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Climate Change Adaptation: looking back at lessons from an ‘early research’ Key note address Ton Dietz 7th Knowledge for Development Conference, Utrecht, November 5, 2010. An ‘early research’ in 19982004: Impact of Climate Change on Drylands, with a focus on West Africa ICCD PROJECT FUNDED BY NETHERLANDS RESEARCH PROGRAMME ON GLOBAL AIR POLLUTION AND CLIMATE CHANGE COLLABORATION BETWEEN CERES, WAGENINGEN UR, RIVM AND WEST AFRICAN SCHOLARS COORDINATED BY TON DIETZ, RUERD RUBEN AND JAN VERHAGEN MAJOR RESULT: BOOK KLUWER 2004 The impact of climate change on drylands, with a focus on West Africa; Kluwer academic publishers 2004 Africa: semi-arid and sub-humid areas, with high or low degradation, high or low population densities and urban or non-urban What do we know about climate change in Africa? • Long-term climate change not easy to establish from ‘normal climate data’ • Lack of long-term reliable statistics: late start of weather measurements, poor network of climate stations, unreliable data collection and reporting • Upward temperature change: maybe, but what about the ‘urban heat island impact’? • Indirect evidence (Kilimanjaro!): conflicting interpretations • Rainfall variability much more evident than a rainfall trend. Rainfall variability is evident but downward trend? Example Mali 1918-1998 Another example: Bawku north east Ghana Africa: comparing aridity classes 1930-1960 with 1960-1990: major changes, but… Expectations until 2050 Expectation: increased drought risks However: many different predictions Indirect evidence • Study people’s own perceptions of changes in their natural environment and in their land use and agricultural success • This study should be embedded in an overall study of changes in people’s livelihoods and their livelihood options • That is what we tried to do in Mali, Burkina Faso and Ghana and our starting point was the ‘intensification theory’: what happens if there are growing tensions between people’s demand for food and other natural resources and local supply? f Climate risks Normal’ climate risks: • risks related to peak rainfall (a high volume of rainfall in short periods, and often with high rainfall energy) • risks related to peak river discharge, often following peak rainfall in river catchment areas; • risks related to severe storms, often near sea (and major lake) coasts; often part of monsoon periods, or of hurricane and cyclone seasons; • risks related to heat (relative heat waves); • risks related to droughts (‘normal’ dry seasons, dry spells in ‘normal’ wet seasons, or failing rainy seasons); • risks related to frost, particularly if unexpected (e.g. early in autumn, or late in spring seasons). Additional Climate Change Risks • higher temperatures, = higher evaporation rates; = higher heat risks; = lower frost risks. changing rainfall patterns: often: more rain; more flood risks. more variability; more unpredictability rising sea levels, + more severe coastal storms = threatening coastal cities melting ice in upper catchments of major rivers, = faster and higher river water discharge, = threatening downstream cities. RISKS OF CLIMATE CHANGE IN AFRICA gradual change to higher temperatures and hence higher evapotranspiration changing rainfall regimes change of ecozones, agro-ecozones, and biodiversity and crop niches with impact on livelihood options higher chances of extreme weather events (droughts, floods, storms) TYPES OF RISKS species extinction human and animal death damage to property and physical infrastructure directly threatened livelihoods lower resilience lower innovative capability lower (insurance) buffers collapse of the social trust system: violence and threatened livelihoods (including ‘no go areas’) (e.g. Welzer: ‘climate wars’ or ’climate refugees’) Sahel: vulnerable agricultural, livestock and mixed agricultural areas, with increasing drought-prone conditions in the 1970s and 1980s, but fast recovery afterwards! People have ´normal´ seasonal and general coping mechanisms, adaptation capability, with ´normal´ support networks. What happens during more extreme conditions, if they start again? What can we learn from the 1970s and 1980s? Social differentiation of impact of drought: Increased vulnerability hits the poor more than the rich, but the poor are more risk-averse, and have less taboos with regard to extreme coping behaviour Extreme shocks/disasters can devastate the rich as well as the poor But the rich are generally better protected physically, socially and economically And there is path dependency for people and for areas! Diversification is a key strategy However: The poor have a poverty-driven diversification profile and the rich an opportunity-driven diversification profile Both the rich and the poor have multi-spatial and multi-sector livelihoods Middle-level wealth groups are most vulnerable for shocks especially: one-place, economic specialists, dependent on external markets, and with relatively low buffers, and in particular if they ‘have to keep up appearances’ (taboos on adjustment, or hanging on to