Preparing to Be Unprepared: Human Resources Susanne Jul, PhD Pacific Disaster Center [email protected] Presented by: Canadian Centre for Emergency Preparedness.
Download ReportTranscript Preparing to Be Unprepared: Human Resources Susanne Jul, PhD Pacific Disaster Center [email protected] Presented by: Canadian Centre for Emergency Preparedness.
Preparing to Be Unprepared: Human Resources Susanne Jul, PhD Pacific Disaster Center [email protected] Presented by: Canadian Centre for Emergency Preparedness Disclaimer • Work done, in part, at the Pacific Disaster Center under a National Research Council postdoctoral fellowship • However, not directly related to PDC operations – PDC operations focused on geographic information analysis (primarily for mitigation efforts) • Research supplemented with personal experience with American Red Cross Disaster Services © SJul 2007 2 WCDM 2007 Anne © SJul 2007 3 WCDM 2007 To Be Prepared We need to have a) b) c) d) e) f) g) © SJul 2007 More people More planning More training More exercises More supplies More money All of the above 4 WCDM 2007 But, What About When We don’t have a) b) c) d) e) f) g) © SJul 2007 More people? More planning? More training? More exercises? More supplies? More money? All of the above? 5 WCDM 2007 Claim • Preparedness is an illusion – It is impossible to prepare for all possible events • Responders and response organizations need to function in situations and under circumstances for which they are unprepared © SJul 2007 6 WCDM 2007 Preparedness Is An Illusion Sociological Evidence • Disaster sociology has been a field of systematic study since ~1950 • Literature predominantly reflects responses to natural disasters in North America • Three dimensions of events correlated with response characteristics – Scale – Kind – “Anticipability” © SJul 2007 8 WCDM 2007 Scale • A measure of the extent of the effects of an event 5, 6, 9, 12 Local Emergency Example 1997 Paris traffic accident Impact on community infrastructure Local Disaster Catastrophic Disaster 9/11 Terrorist attack, 1989 Loma Prieta earthquake 1918 Flu Pandemic, 2004 US hurricane season, 2005 Hurricane Katrina Localized effects, if any Localized damage or loss Extensive damage or destruction Impact on response infrastructure Largely unaffected Localized damage or loss Extensive damage or destruction, and/or completely overwhelmed Adequacy of response measures Within local planning Exceeds local capacity but within greater response capacity Exceeds all planning and capacity Organizational emergence Only established organizations mobilized Scope Only part of single community and official jurisdiction affected Single community and official jurisdiction affected Multiple communities and official jurisdictions affected Duration Hours-weeks Weeks-months Months-years © SJul 2007 2006 Mountain View apartment complex fire Disaster Established and expanding organizations mobilized Established, expanding, extending and emergent organizations mobilized 9 WCDM 2007 Organizational Emergence • Emergence – Spontaneous involvement and behavior of individuals and organizations 3, 4, 5, 6 Tasks Routine Operational Organizational Structure Non-Routine Same as predisaster I. Established (e.g., city emergency services) III. Extending (e.g., city council or church community) New II. Expanding (e.g., American Red Cross) IV. Emergent (e.g., community group formed to collect donations) “DRC typology” 6 © SJul 2007 10 WCDM 2007 Scale • A measure of the extent of the effects of an event 5, 6, 9, 12 Local Emergency Example 1997 Paris traffic accident Impact on community infrastructure Local Disaster Catastrophic Disaster 9/11 Terrorist attack, 1989 Loma Prieta earthquake 1918 Flu Pandemic, 2004 US hurricane season, 2005 Hurricane Katrina Localized effects, if any Localized damage or loss Extensive damage or Impact on response infrastructure Largely unaffected Localized damage or loss Extensive damage or destruction, and/or completely overwhelmed Adequacy of response measures Within local planning Exceeds local capacity but within greater response capacity Exceeds all planning and capacity Organizational emergence Only established organizations