The perils and pitfalls of productivity measurement for English local authorities This work is funded by the ESRC Public Services Programme, grant no.
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The perils and pitfalls of productivity measurement for English local authorities This work is funded by the ESRC Public Services Programme, grant no. RES-153-25-00 60 Prof Iain McLean Dr Dirk Haubrich University of Oxford McLean & Haubrich: The perils and pitfalls of productivity measurement for English local authorities Outline of talk Productivity in the context of our project The CPA framework to assess English local authorities Pitfall 1: Vicious triangles Pitfall 2: The limits of self-assessment Pitfall 3: Inferring productivity from authorities’ expenditure & CPA scores 2 McLean & Haubrich: The perils and pitfalls of productivity measurement for English local authorities Productivity in the context of our project Productivity is only one of many issues addressed by our 12-months research project, which asks 3 questions about the assessment of local authorities: 1. Is CPA a reliable and valid measure to assess service quality in local authorities? Or is service quality influenced by external constraints, such as deprivation, discretionary expenditure, or political control? 2. Assuming that CPA is (or can be made to be) a reliable & valid measure, can it be used to capture productivity? 3. What, if anything, can England learn from Wales and Scotland? 3 McLean & Haubrich: The perils and pitfalls of productivity measurement for English local authorities The CPA Assessment Framework* * as applied between 2002 and 2004; minor changes introduced in 2005. ABILITY TO IMPROVE Self-Assessment and County Councils’ Corporate Assessment Total Score category score Council Score Councils’ ‘core services’ Category Score Category Single 2 Tier Councils’ 3 1 4 Category Less than 24 points1 Score Total Score Score Housing Education Use of resources Libraries & Leisure Environment Social Care Benefits Councils’ 1 Poor 24 to 31 ‘Ability Poor Less than 24 points 1 2 to 32 to 39OVERALL Improve’ 24 to 29 2 3 Weak ASSESSMENT category - Excellent ASSESSMENT More 40 Service score than 4 N/A 30 to 36 3 - Good FRAMEWORK - Fair More than 36 4 - Weak Education - Poor Social Services Poor Weak N/A 2 Weak Good Less than 30Fair points 3 Excellent GoodPUBLIC 30Fair to 37 REPORTING 4 Excellent Minimum Maximum 38Good to 45 Excellent Score Score IMPROVEMENT More than 45 PLANNING 4 16 4 16 Housing* 2 8 Environment 2 8 Benefits* Libraries and Leisure Resources CURRENT PERFORMANCE ON SERVICES Inspection Judgements, auditor judgements, TOTAL SCORE performance indicators, and governmental Assessments of councils’ plans 1 2 3 4 4 (using hundreds of PIs ► With such1an elaborate scheme and auditor/inspectorate judgements), CPA may be said to 1 4 present a rounded assessment of an authority’s performance, potentially1providing a basis4for productivity measurement. 15 60 Audit Commission 2002 4 McLean & Haubrich: The perils and pitfalls of productivity measurement for English local authorities Pitfall 1 – The vicious triangle (I) Indicator used in CPA and IMD/SSA: “% of pupils doing well in external assessment“ Performance on Indicator increases CPA CPA score increases ► greater SSA autonomy IMD/SSA IMD ranking decreases ► SSA grant decreases 5 McLean & Haubrich: The perils and pitfalls of productivity measurement for English local authorities Pitfall 1 – The vicious triangle (II) Implication for local authorities: If you improve your GCSE results, your CPA score goes up but your SSA share goes down. Conversely, if GCSE results worsen, SSA share goes up but your CPA score goes down. Either way you gain a (partly) financial bonus and suffer a (partly) financial penalty. You should do whichever carries the larger net bonus. Implication for central government There are two contradictory regimes in place, at least one of which must be abandoned or modified. 6 McLean & Haubrich: The perils and pitfalls of productivity measurement for English local authorities Pitfall 2 – The limits of self-assessment (I) The CPA approach relies on authorities self-assessing their ability to improve service delivery in the future. Yet, the first three CPA rounds show that their selfassessment in year t is a bad predictor for their actual performance in t+1 or t+2. 7 McLean & Haubrich: The perils and pitfalls of productivity measurement for English local authorities Pitfall 2 – The limits of self-assessment (II) CPA ratings and scores provide policy makers with information about an authority’s performance in delivering public services. These might constitute a suitable output/outcome basis for productivity measurements, but the partial reliance on self-assessment to produce these scores and ratings raises doubts about their reliability and validity. This is a problem, because the Audit Commission is currently in the process of re-designing CPA for the rounds 2008 onwards and seeks, with support from the Local Government Association (LGA), to incorporate additional elements of self-assessment. Our analysis holds even when issues regarding ‘ceilings’ and ‘moving of the goal posts’ are considered and the model is rerun. 