Transcript Slide 1

International
Relations in the
Baltic Sea Region
Leonid Karabeshkin, PhD
Spring Semester 2011/2012
US Policy in the BSR
 The “Romantic period” -1991-1994: support of
democratic reforms in Russia, no enlargements,
but support to Baltic statehood, encouraging
withdrawing troops
 1994 – 2000 – worsening US-Russia relations,
the Lake Doctrine (widening democracy) –
consolidation of new democracies and market
economy through NATO enlargement, initiation of
the North-European Initiative of the US
(assistance to integration of the Baltic States to
Euro-Atlantic structures and widening US
economic presence in the region.
US Policy in the BSR: 1994 – 2000
 Worsening US-Russia relations;
 The Lake Doctrine (widening democracy) – consolidation
of new democracies and market economy;
 NATO enlargement;
 “Low profile” policy failure – the attempts to charge
Nordic Countries (Sweden first) to supervise Baltic
security and Euro-Atlantic integration of the Baltic States.
 North-European Initiative - assistance to integration of
the Baltic States to Euro-Atlantic structures and widening
US economic presence in the region
 Strengthening economic presence in the Region: MN,
Estonian Raiways, Eesti Energia – beyond the Baltic
States active investment in the Leningrad Oblast;
 Political elites – new “American” presidents in Latvia and
Lithuania, further in Estonia (2006).
US Policy in the BSR: 2000-2004
 Peripheryzation of the Baltic issue on US
Policy agenda: 9/11, Iraq, Afghanistan; stability
in the Baltic Sea Region; improving relations
with Russia under the “first” Putin;
 Accession of the Baltic States to NATO and EU
– the policy of engagement to Russia from the
Baltic States and establishing Russia-NATO
Council;
 Weakening policy of defending investments –
withdrawing from MN, Eesti Raudtee, etc.
 Weakening interest to domestic policy –
Rolandas Paksas in Lithuania, Arnold Rüütel in
Estonia bacame presidents.
US Policy in the BSR: 2004-2008
 Relative growth of US interest to the Baltic States, and
Eurasia in general;
 E-PINE initiative aimed at widening multilateral
cooperation in fighting terrorism, active involvement into
coalitions of the willing, “democracy export” to the postSoviet space (incl. Russia).
 Tensions in relations with Russia: colour revolutions,
YUKOS, Iraq, Beslan etc.
 Strengthening voice in European affairs through new
NATO and EU members which pursue pro-American
stance; limiting potential Russian-European
rapprochement.
 Worsening Russian-Baltic relations
 Impeachment to Paksas in Lithuania, election of Ilves in
Estonia.
 Trenin on US policy in the BSR: “restricted peripheral
confrontation”.
US Policy in the BSR: 2008-2012
 “Reload” in Russian-American relations;
 Decreasing US Activism in the BSR
 Decreasing US activism on the post-Soviet
space, disappointment of the Baltic States with
the results of their policies in Georgia, Ukraine
and other states of the former USSR;
 Energy recourses diversification policy –
support of the Baltic States policies in energy
security, against of Nord Stream;
 NATO presence in the region, defence action
plan for the Baltic States;
EU Approaches to Baltic
Policy
1996 – “Baltic Sea Region Initiative”
 “To strengthen political stability and economic
development in the Baltic Sea region”
 “The CBSS has a unique role in the region as a vehicle
for political dialogue and coordination of measures
favouring democracy and stability.
 “The recommendations of the initiative are closely
linked to the preparation by the Swedish Presidency of
the CBSS of the "Visby Charter" with a view to
promoting action programmes for contacts, economi
cooperation and environmental cooperation.”