mobilized Scope Only part of single community and official jurisdiction affected Duration © SJul 2007 Hours-weeks 2006 Mountain View apartment complex fire Disaster There will always be a response destruction that exceeds actual preparedness Established and expanding organizations mobilized Established, expanding, extending and emergent organizations mobilized Single community and official jurisdiction affected Multiple communities and official jurisdictions affected Even small responses depend on responders and responding organizations with limited or no training, Weeks-months Months-years knowledge or experience in disaster management 11 WCDM 2007 Kind • An indicator of the types of effects of an event 6, 11, 13 Agency 10 Consensus Affect 6 © SJul 2007 Conflict Community disaster Natural hazard event Social conflicts Sector disaster Technology failure Sabotage Trans-system social rupture (TSSR) 12 Pandemic Computer virus 12 WCDM 2007 Kind • An indicator of the types of effects of an event 6, 11, 13 Agency 10 Consensus Affect 6 Conflict Community disaster Natural hazard event Social conflicts Sector disaster Technology failure Sabotage Trans-system social rupture (TSSR) 12 Pandemic Computer virus Many responses depend on responders with specialized skills that are unrelated to conventional disaster management © SJul 2007 13 WCDM 2007 “Anticipability” • A measure of the possibility of preparing for a particular event 7 There will always be a response that we have not imagined or believed could be needed Predictability = Imaginability + Believability Easy Influenceability Hard Easy 1. Conventional (e.g., 1986 Chernobyl) 2. Unexpected (e.g., 1979 Three Mile Island) Hard 3. Intractable (e.g., 2005 Hurricane Katrina) 4. Fundamental (e.g., 9/11 Terrorist attack) There will always be a response that we cannot anticipate © SJul 2007 14 WCDM 2007 Summary 1. Even small responses depend on responders and responding organizations with limited or no training, knowledge or experience in disaster management 2. There will always be a response that exceeds actual preparedness 3. Many responses depend on responders with specialized skills that are unrelated to conventional disaster management skills 4. There will always be a response that we have not imagined or believed could be needed 5. There will always be a response that we cannot anticipate © SJul 2007 15 WCDM 2007 In Other Words, • Preparedness is an illusion – It is impossible to prepare for all possible events • Responders and response organizations need to function in situations and under circumstances for which they are unprepared © SJul 2007 16 WCDM 2007 But Wait! • Even if it were possible to prepare for all possible events, resource limitations make it impossible • In fact, resource limitations make it impossible to prepare for those events for which it is possible to prepare © SJul 2007 17 WCDM 2007 Resource Limitations • Planners generally not resource controllers 1, 10 – Public vs. private sector – Staff vs. line management • Given the reality of limited resources, resource controllers must prioritize certain, near-certain and immediate threats (i.e., routine events) 10 – Perceived low-probability and distant threats (i.e., disasters) lose out © SJul 2007 18 WCDM 2007 Scared? • Can’t prepare for all possible events • Even if we could, we don’t have the necessary resources • Yet everyone expects (and needs) us to be prepared for any event! What to do? © SJul 2007 19 WCDM 2007 Continue Conventional Preparedness Work on getting a) b) c) d) e) f) g) More people More planning More training More exercises More supplies More money All of the above Prepare Not to Be Scared! © SJul 2007 20 WCDM 2007 Prepare to Be Unprepared • Augment conventional preparedness • Prepare responders and response organizations to leverage available resources – People – Supplies © SJul 2007 Prepare to Be Scared! 