Navy in JIAMD Programs – The Way Ahead Sea-Based Terminal Working Group Update to NDIA RDML Brad Hicks Deputy Surface Warfare for Combat.
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Navy in JIAMD Programs – The Way Ahead Sea-Based Terminal Working Group Update to NDIA RDML Brad Hicks Deputy Surface Warfare for Combat Systems/Weapons (N76F) April 7, 2005 Sea Power 21 Missile Defense Operations Sea Shield UNCLASSIFIED Provide regional defense for allies and expeditionary forces where land based missile defenses are denied, as well as critical air and seaports FORCEnet Sea Strike Active missile defenses augmented by advances in ISR and INFO OPS (IO) provide high leverage offensive defensive integration in missile defense Sea Basing Maintaining the Joint Sea Base sanctuary is the Navy’s highest operational level missile defense priority Missile defense is a key capability in executing Sea Power 21 and the National Strategy UNCLASSIFIED 2 The Challenge Defense of the Joint Sea Base, APODs, and SPODs from SRBM & MRBM • Analysis defines clear capability gap – 2012 MCO-3 (POM 06) – 2020 MCO-1 & MCO-2 (PR07) • COCOM Priority • A potential Navy contribution to a joint BMD solution 3 The Joint Missile Defense Vision AF Navy Information Operations Number of threat TBMs Time Critical Strike Engagement Army USMC IO Assessment % TBMs reduced TCS Assessment % TBMs reduced Sea Based Terminal Defense Contributes to Layered Defense Tier 1 Missile Engagement SM-3 ABL THAAD % TBMs reduced Tier 2 Missile Engagement SBT PAC-3 % TBMs reduced D-DAY D+1 D+2 Offensive IO TCS for TELs Missile engagement D+3 D+4 D+5 Reduction in threat TBMs 4 Two Tier Sea Based Defense Exo-atmosphere Endoatmosphere BMDS Layered Defense requires Midcourse and Terminal Engagement Capability Depth of fire needed to achieve desired Pn / Pra SRBM / depressed trajectories may not allow engagement by exo-atmospheric systems 5 SBT Assessment History • FY03 SBT Study • Near term focus • SM-2 Block IV mod test • POM 06 BUR • Netted TAMD assessment • Included assessment of SBT missile options • PR07 Navy SBT way ahead effort • TF Missile Defense issue • 14 Dec Navy-MDA BOD SBT Brief • Significant MDA interest Result was joint Navy-MDA sponsorship of SBT BMD Assessment 6 SBT Assessment Charter • Examine a range of options for SBT systems development • Consider ongoing MDA and service programs that could be leveraged for SBT • Address need to ensure Joint Assured Access and Defense of Joint Sea Base • Assess combat systems options / requirements • Present options and assessment to MDA and Navy leadership 7 Sea-Based Terminal BMD Assessment Working Group Organization Assessment Leads Kevin Apel CAPT(s) Bill McQuilkin Technical Leads Mickey Skamangas Bill Tropf Threat Assessment Steve Peduto Capabilities-Gaps Analysis Gary Schnurrpusch Systems Architecture Jerry Rogers Options CDR Gary May SBT Working Group MDA (DT, AB, TR, SE, PI, BC) USA USAF STRATCOM PEO IWS (1.0, 2.0, 3.0, 6.0 7.0) J8 JTAMDO PEO Ships OPNAV (N76, N70, N81, N2) AMRDEC SEA 017 DIA MSIC NSWC-DD SPA JHU-APL 8 Sea-Based Terminal BMD Assessment Analysis Team Approach • Threat Assessment: – Define threat space – Characterize operational threat environment • Capabilities-Gaps Analysis: – Quantify operational capabilities & gaps given the BMDS program of record – Assess operational contribution of SBT options • System Architecture: – Characterize Block 2010 BMDS baseline – Develop and characterize SBT options Performance assessment of SBT options • Options: – Characterize cost, schedule, and risk of selected options 9 Sea-Based Terminal BMD Assessment Option Assessment Criteria (U) Sea-Based Terminal BMD options are assessed on ability to provide robust defense of the Sea Base and forces ashore. Assessment Criteria Operational Performance Program • Availability of assets • Engage targets • Development status • Mission commonality • Adequate fire power • Adequate number of engagements • Defend assets or area (footprint) • Technical maturity and risk • Complexity of BMC2, communications • Maintain battle space • Conceptual Modifications • Produce effective kill • Cost • Risk to assets • Ability to fill the gap • Schedule 10 SBT Capability Functional Building Blocks PLATFORMS CG / DDG DDX Large Ship CVW TACAIR WEAPONS SM-6 Mod SBMSE MSE Marinized THAAD THAAD C2BM SENSORS Modified SPY-1 Modified DDX DBR PATRIOT Radar THAAD Radar Aircraft Organic Radar Aircraft IRSTS Aegis BMD w/ SBT Mods OA Aegis w/ SBT Mods DDX w/ SBT Mods PATRIOT ECS THAAD C2BM Airborne Organic C2BM Airborne Integrated C2BM 11 SBT Option Candidate "ESG"s Surface Combatant Options Aegis/DDX with SM-6 Aegis/DDX with SBMSE Aegis/DDX with Marinized THAAD Embarked System Options Large Ship Embarked PAC-3 Large Ship Embarked THAAD Large Ship PAC / THAAD Engage on SPY Radar TACAIR Options TACAIR with MSE Engaging on own or Aegis Radar 12 Sea-Based Terminal BMD Assessment Status / Group Schedule Activity TOR Kick-off Meeting January February March April May June 1/19 2/2 Threat Assessment Refinements Capability - Gap Analysis Refinements System Architecture Refinements Options Overall Assessment & Recommendations Major EXCOMM EXCOMM / BoD 2/28 3/28 EXCOMM BoD In-Process Reviews Final Report 13