Transcript PowerPoint プレゼンテーション

Global Politics:
Classical theories
Klaus Segbers
MGIMO/ FUB
March 29, 2005
The Game of Theories
Positivism/ Ratchoice
World
systems
Reflectivism/ Constructivism
Institutions
Cognitive
(Neo)
Realism
Liberalism/
domestic
IR/ GP Theories
copyright klaus segbers 2005
A World of States!
For a long time, international politics was
defined and understood as politics between
states.
Accordingly, IP/ IR require the existence and
interaction of and between states.
Also, reflections on the state are quite old:
theories of state, state-based law, etc.
copyright klaus segbers 2005
A World of States?
At the same time, clear definitions of
“the” state always were problematic.
Today, it is more problematic than ever
to maintain that states are the only,. Or
even the main players on the globe.
copyright klaus segbers 2005
State: Evolution
There were social entities w/o a state. The
modern state is a rather new phenomenon.
It very well may be that the state is, after all,
a transitory phenomenon.
The Westphalian system (1648-1991) was
preceded (and may be replaced) by world
orders which do not require the modern
nation state as the core unit.
Various forms of states characterized political
history starting from the ancient Greek polis.
copyright klaus segbers 2005
States: Attributes
Administration (not bargaining)
Territoriality (not nomadism)
Internal sovereignty, esp. power monopoly
Social homogenization (not patchworks etc.)
External sovereignty (no interference in domestic
affairs)
Citizenship/ Statsbürgerschaft (not multiple identities)
National identity (not regional or other)
Borders, indicating domestic/ foreign spheres
Symbols
copyright klaus segbers 2005
What is this about?
Explaining cooperation between actors
and coordination of actions
Explaining In/Stability
Explaining In/Security
copyright klaus segbers 2005
Realism: Core ideas (1)
The context is anarchic
Actors are unitary (state) actors
States (container-states) must survive;
they live in a competitive, even
dangerous context
Therefore they engaged in self-help
This makes cooperation less likely (and
reasonable)
copyright klaus segbers 2005
Realism: core ideas (2)
Human nature is power oriented
What matters, therefore, is power maximization
Military power is the decisive currency of power
Gains are relative gains
Balancing and coalition building is possible, but
its effects are always temporary
copyright klaus segbers 2005
Core thinkers and ideas (1)
Classical realisms is characterized by some
names and writings (s. req. reading):
Thucydides („adapt the natural reality of
unequal power“ – Melos dialogue)
Machiavelli („Maxims of realist statecraft“, the
world is dangerous; civic virtue aspect)
Hobbes (state of nature >>> permanent
‘state of war‘)
copyright klaus segbers 2005
Core thinkers and ideas (2)
20th century approaches:
Morgenthau, neoclassical realism („men
and women are political animals, born
to pursue power“)
Schelling, strategic realism (foreign
policy decision making, game theories,
neutral toward values)
copyright klaus segbers 2005
Neo-Realism (1)
A move toward more scientific credentials
Waltz: (only) structure matters
Structure is anarchic
States are units, being shaped by this
structure
States act in this macro-configuration
The result is the international outcome
Nothing else matters, incl. human nature
copyright klaus segbers 2005
Neo-Realism (2)
• Mearsheimer: bipolar systems are
inherently more stable than multi-polar
systens of IR
• In general: rather pessimist prospects
for peace and stability
copyright klaus segbers 2005
Realism: questions and critique
• Are states unitary actors?
• Is territoriality a given?
• How many classical states are around these
days?
• What about the validity of sovereignty?
• The pursue of (individual) survival and the
resulting security dilemma
• Borders or cleavages, stable or fluid?
• Domestic/ foreign dichotomy- still valid?
copyright klaus segbers 2005
2
Institutionalism
There is some confusion re. how to label this
approach.
Suggestions are: institutionalism,
functionalism, idealism…
Also, this is close to regime theories.
Others talk about „neoliberal institutionalism“.
copyright klaus segbers 2005
Definition of institutions
Institutions are …
rules of the game
formal or informal (examples?)
legal or illegal
effective or not
constraints – and opportunities – for actors
not organizations
rules - instructions for interaction
copyright klaus segbers 2005
Definitions of institutions (2)
Institutions are formal and informal
rules that constrain individual behavior
and shape human interaction.
(Douglass North)
copyright klaus segbers 2005
Basic assumptions (1)
Institutionalists have a similar understanding
of the international system (anarchic) and the
state (unitary) as realists (next week).
Yet, they are saying that the state can be
embedded in rules and act in such a way that
its inherent behavior – utility maximizing
leading to permanent instability – can be
overcome by utility maximizing – leading to
increasing interdependence b/w states,
thereby producing stability and cooperation.
copyright klaus segbers 2005
Basic assumptions (2)
Institutionalists realize that modern societies
are characterized by complex schemes of
division of labor. This makes them vulnerable
for dysfunctions, for example by attacks.
So governments may develop an interest to
intertwine and integrate some of their
functional spheres with other societies –
resulting in networks, and in increasing
mutual vulnerability.
copyright klaus segbers 2005
Basic assumptions (3)
Regimes and institutions can be useful, so
their proponents, because they do not rest on
appeals and values, or altruism, but because
they serve mutual interests.
Therefore, they can be integrated into
interests, or even preferences, of state (or
other wp) actors – who expect utilities from
regimes.
copyright klaus segbers 2005
Sources
Disciplinary source: economics
Meta-theoretical source:
(not only) ratchoice
copyright klaus segbers 2005
Neoinstituional Concepts:
Transaction costs (TACs)
TACs are investments for initiating, measuring,
proceeding, monitoring, control and correction of
(originally: economic) exchanges.
