Transcript Identities and cleavage structures - univ

The (shrinking) Left in
Europe
Alistair Cole
(Northern European) Social
Democracy: core and features
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Strong working class anchoring, but not strictly speaking class parties (i.e.
always appealing beyond just the industrial working class)
mass parties
close relationships with the trade unions
an interclassist electoral profile
dominant force of the left
accept rules of democratic game
party of government
national, rather than … internationalist parties
corporatism
mixed economy
northern-southern divide
French Socialists (again
in search of a role)
Alistair Cole
How does the French PS fit with this
model?
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Strong working class anchoring: not really…party of public sector middle
classes under SFIO, but PCF
mass parties : not really a mass party. Organisation 200000
close relationships with the trade unions: no, legacy of anarcho-syndicalism
an interclassist electoral profile: in 1981 or 1997, yes, but electorate biased
towards public sector middle classes
dominant force of the left: yes, but only late on in the day
accept rules of democratic game : yes, characteristic of Blum
party of government: yes, on numerous occasions, but not recently
national, rather than internationalist parties:
corporatism : not really, but under Jospin
mixed economy : yes, a strong belief in nationalisation under Mitterrand
and industrial policy under Jospin
northern-southern divide…
French Socialists
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The first unified French Socialist party - the Section Française de l’Internationale
Ouvrière (SFIO) of 1905- was formed on the orders of the Second International as
a revolutionary party, in total opposition to bourgeois society.
Though the pre-1914 SFIO fought elections, voted for progressive legislation, and
ran many municipal councils, its ideological identity as an opposition party was of
crucial importance in the young SFIO’s life (Judt, 1974).
As in Germany, the 1917 Revolution caused a fundamental schism within the
French left: initially marginal, the French communist party (PCF) gradually
became the stronger leftwing party from mid-1940s to mid-1970s. In order to
support its claim to be the legitimate heir to the original 1905 party, the socialist
SFIO continued to declare itself a revolutionary Marxist party.
The Popular Front government of 1936 finally buried the SFIO’s ‘nonparticipation’ doctrine when, under Léon Blum, the SFIO headed the first Socialistled government in French history.
However heroic in retrospect, the Popular Front government was short-lived (193637), and suffered from a chronic lack of cohesion, on account of PCF ambivalence
and left-wing opposition to Blum’s economic policy, the pace of reforms and
whether or not to intervene in the Spanish civil war.
French Socialists in Office 1.
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The French version of the post-war consensus had its genesis in the
Tripartite government of 1944-47.
This post-war coalition of progressive forces (Communists, ChristianDemocrats [MRP], Socialists) left a robust reformist record to its credit
after 30 months in office. It introduced France’s comprehensive social
security system. It enacted important civil and social reforms, notably the
advent of female suffrage and the creation of workplace committees.
Moreover, it greatly accentuated practices of economic dirigisme by taking
several major industries into public ownership, and launching French
planning procedures.
The nationalisation programme created large state firms in the key sectors
of energy (gas, coal, electricity, Atomic energy) transport (Air France,
Renault), banking (the Bank of France, and four deposit banks, including
Crédit Lyonnais) and insurance. With the break-down of triparitism in
May 1947, France had to wait until Mitterrand’s election in 1981 for its
next experience of left-wing government.
Potted History of the Modern PS
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Decline throughout fourth Republic. Lowc point in 1969
presidential election. Modern PS recreated at Epinay 1971
The Epinay ‘line’ was that of the Union of the Left: the
alliance with the PCF, ‘ no enemies to the left’, the PS must
anchor itself to the left and resist the temptation for third force
alliances with the centre.
During the 1970s Mitterrand's PS was a party well-attuned to
the institutional, social and political imperatives of the Fifth
Republic and the social structures of French society.
After the decade of revival (1971-81), the French Socialists
experienced a decade of being the presidential party (1981-93),
before being brutally rejected by the French electorate in 1993,
losing the presidential election in 1995, unexpectedly returning
to office in 1997 and losing again in 2002, and 2007. The
French PS has now lost the last three presidential elections
Organisation: a Factional Party
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The PS is the most openly factionalised of French political
parties
The leading factions each represent specific political
traditions, as well as strongholds within the party itself (such
as local government, think-tanks and structures of expertise,
the interests of the parliamentary party or principled
opposition to the leadership).