Enhancing Democracy and Stability
Commission will further support:
• direct contacts between public and private institutions, including
public administration reform, for instance through secondment of
staff, and local initiatives at municipal and subregional levels;
• projects in the area of civil society and human rights under the
PHARE and TACIS Democracy programme;
• better coordination of regional networking of non-governmental
organizations within the framework of the CBSS;
• more comprehensive activities for the rights of national
minorities through improved legislation and
administrative procedures as well as facilitation of their economic
and social integration by means of language training and other
supporting measures;
• activities of the CBSS Commissioner on Democratic Institutions
and Human Rights, including the rights of persons belonging to
minorities;
• measures under the Stability Pact to strengthen democracy and
human rights.
Promoting economic development
• to support the establishment, in accordance with WTO
rules, of the Baltic Free Trade Area between
Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania, including a customs union
by 1998, and free trade between these countries
and Poland in the framework of CEFTA (Central European
Free Trade Agreement), which will further
complement the Europe Agreements;
• to assist in speeding up the approximation of regulatory
frameworks;
• to consider cofinancing integrated trade networks,
combining infrastructure projects with advice on trade
facilitation;
• cofinance the Via Baltica (Helsinki-Tallinn-Riga-KaunasWarsaw) • promote the Via Hanseatica (Riga-SovietskKaliningrad-Gdansk-Szczecin-Bremen)
• finance technical assistance on the HelsinkiSt.Petersburg-Moscow corridor, • cofinance the
development of ports,
Energy
 Energy efficiency and the interconnection of electricity
and gas networks will improve security of
energysupplies, contribute to economic development
and protect the environment. The Russia-BelarusPoland-Germany gas pipeline is a EU-priority project.
The crude-oil pipeline from Russia to Finland, together
with the linking of electricity and gas supply networks in
the Union with those of partner countries, e.g. the
Baltic Electricity Ring, should be developed;
 contribute further to the improvement of the safety of
nuclear reactors in the region (Ignalina, St.Petersburg,
Kola) and to enable the total dismantling of the nuclear
reactor in Paldiski, Estonia;
Northern Dimension
 The initiative was announced by Finish Prime-Minister
Paavo Lipponen
 Was aimed at overcoming geographical and politically
peripheral status of Finland in the EU (accessed in 1996);
 Had to attract attention of the EU to the Baltic Sea region
and relations with Russia where Finland possessed the
only immediate border-line between the EU and Russia;
 Was critically met by Sweden, Baltic States and Poland,
as well as by Russia;
 Was cautiously met by the EU, which claimed that
Northern Dimension is not a new regional initiative but just
a “concept which can provide for an added value”. The
initiative did not receive separate budget line, but served
as a coordination mechanism of existing programmes.
Northern Dimension
 EU Commission Communication “Northern Dimension for
the Policies of the Union” – 1998.
 6 priority areas were enumerated: energy, environmental
and nuclear safety, cross-border cooperation, trade,
transport, telecommunications and health care.
 Northern Dimension became a policy of the EU
 Avoiding EU foreign policy implementation by one country
only (Finland)
 Coordination of different financial aid instruments for
Finland and Sweden (Structural funds), Baltic states and
Poland (PHARE), as well as Russia (TACIS).
 Relatively low priority status of the initiative, dependent on
the position of the EU Presidency – Finland and Sweden
as the main lobbyists.
Northern Dimension
 Preparation of the 1st Action plan (2000-2003) – decision made under
Finnish presidency in the EU (1999).
 Included the list of challenges and operational actions in the following
areas:
- Infrastructure (Energy – “Access to the west European market for gas
from the region is important for European security of supply”;
Transport – Trans-European networks and border bottlenecks;
Telecommunication and Information Society) .
- Environment and Natural Resources (the main priority – used water
treatment improvement);
- Nuclear Safety – NPP and Russian submarines (“EU policy aims at the
earliest practicable closure of all nuclear reactors at the nuclear
power plants in the region, namely Ignalina, Leningrad and Kola (1-2)
that cannot be upgraded to internationally accepted levels of safety at
a reasonable cost”).
- Public Health; Trade and Business; Cross-border Cooperation (incl.
