Transcript 課程名稱 - 臺大開放式課程 (NTU OpenCourseWare)

西洋哲學史
第八講：Aristotle’s Logic and
Philosophy of Science
授課教師：國立臺灣大學哲學系 苑舉正 教授
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亞里斯多德（384-322 BC）
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亞里斯多德的生平與他的哲學關連。
如何從「蘇柏亞」中看亞里斯多德？
亞里斯多德哲學的關鍵概念。
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亞里斯多德的生平與他的哲學關連
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他是馬其頓人，不是
雅典人，卻是希臘人。
他是御醫的兒子，所
以終其一生對於中庸
平衡的概念，極為重
視。
離開學習20年的雅典
學院，10年後回來建
立Lyceum。
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如何從「蘇柏亞」看亞里斯多德


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
柏拉圖與亞里斯多德之
間，大多相似，但在體
系上完全不同。
對於知識，P強調絕對
真實，A強調經驗中的
適當性。
A企圖回答S的問題：我
能擁有知識嗎？
實在論VS唯心論。
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亞里斯多德哲學的關鍵概念
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1. 「形式」與「材質」的結合。
Both the form and the matter are stressed.
2. 從「潛在」到「實現」的過程。
Process from potentiality to actualization.
3. 經驗論與實在論的結合。Empiricism and Realism.
4. 基礎論 Foundationalism。
5. 目的論 Teleology。
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知識的可能性

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蘇：我唯一知道的，就是什麼都不知道！
柏：我所有知道的，都是理型的照耀結果。
亞：蘇不是「宣稱」，而是「假稱」；我們可以
「知」，但不必否定感官知覺，因為它們的內容也
含有知識。
約定的基礎論。
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亞接受柏的知識論，但…
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1. 將這個知識論融合於常識之中。
2. 強調知識的分類：
A. 生產的知識（如繪畫與建築）。
B. 實踐的知識（如倫理與政治）。
C. 理論的知識，如：
I. 自然科學（對象可以分別與變化）。
II. 數學（對象不可以分別也不變化）。
III. 神學（對象可以分別但不變化）。
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亞氏的哲學系統
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1. 邏輯與語言。
2. 物理學對變化的解釋。
3. 心理學中對於身體與靈魂的解釋。
4. 生物學中對於潛能與實現的解釋。
5. 形上學中對於實體的討論。
6. 倫理學中對於實踐智慧的討論。
7. 政治學中對於政治組織的分類。
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亞氏的邏輯與語言
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對於亞氏而言，追求知識的過程，就是展現經驗確定性的過
程。
對於經驗的確定性追求絕對基礎的觀念是過於極端的想法。
約定的知識基礎是足夠的，也是唯一的。
為什麼？
因為「世界的秩序」是給定的，自明的與不變的。
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亞氏的邏輯與語言
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亞里斯多德的哲學系統立基於結合觀察與理解（observations
and understanding）.
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它們的結合，證成從自然透過觀察所歸納出來的普遍原則。

