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All-Hazards Mental Health Michael T. “Mick” Maurer, PhD, MHA Department of Applied Psychology, NYU Steinhardt School of Education And Business Continuity and Homeland Security Certificate Program The Center for Management Division of Business and Legal Studies NYU School for Continuing & Professional Studies 7/21/2015 www.mickmaurer.com 2 Short-term temporal perspectives of contemporary New Jerseyans • “We should never talk about what we will do in 100 years; it is too far off to be dealt with.” Mayor of a New Jersey coastal municipality, 1997 • “Let's hold off on major (hazard land use) policy decisions for the next 40 or 50 years.” President of a NJ property owner lobbying group, 1997 7/21/2015 www.mickmaurer.com 3 New Jersey’s natural hazards 1883 Newark blizzard 1917 South Cape May coastal storm 1955 flood Blairstown 2002 Pine Barrens fire 2002 drought Boonton Reservoir 7/21/2015 www.mickmaurer.com 4 Hazard = f(Risk, Exposure, Resistance, Resilience) Risk (e.g. tropical storm-driven waves at Belmar) Exposure “ …recent population increases, as evidenced by the 2000 census, result in more people and property at risk from (New Jersey’s) coastal hazards. With the prospect of accelerated rates of sea level rise, this vulnerability is likely to increase." • Resistance Resilience (Strathmere geotextile tube under dunes) 7/21/2015 www.mickmaurer.com The post-disaster ability to return to a pre-existing state or to achieve a new desired state; sometimes indexed by speed of recovery 5 NJ’s Major 20th C Natural Disasters DATE TYPE October 7-10, 1903 Flood after tropical storm (dying hurricane) Passaic River Basin $7 million damage; year 2000 repeat - c.$3Billion Accelerates instrumentation of NJ rivers September 14, 1944 Tropical storm (dying hurricane) Long Beach Island, Brigantine, Atlantic City, Ocean City, Sea Isle City 8 deaths, 460 homes and 217 other buildings destroyed, c. 3,600 buildings damaged; $25 million loss August 7-13, 1955 Flood after passage of tropical storms Connie & Diane Delaware, Raritan & Passaic River systems At least 50 NJ and PA deaths; Worst along middle Delaware and in Blairstown on Paulins Kill Creation of DRBC March 6-9, 1962 Nor’easter coastal storm Jersey oceanfront coast 10 deaths; $130-400 million loss; Half Cape May’s population evacuated April 20-22, 1963 37 major forest fires Pine Barrens 7 deaths, 186 homes and 197 outbuildings destroyed; 190,000 acres burned 1964-68 Drought Statewide 20th century drought of record; perhaps surpassed by 20002003 drought September 16, 1999 Flood after tropical storm Floyd (dying hurricane) Raritan and Passaic River basins 4 deaths and $1 billion loss statewide; most expensive New Jersey disaster on record 7/21/2015 LOCATION IMPACTS www.mickmaurer.com 6 NJ FEDERAL DISASTER DECLARATIONS 1992-99 Note: “90% of the disasters that occur in the U.S. do not result in a Federal Disaster declaration. ” National Conference of Insurance Legislators, 2002 DATE DISASTER NUMBER TYPE March 4, 1992 FEMA-936-DR Coastal storm/flood December 18, 1992 FEMA-973-DR Coastal nor’easter storm March 17, 1993 FEMA-3106-EM Snow removal January 13, 1996 FEMA-1088-DR Winter storm/Blizzard November 19, 1996 FEMA-1145-DR Severe storm/flood September 23, 1997 FEMA-1189-DR Flood March 3, 1998 FEMA-1206 Coastal storm/flood September 17, 1999 FEMA- EM-3147 Tropical storm Floyd flood September 18, 1999 FEMA 1295 Tropical Storm Floyd flood 7/21/2015 www.mickmaurer.com 7 A worsening burden of hazard • Record-setting disaster costs • Tropical Storm Floyd (1999) - >$1.0 Billion • Repeat of 1903 Passaic floods estimated - $3.5 Billion • Larger numbers of impacted people • Recent drought emergency orders affected NJ’s 8 million+ residents for weeks to months • Ocean County storms now affect population >2,500% larger than 1900 • Unprecedented levels of disruption • Airport & highways closings affect region & nation 7/21/2015 www.mickmaurer.com 8 Population Change: A Driver of Exposure DATE 7/21/2015 ABSOLUTE INCREASE % INCREASE 1901-10 653,498 34.7 1911-20 618,733 24.4 1921-30 885,434 28.1 1931-40 118,318 2.9 1941-50 665,164 16.0 1951-60 1,241,403 25.7 1961-70 1,101,382 18.0 1971-80 196,659 2.7 1981-90 365,365 5.0 1991-2000 684,162 8.9 www.mickmaurer.com 9 7/21/2015 www.mickmaurer.com 10 20th Century Hazard Trends • Drought & floods – Worsened; urbanized; spreading statewide • Blizzards – Declined; urbanized; becoming aestheticized performances and communal catharses • Forest fires – Reconfigured; more numerous but