The French PS was reformed at Epinay on the basis of
unifying a set of existing party organisations: SFIO, CIR, then
PSU
The positioning of rivals for the presidential election has
been one source of factional competition throughout the
history of the Socialist Party. Issues, strategy, personality all
divide
Types of faction in the PS
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Organisation Faction. Group that controls the organisation. Stresses the
importance of respecting internal organisational rules and the control of the
organisation as the fount of all legitimacy. Emphasises internal
organisational rules over external popularity. Francois Hollande leader
since 1997
Left faction. CERES in 1970s. Today’s version of this left opposition is
crystallised over European integration; the No camp in the 2005
referendum, around Laurent Fabius. Benoit Hamon, 19% in votes on
motions for the Reims congress 14-16/11/2008
External faction...refers to an individual/group who relies on resources
outside of the official party organisation to try and make a challenge to
conquer the latter. Mitterrand against Mollet in the 1960s ; Rocard against
Mitterrand in the late 1970s; Royal in 2006 and 2008 (Royal ahead in the
votes for the Reims congress with 29%)
Parallel faction. Any group with a parallel organisation to that of the party
itself.
The left in Office 1
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36-37, 44-47, 56-57, 81-86, 88-93, 97-02
The plural left, 1997-2002.. Jospin’s government delivered a distinctive
political programme that bore some similarities with the 1981-83 period.
the French Socialists rejected most of the precepts of New Labour. In
response to Blair’s ‘third way’ between the old left and the new right,
Jospin pointedly refused to define a new orientation between socialdemocracy and liberalism, preferring the former to the latter. (‘Yes to a
market economy, no to a market society’).
While Blair advocated reforming the policy environment to adapt to
globalisation, Jospin stressed the importance of EU and state-level public
policy intervention to control globalisation.
While Blair assiduously courted business during the first term, the
landmark reforms of the Jospin premiership, and especially the 35-hour
week, were implemented in the face of fierce business opposition.
French Socialists in Office 2
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Despite its antipathy to the label social-democratic, the Mauroy
government (1981-84) enthusiastically adopted classic social-democratic
remedies while these were being progressively jettisoned elsewhere. The
Socialist-led government implemented Keynesian demand management
policies to stimulate growth and combat unemployment. In the early
1980s, with the US and western Europe in the midst of recession, the
French socialist government’s counter-cyclical economic policy contrasted
starkly with the macroeconomic policies being pursued by France’s
principal trading partners. Moreover, its audacious industrial policies (the
1982 nationalisation of 36 banks and five major industrial groups) ran
directly counter to the incipient privatisation trends elsewhere. Its social
generosity (as measured by increases in pensions, the minimum wage, and
family allowances) contributed to the goal of economic relaunch, and
fiscal redistribution (consolidated by the Wealth tax), but created
intolerable economic strains.
French Socialists in Office 3
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Harsh economic realities forced the government to modify the pace of
redistributive welfare reforms and Keynesian pump-priming. The French
economy simply could not absorb the pressure imposed by spiralling trade
and budget deficits. The left’s economic U-turn - which took place in two
stages, in June 1982 and in March 1983 - demonstrated for most observers
France’s economic vulnerability: unilateral Keynesian reflationary policies
were no longer possible for a medium-sized nation such as France in an
interdependent world economy. The failure of Socialist reflation from
1981-83 revealed the pressures for convergence between French economic
policies and those of its main competitors, especially Germany. There was
a particularly strong linkage between domestic budget retrenchment,
monetary rigour, and the drive for closer European integration in the 1980s
and 1990s, not least because of the prominent role by Mitterrand (and
Delors) in negotiating the Single European Act (1986) and the Maastricht
Treaty (1993).
Plural left, 1997-2002
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The plural left’s electoral victory in June 1997 brought the Socialists back to power
rather earlier than most observers expected. The Jospin government delivered a
distinctive political message based on defending the French social model under
attack from a neo-liberal onslaught and the invisible forces of globalisation that
bore many similarities with the 1981-83 period. The main difference between the
two periods relates to the degree of interdependence of France and her European
partners, and the limited sovereignty of national economic policies after the Single
European Act and the Maastricht Treaty. The economic activity of the Mauroy
government during 1981-82 presupposed a degree of formal national economic
sovereignty that no longer existed in 1997. The nationalisation programme of 1982
would certainly not have been possible in 1997, EU competition policy obliging.
