Transcript Tactical Conflict Assessment and Planning Framework (TCAPF) Office of Military Affairs (OMA) Agenda 1.

Tactical Conflict Assessment
and Planning Framework
(TCAPF)
Office of Military Affairs (OMA)
Agenda
1. TCAPF Overview
2. TCAPF Methodology
1. Collection
2. Analysis
3. Design
4. Monitoring & Evaluation
3. TCAPF Timelines and Benefits
4. Real-World Example: Lashkar Gah
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Why TCAPF?
USAID’s competency
DoD’s competency
INSTABILITY
Typical Metrics
Typical Metrics
• 80% of Afghan children attend school
• 3,000 km of all-weather roads
• 85% access to basic health care
• Increased number of Afghan security forces
• Increased number of insurgents killed
Outcomes (Between 2007-2008)
•
•
•
•
•
39% increase in civilians killed in ISAF military operations
33% increase in IEDs
119% increase in attacks on ASF
36% decrease in support for the Afghan Government (since 2006)
Decreased NGO presence in South and East
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TCAPF Overview
Obstacles to Effective Stabilization:
1. Lack of a standardized assessment process that allows civilians and
military to develop a common view of the causes of instability
2. Civilian programs and military operations are not linked and synched
3. Failure to make the local population the focal point
“Understanding Afghan popular perceptions at the province, district, and local
level is critical and usually ignored in official reporting….success in the
area must be based on Afghan terms and values and the focal point for all
activity must be the impact on Afghan perceptions and attitudes.” -- CSIS
Af-Pak report (2008)
4. Failure to integrate tactical information into strategic planning
5. Programming based on LOOs created at higher HQ, not local conditions
6. Failure to target the root causes of instability
7. Reporting focused on outputs, not impacts
How can we diminish these obstacles?
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TCAPF Overview
TCAPF is a tool that helps to:
1. See the environment through culturally sensitive
and consistent data collection
2. Understand how to change the environment by
identifying and targeting the causes of instability
3. Act by implementing programs that diminish the
causes of instability
4. Measure the effectiveness of the programming
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TCAPF Overview
Implementation:
1.
UK 52nd BDE, Helmand, Afghanistan – 2007
2.
USMC RCT8, currently in Anbar, Iraq
3.
USMC MEB-A in RC-South, Afghanistan
4.
4th BDE, 25th ID – currently in RC-East, Afghanistan
5.
Elements of 4th BDE, 82nd Abn Div – in RC-East & RCSouth
6.
5th BDE, 2d ID – currently in RC-South, Afghanistan
7.
UK 11th BDE – currently in Helmand, Afghanistan – 2009
8.
COIN Academy, Kabul – 2009
9.
USAID Mission, Field Officers, and Implementing
Partners, Afghanistan
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TCAPF Overview
History and Growth:
1. USAID Conflict Assessment Framework
– Created by USAID’s Office of Conflict Management and Mitigation (2004)
– Strategic, versus tactical focus
2. TCAPF – developed in 2006
– Adapts CAF to tactical level
– Links conflict assessments to planning
3. Road tested in Horn of Africa (2006)
4. Included in Army doctrine – FM 3-07, Stability Operations,
October 2008
5. Financial support:
– $3.3M USMC contract for USAID to train units deploying to Afghanistan
– $177,000 USMC contract for paper-based training
– $500,000 JFCOM contract for online training
– $6M from USAID/OCR for simulation training
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TCAPF Methodology
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TCAPF Methodology
Evaluation
Implementation
Measure
Impact
Implement
Activity
Select
Data
Sources
Collection
Assess
“Measure”
“See”
Collect / Log
Local
Perceptions
POPULATION
Determine
Output
Indicators
“Act”
“Understand”
Design
Identify
Activities
Select
Data
Sources
Identify &
Prioritize
Objectives
Determine
Impact
Indicators
Analysis
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Collecting Local Perceptions
…with the TCAPF Questionnaire
1. Used at the tactical level to identify local perceptions about the
causes of instability
2. Establishes a baseline for local perceptions
3. Generates data that can be used to measure the impact of
activities and changes in local perceptions over time
4. Four simple questions:
– “Has the number of people in the village changed in the last
year?”
