Alessandro Innocenti

Università di Siena LabSi Experimental Economics Laboratory BefinLab The Research Laboratory for Behavioral Finance (in collaboration with

Francesco Feri

and

Paolo Pin

)

EXPERIMENTAL ECONOMICS AND ECONOMIC MODELLING

Second University of Naples, Capua, 3-4 June 2011 .

 Apesteguia and Palacios-Huerta (AP 2010) provide empirical data (from a randomized natural experiment) that in a strictly competitive environment, i.e. 129 penalty shoot-outs in the major international soccer competitions, kicking first significantly increases the probability of winning.  They interpret this finding as evidence that kicking second put players under psychological pressure, which would hinder their scoring probability.

 AP 2010 do not identify the precise psychological mechanism that generates the result  What they identify is that the nature of the mechanism is psychological, but not which one it is  This would imply that their claim could not extended to different types of competitive environments without further qualifications

 Kocher, Lenz and Sutter (2010) check the robustness of the result on a larger data set including 470 shoot-outs in the major international soccer competitions  They find that the probability of winning for the first-kicking teams is not significantly different from 50% (53.4%), in contrast with the 59.2% reported by AP  They conclude that AP’s “claim of a significant first-mover advantage is not generally robust.”

1. During the game penalties are usually kicked by the team’s specialist, while in shoot-outs most kickers face a largely uncommon decision-making environment. Team performance could be consequently attributed to individual differences in cognitive anxiety. 2. Players’ heterogeneity could also make relevant the penalty kicks sequence, which is not randomized and chosen by the team trainer. 3. Goalkeeper’s ability is a key endogenous factor for kicker’s scoring probabilities

 AP (2010) argue that their outcome may also depend on the opposite effect on the goalkeeper, whose performance would benefit from being second in the shoot-out.   To refute this argument, AP (2010) report: regressions proving that goalkeeper’s saves have a weaker impact on the penalty outcome than kicker’s misses a survey of professional players showing that nobody mentions the possibility that the performance of the first team’s goalkeeper may be enhanced when the partial score is in his favor.

 In order to check the validity of this finding, we changed sport and experimental setting  We organized a field experiment with a free throw competition among pairs of professional basket players

Differences from AP  1. STAKES. The stakes for the subjects studied in AP are high, often very World Cup, a European Cup etc. The stakes in this paper are high as in the final of a low (about 10-15 euros).

 2. CONSEQUENCES. Real life penalty shoot-outs have consequences beyond those for the individual, namely consequences for a team, or even a nation. In our experiment, there are no consequences for anybody except for the player himself.

 3. AUDIENCE. All the subjects in AP perform in front of an audience of thousands stadium, and millions on TV. The subjects in this paper perform in front of of people in a no audience.

 4. TYPE OF OPPONENTS. In real life, the subjects in penalty shoot-outs are “enemies” (they belong to different teams). In this paper the subjects belong to the same team.

 5. NUMBER OF PLAYERS. A penalty shoot-out involves 2 players. The game in throw) involves 1 player this paper (a free

 Fourteen basket professional players of the Mens Sana Siena, who are the 2009/2010 Italian Champions, were involved in a series of free throw competitions in pairs.  One player shot five free-throws, then the second player performed the same exercise.  In case of a tie each of the two had the opportunity to try a single free throw each, and in case of enduring tie this tie breaking rule was always repeated.

 In AP penalty shoot-out the order alternates: A B A B A B A B A B  In our paper, the order is in the first five throws is: A A A A A B B B B B but in the final tie break becomes A B A B A B ....

 We can assume that psychological effects are similar in the final tie break and different in the first five throws.

 Randomly assignment to two groups of 7 players with round-robin tournaments in which each player met twice all the other players, being once first mover and once second mover.  The result of each group in the first round determined the positions in a single elimination play-off second round, where all the fourteen players participated.

 Payments: fixed show up fee of 10 euro plus 5 euro for each won match and 90 euro for the final winner of the play-offs

 We analyze individual behavior and not team performance  The impact of players' heterogeneity is greatly reduced by the chosen type of tournament and by random assignment  The result of every single free throw depends only on player’s performance and not on anyone else  We also analyze the same couple of opponents twice, in both orders

 Probabilities of success in the first five throws of each competition are equal for first and second movers  Success rate in the experiment is significantly greater than 50% (as in AP 2010)  Assuming that the probability to win follow a logit distribution, we find a significant second mover positive effect in the tie breaks

 The advantage for the second mover happens when the cost of a mistake is higher (i.e psychological pressure is higher).

 In the 66 matches ended in the first stage, first and second movers share an equal number of victories.  In the 18 matches ended by the tie breaking rule, for 13 times the second mover won.

 We do not find any difference caused by shooting order when the sequence is AAAAABBBBB  Second mover effect appears with the sequence ABABABAB that is AP’s sequence

 The key difference between the two settings is that AP analyze a non-routine task  For most soccer players to kick a penalty is an activity that is not part of their daily practice  In shoot-outs

most kickers face a largely uncommon decision-making

 The first mover advantage in soccer may depend on the reversed effect on the goalkeeper, that on the contrary performs a routine task.

 In competitive tournaments in which the first mover knows he has an outsized influence on the game the goalkeepers can turn the entire psychology of the second team upside down.

 In basketball players are trained to execute free throws and this may have a different impact on results  Basketball players’ performance in our field experiment is indeed representative of their performance during the regular season

 We start from a situation in which, according to AP (2010), a first mover advantage should be observed, and we end up with the opposite finding.

 In both cases, to be leading or lagging in the score would to have an impact on performance for psychological reasons, i.e. changes in mood and arousal

 Our exercise is much more similar to everyday life activities that people experience in their profession.

 Our subjects performed a task that is strictly related to their professional activities. Our results is consequently more relevant for the design of incentive schemes and the design of the workplace in general

 A within-subjects comparison of their performance as second mover with their performance as first mover.  Increase the number of subjects  To perform a virtual experiment on basketball free throws

 The methodological objective of Virtual Experiments is to combine the strengths of the artificial controls of laboratory experiments with the naturalistic domain of field experiments or direct field studies  In a virtual experiment the internal validity of controlled lab experiments is joined with the external validity of field experiments

 Virtual Experiment to elicit subjective perception of psychological pressure by detecting body reactions such as gaze direction or sweating  Subjects experience dynamic visual simulations of competitive environments, with varying tasks and conditions. Simulations are selected to represent high and low level of psychological pressure  In this way subjects experience a sense of presence, a psychological state of “being there” and take decisions in “immersive spaces” with cognitive constraints