Moreover, European policy fashions have shifted over the period, in favour of
greater marketisation and privatisation. Yet a resurgent French Socialist party, once
again in government since June 1997, has been reluctant to accept the cultural or
ideological reference frames in vogue amongst certain other social-democratic
parties (notably the mantra of labour flexibility), to the extent of being seen as
‘archaic’ by Anglo-Saxon commentators enamoured with Tony Blair and new
Labour.
The Left in Office 2
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There was a strong faith in state action to fight unemployment, promote
growth and reform society. 35 working hour at the centre of the
government reform programme: the idea that unemployment can be
resolved by sharing existing work, an idea strongly contested in the 2007
election by Sarkozy. An activist employment policy also symbolised by the
emplois jeunes, the creation of 350,000 jobs for young workers on a CDD
(five years).
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But the Socialists were/are also realistic in relation to the limits of state
activism and the role of France in the international environment. We should
not forget that the largest privatisation programme ever undertaken in
France – in terms of capitalisation – took place while Jospin was PM,
including Air France under the Communist Transport minister Gayssot.
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Key social democratic elements: corporatism? Welfare redistribution and
benefits…
Plural left, 1997-2002..
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If the margins of manoeuvre open to the Jospin government were limited,
this was partly as a result of the legacy of the Mitterrand presidency itself.
Mitterrand’s principal achievements (of Europeanisation, marketisation,
and modernisation ) were difficult to reconcile with a traditional socialdemocratic political agenda.[1] In European policy, the single European
Act and the Maastricht treaty were major achievements for which
Mitterrand could claim some credit. The Maastricht Treaty imposed a
monetarist vision of an ever closer union, a logic which had little in
common with Keynesian reflationary policies or the left’s traditional social
objectives. While the Jospin method was consciously crafted as the
antithesis of the Mitterrand presidency, the new government had to operate
within the parameters of powerful constraints, not least those relating to the
prospect of EMU and the convergence criteria, which were in a real sense
the legacy of Mitterrand.
[1] Cole François Mitterrand: a Study in Political Leadership, chapter 12.
35 Hour week and other reforms
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The 35 hours was by far the most audacious reform of the Jospin
government. Premier Jospin refused to accept that nothing could be done
about unemployment; bold government action was called for. Specialist
advice was divided, however; certain economists predicted real job gains
from a move to 35 hours, whereas others doubted it would have any effect.
[1] At a National Conference attended by government ministers, trade
unions and employers associations on October 10, 1997, premier Jospin
announced that ‘a law would fix the legal duration of the working week at
35 hours from January 1, 2000’, for all firms with more than 10 workers.
[2] Such a law was passed through the National Assembly in January
1998 , instructing employers and unions to negotiate the modalities of the
passage to 35 hours by the year 2000. This decision was more radical than
expected, to the satisfaction of the plural left majority and the trade unions,
and the distress of the CNPF.
Jospin…then oblivion?
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The essence of Jospin’s governing method was to stress the autonomy of
political action, even in a context of strong interdependence. Jospin did not
call into question the market, but adopted a far less accommodating stance
to business interests than late Mitterrandism; this was demonstrated by the
increase in company taxation in July 1997, and above all by the legally
binding move to a 35 hour week against fierce CNPF opposition.
Ultimately, there were similarities, as well as differences, between Jospin,
and his former mentor Mitterrand. Both leaders placed a high value on the
importance of politics, as against technical constraints. The attempt at
economic reflation and thoroughgoing social reform had illustrated
Mitterrand's belief in the ascendancy of the political over the economic, a
belief strongly maintained until France was constrained to change course in
1982-83.
But the 2002 elections ,, represented a major setback for the French PS and
the left. Is it now a municipal socialist party?
What Future for the French
Socialists?
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Divisions over strategy: centre-PS alliances? No enemies to
the left?
Divisions over policy: laid bare during and since the
2007presidential elections. Role of the 35 hour week totemic
Attitude to Sarkozy: confrontation, attraction, ‘responsible’
opposition?