less-successful ones until nothing is left). Example: northern Ghana Indeed: strong signs of climate deterioration and changing behaviour between 1970 and 2000 Evidence: • Dryer natural environment: more ´northern´ species, traditional species disappear (including some important economic trees) Lower reliability of the seasons Shift towards later start of the planting season More dry weeks during the agricultural season More sudden floods More early-maturing, drought tolerant varieties Shift to riverine fields and fields in former marsh lands More diversified portfolio of fields Continuation: •Water table in wells lower •More seasonal rivers •Earlier stagnant water pools (malaria!) •More salty water sources •Growing importance of goats •Higher reliance on irrigation and on niche crops (onions, tomatoes); shifts to other water-harvesting methods •Southern shift of the cotton belt Strongly increased farmer’s willingness to invest in soil and water enhancing environmental management + on-farm tree planting + higher labour input + during bad seasons shift from cereals to legumes Much higher dependence on remittances from elsewhere Much higher migration (seasonal and casual, but also permanent) to “down south”, even during the cropping season at home (“hunger trips”) Much more emphasis on social networks and social security arrangements More powerful position of rich families and of successful migrants elsewhere Considerable population redistribution 1960-1994: Emptying of the extreme drylands and war zones Move to the coast Very strong urbanisation Urbanisation prospects until 2020 Policy priorities according to a West African expert panel in 2002: 1 Better early warning systems and better communication about its findings 2 Integrate knowledge about changing nature and changing behaviour 3 Develop more adaptive agricultural, pastoral, sylvicultural and horticultural practices (and support ‘northern nature and crops’ moving south) 4 More attention to and support for social security networks and for diversified livelihood profiles 5 More attention for migration and for the role of remittances 6 More attention for entitlement changes (e.g. land, water and forest rights) and for conflict prevention between groups with different identities (e.g. cultivators vs herders). And what happened after 2004? Institutionalisation of CC agencies • Many African countries now have agencies responsible for mitigation measures and participating in the global negotiation meetings • There is growing awareness of the need for systematic thinking about adaptation, but mainly oriented to extreme events (floods, storms, droughts) and some connection with PRSPs. • Here and there start of ‘sustainable cities’ concept • Often a major external push (aid, NGOs); lack of African ownership? • Very little African examples yet of REDD and new compensation regimes or GHG trading; exception: South Africa. More emphasis on health risks WHO study 2003: “Any increase in frequency of extreme events such as storms, floods, droughts and cyclones would harm human health through a variety of pathways. These natural hazards can cause direct loss of life and injury and affect health indirectly through • loss of shelter; • population displacement; • contamination of water supplies; • loss of food production; • increased risk of infectious disease epidemics (including diarrhoeal and respiratory diseases; • and damage to infrastructure for provision of health services (These can be) devastating impacts, particularly in densely settled populations with inadequate resources” Health risks! Floods: • increase in bacteriological diseases like cholera and typhoid, • and in an increase in parasitic diseases like amoebiasis, giardiasis, and cryptosporidiosis Droughts: • limited water supplies can have a higher concentration of pathogens, • and hence higher risks of water-borne diseases, • but low supplies may also affect personal hygiene and result in skin infections More emphasis on adequate water provision, but an uphill task in growing cities • Ouagadougou; 1960: 59,000 people • Now: > 1 million Per person available: • In 1978: 57 l/d • In 1986: 39 l/d • In 1993: 26 l/d • Needed: Extra water dams, far away + urban water harvesting + subsidised water for the poor + health care for those without clean water 1996 and 1986 But this is also Ouagadougou 3-9-2009 And then, in 2007/2008, the hypes • Sudden increase of food prices and food price speculation: new emphasis on agriculture and on the need for an ‘African Green Revolution’ (Kofi Annan); aid agencies begin to adapt. • Sudden massive attention for biofuels as a way out of global energy scarcity: full of controversies • Sudden massive attention for ‘land grab’. Consequenses of the financial crisis 2008-2010 • Food and other prices of basic commodities down again • Many land acquisition plans on hold or if land has been acquired: little action yet • But Asia much less affected: towards a multipolar world order. • Africa as a victim of a new round of resource grab? Or chances for Africa to better ‘negotiate’ this multi-polarity and break away from poverty?