Kaliningrad)
 Approved on the EU Summit in 2000 (Feira, Portugal) – the list of top
priorities narrowed to: environment, nuclear safety, trans-border crime
and Kaliningrad.
Northern Dimension:
problems
Narrowing agenda was caused by a number of reasons:
- Limited recourses – both financial and institutional;
- Russia did not welcome the energy cooperation in EU
interpretation, perceiving it as unattractive; energy dialogue was
viewed as a separate part of Russia-EU relations, beyond the
Baltic agenda;
- Russia was concerned about widening external relations of its
regions – Putin started centralizing state governance, including
foreign affairs;
- EU had ambiguous goals: on the one hand, enlargement and
eliminating internal barriers; on the other hand, development of
cross-border cooperation with Russia. The priority was granted to
the first area, which stipulated fastening external border perimeter;
- Economic disparity of the regions across borders; differences in
organizing regional and municipal governance – Russian regions
and especially municipalities could serve only as recipients of
foreign aid;
Northern Dimension
2nd Action Plan 2004-2006
Priorities – more or less repeated from the 1st Action Plan:
 economy, business and infrastructure;
 human resources, education, culture, scientific research
and health;
 the environment, nuclear safety and natural resources;
 cross-border cooperation and regional development;
 justice and home affairs.
 Kaliningrad
 Arctic Area
nd
2
ND Action Plans:
Comparison
 In comparison with its predecessor it is less
political and strategic, representing rather a list
of the projects to be implemented.
 The list of environmental projects here is
longer than in any other field of activities
 Establishment of Partnerships – Social and
Environmental
 2004 – Baltic States and Poland became EU
members. “Externalization” of ND – growing
role of Russia
ND and EUSBSR
 2007 – ND was transformed into quadrilateral
program of Russia, Norway, Iceland and the
European Union
 Widening number of Partnerships:
- Transport and Logistics
- Culture
 Initiation of the EU Strategy for the Baltic Sea
Region as a projection of the EU regional
policy.
Partnerships: Transporn
and Logistics
“The NDPTL's goal is to improve, in compliance
with the ecological needs of the region, the
major transport connections and logistics in the
Northern Dimension region to stimulate
sustainable economic growth at the local,
regional and global levels by focusing on a
limited number of priorities that reflect both
regional and national priorities in a balanced
way.” (NDPTL Director Interview)
NDPTL Priority:
The Barents Link
The Barents Link: Way to Asia
800 km decrease in distance
Northern Dimension Environmental
Partnership: Projects 2011
NDEP: financing
EU Strategy for the Baltic
Sea Region 2009
What for?
 “The Baltic Sea Region is a highly heterogeneous area
in economic, environmental and cultural terms, yet the
countries concerned share many common resources
and demonstrate considerable interdependence. This
means that actions in one area can very quickly have
consequences for other parts, or the whole, of the
region. In these circumstances, the area could be a
model of regional co-operation where new ideas and
approaches can be tested and developed over time as
best practice examples” (European Commission
Communication, 2009).
EU Strategy for the Baltic
Sea Region 2009
 European Parliament published a report in late
2006 calling for a strategy for the Baltic Sea
Region.
 On 14 December 2007, the European Council
in its Presidency Conclusions invited the
Commission to present a European Union
strategy for the Baltic Sea region no later than
June 2009.
 EU Commission Communication 10 June 2009
EUSBSR Challenges
 To enable a sustainable environment
 To enhance the region’s prosperity
 To increase accessibility and
attractiveness
 To ensure safety and security in the
region.