Role of Hollande and control of the organisation. 2008
municipal elections
Lost three presidential elections in a row
Victory in Regional elections – but so what?
2012: lendemains qui chantent?
Labour and New Labour
in the UK
How does Labour fit with this
model?
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Strong working class anchoring: yes, party of trade unions
mass parties : yes, via Unions
close relationships with the trade unions: yes… but weaker
today
an interclassist electoral profile: under new Labour, yes
dominant force of the left; yes, no competition
accept rules of democratic game: yes
party of government: yes
national, rather than … internationalist parties: yes
corporatism : under old Labour
mixed economy : yes. But NL accepts neo-liberal legacy
northern-southern divide
British Labour Party
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The British Labour Party was organically linked with the Labour
movement in a manner which had no equivalent elsewhere. Labour was
‘labourist’, rather than socialist or social-democratic.
Organically bound to industrial labour and the trade union movement,
Labour was originally created as a mechanism for electing trade union
sponsored representatives of the working class to parliament, rather than to
combat capitalism, such as the French or German parties.
Labour never made Marxism into a creed, unlike many continental
European social-democratic and socialist parties. It first made an explicit
commitment to socialism in its constitution of 1918, clause four of which
committed the party to public ownership of the means of production and
exchange.
The socialism present within the Labour party was of the intellectual
(Fabian), Christian socialist, or non-conformist variety: Marxism was a
minority pastime.
The 1917 Soviet revolution had a minimal effect; the communist party
(CPGB) never established itself as a serious competitor.
British Labour
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Unlike in France or Germany, there was never any principled opposition to
participation in bourgeois governments. Indeed, the two interwar minority Labour
governments of 1924 and 1929-31 depended for their survival upon a measure of
complicity from other parties.
Of our three countries Britain alone experienced a homogeneous social-democratic
government during the formative years of the post-war consensus.
The 1945-51 post-war Labour government established the model of consensual
British social democracy that exercised a preponderant ideological and policy
influence on all parties until the mid-1970s.
The 1945-51 Labour government carried out an important programme of
nationalisations, introduced demand-management policies and - on the back of the
Beveridge report - enacted the most imposing series of welfare reforms in British
history.
The centrepiece of the reforms - the National Health Service - has survived until the
present.
Somewhat less durable was the legacy of a bureaucratic model of public ownership,
with the major utilities (water, gas, electricity, railways) directly managed by the
state. This aspect of the social-democratic heritage was in the main dismantled by
the Thatcher governments (1979-1990).
1964-70; 1974-1979
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Labour’s performance in government from 1964-70, and - especially - 1974-79 has had a less
exalted historical reputation.
Both governments were tormented by economic difficulties. The 1964-1970 government was
beset by the problem of the currency, and suffered the humiliation of two major devaluations
of sterling in short succession. The 1974-79 administration was a minority government that
survived after 1976 only thanks to the support of the Liberals.
Economic crisis severely weakened both Labour governments. The Callaghan government
was forced to go to the IMF in 1976 for an emergency loan to stablise the economy.
The Labour governmental heritage was also one of failed neo-corporatism. In spite of
attempts to build neo-corporatist structures (collective conventions, regulated pay bargaining,
industrial tripartism) Labour governments entered into direct conflict with the trades unions
over pay policies and industrial relations reform.
In 1969, the Wilson government reluctantly abandoned an attempt to reform industrial
relations law - In Place of Strife - after threatened strikes from the unions. In 1978-79, the
Callaghan government was paralysed by a wave of public sector strikes during the Winter of
Discontent.
Labour government thus became associated with images of economic incompetence, poor
industrial relations and inflation.
New Labour
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New Labour grew from an rejection of social-democracy, as understood in
its neo-corporatist, Labourite manifestation.
Hostile to traditional symbols of social-democracy- notably the link with
organised labour - the Blair government developed a political discourse
based on communautarianism, and individual rights and responsibilities, as
demonstrated in its Welfare to Work proposals.
Blair’s communautarianism goes way beyond past Labour revisionist
thinking. It stresses duties, rather than rights and emphasises the moral,
rather than the socio-economic basis of community. This has had a major
impact at the level of problem-definition. Thus the unemployment
problem is defined not as one of scarcity of work, but one of the
employability of individuals.
