Navy in JIAMD Programs – The Way Ahead Sea-Based Terminal Working Group Update to NDIA RDML Brad Hicks Deputy Surface Warfare for Combat.

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Transcript Navy in JIAMD Programs – The Way Ahead Sea-Based Terminal Working Group Update to NDIA RDML Brad Hicks Deputy Surface Warfare for Combat.

Navy in JIAMD Programs – The Way Ahead
Sea-Based Terminal Working Group Update to NDIA
RDML Brad Hicks
Deputy Surface Warfare for Combat Systems/Weapons (N76F)
April 7, 2005
Sea Power 21
Missile Defense Operations
Sea Shield
UNCLASSIFIED
Provide regional defense for allies and expeditionary forces
where land based missile defenses are denied, as well as
critical air and seaports
FORCEnet
Sea Strike
Active missile defenses augmented by advances
in ISR and INFO OPS (IO) provide high leverage
offensive defensive integration in missile defense
Sea Basing
Maintaining the Joint Sea Base sanctuary is the
Navy’s highest operational level missile defense
priority
Missile defense is a key capability in executing
Sea Power 21 and the National Strategy
UNCLASSIFIED
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The Challenge
Defense of the Joint Sea Base, APODs,
and SPODs from SRBM & MRBM
• Analysis defines clear capability gap
– 2012 MCO-3 (POM 06)
– 2020 MCO-1 & MCO-2 (PR07)
• COCOM Priority
• A potential Navy contribution to a joint
BMD solution
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The Joint Missile Defense Vision
AF
Navy
Information
Operations
Number of
threat TBMs
Time
Critical
Strike
Engagement
Army
USMC
IO Assessment
% TBMs reduced
TCS Assessment
% TBMs reduced
Sea Based Terminal Defense
Contributes to Layered Defense
Tier 1 Missile Engagement
SM-3
ABL
THAAD
% TBMs reduced
Tier 2 Missile Engagement
SBT
PAC-3
% TBMs reduced
D-DAY
D+1
D+2
Offensive IO
TCS for TELs
Missile engagement
D+3
D+4
D+5
Reduction in threat
TBMs
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Two Tier Sea Based Defense
Exo-atmosphere
Endoatmosphere
BMDS
Layered Defense requires Midcourse and Terminal Engagement Capability
Depth of fire needed to achieve desired Pn / Pra
SRBM / depressed trajectories may not allow engagement by exo-atmospheric systems
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SBT Assessment History
• FY03 SBT Study
• Near term focus
• SM-2 Block IV mod test
• POM 06 BUR
• Netted TAMD assessment
• Included assessment of SBT missile options
• PR07 Navy SBT way ahead effort
• TF Missile Defense issue
• 14 Dec Navy-MDA BOD SBT Brief
• Significant MDA interest
 Result was joint Navy-MDA sponsorship of
SBT BMD Assessment
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SBT Assessment Charter
• Examine a range of options for SBT
systems development
• Consider ongoing MDA and service
programs that could be leveraged for SBT
• Address need to ensure Joint Assured
Access and Defense of Joint Sea Base
• Assess combat systems options /
requirements
• Present options and assessment to MDA
and Navy leadership
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Sea-Based Terminal BMD Assessment
Working Group Organization
Assessment Leads
Kevin Apel
CAPT(s) Bill McQuilkin
Technical Leads
Mickey Skamangas
Bill Tropf
Threat
Assessment
Steve Peduto
Capabilities-Gaps
Analysis
Gary Schnurrpusch
Systems Architecture
Jerry Rogers
Options
CDR Gary May
SBT Working Group
MDA (DT, AB, TR, SE, PI, BC)
USA
USAF
STRATCOM
PEO IWS (1.0, 2.0, 3.0, 6.0 7.0)
J8 JTAMDO
PEO Ships
OPNAV (N76, N70, N81, N2)
AMRDEC
SEA 017
DIA MSIC
NSWC-DD
SPA
JHU-APL
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Sea-Based Terminal BMD Assessment
Analysis Team Approach
• Threat Assessment:
– Define threat space
– Characterize operational threat environment
• Capabilities-Gaps Analysis:
– Quantify operational capabilities & gaps given
the BMDS program of record
– Assess operational contribution of SBT options
• System Architecture:
– Characterize Block 2010 BMDS baseline
– Develop and characterize SBT options
Performance
assessment of
SBT options
• Options:
– Characterize cost, schedule, and risk
of selected options
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Sea-Based Terminal BMD Assessment
Option Assessment Criteria (U)
Sea-Based Terminal BMD options are assessed on ability to
provide robust defense of the Sea Base and forces ashore.
Assessment Criteria
Operational
Performance
Program
• Availability of assets
• Engage targets
• Development status
• Mission commonality
• Adequate fire power
• Adequate number of
engagements
• Defend assets or area
(footprint)
• Technical maturity and
risk
• Complexity of BMC2,
communications
• Maintain battle space
• Conceptual
Modifications
• Produce effective kill
• Cost
• Risk to assets
• Ability to fill the gap
• Schedule
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SBT Capability
Functional Building Blocks
PLATFORMS
CG / DDG
DDX
Large Ship
CVW TACAIR
WEAPONS
SM-6 Mod
SBMSE
MSE
Marinized THAAD
THAAD
C2BM
SENSORS
Modified SPY-1
Modified DDX DBR
PATRIOT Radar
THAAD Radar
Aircraft Organic Radar
Aircraft IRSTS
Aegis BMD w/ SBT Mods
OA Aegis w/ SBT Mods
DDX w/ SBT Mods
PATRIOT ECS
THAAD C2BM
Airborne Organic C2BM
Airborne Integrated C2BM
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SBT Option Candidate "ESG"s
Surface
Combatant
Options
Aegis/DDX with SM-6
Aegis/DDX with SBMSE
Aegis/DDX with Marinized THAAD
Embarked
System
Options
Large Ship Embarked PAC-3
Large Ship Embarked THAAD
Large Ship PAC / THAAD Engage
on SPY Radar
TACAIR
Options
TACAIR with MSE Engaging on
own or Aegis Radar
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Sea-Based Terminal BMD Assessment
Status / Group Schedule
Activity
TOR
Kick-off Meeting
January
February
March
April
May
June
1/19
2/2
Threat Assessment
Refinements
Capability - Gap Analysis
Refinements
System Architecture
Refinements
Options
Overall Assessment &
Recommendations
Major
EXCOMM
EXCOMM / BoD
2/28
3/28
EXCOMM
BoD
In-Process Reviews
Final Report
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