Transcript Commentary on Searle David Florey Fodor’s Commentary • On Robot’s – Why place the man inside instead of the computer? • This is not.

Commentary on Searle
David Florey
Fodor’s Commentary
• On Robot’s
– Why place the man inside instead of the computer?
• This is not the right kind of causal linkage, but it’s tough to
say what is
– Causal relations of the right kind
• Why is it that only our brains maintain causal relations?
– How are thoughts made up of hydrocarbons so
unique?
• Can I not also hold that thought in some other form?
Fodor’s Commentary
• On formal systems
– What of the work in linguistics?
• Searle claims that “no purely formal model will ever be
sufficient for intentionality because the formal properties are
not by themselves constitutive of intentionality”
– But, our minds work over symbols
• In other words our mental processes, our intentions use
symbols
• How can Searle claim that this is not a necessary condition
for mental processing?
Haugeland’s Commentary
• Focusing on the right causal powers
– Searle’s Demon (a super fast man)
• Performs according to the “right” causal powers
• Can take the place of neuron communication
• Can take the place of chlorophyll
– Does he not have the “right causal powers?”
• Of course he does
– Searle skates a thin line when discussing the right
“stuff”
• Humans, or perhaps aliens – but NOT computers!
• What about silicon-based aliens?
Haugeland’s Commentary
• Original vs derivative intentionality
– Original is intentionality “in its own right”
• Humans have this
• Searle argues that computers can never have this
– Derivative is intentionality “borrowed from” something
• Linguistic tokens have this
• Computers/programs can also have this
– Haugeland argues that semantically active states
constitute the “right” causal power for original
intentionality
• Therefore, he argues, AI Systems can be intelligent
Hofstadter’s Commentary
• Searle does not believe a soul can exist in
a machine
• And what of the formal systems that make
us up?
– Physics is a formal system and our brains
work within this formal system
– How can we have intentionality then if we are
built on stuff that has none?
Hofstadter’s Commentary
• And what of the little man?
– This is an emotional ploy
– You feel for the little man toiling hard all day
to pretend he is a machine
Lycan’s Commentary
• Behaviorism
– If it walks and talks like a duck…
• Species-chauvinistic view “functionalist”
– Not good enough
– It must process information in the same
manner that we do as well
Lycan’s Commentary
• Where is the understanding in this system?
– You are too small, looking at the pipes and water
– Forget the little man
– What if the pipes were neurons and the water
electricity?
• While present day computers don’t have this
capability
– Nothing says future computers could not
– The point is that present day computers are not
forced through the same environment as us
Minsky’s Commentary
• Decentralized Minds
– We seem to have many minds (those that understand certain
abstract terms and those that don’t)
– Perhaps Searle’s model is too simple – where is the collaboration
of the many minds?
• Caution of Terminology
– Using terms like “mean” and “intend”
– One the one hand we understand these terms, but on the other
its hard to draw a concrete representation
• Caution of Bad Logic
– Look to new empirical studies to better understand the
discussion not only of AI
– But also of our own minds