– “What are the most important problems facing
the village?”
– “Who do you believe can solve your problems?”
– “What should be done first to help the village?”
Always followed with “Why?”
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TCAPF Questionnaire
“Village” can be replaced by
“neighborhood,” “valley,” or
other relevant area.
Remember to
always ask “WHY?”
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Questionnaire also in Pashtu, Dari, and Arabic
TCAPF Database
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TCAPF Methodology – Analysis
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TCAPF Methodology - Analysis
To increase stability in your AO, you must understand what is causing
instability. This understanding is based upon:
– Operational environment (political, military, economic, social,
infrastructure, and information)
– Cultural environment (tribe, clan, religion, language, etc.)
– Instability Dynamics (grievances, resiliencies, key actors, events)
– Local perceptions
Until you understand your operating environment, your
programming will not be effective. In some cultures, honor,
justice, and revenge matter more than schools, roads, and jobs!
How do we acquire the population’s view of the local causes of
instability?
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Design
Stabilization Fundamentals – does each activity:



Increase support for the government?
Decrease support for individuals or groups causing instability?
Increase institutional and societal capability and capacity?
If yes, does it also comply with the Design Principles:
1. Ensure sustainability by the local government or institutions?
2. Facilitate local ownership?
3. Consider the trade-offs between short-term vs. long-term impacts?
4. Fit the local political and cultural context?
5. Strengthen governmental accountability and transparency?
6. Leverage/support OGA, IGO, NGO, and HN programs?
7. Draw upon readily accessible local resources?
8. Provide flexibility?
Key: Are you fostering STABILITY?
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TCAPF Methodology – Tactical Stability Matrix
Grievance
Causes
(Perception)
Causes
(Systemic)
Objective
Impact
Indicators
Impact
Indicator
Data
Sources
Investigate /
remove corrupt
officials
Police/gvt
officials are
corrupt
Police/gvt
officials
support those
who pay
them the
most
The gvt uses
the law to
help its
friends
Land
Disputes
The Barakzai
control the
gvt.
There is no
justice
Our
documents
are lost /
destroyed
Others are on
our land
Violence linked
to land disputes
diminished
Police/gvt
officials are
not paid on
time
Gvt. officals
are not
selected by
the
population
Police/ justice
officials do
not go to rural
areas
Lack of gvt.
conflict
resolution
capability and
capacity
Destroyed/
conflicting
land records
New
pastoralist
routes
IDPs have no
land of their
own
Activities
Increase in the
number of gvt.
recognized land
deeds
Peaceful
resolution of
land
disputes by
gvt.
recognized
entities
Increase in the
number of land
disputes
resolved by gvt.
recognized
entities
Number of land
disputes
resolved by
AGM decreasing
Establish direct
deposit for police /
gvt officials
Output
Indicators
Output
Indicator
Data Sources
# Police /
officials
investigated
Direct deposit
established
Gov’t
personnel
records
TCAPF
questionnaire
Encourage gvt
appointment of
non-Barakzai
# Non-Barakzai
in gvt
Government
records
Establish a mobile
gvt. dispute
resolution unit
# Cases
resolved by
mobile dispute
unit
Bank &
Gvt
financial
records
Public
surveys
Link shuras to gvt.
to resolve land
disputes
Shura/gvt. link
established
Interviews
Patrol
Reports
Revamp / establish
land records
system
Functional
records system
established
Assessments
Mediate
pastoralist /
agrarian land
access
# Pastoralist/
agrarian
discussions
TCAPF
Surveys
Identify permanent
homes
for IDPs
# IDPs
relocated
Interviews
Assessments
Conduct IO
campaign
Patrol
Reports
# IO radio spots
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Process – Evaluation
1. Have your program activities been achieved?
(Measure of Performance)