smaller; more humancaused; worsened at forest edges; continuing catastrophe potential • Coastal storms – Sensitized fear of hurricanes but other storms more common and more destructive 7/21/2015 www.mickmaurer.com 11 Droughts 7/21/2015 www.mickmaurer.com 12 Urban drought perceived as an increasing policy problem • • • • • • • 1895 - No newspaper reports 1915 - Handful of reports about crops 1930 - Concern about future shortages – “A few years of such dry summers as that of 1930 and the communities of Northern New Jersey would lack sufficient potable water, unless relief in the meantime had been contrived.” NYT, 10/17/30 1957 - Pres. Eisenhower refuses to issue disaster declaration for NJ – “The basic problem is how to atone for lack of foresight and inadequate distribution facilities in the suburbs. The outward thrust into the suburbs since 1950 appears to have caught water plants there unprepared.” NYT, 7/22/57 1965 - Pres. Johnson issues drought disaster declaration for NJ 1974 - Gov. Byrne issues 1st drought Executive Order. – “…the largest municipalities in New Jersey…depend on reservoirs in the heavily populated areas, where runoffs after heavy rains and snowfalls are considerably reduced because of the development of open spaces.” NYT, 6/5/74 1999 - Complex problems demand sophisticated responses – “…state and local governments and the news media have failed to recognize drought as a complex set of phenomena that demand long range regional planning and hard decisions after the inevitable rains come and the emergency decrees fade away. … In general there should be a more robust public debate about how the government functions in a liberal democracy in times of emergency.” NYT, 8/15/99 7/21/2015 www.mickmaurer.com 13 Urban Blizzards - THEN • Threatens – Life (hypothermia) – Heating supplies (coal barges) – Food supplies (milk trains, bread) – City transportation (ferries, freight wagons) • “The time may not come within the present century when the newspaper will not be hampered in its work of news collecting by storms of such intemperate violence as that which swept the earth yesterday, but progress is making in that direction, and ultimately no doubt the telegraphic system of the entire country will be as secure from damage by wind and storm …” New York Times, March 13, 1888 7/21/2015 www.mickmaurer.com 14 Urban blizzards - NOW • Threatens – Transportation (especially roads, airports) • Benefits – Social solidarity – Aesthetics – Sense of wellbeing • “Sudden destruction of the normal order had its virtues this weekend. What after all is so delightful about being strapped rigidly into the normal order?… The blizzard had elbowed (people) off the treadmill and provided a gentle adventure” New York Times, January 9, 1996 7/21/2015 www.mickmaurer.com 15 New Jersey forest fires by decade, 1902-2000 “Whatever else they do, men in the Pine Barrens are fire-fighters throughout their lives” John McPhee, 1967 DECADE FIRES BURNED ACRES RATIO ACRES/FIRES 1902-1909* 1,509 424,984 281 1910-1919 7,085 713,215 101 1920-1929 10,241 668,751 65 1930-1939 13,841 586,176 42 1940-1949 15,020 257,619 17 1950-1959 12,573 171,418 14 1960-1969 15,165 311,540 21 1970-1979 16,746 122,718 7 1980-1989 15,776 79,580 5 1991-2000 16,147 69,497 4 124,103 3,405,498 27 TOTAL 1902-2000* 7/21/2015 www.mickmaurer.com 16 PERCEIVED CAUSES OF NJ FOREST FIRES CAUSAL AGENT 1895 1990 Locomotives 49% <1% Accidents/carelessness 41% 39% Incendiary 6% 50% Other 2% 10% 7/21/2015 www.mickmaurer.com 17 "Huddled masses" as hazard agents • “Hundreds of uneducated immigrants have invaded the Pines, owing to the cheapness of the land and proximity to large cities. Few of these have brought with them European forestry ideas, and many of the most disastrous fires are those which they carelessly set in clearing their farms.” (State Geologist, 1899, p. 289) – “Many of the sufferers are poor Italians, who obtained small clearings and enlarged them by degrees.” (New York Times, April 30, 1900) – In September 1895 one fire was “set by an Italian back-firing in the wrong way” and another was “set accidentally by Italians cooking in the woods”. (State Geologist, 1899, p. 164.) 7/21/2015 www.mickmaurer.com 18 General Findings • The burden of hazard has grown and shifted repeatedly as New Jersey added population and investments at different rates in different areas that are themselves differentially exposed to natural risks. • Broad unplanned societal changes have affected the hazard ecology of New Jersey at least as much as the deliberate efforts of hazard management agencies and individuals. 