Norway
Slovenia
Netherlands
Germany
Slovak Rep.
FinlandDenmark
Luxembourg
Slovenia
Austria
Belgium
Norway
Sweden
Finland
Czech R.
Development
(per capita GDP - PPP)
20
12
3,6
3,7
3,8
3,9
4
4,1
4,2
4,3
4,4
4,5
4,6
Construction européenne et croissance des inégalités
European
enlargement
step
European Gini
(exchange rate)
European
Gini
(PPP)
6
29%
28%
12
32%
30%
15
31%
30%
25
42%
33%
28
58%
43%
31
59%
43%
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2. Objective intensity of inequality and class
consciousness: paradoxical dynamics
(in the French case)
Distinction between objective and subjective class systems
Class system without class consciousness
The spiral of social classes
14
Objective and subjective intensity of class system
Number of Book Titles in the catalogue of Bibliothèque nationale de France (BNF) containing
« classes sociales » or « classe ouvrière » (20-years mobile average of per decade occurrences)
100
90
80
« classe ouvrière » or « classes sociales »
70
60
50
40
30
20
« classes sociales »
10
0
1810- 1820- 1830- 1840- 1850- 1860- 1870- 1880- 1890- 1900- 1910- 1920- 1930- 1940- 1950- 1960- 1970- 1980- 19901819 1829 1839 1849 1859 1869 1879 1889 1899 1909 1919 1929 1939 1949 1959 1969 1979 1989 1999
Source : Bibliothèque nationale de France catalogue
15
1960 to 1980 decline in income inequality and stability after
Inequality measure : Interdecile ratio D9/D1 1954 to 2002
9
8
7
6
5
4
3
2
1
0
1950
1960
1970
1980
1990
2000
2010
Older Source : Paper publications : Enquête revenus fiscaux ERF ; Newer source : INSEE reevaluation 16
ERF
Independence of objective and subjective dimensions :
a typology
Weak objective degree of
inequalities
Strong objective degree of
inequalities
Strong degree of
subjectivation of
inequalities
Victory of proletariat
Class Society
Weak degree of
subjectivation of
inequalities
Classless society
Alienation
Older Source : Paper publications : Enquête revenus fiscaux ERF ; Newer source : INSEE reevaluation 17
ERF
Subjectivity of class:
consciousness
movments, and class
struggle


Victory of proletariat
Class society
F 1970
F 1950
Decommodification
F 1982
F 1890
F 1830
F 1989
F 2000
classless society

The historical social classes spiral
Recommodification
Alienation

Objectivity of class: 18
Intensity of Inequalities
3. The middle class dynamics and
Welfare state expansions and retrenchments
Back to Schmoller : the state and the “new middle class(es)”
Post-affluent societies:
the lost paradise of the new middle class
The fate of generational dynamics
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The state and the “new middle class”
SCHMOLLER G. 1897, Was verstehen wir unter dem Mittelstande? Hat er im
19. Jahrhundert zu oder abgenommen?, Göttingen, Vandenhoeck und Ruprecht.
Against the Marxist theory of pauperization :
=> Late Nineteenth century and the expansion of large state and private technical,
managerial and expertise bureaucracies – supported and institutionalized by increasing
social rights – foster the constitution of a culturally educated and economically
comfortable “neu mittelstand”
New higher
middle class
Higher
strata Old higher
middle class
Economic
Ressources
Educational
ressources
New lower
middle class
=> The state is not simply an
equalitarian ruler, a provider of
decommodified resources,
it could be also a specific employer
Old lower
middle class
Lower
Strata
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Post-affluent societies:
the lost paradise
of the new middle class
Educational
ressources
dominant
The Bourdieu scheme
Higher
strata
Professions libérales
Professeurs,
professions
scientifiques
Cadres de la IngénieursCadres
Chefs d'entreprises
fonction
pub.
administratifs
Instituteurs ou
de 10 salariés et plus
d'entreprise
assimilés
Professions
Professions
Professions
intermédiaires de laintermédiaires
intermédiaires
santé et du travail administratives
administratives de la
social
entreprises
Economic
Commerçants
fonction publique Techniciens Employés
Contremaîtres,
Employés fonc pub,
Employés
entreprises
agents de maîtrise
Policiers et militaires
agents de service
Artisans
Personnels des
de
Ouvriers qualifiés,Ouvriers qualifiésservices
directs aux
particuliers
type
industriel
manutention,
Ouvriers qualifiés de
magasinage,
Chauffeurs
Ouvriers non qualif
transport
industriel
artisanal
Ressources
dominant
Ouvriers agricoles
Lower
Strata
21
1992 to 2002 densification on the Bourdieu scheme
0,2-0,3
0,1-0,2
0-0,1
-0,1-0
-0,2--0,1
-0,3--0,2
-0,4--0,3
-0,
0,1
0,3
0,2
0
4
3
2
1
-0,
0,1
0,3
0,2
0
4
3
2
1
50 to 59 Years old
30 to 39 Years old
22
Available explanations ?
Decline in the return to educational assets (and not to
economic assets) — is it really a “knowledge society”?
State as an employer is more and more a state as a pension
system for former civil servants (strong decline in
recruitments for the newer generations)
The fate of generational dynamics: the newer generations
are the children of a gifted generation (first cohorts of the
baby-boom) which was massively new middle-class, but the
newer generations have little room in the “new” middle-class
23
The fate of generational dynamics
Upward and downward mobility rate (cohort diagrams) - male population
Upward mob rate
Downward mob rate
35
%
30
25
14
Age
30
35
40
45
50
12
10
20
8
15
6
10
5
%
their
parents
first cohorts
of the babyboom
Age
30
35
40
45
50
4
their
children2
Cohorte
Cohorte
0
0
1910
1920
1930
1940
1950
1960
1970
1910
1920
1930
1940
1950
1960
1970
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4. Conclusion:
Farewell to the “new” middle class?
What is ever “new” with new middle class, 1 century later?
A social backlash after affluence?
Which consequences?
Which are the accurate social policies:
feeding the poor (bread and circuses),
or rehomogeneisation of Europe)?
Are sociologists the next slice of the salami?
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Semi-plenary session:
“Role of the state in reduction/amplification of inequality”
THE END
Louis Chauvel
Pr at Sciences-Po University Paris
and Institut Universitaire de France
Site : http://louis.chauvel.free.fr
[email protected]
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