Influenza: From Basics to Pandemics Why Worry? Why Plan? Influenza is Serious! •Annual deaths: 36,000 •Hospitalizations: >200,000 Who is at greatest risk for serious complications? Persons Persons 65 and.
Download ReportTranscript Influenza: From Basics to Pandemics Why Worry? Why Plan? Influenza is Serious! •Annual deaths: 36,000 •Hospitalizations: >200,000 Who is at greatest risk for serious complications? Persons Persons 65 and.
Influenza: From Basics to Pandemics Why Worry? Why Plan? Influenza is Serious! •Annual deaths: 36,000 •Hospitalizations: >200,000 Who is at greatest risk for serious complications? Persons Persons 65 and older with chronic diseases Infants Pregnant Nursing women home residents Influenza= Flu Respiratory infection Rapid onset of Fever, Chills, Body aches, Sore throat, Non-productive cough, Runny nose, Headache Takes 1- 5 days from exposure to beginning of symptoms Contagious maximum 1-2 days before to 4-5 days after onset of symptoms Peak usually occurs December through March in North America Influenza Virus: How it spreads Close contact (<6 feet) with sick person who is coughing or sneezing by way of droplets OR Touching a surface contaminated by respiratory secretions and getting the virus into mouth, nose or eyes. Influenza Epidemic Pattern Epidemic: Higher than normal number of cases of a disease in a community Also called “outbreak” Abrupt onset in a community: overall attack rate 10-20% Sharp peak in 2- 3 weeks, lasts about 56 weeks Influenza Epidemic Pattern First sign: Increased # children with febrile respiratory illness Followed by: increased hospitalization rate for pneumonia/COPD/CHF/cr oup Absenteeism a late indicator Influenza background Flu strains typically found in many mammals Birds and swine common hosts for what ultimately become human flu viruses Flu hosts usually develop an immunity to the virus after infection How does the virus survive? Minor mutation in flu virus is referred to as drift. A much bigger change is referred to as a shift Shift: Major change = new subtype = Pandemic potential Pandemic – An epidemic that spreads around the world Influenza types Type A (Party Girls) Animals and humans More versatile, more virulent Epidemics and pandemics All ages Type B (DAR) Humans only Milder epidemics Primarily affects children Key Influenza A Viral Features Two surface glycoproteins (major antigens) Hemagglutinin (HA) HA • Site of attachment to host cells Antibody to HA is protective Neuraminadase (NA) NA • • Helps release virions from cells Antibody to NA can help modify disease severity The Pandemic Influenza Cycle Rapid transmission worldwide Multiple waves of disease over a 18-24 month period Occurrence of cases outside usual season High attack rate and high death rate All age groups, especially young adults Cycles every 10-40 years Last pandemic was mild-1968 How does the virus survive? Minor mutation in antigens of flu virus is referred to as drift. A much bigger immunologic change (mutation) is referred to as a shift Shift: Major change = new/novel subtype = Pandemic potential Pandemic – an infectious disease occurring over a wide geographic area targeting a high percentage of the population Mechanisms of Antigenic Shift Non-human virus Human virus Reassortant Virus – 1957, 1968 The Pandemic Influenza Cycle Rapid transmission with worldwide outbreaks; multiple waves of disease over a 18-24 month period Occurrence of cases outside the usual season High attack rate for all age groups, with high mortality rates, esp for young adults Cycles 10-40 years. Last pandemic was mild, 1968 Influenza Pandemics in the 20th Century Credit: US National Museum of Health and Medicine 1918: “Spanish Flu” A(H1N1) 1957: “Asian Flu” A(H2N2) 1968: “Hong Kong Flu” A(H3N2) 20-40 m deaths 1-4 m deaths 1-4 m deaths 675,000 US deaths 70,000 US deaths 34,000 US deaths Impact of Past Influenza Pandemics/Antigenic Shifts Pandemic, or Antigenic Shift Excess Mortality Populations Affected 1918-19 Spanish Flu 500,000 Persons <65 years 1957-58 Asian Flu 1968-69 Hong Kong Flu 70,000 Infants, elderly 36,000 Infants, elderly 1977-78 Russian Flu 8,300 Young (persons <20) The social and medical importance of the 1918-1919 influenza pandemic cannot be overemphasized About half of the 2 billion people living on earth in 1918 became infected At least 20 million people died 1918 Spanish Flu: United States 20 million flu cases were reported and almost ½ million people died “It is impossible to imagine the social misery and dislocation implicit in these dry statistics.” America’s Forgotten Pandemic, Alfred Crosby H5N1 “Avian” flu The current strain of avian flu, H5N1, represents a major shift When the major shift “waits” 50-75 years: Community has very little or no immunity/protection Entire population is a ripe target Current outbreaks for H5N1 Avian Flu in poultry and birds are largest ever documented Duration of outbreak creates potential for genetic change that could result in person-to-person transmission 20 