7/21/2015 www.mickmaurer.com 19 Value of NJ experience to policy making - I • State's leading role in national research & policy • • • • First systematic study of forest fire in USA First USGS reports on flooding Formative research on beach processes Capitalize on this experience especially with respect to innovations for the future • Continuing trend towards broader perspectives • Broader interpretations of hazard issues • Broader solutions • We will increasingly have to think in interdisciplinary ways that mediate among conflicting conceptions and contradictory goals. 7/21/2015 www.mickmaurer.com 20 Value of NJ experience to policy making - II • Natural hazards and disasters provide a basis for public intervention and open up opportunities for institutional innovation • Without the threat of fires would there be Pinelands regulation? • Without the 1955 Delaware floods would there be a DRBC? • Disjunctive change can fundamentally restructure old arguments; beware of relying on assumptions about continuation of current trends • Limitations of relying on tightly coupled prediction & response systems • No hurricanes BUT – Plenty of tropical storms and nor’easters – Inland impacts instead of coastal ones • Plan for surprises; consider kinds of risk as well as degrees of risk; shift emphasis “upstream” to mitigation of material losses "New Jersey hazards in the 20th century" Mitchell - November 16, 2004 7/21/2015 www.mickmaurer.com 21 7/21/2015 www.mickmaurer.com 22 “Terrorism is the deliberate and systematic assault on civilians to inspire fear for political ends.” “Terrorism is the intentional use of, or threat to use violence against civilians or against civilian targets, in order to attain political aims.” 7/21/2015 www.mickmaurer.com 23 ‘Suicide’ Bombings Public Transport – Haifa , Dec 2 , 2001 7/21/2015 To be a 'shahid' or not to be… www.mickmaurer.com 24 METROPOLITAN DESK | September 10, 2004, Friday Terror in the Age of Eisenhower; Recalling the Mad Bomber, Whose Rampage Shook New York By CHARLES DELAFUENTE (NYT) 1226 words Late Edition - Final , Section B , Page 1 , Column 2 There was a bomber on the loose in New York City. On the evening of Dec. 2, 1956, 1,500 people were at the Brooklyn Paramount Theater watching ''War and Peace'' when a pipe bomb beneath a seat exploded at 7:50 p.m. Six people were injured, including Abraham Blumenthal, who was lifted out of his seat by the blast. The next day, Police Commissioner Stephen P. Kennedy ordered what he called the ''greatest manhunt in the history of the Police Department.'' 7/21/2015 www.mickmaurer.com 25 At the time of that bombing, the police had been searching for the man known as the Mad Bomber for years. He first struck in the city in 1940 and 1941, planting two bombs that did not explode. He resurfaced in 1951, planting 22 bombs that did explode and several more that did not. Bombs were left in crowded public places: train, bus and subway stations, Macy's, movie theaters, office buildings and the New York Public Library. The fact that a place had been bombed before was no assurance that it was subsequently safe. Grand Central Terminal was the site of five bombs; there were three at Pennsylvania Station; two were planted at the Port Authority Bus Terminal; and two at Radio City Music Hall. Fifteen people were injured by the bombs. 7/21/2015 www.mickmaurer.com 26 Though no one was killed, the city's nerves were rubbed raw. ''There was a lot of fear, especially in the subways,'' recalled Arthur Gelb, a former managing editor of The New York Times. ''People thought twice before taking the subway,'' said Mr. Gelb, who was a Times reporter during the series of attacks. ''Many people took buses because they felt the subways were where he would attack.'' 7/21/2015 www.mickmaurer.com 27 • There have been other bombers in New York, both before and after the Mad Bomber. German saboteurs struck in 1916, during World War I, and attackers believed to be Bolsheviks planted a bomb on Wall Street in 1920. Another serial attacker, known as the Sunday Bomber, left bombs in a subway car, a subway station, the Staten Island Ferry and public buildings in late 1960, killing one person. That bomber was never caught. • Members of the Weather Underground, a radical group, committed at least a dozen bombings in New York in 1969 and 1970 to protest the war in Vietnam. The only fatalities were three of the radicals, who were killed when a townhouse in the Village, described by the police as a bomb factory, exploded. • And