21 WCDM 2007 Preparing to Be Unprepared (PUp): Human Resources Problem • Current response model is expert model – Prepare expert responders and teams to accomplish response – Develop expertise before performing response tasks Task-relevant knowledge Task-specific Knowledge of disaster response © SJul 2007 General domain Little Extensive Super-expert Functional semi-expert Functional inexpert Some Expert Semi-expert Functional inexpert Little Specialist Semi-specialist Inexpert 23 WCDM 2007 Problem • Current response model is expert model – Prepare expert responders and teams to accomplish response – Develop expertise before performing response tasks Task-relevant knowledge Task-specific Knowledge of disaster response © SJul 2007 General domain Little Extensive Super-expert Functional semi-expert Functional inexpert Some Expert Semi-expert Functional inexpert Little Specialist Semi-specialist Inexpert 24 WCDM 2007 Reality • Experts are a scarce resource – We can’t train enough of them in advance – We can’t train the right expertise in advance – If further learning is not supported, crash courses are often just that Task-relevant knowledge Task-specific Knowledge of disaster response © SJul 2007 General domain Little Extensive Super-expert Functional semi-expert Functional inexpert Some Expert Semi-expert Functional inexpert Little Specialist Semi-specialist Inexpert 25 WCDM 2007 Reality • Experts are a scarce resource – We can’t train enough of them in advance – We can’t train the right expertise in advance – If further learning is not supported, crash courses are often just that Task-relevant knowledge Task-specific Knowledge of disaster response © SJul 2007 General domain Little Extensive Super-expert Functional semi-expert Functional inexpert Some Expert Semi-expert Functional inexpert Little Specialist Semi-specialist Inexpert 26 WCDM 2007 PUp Strategy • Plan for semi- and inexpert responders and response organizations to accomplish response • Prepare for developing expertise while performing response tasks • Reserve experts to guide, teach and mentor Task-relevant knowledge Task-specific Knowledge of disaster response © SJul 2007 General domain Little Extensive Super-expert Functional semi-expert Functional inexpert Some Expert Semi-expert Functional inexpert Little Specialist Semi-specialist Inexpert 27 WCDM 2007 PUp Techniques • • • • • Prepare tools and matériel for inexperts Train coach responders Leverage remote expertise Plan and train to co-source quotidian tasks Get ready to catch the wave © SJul 2007 28 WCDM 2007 Prepare Tools and Matériel • For use by inexperts – Affix instructions critical to usage – Prioritize learnability in selection • For inexperts – Design to foster just-in-time and collateral learning – Promote dual-purpose tools © SJul 2007 29 WCDM 2007 Train Coach Responders • Onsite trainer – No direct response responsibilities – Provides tactical “what” and “how to” guidance to semi- and inexpert responders – Must have coaching skills and understanding of response tasks – Should be kept informed about operational goals, strategies and needs © SJul 2007 30 WCDM 2007 Train Coach Responders • Onsite team builder – Responsible for (or assists with) direct response tasks – Develops ad-hoc team of available responders to accomplish task – Must have team development and leadership skills – Can be paired with responders with knowledge of response task © SJul 2007 31 WCDM 2007 Leverage Remote Expertise • Remote mentoring – Expert or specialist responder supporting semi- or inexpert responder, e.g., by phone – Relationships and trust developed at individual personal level © SJul 2007 32 WCDM 2007 Leverage Remote Expertise • Responder support service, e.g., via hotline or website – Pool of expert or specialist responders as responder support staff – Continuous service (potentially 24/7) – Pooled expertise – Relationships and trust established at the organizational level © SJul 2007 33 WCDM 2007 Co-source Quotidian Tasks • Quotidian – Daily, ordinary, common-place • Quotidian task – Specialized, outsourceable, non-response-specific • Dual-purpose organization 2 – Primary purpose not disaster-related, but capabilities are response-relevant © SJul 2007 34 WCDM 2007 Co-source Quotidian Tasks • Engage non-response organizations to perform tasks that are part of their normal operations – Look for candidate tasks during planning – Train responders to look for and recognize quotidian tasks and dual-purpose organizations – Train responders to work with non-“command and control” organizational structures – Develop response-time procedures for establishing and maintaining co-sourcing relationships © SJul 2007 35 WCDM 2007 Catch the Wave • Allow external experts to take ownership of projects to benefit future responses – Compile “needed projects” descriptions in advance – Implement development projects (even if not immediately deployable) – Solicit innovative solutions to operational needs (even if not immediately practicable) – Evaluate and test development projects using operational inputs (even if not actually deployed) © SJul 2007 36 WCDM 2007 Summary Summary • Three dimensions of disaster correlated with qualitative differences in ensuing responses – Scale – Kind – Anticipability • Preparedness is an illusion – It is impossible to prepare for all possible events – Even if it were possible to prepare for all possible events, resource limitations make it impossible • Must prepare responders and response organizations to leverage available resources Jul, S. (2007). Who’s Really on First? A Domain-Level User, Task and Context Analysis for Response Technology. Proceedings of the 4th International ISCRAM Conference. © SJul 2007 38 WCDM 2007 Summary • Techniques for preparing to leverage available human resources – – – – – Prepare tools and matériel for inexperts Train coach responders Leverage remote expertise Plan and train to co-source quotidian tasks Get ready to catch the wave © SJul 2007 39 WCDM 2007 Prepare not to be scared to be scared to be prepared © SJul 2007 & 40 to be unprepared WCDM 2007 Thanks to • The Pacific Disaster Center and the US National Research Council for financial support • Steve Hailey, American Red Cross, for leading by example © SJul 2007 41 WCDM 2007 References 1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6. 7. 8. 9. 10. 11. 12. 13. Auf der Heide, E. (1989). Disaster Response: Principles of Preparation and Coordination. St. Louis, MO: C.V. Mosby Company. Bankoff, G. (2002). Cultures of Disaster: Society and Natural Hazards in the Philippines. Routledge. Drabek, T.E., McEntire, D.A. (2002). Emergent Phenomena and Multiorganizational Coordination in Disasters: Lessons from the Research Literature. International Journal of Mass Emergencies and Disasters, 20(2):197-224. Drabek, T.E., McEntire, D.A. (2003). Emergent Phenomena and the Sociology of Disaster: Lessons, Trends and Opportunties from the Research Literature. Disaster Prevention and Management, 12(2):97-113. Dynes, R. R. (1970). Organized Behavior in Disaster. Lexington, MA: Heath Lexington Books. Dynes, R. R. (1998). Coming to Terms with Community Disaster. In Quarantelli, E.L., What Is a Disaster? Perspectives on the Question. Routledge:109-126. Gundel, S. (2005). Towards a New Typology of Crises. Journal of Contingencies & Crisis Management, 13(3):106-115. Jul, S. (2007). Who’s Really on First? A Domain-Level User, Task and Context Analysis for Response Technology. Proceedings of the 4th International ISCRAM Conference. Delft, the Netherlands, May 2007. Kreps, G.A. (1998). Disaster as Systemic and Social Event. In Quarantelli, E.L., What Is a Disaster? Perspectives on the Question. Routledge: 31-55. McConnell, A., Drennan, L. (2006). Mission Impossible? Planning and Preparing for Crisis. Journal of Contingencies & Crisis Management, Jun, Vol. 14 Issue 2, p59-70. Quarantelli, E.L. (1993). Community Crises: An Exploratory Comparison of the Characteristics of and Consequences of Disasters and Riots. Journal of Contingencies & Crisis Management, 1(2):67-78. Quarantelli, E.L. (2005/9/26). “Catastrophes are Different from Disasters: Some Implications for Crisis Planning and Managing Drawn from Katrina.” Online posting. The Social Science Research Council forum: Understanding Katrina: Perspectives from the Social Sciences. 2006/12/14. <http://understandingkatrina.ssrc.org/Quarantelli/>. Quarantelli, E.L. (2006). The Disasters of the 21st Century: A Mixture of New, Old, and Mixed Types. Online proceedings. The Third Annual MaGrann Research Conference. <http://geography.rutgers.edu/events/magrann_conference/2006/papers/quarantelli.pdf>. © SJul 2007 42 WCDM 2007