Transcript Why Oh Y ? HS2 -- grand projet, great delusion or national network ? Jonathan Tyler Passenger Transport Networks,YORK Institute of Railway Studies and Transport.

Why Oh Y ?
HS2 -- grand projet, great delusion
or national network ?
Jonathan Tyler
Passenger Transport Networks,YORK
Institute of Railway Studies and Transport History
National Railway Museum / University of York
1 June 2011
Why I’m sitting on the fence [1]
• as a long-time environmentalist
I hold to a radical critique of
high capitalism / the presumption of
globalisation / the concept of eternal
growth / hyper-mobility
• but transition to a less mobile society
will take time
• and we need excellent public transport
why I’m sitting on the fence [2]
• demand for rail travel is growing strongly
and rail’s mode share is rising
• there are some difficult capacity issues
• significant sections of the infrastructure
are of poor quality
• the pattern of services requires overhaul
>> high-speed rail could be
part of the solution
The case for the grand projet [1]
• capacity is at a premium on WCML and
will become so on MML and ECML
• expanding capacity by rebuilding the
existing railway is out of the question
• the nation therefore needs new railway
on fine new alignments
• if doing that then we should build a highspeed line using the best available
technology – indeed, a 400 km/h railway
the case for the grand projet [2]
• maximises economic benefits (shorter
journey times, enlarged markets)
• the best route to serve major centres,
relieve the main lines and capture traffic
from other modes is the ‘Y’
• the new railway will release capacity on
the ‘classic’ railway for growth in
commuting, regional travel and freight
“a truly national
high speed rail
network for the
whole of Britain”
Programme for
Government
May 2010
It’s a beautiful concept, but
DOUBTS
My involvement >
• long-time advocate of better timetabling
• Greengauge 21 – use of WCML post-HS2
• timetabling support for critics
• Arup – advice to eastern regional bodies
Doubts [1]
• is capacity really (going to be) tight ?
-
timetabling
operating practices, performance regime
size of trains
load factors and the fares system
peak hours (should we query the economics ?)
the Friday evening phenomenon
growth assumptions
doubts [2]
• rebuilding
- legitimate argument against total rebuilds
- but not against location-specific projects
• new railways
- an HS network not a necessary outcome
- incremental alternatives
doubts [3]
• is ultra-high-speed technology
appropriate in Britain ?
- relatively short distances
- implications of straight alignments
- no point without long runs, hence
omission of calls at intermediate stations
- risk from extended building timescale
- no assessment of < 400 km/h options ?
doubts [4]
• economic benefits
- evaluation depends on possibly-obsolete
classical models
- is ever-increasing mobility credible,
sustainable ?
- is forecasting way into future sound ?
- tendency to favour large conurbations
doubts [5]
• the ‘Y’ configuration
- small number of stations
- stations not in city centres
• capacity release on classic railway
- not as great as claimed ?
- benefits of commuting and freight ?
so you might
reasonably
conclude that I’m
falling off the
fence onto the
‘no’ side
Great delusion(s) ?
that
• we need a ‘transformational’ project
rather than incremental change
• a project which will not be completed
until 2026 is relevant to problems now
• running Scotland <> London in 3½h in
2033 is a serious means of curtailing flying
• a scheme which is merely carbon-neutral
helps to achieve carbon-reduction targets
great delusion(s) ? [continued]
that
• high-speed lines serving few stations
make sense in a multi-centric country
• centre-city stations separately located
from existing stations will diffuse benefits
• ex-urban stations are acceptable
• capacity will exist for every aspiration to
be satisfied
this last issue is vital and unacknowledged
The capacity delusion [1]
•
-
trains / hour
Tokaido : 14
RFF / SNCF : 13, rising to 15
study for Greengauge : 16.6
under ERTMS 3, in theory : 18
eddy-current brakes, calculated risk : 19.2
HS2 Ltd : 10 / 14 / 18
the capacity delusion [2]
• now look at the aspirations
• and at the reality
distribution of paths [peak hour]
aspir- HS2 single portions
ations Ltd trains
Scotland
2
2
2
2x½
Newcastle … York
1-2
2
--Yorkshire + E.Midlands
6
4
4
6x½
Manchester
3-4
4
3
4
other North West
3-4
2
3
4x½
Birmingham
4
4
4
4
Europe via HS1
4
see
--quote -Heathrow
4
-TOTAL
27-30 18
16
14
“Further work is being done to
determine which of the above services
might serve Heathrow and which might
run on to mainland Europe”
Department for Transport / HS2 Ltd, February 2011
The capacity delusion – the problems
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
planning must not assume a techno-fix
somehow we have to decide priorities
no credible basis for HS1 or Heathrow links
infrastructure decisions, eg. E.Mids, portions
Newcastle and York not served by HS2
complicates capacity release on classic lines
not just HS2 core but also LDHS-J <> WTOE-J
regulation and competition
can we put the
pieces together
again ?
Why oh Y are we in this mess ?
• keeping up with Japanese, French, …
(politicians + railway enthusiasts)
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
alternative to Heathrow expansion
models of economic growth
regional interests – links with London
DfT and Network Rail forecasts
fashionable sustainability arguments (freight)
engineers’ excitement about the perfect railway
no understanding of strategic timetabling
route plans > secrecy > no debate on principles
Above all :
no strategic plan for public transport
last of my three perspectives :
the case for a national network
• does Britain need milch-cow / minimumsubsidy franchises or a public transport
network to ensure sustainable mobility ?
• do we want competing operators or an
integrated system ?
• has McNulty ignored this ?
What does a high-quality, integrated
and genuinely-sustainable system of
public transport require us to do ?
•
•
•
•
•
change planning objectives
abandon competition in the market
accept desirability of central planning
tender concessions for service delivery
plan and timetable comprehensively
(HS2 started from wrong place)
toward an excellent system of public transport
modal-split
targets
national standards
of service-quality
and connectivity
organisations,
budgets
timetabling,
operations
planning
modelling
route-specific
demand
data,
scenarios
infrastructure
plan
Where does this leave High Speed Rail ?
• conceivably with a significant role, where
- an increment of capacity is essential
- existing inter-urban route devious, slow
[eg. Leeds … Sheffield, Leeds … Manchester]
• but NOT 400 km/h, NOT ex-urban
stations, NOT separate network
• more like German than French model
>> incremental change
conscious that I
may be the little
boy pointing out
the emperor’s
nakedness, but my
criticism is of the
present ‘Y’ plan for
HS2, not of highspeed railways
Jonathan Tyler / Passenger Transport Networks,YORK
01904 611187 / [email protected]