Desirability of religion and the non-cognitive function of misbeliefs Konrad Talmont-Kaminski Marie Curie-Sklodowska U., Poland.
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Desirability of religion and the non-cognitive function of misbeliefs Konrad Talmont-Kaminski Marie Curie-Sklodowska U., Poland Background Philosopher of science Investigating superstitious, magical and religious beliefs and practices As cognitive, evolved phenomena Their relation to science and human rationality PhD from Monash Uni, Australia Teaching in Lublin, Poland Fellowship at the Konrad Lorenz Institute for Evolution and Cognition Research Background Two developments make my approach possible The cognitive turn 1960’s onwards Positing mental mechanisms to explain behaviour Applied to religious & superstitious practices Evolutionary explanations of human behaviour 1970’s onwards Ultimate vs. proximate explanations Behaviours as adaptive, byproducts, etc. Cultural as well as genetic evolution Applied to religious & superstitious practices Background Cognitive Science of Religion Pascal Boyer, Justin Barrett Religion as byproduct Evolutionary psychology Massive modularity Dual-process accounts of reasoning Other approaches exist Approach pursued by me Religion as a cultural adaptation that exapts/recruits existing cognitive byproducts Dual inheritance theory Bounded rationality theory Plan How can misbeliefs be adaptive? In what ways can misbeliefs be protected? What makes certain misbeliefs plausible? Why are some misbeliefs potentially desirable? What effect does investigating misbeliefs have? Adaptive misbeliefs Misbeliefs can motivate adaptive behaviour Fear of Fri 13th leads to avoiding train crash Coincidental Only significant if systematic Possible systematic examples Magical contagion Religion Adaptive misbeliefs Magical Contagion (Paul Rozin) Cardigan example (Bruce Hood) Role of explanation? Fear of ‘catching’ evil Invisible vehicles of contagion passed by contact Very useful given bacteria & viruses False explanation, partly true (overgeneralised) correlation Ideas of magical contagion motivate behaviour Ideas of magical contagion post hoc explanation of behaviour Studied extensively by Paul Rozin Misbelief explained as byproduct of cognitive heuristic Adaptive misbeliefs McKay and Dennett, BBS 32.6 (2009) The “boy who cried wolf” problem Misbelief in the face of counterevidence Misbelief unstable due to counterevidence Disproved misbeliefs Can not be systematically adaptive Rejected Reinterpreted Contagion example Belief that you can catch evil not adaptive But, belief in contagion in general is Protecting misbeliefs Misbeliefs can be protected against counterevidence Talmont-Kaminski, BBS 32.6 & Teorema 28.3 (2009) Protected misbeliefs stable Can still motivate behaviour Three ways to protect misbeliefs Content Social context Methodological context Protecting misbeliefs Content of stable misbeliefs Avoid content in direct conflict with experience Claim epistemic impediments Semi-propositional content (Sperber) Invisibility – ghosts, Christian god Shyness – faeries Distant locale – dragons, Olympic gods Shape-shifting – Olympic gods Vagueness – New Age beliefs Holy Trinity Apparent problem Belief in the face of the lack of evidence Protecting misbeliefs Social context of misbeliefs Make investigation of misbeliefs socially unacceptable The sacred – religious and magical beliefs Religious relics Respecting religious beliefs above other beliefs Disparage curiosity Oppose rational criticism Problem Stultifies progress Protecting misbeliefs Methodological context of misbeliefs Related to social context Limit development of science Scientific theories Scientific methods/equipment Scientific attitudes Problem Limited access to science Not such an issue traditionally Plausible misbeliefs Why believe without evidence? Not really a problem Only problem with perfectly rational beings Boundedly rational beings will have systematic biases Why believe without evidence the things we do? Primarily: Due to the particularities of human cognitive system Due to the particular heuristics humans use Secondarily: Due to function of the beliefs Plausible misbeliefs By-products of cognitive heuristics Type I errors (Skinner) Magical contagion (Rozin) Contagion heuristic Cognitive science of religion Error Management Theory (Haselton) Smoke alarm principle Minimally counterintuitive concepts (Boyer) Hyperactive agency detection device (Guthrie) Enormous scope for further empirical research Desirability of misbeliefs What, if anything, is the function of misbeliefs? Not to accurately represent the world Protecting against disconfirmation ensures truth of a belief is coincidental Allows noncognitive functions to determine popularity of belief Function must depend upon the behaviour motivated by the belief Desirability of misbeliefs Several possibilities Adaptive for individuals Adaptive for groups Prosocial behaviour (D. S. Wilson) Adaptive for beliefs Costly-signalling (Sosis) Memetic virus (Dawkins, Blackmore) Not directly functional Simply a byproduct (Boyer) Desirability of misbeliefs Which thesis about function is correct? Need to investigate religion to find out Answer may be complex Superstitions – byproducts Religions – prosocial exaptations (ancestral traits?) Is religion is something desirable for us? Universally assumed by religious individuals Dennett’s “Belief in belief” Need to investigate religion to find out Not necessarily even if an individual-level adaptation Dennett’s question: Who thinks that their goal in life is to have as many kids as possible? Issue is somewhat more complex, of course Still, Dennett has a point Investigating misbeliefs Even if religious is desirable Investigation of religion Requires maintaining belief in those claims Which requires protecting those beliefs Investigation of religion undermines its function Requires scientific attitude Maintaining positive effects of religious claims There is a problem Even if that function happens to be individually desirable But to determine if religion is desirable we must investigate it Thank you Konrad Talmont-Kaminski [email protected] lublin.academia.edu/ KonradTalmontKaminski McKay & Dennett, Evolution of Misbelief, BBS 32.6 (2009) Talmont-Kaminski, Effective untestability and bounded rationality help in seeing religion as adaptive misbelief, BBS 32.6 (2009) Talmont-Kaminski, Fixation of superstitious beliefs, Teorema 28.3 (2009)