Nations With Confirmed Cases H5N1 Avian Influenza (July 7, 2006) Avian Influenza A Viruses Wild waterfowl are natural reservoir Infect respiratory and gastrointestinal tracts of birds Usually do not cause disease Genetic re-assortment is frequent Viruses are present in respiratory secretions, feces Can survive at low temperatures and low humidity for days to weeks, and in water H5N1 in Humans – 2003-2006 As of June, 2006: 256 cases, 152 deaths Ten countries Millions have been exposed to poultry 50% cases in persons <20 years old 90% cases <40 years old Sporadic, with occasional clusters All lived in countries with poultry outbreaks Most had touched or handled sick poultry Few cases of probable, limited human-to-human transmission Global Status of Current Pandemic Threat World Health Organization (WHO) defines 3 major periods (broken into 6 phases) of increasing human infection with new flu virus: Interpandemic (no human infection) Pandemic Alert (limited human infection) Pandemic (widespread human infection) Presently at Pandemic Alert (Phase 3) “Isolated human infections with a novel influenza strain [H5N1] with no (or rare) person-to-person transmission”. “The pandemic clock is ticking, we just don’t know what time it is” Assumptions About Disease Transmission No one immune to virus 1 out of every 3 people will become ill People may be contagious up to 24 hours before they know they are sick Most will become ill 2 days (range 1-10) after exposure People are most contagious the first 2 days of illness Sick children are more contagious than adults On average, each ill person can infect 2 or 3 others (if no precautions are taken) Social and Economic Impact Assumptions Absenteeism At the peak of a 6-8 week wave, ~40% of employees may be absent Illness Caring for sick family member Fear Hospital demands Estimated >25% more patients than normal needing hospitalization Hospitals will not be able to take everyone they normally would! Federal or other outside volunteers and resources? Volunteers will be needed in their own communities Communities should plan to respond with their own resources, not rely on outside help HHS Estimated Medical Burden in Tennessee (Pop: 6 million) Characteristic Moderate Severe* Illness (30%) Outpatient Care 1.8 million 900,000 1.8 million 900,000 Hospitalization 17,300 198,000 ICU Care 2,575 29,700 Mechanical Ventilation Deaths 1,300 14,850 4,180 (0.2%) 38,060 (2%) *HHS Recommends that states plan for severe scenario Estimated Medical Burden in Knox County Characteristic Illness (30%) Moderate (0.2%) Severe (2%) 119,000 119,000 Outpatient care 59,500 59,500 Hospitalization 1,190 11,900 ICU (15% hosp pts) 180 1,800 Mechanical ventilators (50% 90 900 240 2,380 ICU pts) Deaths HHS Assumptions: Objectives of Pandemic Planning & Response Primary objective: Minimize sickness and death Secondary objectives: Preserve functional society Minimize economic disruption There is not complete consensus on the proper order of these assumptions! Surveillance: Traditional responsibility of Department of Health Syndromic Surveillance: Monitor 911 calls, emergency department visits, doctor visits, and school absenteeism Sentinel health care providers: Testing and active surveillance for patients with ILI CDC planning additional national surveillance activities Disease Control: Early Stage Initial objective: slow spread of disease Isolate sick patients Quarantine exposed healthy persons. Housing, health care, food, psychological, spiritual, needs must be met Legal measures possible but will rely on voluntary cooperation Once beyond initial cases, shift strategy to “Stay home when you are sick” Disease Control: Social Distancing Once pandemic begins in US, gatherings of >10,000 people subject to cancellation During local waves: Suspend discretionary public gatherings of >100 School and Daycare Closure Key to slowing spread is to disrupt nodes of intense transmission Preschool through 12th grade are such nodes Attack rates of 40% possible in schools during ordinary flu season Pre-emptive school/large daycare closure is central component of proposed federal strategy School and Daycare Closure Key to slowing spread is to disrupt nodes of intense transmission Preschool through 12th grade are such nodes (Attack rates of 40% possible in schools during ordinary flu season) Pre-emptive school/large daycare closure is central component of proposed federal strategy Infection Control: “Cover Your Cough” “Respiratory hygiene”, “Cough etiquette”, “Good health manners” Infection Control Assumptions Survival @ 82oF, 3549% humidity (longer if lower temp, lower humidity) 48h on hard non-porous surfaces 8-12h on cloth, paper, tissue Susceptible to EPA registered disinfectants Transmission: Dropletsurgical masks protective Infection Control Assumptions Airborne transmission (less common, but much more infective: 10-100 x vs. droplets). Surgical masks NOT protective Aerosol-generating procedures (e.g., intubation, suctioning, nebulizer