8 McLean & Haubrich: The perils and pitfalls of productivity measurement for English local authorities Pitfall 3 – Inferring productivity from CPA & spend (I) 93.75 + LAs with high | * | * productivity? * * c | * * * * ** * Y p | * X * ** * ** * * * * * * * Z ** 3 Outliers a | * *** *** *** * * * * | * * * ***** * ****** * ** * * p | * * * **** *** ** * **** * * * * * e | * * * ******* ********* **** * * r | * **** * ****** **** * ** * * * * * * c | * *********** ** * ***** * ** e | **** **************** **** *** ** ** * * n | * *** ************ * * ** * ** * t | * *** * ** *** ** *** * * a | * * * *** ** ** * * g | * * * * * e | * **** *** * * * * s | * * * | * LAs with low | productivity? 36.6667 + * +----------------------------------------------------------------+ .915216 discretionary expenditure 2002-2004 1.33661 9 McLean & Haubrich: The perils and pitfalls of productivity measurement for English local authorities Pitfall 3 – Inferring productivity from CPA & spend (II) With such an elaborate scheme (which uses hundreds of PIs and auditor/inspectorate judgements), CPA may be said to present a rounded assessment of an authority’s performance. Potentially, then, CPA provides a suitable basis for productivity measurement and allows identifying productive (green) and unproductive (red) authorities. However, this is only true if CPA is a valid and reliable measure of public service in local authorities (for doubts, see pitfalls 1 and 2) if the formula by which central government calculates the SSA/FSS accurately assesses needs and (!) resources (see pitfall 3) But what if not? 10 McLean & Haubrich: The perils and pitfalls of productivity measurement for English local authorities End of Presentation 11 McLean & Haubrich: The perils and pitfalls of productivity measurement for English local authorities Backup Slides 12 McLean & Haubrich: The perils and pitfalls of productivity measurement for English local authorities Circularity between CPA & IMD: Preliminary Findings In the statistical model, the 100+ PIs used in the seven CPA service blocks (as dependent variable) need to be checked for potential circularity with the 27 indicators used in the IMD domains (as explanatory variable). So far, no circularity issue was found for Culture, Environment, & Benefits. Education is still being checked; Social Serv. & Housing has 4 PIs with moderate/low circularity: CPA Indicator IMD Indicator Behaviour of indicators Concern for statistical model 1 Soc. Services Adults, A0/A5: “ Emergency Admissions (Interface) percentage change on previous year in total emergency admissions to hospital per 1,000 population” Health Deprivation: “Measures of emergency admissions to hospital” CPA: ↑ (rise) of indicator (emergency admissions) MODERATE, because leads to ↑ of CPA score, which leads to ↑ in (a) very similar measures are used on both sides, financial freedom and both indicators move into the same IMD: ↑ of indicator (emergency admissions) leads direction to ↑ of level of deprivation, which leads to ↑ in financial resources. 2 Soc. Services Children, CF/A2: “Percentage of young children leaving care aged 16 or over with at least 1 GSCE at grade A*-G” Education CPA: ↑ of indicator (educational attainment of care LOW, because Deprivation: leavers) leads to ↑ of CPA score, which leads (a) CPA indicator (with a denominator of children “Average Points to ↑ in financial freedom leaving care) is only a small subset of the IMD Score of pupils at IMD: ↑ of indicator (educational attainment) leads indicator (with a denominator of all children); key stage 4 (GSCE)” to ↓ of level of deprivation, which leads to ↓ in (b) IMD indicator measures average score, while financial resources. CPA indicator has threshold of 1 GSCE. 3 Soc. Services Adults A0/C29,30: “Adults with physical/mental/learning disabilities helped to live at home per 1,000 population” Health Deprivation: CPA: ↑ of indicator (percentage of adults cared at “Comparative Illness home) leads to ↑ of CPA score, which leads and Disability Ratio” to ↑ in financial freedom IMD: ↑ of indicator (higher ratio of ill or disabled individuals) leads to ↑ of level of deprivation, which leads to ↑ in financial resources. 4 Housing BV 184b: "The percentage change in proportion of non-decent Local Authority homes between 1 April x and 1 April x+1." and definitions of “decent”. Living Environment: “Social and private housing in poor condition” LOW, because (a) the two indicators do not measure exactly the same phenomenon. (b) CPA Indicator may have to be “per 1,000 population” in the denominator, rather than “all disabled adults”? CPA: ↑ of indicator (percentage change in nonMODERATE, because decent homes) leads to ↓ of CPA score, (a) the two indicators do not measure exactly the which leads to ↓ in financial freedom same phenomenon, but IMD: ↑ of indicator (housing in poor condition) (b) on the IMD side, the indicator has a leads to ↑ of level of deprivation, which leads considerable weight on the IMD composite 13 to ↑ in financial resources. McLean & Haubrich: The perils and pitfalls of productivity measurement for English local authorities The CPA Assessment Framework ABILITY TO IMPROVE Self-Assessment and Corporate Assessment OVERALL ASSESSMENT - Excellent - Good - Fair - Weak - Poor PUBLIC REPORTING IMPROVEMENT PLANNING Housing Education Use of resources Libraries & Leisure Environment Social Care ASSESSMENT FRAMEWORK Benefits The CPA Assessment Framework CURRENT PERFORMANCE ON SERVICES Inspection Judgements, auditor judgements, performance indicators, and governmental Assessments of councils’ plans Audit Commission 2002 14