這也導致亞里斯多德科學的起點。
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亞氏邏輯系統建立在如下六點
1. 經驗論 Empiricism;
2. 實在論 Realism;
3. 思想與語言 Thought and Language;
4. 演繹法 Deduction
5. 科學知識的展示 Demonstration of scientific knowledge
6. 基礎論 Foundationalism.
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對於亞氏而言，理性探究的目標，就是從
「我們所知」進步成為「自然所知」。
The general aim of rational inquiry, according to
Aristotle, is to advance from what is ‘better
known to us’, to what is ‘better known by nature’.
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我們達到這個目標的前提是：
(1) 我們應用的命題應當是經過理解而為真的
命題；例如，數學命題。
(knowing by understanding);
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(2) 我們也以從歸納而得的普遍原則作為解釋
與證成我們抱持為真的特定真理（例如，
「所有人都會死」導致「蘇格拉底會死」。
(knowing by justifying);
(3) 我們也察覺實在中的面向解釋熟悉的面向
（例如，「人是唯一擁有語言的動物」）。
(knowing by convention).
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這是一個融貫的系統！
A system of internal coherence!
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1.經驗論(一個科學方法論)
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我們只能知道事物的表象，叫做「現象」。
The things better known to us in a particular area are the relevant
‘appearances’, (phainomena).
亞氏認為，蒐集經驗資料，然後呈現現象的過程，就是研究
的工作。
collections of empirical data, reached as a result of ‘inquiry’
(historia).
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1. 經驗論
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經驗研究從單一觀察開始，經由歸納法的應用，得到普遍法
則，直到我們確定經驗的內容為何。
by means of generalizations through induction from these
particular cases, until we reach experience (empeiria).
經驗使我們可以知道自然所包含的原則，而原則也不斷地受
到經驗的檢驗。
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這是一個科學方法論
A. A person sees “what appears from nature” (appearances, phenomena).
B. The person’s inquiry of these phenomena is composed of collections of
empirical data.
C. The result of his empirical inquiry is experience which is the inductive
generalization reached by the accumulation of particular observations.
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這是一個科學方法論
D. Experience, because of its generalized character, can be
further accumulated to reach principles which can be
tested by further experiences.
E. The scientific inquiry is presumed to be a process of
generalizing particular observations with principles
which in turn will be tested still by further observations.
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這是一個科學方法論
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Phenomena are not empirical observations for two
reasons:
A. Phenomena demonstrates only the appearances of nature;
B. Nature can only be explored by observing its empirical
data, not phenomenal appearances.
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這是一個科學方法論
Nevertheless, insofar as the nature is concerned, the
appearances are the only data we believed and
assumed; they are the beginning of inquiry of any
kind.
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這是一個科學方法論
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The critical and constructive study of these common
beliefs is ‘dialectic’.
Aristotle’s method is basically Socratic (referring to
the methods of Socrates such as questioning, arguing,
and debating in seeking truth).
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這是一個科學方法論
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The study of common beliefs is both critical and constructive.
The critical part refers to the part of questioning them in order to
seek further possibility of exploring truth.
The constructive part refers to the part of arguing for what might
better be considered to be true.
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這是一個科學方法論
The questioning and arguing form the procedure of
dialectic which refers to a process of dialogue pretty
much in the form of the Socratic elenchus.
The Socratic method refers to something like
detecting truth by questioning what has been believed
commonly by predecessors.
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2. 實在論立場
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Inquiry leads us to causes and to universals (coming
from “why” questions and their answer in the
generalized form).
Aristotle has a realist conception of inquiry and
knowledge; beliefs and theories are true in so far as
they grasp the reality that we inquire into.
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2. 實在論立場
Universals and causes are ‘prior by nature’, they
are not created by, or dependent on, any theory,
but a true theory must fit them.
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3. 思想與語言
One means of access to appearances, and
especially to common beliefs, is the study of
what words and sentences ‘signify’ (semainein).
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3. 思想與語言
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This is part of ‘logic’ (logike), derived from logos, which may be
translated ‘word’, ‘speech’, ‘statement’, ‘argument’, or ‘reason.
This section of the corpus came to be called the ‘Organon’
(‘Instrument’), because logic, as Aristotle conceives it, concerns
statements and arguments in general, without restriction to any specific
subject matter; it is therefore an instrument of philosophical inquiry in
general.
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3. 思想與語言
(1)signification:
 According to Aristotle’s account of signification, as commonly
understood, the word ‘horse’ signifies horse by signifying the
thought of horse; in using the word, we communicate thoughts
about horses.
 When the thoughts about horses we communicate are true, we
communicate truths about the universal horse.
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3. 思想與語言
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The correspondence of the word signifying
an object with the thought of that object is
presumed in the sense that the signification
of a word “communicates” what we think
about the word.
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3. 思想與語言
(2) definition:
To understand the signification of a name ‘F’,
we look for the corresponding definition
(logos, horismos) of F.
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3. 思想與語言
Some names correspond to more than one universal, as
‘chest’ signifies both a container and a part of an animal.
Chests are ‘homonymous’ (homonyma) or ‘multivocal’
(‘spoken of in many ways’); more than one definition is
needed to capture the signification of the name, like the
notion of “cause”.
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3. 思想與語言

Some philosophically important cases of multivocity are
cause (e. g. Aristotle’s doctrine of the four causes), being
(e. g. the doctrine of the categories) and good (e. g. the
criticism of Plato’s belief in a Form of the Good in
Nicomachean Ethics I 6).
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4. 邏輯與科學哲學
In the Prior Analytics he examines one type of
argument, a ‘deduction’ (syllogismos; literally,
‘reasoning’, hence the standard term
‘syllogism’.
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4. 邏輯與科學哲學