EUSBSR: Priority Areas
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1. Nutrient inputs to the sea
2.Natural zones and biodiversity
3. Hazardous substances
4. Model region for clean shipping
5. Climate change
6.Internal market and cooperation in the customs and tax areas
7. Research and innovation
8. Entrepreneurship, SMEs and human resources
9. Agriculture, forestry and fisheries
10. Energy markets
11. Transport links
12. Education and youth, tourism, culture and health
13. Maritime safety and security
14. Maritime accident response capacity
15. Cross border crime
ENVIRONMENTALLY DOMINATED AGENDA
Baltic Dimension of EU
Policies: Environmental Axis
 Externally:
- fighting climate change
- ensuring environmental leadership and
projecting environmental regimes worldwide
- exporting “environmentalism” / related
technologies
 Internally:
- prioritizing environment as an element of
sustainable development
- integrating environmental goals into
implementation of other EU policies
Lisbon Treaty
 Environment – shared competence with
member states
 Conservation of biological marine resources (a
special part of fishery policy) – exclusive
competence of the EU
 Integration (harmonisation) – priority on
internal market/energy
 “The polluter should pay” (Article 191 EUFT)
EU 2020 Strategy
Climate change / energy
 greenhouse gas emissions reduction
20% (or even 30%, if the conditions are
right) lower than 1990
 20% of energy to be received from
renewable sources
 20% increase in energy efficiency
EU 2020 Strategy:
Sustainable Growth
 more competitive low-carbon economy
 protecting the environment, reducing emissions
and preventing biodiversity loss
 capitalizing on Europe's leadership in
developing new green technologies and
production methods
Outcomes: energy security, climate change,
preserving natural resources as well as social
and economic benefits (boosting GDP growth,
new jobs, global competitiveness)
EU 2020 strategy:
Estonian national targets
 Renewable energy – 25%
 CO2 Emission +11% (in relation to 1990)
 Energy consumption – 0.71 Mtoe (0.3%
of EU)
Environmental targets
integration: transport policy
EU TRANSPORT: 60% of oil consumption, target of
decreasing GHG emission 60% by 2050.
White (strategy) Paper on Transport (2011):
fuels, intermodality, operational measures
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-50% “conventional” fuel in urban transport by 2030 (full
elimination by 2050);
40-50% decrease of emissions in aviation and maritime
transport
30% of long-distance road traffic to be switched to
maritime and railways by 2030
Medium-distance passenger traffic to rail by 2050
Air, maritime and road management systems
Environmental targets
integration: maritime policy
 Integrated Maritime Policy (2007)
“to face challenges of globalization
and competitiveness, climate
change, degradation of the marine
environment, maritime safety and
security, energy security and
sustainability”
 Maritime Transport Strategy (2009)
Target: zero-waste, zero-emission
maritime transport
Support of IMO MARPOL sulphur
limitations for ship fuel:
4,5
4
3,5
3
2,5
2
1,5
2000
2010
2015
1
0,5
0
ECA
Globally
The EU’s Baltic Sea Strategy (2009):
a macroregional dimension of EU
Policies
 4 priorities: environmental sustainability, prosperity
(economy), accessibility and attractiveness (energy and
transport), safety and security.
 Challenges and proposed responses
- eutrophication – reducing nutrient inflows (priority –
removing phosphates from detergents);
- biodiversity – reducing negative effects of fishing
- hazardous substances – reduction of use
- pollution from ships – reducing water discharge, air
pollution, noise is getting a problem
- climate change – regional adaptation (vs. global fighting)
EU Baltic Sea Strategy:
transport and environment
 Support of railways: Nordic Triangle, Rail
Baltica (TEN-T Priority Projects)
EU Baltic Sea Strategy:
transport and environment
 Motorways of the Sea: providing
transport intermodality - strengthening
north-south ferry links: Karlskrona to
Klaipeda and Gdynia, Trelleborg to
Sassnitz.
Gdyna - Karlskrona
MoS Klaipeda-Karlshamn:
to increase share from 18%
to 71 % by 2025
Green Transport Corridors
“To facilitate more traffic on existing corridors between major hubs,
while encouraging environmental sustainability and energy efficiency”
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Low impact for natural environment
Energy Efficiency
Complementarity of modes
Infrastructure and facilities (ports,
terminals)
 Supply points (bio-fuels and hydrogen)
 Innovative management technologies
 Harmonized rules and equal access
Green corridors: basic
concepts
 Co-modality
 Support of environmentally friendly modes (sea
and rail)
 Intellectual Transport Systems
 Spatial development
 Internalisation of external costs
 Concentration of cargo on long-distance legs
 Eco-labelling
 Incorporating Russia, Belarus and Ukraine
EU: Energy and
Environment
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Emission Trade System since 2005.