New Labour thus appears as an original blend of political radicalism,
socio-economic conservatism, and civil rights.
A minimal welfare state and an acceptance that the universalist principle is
outmoded are the salient features of new Labour. But this is also a
redistributive government-, with the minimum wage, tax credits, Sure start,
child benefit…
New Labour against social
democracy?
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While the landmark reforms of the Jospin
premiership were implemented in the face of fierce
business opposition (35 hour week), Blair appeared
more wary of espousing anti-business policies for
fear of damaging a sustained effort at repositioning
and repackaging an old party.
Acting on the environment, embracing globalisation
and increasing labour flexibility and employability
were the key cognitive codes of the Blair universe.
They break with social-democracy in a more
distinctive manner than in France or Germany.
New Labour: interpretations
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Political enterprise Electoral exercise to allow Labour to be re-elected.
Reorientate Labour electorate away from the declining groups of the
population. Appeal to middle-class voters of Middle England
Ideological restructuring… There is more to this than simple ‘neoliberalism’. The Welfare to work programme clearly sets out to accompany
individuals in their quest for work : to offer social counterparts for
individual effort, notably in the form of training.
Thus governments should act – but in terms of improving the overall
environment, notably the education and training system.
Thus, the New Labour enterprise is quite a subtle compromise – not one
that avoids collective action altogether.. When in power in 1997, it was
essential to demonstrate economic credibility and to steer the economy in a
manner consistent with globalisation (NB). Since 2001, the labour
government was been very heavily investing in public services ; in fact,
spending vast sums of money in a manner that it recognisably socialdemocratic.
By 2008, new Labojur had become… old Labour and had reverted to older
forms of Keynesian economic policy
New Labour and old Socialists
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Attempts to define a new equilibrium for the European centre-left sparked
fraternal rivalries between Blair and Jospin in particular.
In response to Blair’s ‘third way’ between the old left and the new right,
Jospin has pointedly refused to define a new orientation between socialdemocracy and liberalism.
While the new Labour enterprise was intended to demarcate the party from
‘the perceived defeats and bankruptcy of traditional social-democracy’
(Randell, 1998), the French Socialist administration rediscovered a familiar
social-democratic political style.
While Blair looked to the international centre-left (to Clinton and the new
Democrats in particular), Jospin’s activity focussed more firmly on
reorientating the European centre-left towards a new equilibrium less
favourable to globalised international exchanges and more resolutely
favourable to EU-level and state public policy intervention
Schroder somewhere in between
Comparing Socialist and Social
Democratic Parties today
‘Social democracy is a policy
paradigm, rather than an organised
political movement’ Peter Hall.
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A social-democratic ethos underpinning the postwar consensus? Evidence
usually involves the following
a new form of settlement between politics and markets. Acceptance of a
higher degree of state interventionism in economic management (especially
through the budget)
Public ownership or regulation of certain key industries, especially natural
monopolies like gas, electricity and transport.
Governments also invented interventionist industrial policies where the
State played an important role: including in countries such as the UK.
The SD model associated with Keynesian demand management in macroeconomic policies: the role of governments was to pump prime – to create
demand in periods of recession
End of the first wave of socialdemocracy?
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The basic assumption of social-democracy had been that an interventionist
state could control the economic cycle through the use of Keynesian
demand-management techniques.
Damaged by the move to global recession after 1973-4.
Keynesian policies, where applied, increased public expenditure and
aggravated inflation.
Inflation, unemployment, balance of trade crises and state debt put paid to
Keynesianism.
While certain features of social-democratic management initially appeared
strengthened by the 1970s crisis (notably attempts at corporatist-style
management), others were irremediably weakened.
Even successful social-democratic governments - such as those in
Scandanavia - began to cut back upon the huge bureaucracies they had
created, and to adopt anti-inflation programmes.
Revenge of social-democracy?
Comparing Socialist and Social
Democratic Parties today
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Social-democratic parties have always followed the nature of
capitalism (Bull, 1998). They have provided responses to the
evolution of capitalism at any given point in history.