This is an argument in which, if
propositions p and q are assumed,
something else r, different from p and q,
follows necessarily and deductively because
of the truth of p and q (Prior Analytics 24b
18-20).
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4. 邏輯與科學哲學
Aristotle insists that:
1. it is not possible for the premises of a
deduction to be true and the conclusion false
(‘follows necessarily’);
2. that a deduction must have more than one
premise (‘if p and q are assumed’);

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4. 邏輯與科學哲學
3. that the conclusion cannot be identical to
any premise (‘different from p and q’);
4. and that no redundant premises are
allowed (‘because of the truth of p and q’).
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4. 邏輯與科學哲學
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He takes deductions to express affirmative or
negative relations between universals, taken
either universally (‘animal belongs to every
(no) man’) or not universally (‘animal
belongs (does not belong) to some man’).
He takes the affirmative and negative claims
to imply ‘existence’.
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4. 邏輯與科學哲學

Aristotle’s theory of deduction is developed
for its own sake, but it also has two main
philosophical applications.
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4. 邏輯與科學哲學
(1) Deduction
is one type of argument appropriate to
dialectic (which, according to what we have seen
previously, is a method of seeking better results of
inquiry). Aristotle contrasts it with inductive
argument (also used in dialectic), in which the
conclusion does not follow necessarily from the
premises, but is made plausible by them.
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4. 邏輯與科學哲學
(2) It is essential for demonstration (apodeixis),
which Aristotle takes to be the appropriate
form for exhibiting scientific knowledge.
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5. 科學知識的展示
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The progress from ‘what is known to us’ to
‘what is known by nature’ aims at episteme
(the scientific knowledge) whose structure
is exhibited in the demonstrative pattern
described in the Posterior Analytics.
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5. 科學知識的展示
A demonstration is a deduction in which the premises
are
 1. necessarily true,
 2. prior to and
 3. better known than the conclusions, and
 4. explanatory of the conclusions derived from them.
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5. 科學知識的展示
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Aristotle’s theory of demonstration, then, is
not intended to ‘describe’ a procedure of
scientific inquiry that begins from
appearances; it is an ‘account’ of the
knowledge that is achieved by successful
inquiry.
Knowledge is to be claimed.
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5. 科學知識的展示
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This process of justification, Aristotle claims,
must be linear and finite.
A circular ‘justification’ must eventually
‘justify’ a given belief by appeal to itself, and
an infinite regress imposes on us a task that
we can never complete.
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5. 科學知識的展示
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Since, therefore, neither a circle nor an infinite
regress can really justify, a proper justification
must ultimately appeal to primary principles of
a science.
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5. 科學知識的展示
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These primary principles are ‘assumptions’
(hypothesis); we must see that they are better
known and prior to other truths of a science,
without being derived from any further
principles.
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5. 科學知識的展示
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Since they are the basis of all demonstration,
they cannot themselves be demonstrated;
Aristotle claims that we have non-demonstrative
understanding of the ultimate principles of each
science.
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6. 基礎論
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How are we entitled to claim understanding of
an ultimate principle?
Aristotle believes that the principles of a science
are reached from appearances (perceptual or
dialectical or both), which are the starting points
known to us.
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6.基礎論
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That demand suggests that the assumptions of a
science must be self-evident.
It is claimed to be true without any inferential
justification, so Aristotle’s conception of
knowledge expresses a foundationalist position.
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作權法第46、52、65條合理使用。
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35
This is an
argument in
which, ……
truth of p and
q
The Atkins diet and philosophy: chewing the fat with Kant and Nietzsche
POPULAR CULTURE AND PHILOSOPHY Volume 14，作者：LISA MAREE
HELDKE, KERRI MOMMER, CYNTHIA PINEO ，出版者：Open Court,
2005，頁66。
依據著作權法第46、52、65條合理使用。
12、17、22
、25-29、
31-50
The general
aim of
rational
inquiry……e
xpresses a
foundationalis
t position.
IRWIN, T.H. (1998, 2003). Aristotle. In E. Craig (Ed.), Routledge Encyclopedia
of Philosophy. London: Routledge. Retrieved January 16, 2013, from
http://www.rep.routledge.com/article/A022
依據著作權法第46、52、65條合理使用。瀏覽日期：2013/01/25。
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