in 1974, the Armed Forces of National Liberation, better known as F.A.L.N., the initials of its Spanish name, began a decade-long bombing campaign in New York that killed five people. But no one person left as many bombs around the city as the Mad Bomber did. 7/21/2015 www.mickmaurer.com 28 When Mr. Metesky appeared in court, he ''resembled a beaming church deacon,'' according to an account of the proceedings in The Times. He was clinging to a copy of The Journal-American, whose headline proclaimed ''LETTERS TO JOURNAL TRAP THE MAD BOMBER.'' There was quite a bit of surprise that the Mad Bomber, who had terrorized the city for years, turned out to be so ordinary looking. ''Nobody,'' Mr. Pelleck said, ''knew it was going to turn out to be this doddering old man.'' Photos: Police officers put a container holding a bomb into a protected van at Grand Central Terminal in 1956. Right, pieces of letters to the police from the Mad Bomber. (Photo by New York Police Department); (Photo by Neal Boenzi/The New York Times)(pg. B1); George P. Metesky, 53, at the jail in Waterbury, Conn., shortly after his arrest in January 1957. He was later brought to New York for trial. (Photo by Edward Hausner/The New York Times)(pg. B6) Copyright 2005 The New York Times Company 7/21/2015 www.mickmaurer.com 29 Population Exposure model A Seriously injured victims • bereaved family members B Victims with high exposure to trauma • victims evacuated from the disaster zone Bereaved extended family members and friends • rescue and recovery C workers with prolonged exposure • medical examiner's office staff • service providers directly involved with death notification and bereaved families People who lost homes, jobs, pets, valued possessions • mental health providers • clergy, chaplains, spiritual leaders • emergency health care D providers • school personnel involved with survivors, families, of victims • media personnel E Government officials • groups that identify with target victim group • businesses with financial impacts F Community-at-large 7/21/2015 www.mickmaurer.com 30 Agency Type of Event Who is Eligible What is Provided FEMA/ CMHS Crisis Counseli ng Natural or human caused disaster. Must have Presidential declaration. Anyone living, working, or in the declared area at the time of the disaster. Outreach, short-term counseling, referral, and psychoeducational activities provided by mix of professionals and trained paraprofessionals. Typically for about a year following a disaster. Does not provide long-term treatment. Red Cross Mental Health Services Any emergency. Special authorities in transportation emergencies. Anyone in affected areas. Can provide services to families outside disaster area. Counseling and referral by licensed mental health professionals. Typically only for a few days/week following the event. Office for Victims of Crime Criminal acts only (including terrorism). Crime victim's location not critical. Variety of advocacy and other services including support for short- and longterm mental health services. As long as necessary 7/21/2015 www.mickmaurer.com When Provided 31 Natural vs. Human-Caused Disasters Natural Human-Caused Causes Forces of nature Human error, malfunctioning Examples Earthquakes, hurricanes, floods Airplane crashes, major chemical leaks, nuclear reactor accidents Blame No one Person, government, business Scope Various locations Locations may be inaccessible to rescuers, unfamiliar to survivors, little advance warning High Higher, often felt by family members not involved in actual disaster Postdisaster Distress Source: CMHS. Psychosocial Issues for Children and Families in Disasters. A Guide for the Primary Care Physician. Washington, D.C.: U.S. Department of Health and Human Services; Publication No. (SMA) 96-3077, 1996. 7/21/2015 www.mickmaurer.com 32 Percentage Distribution of the Population By Race and Hispanic Origin (Includes foreign and native-born populations) American Indian/ Alaska Native* * Asian and Pacific Islander Hispanic/ Latino Origin* Year White Black/ African American 1995 73.6 12.0 0.7 3.3 10.2 2000 71.4 12.2 0.7 3.9 11.8 2010 67.3 12.5 0.8 4.8 14.6 2050 52.8 13.2 0.8 8.9 24.3 2100 40.3 13.0 0.7 12.6 33.3 * Persons of Hispanic/Latino origin may be of any race. Groups listed under “Race” are not of Hispanic origin. ** Includes American Indians, Alaska Natives, and Aleuts. Source: U.S. Department of Commerce, Bureau of the Census. (2000). Projections of the resident population by race, Hispanic origin, and nativity: Middle series, 1999 to 2100. Washington, DC: U.S. Department of Commerce. 