Transcript Konrad Talmont-Kaminski (Marie Curie-Sklodowska U., Poland)  Philosopher of science  Investigating superstitious and religious beliefs  Their relation to human rationality  Using  Cognitive.

Konrad Talmont-Kaminski (Marie Curie-Sklodowska U., Poland)
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Philosopher of science
 Investigating superstitious and religious beliefs
 Their relation to human rationality
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Using
 Cognitive approaches
 Evolutionary explanations of human behaviour
 Philosophy of science
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Adaptive misbeliefs
Protecting misbeliefs
Plausible misbeliefs
Desirability of misbeliefs
Investigating misbeliefs
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Misbeliefs can motivate adaptive behaviour
 Fear of Fri 13th leads to avoiding train crash
▪ Coincidental
▪ Only significant if systematic
 Possible systematic examples
▪ Magical contagion
▪ Religion
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Magical Contagion (Paul Rozin)
 Cardigan example (Bruce Hood)
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Fear of ‘catching’ evil
Invisible vehicles of contagion passed by contact
Very useful given bacteria & viruses
False explanation, partly true (overgeneralised)
correlation
 Role of explanation?
▪ Ideas of magical contagion motivate behaviour
▪ Ideas of magical contagion post hoc explanation of
behaviour
 Studied extensively by Paul Rozin
▪ Misbelief explained as by-product of cognitive heuristic
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The “boy who cried wolf” problem
 Misbelief in the face of counterevidence
 McKay and Dennett, BBS (forthcoming)
 Misbelief unstable due to
counterevidence
▪ Can not be systematically adaptive
 Disproved misbeliefs
▪ Rejected
▪ Reinterpreted
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Misbeliefs can be protected against
counterevidence
 Talmont-Kaminski, BBS (forthcoming) & Teorema
28.3
 Protected misbeliefs stable
 Can still motivate behaviour
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Three ways to protect misbeliefs
 Content
 Social context
 Methodological context
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Content of stable misbeliefs
 Avoid content in direct conflict with experience
 Claim epistemic impediments
▪ Invisibility – ghosts, Christian god
▪ Shyness – faeries
▪ Distant locale – dragons, Olympic gods
▪ Shape-shifting – Olympic gods
▪ Vagueness – New Age beliefs
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Problem
 Belief in the face of the lack of evidence
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Social context of misbeliefs
 Make investigation of misbeliefs socially
unacceptable
▪ The sacred – religious and magical beliefs
▪ Religious relics
▪ Respecting religious beliefs above
other kinds
▪ Disparage curiosity
▪ Oppose rational criticism
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Problem
 Stultifies progress
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Methodological context of misbeliefs
 Related to social context
 Limit access to science
▪ Scientific equipment
▪ Scientific methods
▪ Scientific attitudes
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Problem
 Limited access to science
 Not an issue traditionally
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Why believe without evidence?
 Not really a problem
 Only problem with perfectly rational beings
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Why believe without evidence the things we
do?
 Primarily: Due to the particularities of human
cognitive system
 Secondarily: Due to function of the beliefs
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By-products of cognitive heuristics
 Type I errors (Skinner, Error
Management Theory)
 Magical contagion (Rozin)
 Cognitive science of religion
▪ Minimally counterintuitive concepts
(Boyer)
▪ Hyperactive agency detection device
(Guthrie)
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What, if anything, is the function
of misbeliefs?
Not to accurately represent the
world
 Protecting against disconfirmation
ensures truth of a belief is
coincidental
 Allows other functions to determine
popularity of belief
 Function must depend upon the
behaviour motivated by the belief
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Several possibilities
 Adaptive for individuals
▪ Costly-signalling (Sosis)
 Adaptive for groups
▪ Pro-social behaviour (D. S. Wilson)
 Adaptive for beliefs
▪ Memetic virus (Dawkins, Blackmore)
 Not directly functional
▪ Simply a by-product (Boyer)
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Which thesis about function is correct?
 Need to investigate religion to find out
 Answer may be complex
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Is religion is something desirable for us?
 Universally assumed by religious individuals
▪ Dennett’s “Belief in belief”
 Need to investigate religion to find out
 Not necessarily even if an individual adaptation
▪ Dennett’s question: Who thinks that their goal in life is
to have as many kids as possible?
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Problem
 Investigation of religion
▪ Requires scientific attitude
 Maintaining positive effects of religious claims
▪ Requires maintaining belief in those claims
▪ Which requires
▪ Protecting those beliefs
 Investigation of religion undermines its function
▪ Even if that function happens to be individually
desirable
Thank you
Konrad Talmont-Kaminski
[email protected]
deisidaimon.wordpress.com
McKay & Dennett Evolution of
Misbelief, Behavioral & Brain
Sciences (forthcoming)
Talmont-Kaminski, Effective
untestability and bounded
rationality help to see religion
is adaptive misbelief,
Behavioral & Brain Sciences
(forthcoming)
Talmont-Kaminski, Fixation of
superstitious beliefs, Teorema
28.3