2. Have your program objectives been achieved?
(Measure of Effect)
3. Is stability increasing or decreasing? (Big Picture)
–
–
–
–
–
–
–
–
Suggested Indicators:
Increasing road movement at night
TCAPF shows increasing government legitimacy
TCAPF shows decreasing security concerns
TCAPF shows population returning to their homes
Decreasing SIGACTS
Decreasing Afghan civilian casualties (all sources)
Decreasing number of govt and tribal leaders killed, kidnapped,
intimidated (e.g. “night letters”)
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Weekly District Stability Snapshot
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Monthly District Stability Report
Provincial Stability Report
400
350
Factor 1: Night road
movement
300
Factor 2: Government
legitimacy
Indexed Value
250
Factor 3: Public security
concerns
Factor 4: Population
leaving home for security
200
Factor 5: Enemy activity
150
Factor 6: Afghan civilian
casualties
100
Factor 7: AAF
intimidation of GIRoA
50
Overall: Average of all 7
Factors
0
Jul-09
Aug-09
Sep-09
Oct-09
Nov-09
Dec-09
Month
Jan-10
Feb-10
Mar-10
Apr-10
May-10
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TCAPF Requirements
1. Requires training (2-3 days)
2. Requires time and resources to gather data
before programming
3. Requires flexibility in insecure environments
4. Requires a shift in focus from national to local
level
5. Requires us to differentiate environments –
stabilization vs. long-term development
– Designing, implementing, measuring & evaluating
programs
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TCAPF Timelines
1 Month
- Identification of Local Causes of Instability
- Develop counter-instability activities
- Initiate Activities
3 Months
- Trend Analysis (Are the local causes of
instability being mitigated?)
6 Months
- Local Instability Analysis. Is the area more
stable?
- Change activities as required
9 Months
- Continued Azimuth Checks.
- Provide left/right correction.
(then quarterly)
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TCAPF Benefits
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.
Helps surmount “stove pipes” by providing a common view of the
sources of instability
Provides a prioritization mechanism for activities in insecure areas
Provides a framework to determine when traditional long-term
development activities can be initiated
Fosters more effective programming because the population identifies
sources of instability, priorities, and potential activities
Provides data for Monitoring and Evaluation of activities – both their
performance (Output) and stabilization impact (Effect)
Steady flow of data facilitates trend analysis and consistency
throughout personnel rotations
Empowers FPOs and tactical military units, the focal point for
successful Stability Ops
Provides StratComm themes that resonates with the local population
Key: Programming is based on knowledge—not assumptions and the
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population is the “center of gravity.”
TCAPF IN LASHKAR GAH
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Population Change
Has the Population of LKG changed in the Last 12
Months?
5%
Yes
32%
No
63%
U/K
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“Why?”
Reasons for Population Change in LKG
6%
19%
Security
Other
Lack of Paid Work
Opportunities
75%
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Sources of Instability
LKG - Biggest problems
2%
1%
Lack of food/ water
Ltd roads/ sewerage/
sanitation/ power
2%
5%
Other
10%
31%
Lack of Paid Work
Opportunities
Security
13%
Access to Education
14%
22%
Lack of Shelter
Access to Health
Care
Corruption
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Sources of Instability
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“Who Do You Believe Can Solve
Your Problems?”
100%
80%
International Forces
Local Police
National Army
Tribal leaders
GIRoA
60%
40%
20%
0%
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Nov-07
Dec-07
Jan-08
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“What Should be Done First
to Help the Village?”
100%
80%
Electrical Power
Roads
60%
Access to education
Security
Potable Water
40%
20%
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0%
Nov-07
Dec-07
Jan-08
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Correlations
Projects:
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1.
1
Pump Rehabilitation Project
External Factors:
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4
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2.
KJ Dam Turbine #3 Fails
3.
Heavy Rainfall
4.
Dep. Gov. Assassinated
5.
Food convoys delayed
2
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Potable Water
Security
10
Employment
3
Electric power
5
Roads
Education
0
Nov-07
Dec-07
Jan-08
Feb-08
Food
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QUESTIONS?
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Points of Contact
TCAPF Methodology
TCAPF Training
Dr. Jim Derleth
(202) 712-5105
[email protected]
Tom Gannon
(202) 712-0332
[email protected]
Dr. Tobie Whitman
(202) 712-1802
[email protected]
Tamra Thompson
(202) 712-4045
[email protected]
Eric Kotouc
(202) 712-5434
[email protected]
Mick Crnkovich
(202) 712-5422
[email protected]
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