7/21/2015 www.mickmaurer.com 33 7/21/2015 www.mickmaurer.com 34 Disaster Projects Confront Distrust • Several disaster crisis counseling projects supported by the Federal Government have had to address the distrust of ethnic minority groups and their reluctance to use available resources. For example, following the 1994 California earthquake, the disaster crisis counseling project found that many immigrants’ distrust of government posed a barrier to their use of disaster services. Likewise, some of the survivors of a hurricane in Alabama were immigrants from Asian Communist countries who did not trust any government and were not accustomed to receiving Government assistance. California Final Report, 1995 • Alabama Final Report, 1999 7/21/2015 www.mickmaurer.com 35 7/21/2015 www.mickmaurer.com 36 Damage from Mississippi Tornadoes Unequal • In the late 1950s, several tornadoes struck rural Mississippi. The only persons killed were black. A subsequent study found that many people in the black community had great difficulty in coming to terms with this disaster. They did not understand how a just God could discriminate in such a fashion between white and black. Perry and Perry, 1959 7/21/2015 www.mickmaurer.com 37 7/21/2015 www.mickmaurer.com 38 Civil Unrest Causes Emotional Problems for Refugees • The civil unrest and fires in Los Angeles that came in the wake of the Rodney King verdict affected a community inhabited by many refugees from Central America and Asia. For immigrants who came from war-torn countries, the Los Angeles disturbances reactivated fears and emotions associated with their homeland. Many experienced increased agitation, depression, confusion, and recollections of prior bereavements. California Final Report, 1994 7/21/2015 www.mickmaurer.com 39 7/21/2015 www.mickmaurer.com 40 Disaster Strikes a Highly Diverse Community • On January 17, 1994, a major earthquake struck Los Angeles and Ventura Counties. The Northridge earthquake was the largest and most violent to hit an urban area in the United States since the 1906 San Francisco quake. The post-disaster recovery effort provided mental health services to 1.9 million persons, representing myriad ethnic groups, special populations, and lifestyles. • The size and scope of the two affected counties, as well as the ethnic diversity of their residents, constituted a challenge to disaster mental health providers. For example, Ventura County is home to many undocumented migrant farm workers, the majority of whom do not speak English and are mistrustful of government at any level. Language and cultural barriers had to be overcome for persons from several Asian cultures as well. The diverse population in the affected areas also included other special populations, such as physically challenged persons and runaway youth, two groups that required special outreach strategies. California Final Report, 1995 7/21/2015 www.mickmaurer.com 41 7/21/2015 www.mickmaurer.com 42 Vulnerable Groups Underserved by Science and Technology • Elderly shut-ins during heat and cold waves • Illegal immigrants crossing southern border • Victims fearful of revealing identities Publics vulnerable to terrorist attacks at home, in workplace, in mass transit, at play • 7/21/2015 www.mickmaurer.com 43 7/21/2015 www.mickmaurer.com 44 Common Stress Reactions • Behavioral Increase or decrease in activity level Substance use or abuse (alcohol or drugs) Difficulty communicating or listening Irritability, outbursts of anger, frequent arguments Inability to rest or relax Decline in job performance; absenteeism Frequent crying Hyper-vigilance or excessive worry Avoidance of activities or places that trigger memories Becoming accident prone 7/21/2015 www.mickmaurer.com 45 • Physical Gastrointestinal problems Headaches, other aches and pains Visual disturbances Weight loss or gain Sweating or chills Tremors or muscle twitching Being easily startled Chronic fatigue or sleep disturbances Immune system disorders • Psychological/Emotional Feeling heroic, euphoric, or invulnerable Denial Anxiety or fear Depression Guilt Apathy Grief 7/21/2015 www.mickmaurer.com 46 • Thinking Memory problems Disorientation and confusion Slow thought processes; lack of concentration Difficulty setting priorities or making decisions Loss of objectivity • Social Isolation Blaming Difficulty in giving or accepting support or help Inability to experience pleasure or have fun (Adapted from CMHS, 2004) 7/21/2015 www.mickmaurer.com 47 Extreme Stress Reactions Post Traumatic