This can be translated into wp/ ir language: costs of
interaction and non/cooperation.
I.e. all kinds of investments for preparing treaties/
contracts, and also for informal rules, and for
evaluating contract fulfillment.
Institutions are designed, and maintained, to reduce
TACs.
copyright klaus segbers 2005
Neoinstitutional Concepts:
Principal Agent
PRINCIPAL
AGENTS
AGENTS
PRINCIPALS
AGENTS
copyright klaus segbers 2005
Formally:
Top – down: Tasks, resources
Bottom – up: Fulfillment, deliveries
Informally:
Hidden action, information, resources
copyright klaus segbers 2005
Neoinstitutional concepts:
Institutional Change (1)
... is initiated by actors
... generated by context modifications (like
relative prices >>> changing preferences)
... aims at better utility maximization (profit –
rents – security – survival)
... proceeds mostly evolutionary/ gradually
... but sometimes also as a rupture
(revolution, war)
copyright klaus segbers 2005
Institutional Change (2)
Actors’ moves always are limited/ constrained by
institutions.
At the same time, institutions are modified by
recalculations of actors’ preferences or interests.
Working and stable institutions provide security and
stability.
Institutional change is unevitable. There are probably
no eternal institutions.
Institutional change starts directed and intentional,
but the outcome may be different.
copyright klaus segbers 2005
Institutional change (3):
Path dependency
This is an important concept that explains
the limits of change.
Generally speaking, there are multiple
options for changing institutions – in theory.
But only those of them have some
opportunity to be realized who correspond to
former institutional legacies.
Ex’l: EE
copyright klaus segbers 2005
Regimes
Regimes are inter- or transnational
institutions.
Functionally, there are hardly any
differences.
copyright klaus segbers 2005
Regimes: Definition
Regimes are „sets of implicit or explicit
principles, norms, rules, and decision
making procedures around which
actors‘ expectations converge in a given
area of international relations.
(Stephen Krasner)
copyright klaus segbers 2005
Institutionalism: questions and critique
• When institutionalism is such a great
concept, why do institutions not work
better? Why do they fail?
• What about actors‘ time horizons?
copyright klaus segbers 2005
3
Liberalism/ pluralism
The dependent variables are, still, aspects of
international or world politics.
But the domestic context (structures) will be
brought in as an independent variable.
This is different from explaining domestic
events/ processes by international factors
(like globalization).
This is different, too, from explaining state
behavior by system-level qualities (anarchy;
distribution of capabilities/ information)
copyright klaus segbers 2005
Core assumptions of Liberalism (1)
• In an IR context, liberalism means that
democratic states don‘t fight each other
– this is the theory of democratic peace.
• But note: democracies do fight nondemocracies.
copyright klaus segbers 2005
Core assumptions of liberalism (2)
The basic tenet of liberal approaches in
IR is that „state-society relations - the
relationship of states to the domestic
and transnational social context in
which they are embedded - have a
fundamental impact on state behavior
in world politics“.
Andrew Moravcsik 1997, p 513
copyright klaus segbers 2005
Core assumptionsof liberalism (3)
This kind of approach is not compatible with
-- states as „black boxes“
-- states as “containers”
-- states as unitary actors
-- states as rational decision makers (though it
may be compatible with ratchoice!)
-- states as effective resource mobilizers
copyright klaus segbers 2005
Core assumptions of liberalism (4)
Rather, societies and social actors are the level/
object of analysis.
There is a primacy of societal actors: individuals &
social groups.
They act and interact, they build coalitions, they
lobby, they put pressure on bureaucracies, they act –
collectively or individually.
Political actors are dependent on election cycles (and,
in general, on time…).
This is what being „liberal“ or „plural“ means in this
ir-context.
copyright klaus segbers 2005
Core assumption of Moravcsik
“… states do not automatically
maximize fixed, homogeneous
conceptions of security, sovereignty, or
wealth per se, as realists and
institutionalists assume.“
copyright klaus segbers 2005
Variant: ideational liberalism
Societal preferences concerning the
scope and content of the „nation“
Commitment of individuals and social
groups to particular political institutions
(regime types)
Nature of legitimate socioeconomic
regulation and redistribution
copyright klaus segbers 2005
Variant: commercial liberalism
Patterns of market incentives facing domestic
and transnational economic actors
Important: Not only free trade
In general: The greater economic benefits for
private actors, the greater their incentive to
press governments to facilitate such
transactions.
copyright klaus segbers 2005
Variant: republican liberalism
... means the mode of domestic political
representation which determines whose
social preferences are institutionally
privileged.
Rent seeking is an important mode of
action.
copyright klaus segbers 2005
Variant: two-level games (R. Putnam)
In int‘l negotiations, people actually sit
at 2 tables at the same time: int‘l, and
domestic.
All possible int‘s outcomes need
domestic ratification.
The sum of all possible outcomes to be
ratified is a win set.
copyright klaus segbers 2005
Variant: transnationalism
• Here social actors are perceived as
transnational (non-state) actors and
players on the world politics arena.
• Their prospects to intrude other
societies depend on those societies‘
(„domestic“) structures.
copyright klaus segbers 2005
Liberalism: questions and problems
This school requires research strategies which
are
complex
related to contexts;
may require case studies;
are necessarily comparative.
You never succeed in identifying a domestic
structure/ coalition once and for ever – they
are permanently shifting.
copyright klaus segbers 2005