Covering energy-intensive enterprises
Multiannual national plans (2008-2012)
The main limitations are imposed on energy
installations (in Estonia – 42 of total 50, 64 %
of total energy-related 86% of GHG emissions)
 Kyoto Commitment – 8% reduction by 2020
 National Program Commitment – 21% by 2010
to 1999
Challenges
 Auctioning emission allowances since 2013
 Decreasing emission allowances 1.74 %
annually in 2013-2020
 Accession treaty obligation on Narva Electric
Power Plants
 Russia is not participating in ETS yet
 Transport issue – aviation covered since 2013
Emissions trading effectiveness in
Estonia: Conclusions of State Audit
Office
 EU Emissions Trading has not brought about reduction in GHG
emissions due to the following:
 –The MoE drafted the two national allocation plans based on
economic interests of companies and failed to take into account the
need to reduce GHG emissions;
 –The money obtained from the sales of allowances was not used for
investments into environmental technologies:
 - During the 2005-2007 trading period the state energy monopoly
sold allowances for approximately128 mln euros. The government
decided to use these revenues for general state budget purposes.
 NB: In April 2011Commission rejected Estonia's revised National
Allocation Plan, NAP for 2008-2012 concerning carbon dioxide
(CO2) emission allowances. The plan was rejected on several
grounds but in particular because the average total quantity of
allowances Estonia proposed to allocate to its installations over
the period was too high.
HELCOM
(Baltic Marine Environment Protection
Commission)
 Priorities:
- Environmental monitoring and assessment
- Combating eutrophication caused by excessive
nutrient loads from municipal wastewater and
agriculture
- Preventing pollution by hazardous substances
- Improving navigational safety and accident
response capacity
- Protecting and conserving marine and coastal
biodiversity
 Members: 9 Baltic States + European Union
HELCOM: Legal Base
 Convention 1974 (fully ratified by 1984)
- political role in relations between USSR and the West;
- research and technical support;
- national concerns vs. regional approach as a driver of environmental
cooperation
 Convention 1992
- changed political realities: the end of the Cold War and active
environmental movements;
- accumulated scientific knowledge;
- inland water included (sovereignty issue);
- more active collaboration with various stakeholders (vs. previous
approach of attracting professional environmentalists from narrow
group of international organizations);
- precautionary principle
- use of best environmental practices and best environmenetal
technologies
- “polluter should pay” principle
HELCOM: Baltic Sea Action Plan
 Priority 1. Fighting Eutrophication
 Goals: Good environmental status
- decrease of inputs of phosphorus to 21,000
(from 36,000) tonnes and nitrogens 600,000
(from 737,000) tonnes;
- improve the treatment of wastewater, including
increasing phosphorous removal from 80% to
90%;
- substituting phosphorous in detergents.
Country
Phosphorus (tonnes)
Nitrogen (tonnes)
Denmark
16
17,210
Estonia
220
900
Finland
150
1,200
Germany
240
5,620
Latvia
300
2,560
Lithuania
880
11,750
Poland
8,760
62,400
Russia
2,500
6,970
Sweden
290
20,780
1,660
3,780
Transboundary
Russian Baltic Policy:
foreign policy tools disposed
- Coercion
- Engagement and Reassurance
- Differentiation
- Marginalization
- Pragmatization/economization
- Peripherization/negligence
The main problems
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Withdrawing Russian troops (1993-1994);
NATO and EU enlargement
Border agreements
Status of Russian-speaking minorities (Latvia
and Estonia)
 Kaliningrad (Lithuania)
 Investment into strategic areas: energy and
transit
 Energy security
The most problematic
relations
 Latvia – before 2007
 Estonia – 2007-2011
 Lithuania – 2011…
Evolution and stages
 Tactical alliance – 1990-1991.