Stress Disorders (PTSD) Type I, II, III - Associated Disorders • Major Depressive Episode • Posttraumatic Stress Disorder • Generalized Anxiety Disorder • Panic Disorder - Associated Complications • Suicide • Substance Abuse • Self-Medication 7/21/2015 www.mickmaurer.com 48 Crisis Counseling Programs for the Rural Community • • • • • • • CHARACTERISTICS OF RURAL AREAS High poverty levels Increasing percentage of older adults High unemployment High levels of social and health related problems Pockets of minorities within a largely homogeneous population Heavy dependence on agricultural, oil, mining, or tourism related businesses Large numbers of people involved with and reliant upon organized religion 7/21/2015 www.mickmaurer.com 49 Challenges Encountered by Rural Crisis Counseling Programs • Emotional Isolation and Independence of the Rural Population • Reaching Farm Families • Geographic Isolation • Accessing Hard-to-Reach Groups • Cultural Values in Rural Populations - Individualism - Mental Health Stigma - Spiritual Traditions 7/21/2015 www.mickmaurer.com 50 The impact of a disaster in an area where agriculture accounts for a major portion of the local economy may not be evident until months after the event. Stress is generated by: • Uncertainty (level of crop damage, price fluctuations, etc.) • Time limits on applying for assistance • The culture, competition, and beliefs on self-reliance as a measure of worth • Distrust of outsiders and government intervention • A maze of programs, red tape, and paperwork in the disaster recovery process 7/21/2015 www.mickmaurer.com 51 Key Concepts of Disaster Mental Health • No one who sees a disaster is untouched by it. • There are two types of disaster trauma—individual and community. • Most people pull together and function adequately during and after a disaster, but their effectiveness is diminished by the effects of the event. • Stress and grief in disasters are normal reactions to abnormal situations. • Many emotional reactions of disaster survivors stem from problems of daily living brought about by the disaster. • Disaster relief assistance may be confusing to some survivors. They may experience frustration, anger, and feelings of helplessness related to Federal, State, and private-sector disaster assistance programs. • Most people do not see themselves as needing mental health services following a disaster and will not seek such services. 7/21/2015 www.mickmaurer.com 52 • Survivors may reject disaster assistance of all types. • Disaster mental health assistance is often more practical than psychological in nature. • Disaster mental health services must be tailored to the culture of communities where they are provided. • Mental health workers should set aside traditional methods, avoid mental health labels, and use an active outreach approach to intervene successfully in disaster. • Survivors respond to active, genuine interest, and concern. • Interventions must be appropriate to the phase of disaster. • Social support systems are crucial to recovery. 7/21/2015 www.mickmaurer.com 53 During the Crisis—At the Scene Minimizing Stress During the Crisis—At the Scene • Clearly define individual roles and reevaluate if the situation changes. • Institute briefings at each shift change that cover the current status of the work environment, safety procedures, and required safety equipment (CMHS, 1994). • Partner inexperienced workers with experienced veterans. The buddy system is an effective method to provide support, monitor stress, and reinforce safety procedures. Require outreach personnel to enter the community in pairs (CMHS, 1994). • Rotate workers from high-stress to lower stress functions (CMHS, 1994). • Initiate, encourage, and monitor work breaks, especially when casualties are involved (McCarroll, Ursano, Wright, & Fullerton, 1993). During lengthy events, implement longer breaks and days off, and curtail weekend work as soon as possible. • Establish respite areas that visually separate workers from the scene and the public. At longer operations, establish an area where responders can shower, eat, change clothes, and sleep (CMHS, 1994). 