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Comparison provides more precise responses
Adjustment, adaptation, rejection, reframing? Responses
reveal clear differences between European social-democratic
parties: from the pan-European activism of the French
Socialist party - calling for a Keynesian relaunch at the
European level and a concerted European effort against
unemployment - to the proselytising neo-liberal flexibility of
the Blair administration.
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first narrative: Adaptation
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there is an argument that social-democratic parties in the late 2000s can at
best adapt to common externally driven convergence pressures.
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European integration and globalisation have called into question many
features traditionally associated with the politics and policies characteristic
of social-democratic governmental experience.
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European integration agenda threatens the social-democratic model of
public service and of political economy.
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how have social-democratic parties coped with common externally driven
convergence pressures?
Adaptation?
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Social-democratic parties are converging towards a common
pattern of political management, under the influence of the
separate but related exogenous pressures of globalisation and
Europeanisation.
The essence of the ‘external convergence’ argument is that
economic globalisation and European integration have
combined to disempower social-democratic parties in office.
These pressures include the impact of globalisation, the
ascendancy of a particular type of European integration
project (EMU), the contingent necessity for domestic budget
and welfare state retrenchment and changing policy fashions,
rendering more difficult traditional interventionist industrial
policies.
Social democracy in office has been restricted ; the case of
Schroder and Hartz 4 reforms in Germany.
Second narrative Internally driven
convergence
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Parties also respond to pressures for internally driven
convergence: EU societies are becoming more and more
similar. They have had to affront comparable cultural and
political effects of social change.
There has been a lessened significance of cleavages based on
social class.
In their internal programmes, parties have abandoned Marxism
and responded to the emergence of new political agendas and
ideas based on post-materialism and individualism.
Parties have reacted in similar manners to comparable
domestic demographic and economic changes.
Third narrative: Regulation?
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While globalisation introduces a new form of macro-economic regulation,
European integration provides a political arena whereby European polities
(Social-democratic parties in particular) can combine their governance
capacity to create (or strengthen) a European political, social and economic
model.
Given the weakness of the nation-state, the European arena is the only
arena where politics can reinvent new forms of political regulation faced
with economic globalisation.
This underlies mainstream French perceptions of the single currency. It
underpinned the efforts of the Jospin government to strengthen social and
employment policies at the European level.
The credibility of such a perspective has increased with the
dysfunctionning of the global economy and international financial markets
in particular.
The revival of Keynesian solutions of demand management since the onset
of crisis in 2008: but these measures have not, in the main, been carried out
by social-democratic parties
fourth narrative Institutional and
cultural differentiation.
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Institutional and cultural forces differentiate between parties,
and are more important than any pressures for convergence.
According to this hypothesis, party behaviour is above all
shaped by the very different national cultures and institutional
arrangements and incentives. This can include institutions
stricto sensu ( the structure of executive leadership; executivelegislative relations; electoral laws, and central-local
relations), but also the myths and symbols attached to
institutionalist perspective.
It also comprises different discursive traditions and rhetorical
devices which are themselves rooted in nationally specific
cultural traditions. Compare the French PS and the British
Labour party...
New Labour and old Socialists
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Attempts to define a new equilibrium for the European centre-left sparked
fraternal rivalries between Blair and Jospin in particular.
In response to Blair’s ‘third way’ between the old left and the new right,
Jospin has pointedly refused to define a new orientation between socialdemocracy and liberalism.
While the new Labour enterprise was intended to demarcate the party from
‘the perceived defeats and bankruptcy of traditional social-democracy’
(Randell, 1998), the French Socialist administration rediscovered a familiar
social-democratic political style.
While Blair looked to the international centre-left (to Clinton and the new
Democrats in particular), Jospin’s activity focussed more firmly on
reorientating the European centre-left towards a new equilibrium less
favourable to globalised international exchanges and more resolutely
favourable to EU-level and state public policy intervention
Schroder somewhere in between
Finally, National versus partisan
responses
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the importance of national and partisan contexts as
filters of change and tellers of truth.
While all parties in government have had to cope with
similar pressures, national responses have varied.
In a narrower time frame, parties have also to react to
the institutional and policy legacies of previous
governments. Thus, Blair’s new Labour has
incorporated a more radical paradigm shift than is the
case for the French Socialists
National contexts might matter much more than the
partisan ones.