- Common efforts in fighting Soviet Center
- Democratic movement in Russia and its
support of Baltic autonomies
- Personal links of Baltic leaders with Yeltsin, his
meeting with 3 Presidents
- Mutual recognition – the Treaties on
Establishing Interstate Relations (1991)
- Undermining Soviet economic blockade
Evolution and stages
 Accepting independence (1992-1996)
- Withdrawing Russian troops;
- Elements of differentiation (Lithuania received
advanced withdrawing);
- Importance of transit – Russia lost its transit
facilities;
- Attempts of coercion to get concessions (winter
1992-1993, energy sanctions);
- Dissatisfaction with minority policies;
- Rejection of territorial claims (Kaliningrad,
Petseri, Abrene).
Evolution and stages
 Differentiation 1996-1998
- “Long-term Russia’s Foreign Policy Line towards the Baltic
States”, 1996
- conditioned development of economic cooperation and
border settlement from resolution of political problems,
first of all, status of Russian-speaking minority rights in
Latvia and Estonia and respect of Russian interests by
Governments of the Balts (NATO membership);
- 1997 - elements of engagement and reassurance in
security – Russia’s proposals on multilateral security
guarantees
- 1997 – Russian-Lithuanian Border Agreement signed
LITHUANIA as an example of good relations with Russia
Evolution and stages
 Peripherization 1998-2000
- Economic crisis in Russia (Default August
1998)
- Political instability – 5 governments in Russia
changed
- Inability to coordinate foreign policy with the
interests of large companies
- 1999 - passive reaction to deal on “Mazeikiu
nafta” refinery in Lithuania
- 2000 – the Law on Compensation of Soviet
Damage (Lithuania)
Evolution and stages
 Economization and “pragmatization” 2000-2004
- Putin-I attempts of improving relations with the West
- Moderate political forces in power in the Baltic States
- Controversial consequences of NATO/EU enlargement:
rhetoric “red lines” and de facto recognition
- Purchase of “Mazeiku nafta” by YUKOS
- Kaliningrad Transit and ratification of Border Treaty with
Lithuania
- Russia actively develops its oil transit facilities
- 2002-2003 Closed oil pipeline to Ventspils
Evolution and stages
 Marginalization 2005-2007
 Worsening relations of Russia and the West
 EU and NATO enlargement: the Baltic States serve a role of
permanent critics of Russia, as well as try to “export democracy”
to the Post-Soviet Space
 Sell of Mazaiku nafta to Polish PKN Orlen and closing “Druzhba”
pipeline
 2005 – Only Latvian President visited 50th Anniversary of Great
Victory Ceremony in Moscow
 The Attempts of Estonian and Latvian Parliaments to stop border
treaty ratification
 Growing importance of historical debate (different interpretations
and “historical policy” in bilateral relations
 Bronze Soldier (April 2007)
Evolution and stages
 Selective engagement – 2007….
- Decreasing interdependence in transit – Russia received transit
facilities for oil, developing Ust-Luga and other ports;
- The issue of Russian-speaking population was separated from the
general agenda of bilateral relations;
- Border agreement with Latvia signed (2007), visit of Latvian PM
A.Kalvitis to Moscow and launch of normalization in bilateral relations;
- Continuing deterioration in relations with Estonia;
- Stagnation in relations with Lithuania, failed efforts of the New
Lithuanian President Dalia Grybauskaite to improve them;
- Energy security in bilateral agenda – 3rd EU Gas Package, Integration
of electricity markets;
- Hard security issues – growing accusations in authoritarianism and
unpredictability towards Russia. At the same time, Latvia and
Lithuania abrogated compulsory military service – orientation on
NATO collective defence and overseas operations.