7/21/2015 www.mickmaurer.com 54 • Implement flexible schedules for workers who are directly impacted by an event (CMHS, 1994). This can help workers balance home and job responsibilities. • Reduce noise as much as possible by providing earplugs, noise mufflers, or telephone headsets (CMHS, 1994). • Mitigate the effects of extreme temperatures through the use of protective clothing, proper hydration, and frequent breaks. • Ensure that lighting is sufficient, adjustable, and in good working order. • Lessen the impact of odors and tastes, and protect workers' breathing by supplying facemasks and respirators (McCarroll et al.,1993). • Provide security for staff at facilities or sites in dangerous areas, including escorts for workers going to and from their vehicles (CMHS, 1994). • Provide mobile phones for workers in dangerous environments. Ensure that staff know who to call when problems arise (CMHS, 1994). 7/21/2015 www.mickmaurer.com 55 After the Crisis Minimizing Stress for Workers After the Crisis • Allow time off for workers who have experienced personal trauma or loss. Transition these individuals back into the organization by initially assigning them to less demanding jobs (CMHS, 1994). • Develop protocols to provide workers with stigma-free counseling so that workers can address the emotional aspects of their experience (CMHS, 1994). • Institute exit interviews and/or seminars to help workers put their experiences in perspective (Bradford & John, 1991) and to validate what they have seen, done, thought, and felt. • Provide educational inservices or workshops around stress management and self-care. • Offer group self-care activities and acknowledgments. 7/21/2015 www.mickmaurer.com 56 Research on children from the September 11th, 2001 attacks & the Oklahoma City Bombing. • Two factors related to increased stress symptoms were: 1) amount of television coverage viewed by the child, 2) parental distress. 7/21/2015 www.mickmaurer.com 57 The Effect of FIRST Responder-Related PTSD on Children • Transgenerational effects of combatrelated/FIRST Responder-Related PTSD have critical implications for a veteran’s interpersonal and family life • Children of combat veterans/FIRST Responder with PTSD generally exhibit one of three response patterns. 7/21/2015 www.mickmaurer.com 58 The “over-identified” child. • Through a process Rosenheck and Nathan (1985) has termed secondary traumatization, children come to experience an emotional disequilibrium similar to the veteran with PTSD. • Children with secondary traumatization are often that parent’s closest companion and are at risk for "relieving" their father’s trauma, experiencing his flashbacks, and sharing his nightmares. • These children fail to develop their own friendships because their lives revolve around their father. • In school, they often have difficulty with concentration because they are distracted by their concern for their father’s well-being. 7/21/2015 www.mickmaurer.com 59 The "rescuers" • Whereby they take on parental roles and responsibilities. • They often feel guilty about trouble at home and blame themselves. • They assume that if they are good, life at home will go well. • They believe it is their responsibility to keep their parents happy and to insure nothing goes wrong. • These children often lose spontaneity and interest in daily activities. • Similar to children of alcoholics, these children are at risk for continuing this pattern into adult life. 7/21/2015 www.mickmaurer.com 60 Third pattern Child • Children who are emotionally uninvolved in family life. • They often know about their father's war experience and need for support, but generally receive little emotional support themselves from their parents. • In an effort to gain recognition, they are apt to perform well academically, • Their emotional and social constriction may cause symptoms of depression and anxiety, • and later cause problems in their adulthood efforts to form intimate relationships. 7/21/2015 www.mickmaurer.com 61 Make Better Use of Existing Science • Target Underserved Populations • Extend management time horizons • Take advantage of present societal trends 7/21/2015 www.mickmaurer.com 62 All-Hazards Mental Health • Addressing regional disasters; • Increasing attention to terrorism and bioterrorism; • The occurrence of Natural disasters (fires, floods, hurricanes) has remained high even as the threat of terrorism has increased. • Mental health and substance abuse must be fully integrated into the public health emergency response. • Little political will to focus on disaster mental health over many years once a disaster passes; • Mental health being overlooked in favor of safety and security concerns; • The lack of well-defined, studied, and easily implemented programs in disaster mental health that can be adopted widely. 7/21/2015 www.mickmaurer.com 63 TERRORISM IS REAL AND IT'S HERE 7/21/2015 www.mickmaurer.com 64 Questions? 7/21/2015 www.mickmaurer.com 65