treatment, bronchoscopy, intubation, BiPAP, CPAP): N95 respirators should be used What About Vaccine? Production minimum 6 month process: Process requires eggs (93 million!) but virus is lethal to birds Unlikely to be available before 1st pandemic wave HHS priority groups Military and Vaccine manufacturers Healthcare workers with direct patient care Persons at highest risk for complications Two doses needed for protection What About Antivirals? Tamiflu Anti-viral agent, currently in short supply Could be used in one area of world to contain first human outbreak Resistance described Should be used within 48 of infection Unlikely to markedly affect course of pandemic Tamiflu ≠ Preparedness Vaccine/Antiviral Distribution Prioritization of personnel : based on level of patient contact Vaccine will be administered by public health personnel over months Prioritization determined by Feds and may change Guidance for Planning Because resources will be limited… Contingency planning should include: Planning for absenteeism: ~40% Hygiene products and education in the workplace Supply shortages Home offices for critical personnel Sick leave policies compatible with state recommendations Internal and External Communication networks Detailed communications plans needed: Internal- Ensure employees know panflu policy, communications plan, their specific role, esp in surge capacity External- POC with Health Department Info via KCHD website, Broadcast FAX, Email, Media Coordinate with like organizations to develop/coordinate emergency plans Communicate with other facilities affected by yours Infection Control: Education Signage to educate personnel and patients Adequacy of surgical masks for patient contact not involving aerosolization procedures Possibility of using surgical masks over reusable N95s as well as goggles/face shields for high-risk procedures Establishing regularly scheduled environmental cleaning Infection Control: Using PPE Follow protocol for donning and removing PPE • Provide hand hygiene materials (>60% alcohol) Provide tissues & instructions when to use them: proper disposal; importance of handhygiene Surveillance for those at work Develop screening for employees with flu-like symptoms Develop sick leave policy specific for panflu: liberal and non-punitive Determine when ill employee may return to work Sick Leave policy Liberal and non-punitive Staff who become ill at work Recovering staff- when to return Symptomatic but functional staffallowed to work? Reassignment of personnel at increased risk for flu complications Offer annual flu vaccine Surge Capacity: Staffing Shortages Identify minimum number employees and categories required for essential operations Temporary help Cross train employees MOAs with other facilities Surge Capacity: Supplies Estimate needs for consumable resources Primary Plan & Contingency Plan Detailed procedures for supply acquisition Normal channels exhausted: have a backup Workforce Support Psychological and physical strain on personnel responding in emergency situation Psychological stress for families Plan for your staff to have adequate Sleep, food Access to psychological and spiritual support Pandemic flu today Despite . . . Expanded global and national surveillance Better healthcare, medicines, diagnostics Greater vaccine manufacturing capacity New risks: Increased global travel and commerce Greater population density More elderly and immunosuppressed More daycare and nursing homes Bioterrorism Steps YOU can take Practice good personal hygiene: Avoid hand contact with your mouth, eyes, and nose Wash hands regularly and often Use paper towels to turn off the faucet and open the restroom doors Steps YOU can take Carry a supply of hand sanitizing gel – use it regularly 60%-95% alcohol-based sanitizer Cover your cough Steps YOU can take Get a flu vaccination when offered When flu season arrives- avoid contact with infected people, limit social activity Consider wearing surgical mask and/or disposable gloves when in public Steps YOU can take Be aware in public of potentially infected surfaces Check-out counters, door knobs, pay phones Regularly disinfect commonly used surfaces 1:10 bleach solution EPA registered disinfectant Steps YOU can take Illness preparation: Maintain supply of electrolyte drinks (Gatorade) Antipyretics (Tylenol) Prescription medications Stock up on water and foodone week’s supply Minimum: One gallon per person per day Store in plastic, not glass Food that won’t spoil Steps YOU can take Make plans for child care in the event schools close 6-8 weeks Plan for eldercare/pet care Family Planning is Essential Good advice for any disaster, not just pandemic influenza!!! See Family Planning Checklists Pandemicflu.gov RedCross.org Ready.gov Resources PandemicFlu.gov CDC.gov/flu/avian RedCross.org www.nyhealth.gov Knoxcounty.org/health: if you want to be put on “Pandemic Alert Email” list For questions regarding pandemic influenza planning, please call 215-5171 or email: [email protected]