The Kosovo Liberation Army Inside Story of an Insurgency Henry H. Perritt, Jr. Chicago-Kent College of Law (book to be published by University of Illinois.

Download Report

Transcript The Kosovo Liberation Army Inside Story of an Insurgency Henry H. Perritt, Jr. Chicago-Kent College of Law (book to be published by University of Illinois.

The Kosovo Liberation
Army
Inside Story of an Insurgency
Henry H. Perritt, Jr.
Chicago-Kent College of Law
(book to be published by University of Illinois Press, 2007)
Introduction
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
Where is Kosovo?
History of oppression
Three Kosovar Albanian factions
Military doctrine
Phases of war, military and political
Battle of the bridge
Targetting and ICL
Lessons learned
Where is Kosovo?
History of oppression
• Ilyrians populated western Balkans
before Romans
• Ottomans conquered after
Skenderbeg died in 1468
• Albania became a state in 1913,
Kosovo forced into Serbia
• Greater Albania during World War II,
under Axis
• Tito promised referendum then
renegged
Rise of Milosevic
• 1987, 1989 speeches on the Field of
Blackbirds demonized Albanians
• Political autonomy revoked in 1989
• Albanians expelled from jobs
• Referendum on, declaration of,
independence in 1991
• Parallel society and government in
exile created 1991
Kosovar culture
• Never had a state they could rely on
• So depended on family/clan
• Strong cultural norms:
• Hospitality
• Revenge
• Loyalty
• Corruption under the formal legal
system necessary to survive
Three factions
• Peaceful Path Institutionalists
• Planners in Exile
• Defenders at Home
Peaceful Path
Institutionalists
President Ibrihim Rugova
Prime Minister Bujar Bukoshi
Planners in Exile
Xhavit Haliti
Hashim Thaci, KLA Political Director
Defenders at Home
Ramush Haradinaj
Commander Remi
Military doctrine
• Clausewitz
•
•
•
•
Superiority of numbers
Concentration of forces
Surprise
Defense has an advantage
• Mao/Che Guevarra
• People must support
• Hit and run attacks
• Provoking reprisals against civilians
builds popular support
• Wear down will of regime
Fourth Generation War
• Goal is political, not military
• Organize conflict so as to:
• Peel elites away from regime
• Build international support for
insurgency
• “Battles” are P.R.
Battle of the Bridge
Police convoy
Machine guns
& sniper
Obstruction
AK-47s
Goals of the KLA’s war
• Defend our families
• Build popular support through resistance-“Slap them in the face” in Drenica
• Avoid annihilation
• Import arms from Albania through
Dukagjini
• Interfere with Serbian lines of supply in
Llapi
• Discredit Peaceful Path Institutionalists
• Attract international intervention
Phases of the KLA’s war
•
Preparations for resistance
•
Enablers
•
Results
•
•
•
1981-1995: build core supporters, infrastructure
1991-1996: the “Intelligence War”
1996-1998: spread violent resistance, “consciousness of potentiality”
•
•
•
1996: Dayton leaves out Kosovo, discredits PPI
1997: Albania collapses, opens arms supply route
1998 (March): Jashari Massacre
•
•
1998 (Summer): 40% KLA controlled; Serb counteroffensive
1998 (October): Holbrooke/Milosevic ceasefire, KLA regroups,
reorganizes
1999 (February/March): Rambouillet
1999 (April/June): NATO bombing campaign; 850,000 civilians driven
from their homes by Serbs
1999 (June): Serbs expelled, KLA disbands, UNMIK established
•
•
•
KLA strategy and
tactics
•
•
•
•
Humiliation, ragewill to resist
Gradually morphs into 4GL
Classic guerrilla tactics 1993-1998
Premature resort to positional
warfare 1998
• Defensive
• Naiveté and overconfidence
• Need to be visible for P.R. reasons
• Retreat into guerrilla warfare during
NATO bombing campaign
Targets
• Special oppressors: secret police, police
(assassination)
• Albanian collaborators (intimidation,
detention, occasional executions)
• Police stations, convoys (hit-and-run
attacks)
• Serb military units and supply lines
(sniping from the hills)
• Defend villages against organized military
attacks (trenches and sniping)
KLA order of battle
• No more than 200-300 active fighters
before Jashari Massacre
• Balooned to 15,000, but poorly
organized and led
• Weapons shortages
• “We’ll carry these guns on our backs
forever”
• Mostly AK-47s, sniper rifles, a few
machine guns and, rarely, anti-tank
weapons
Political order of battle
• Diaspora raised $60-100 million
• Followed CIA advice
•
•
•
•
Limited targets
No violence outside borders of Kosovo
No Mujahadeen
Limited dirty money
• Publicized humanitarian violations
• “My weapon was English and my cellphone”
• “Once the TV crews could go to refugee camps,
they didn’t need to come to Kosovo”
The Stars Aligned
• Collapse of the Warsaw
Pact”consciousness of potentiality
• Active Diaspora in U.S., Germany
• Popular, press outrage at Milosevic
• Dayton/Albania collapse
• Clinton/Blair guilt over Bosnia
• “How I miss the war” sympathetic press
• Good KLA P.R.
• Websites
• Video and cellphone interviews for U.S.
Lessons learned
• Hearts and minds
• Insurgency difficult to extinguish
once it gets a foothold: annihilation
becomes rampage against civilians
• Outside support essential
• Money
• Arms
• Refuge