Transcript Social Democratic parties - univ

Social Democratic parties
Alistair Cole
Historical origins and development
of social-democracy
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. The original social-democratic parties were formed as class-based parties
which attempted to represent the interests of a particular fraction of the
population, namely the industrial proletariat.
During the late nineteenth century, social-democratic and socialist parties
developed throughout western Europe in the main committed - at least
verbally - to a Marxist ideology. These parties nearly all contained a
commitment in their party statutes to the overthrow of the capitalist system.
This commitment was largely verbal, especially after the fundamental split
caused by the October 1917 Bolshevik revolution.
The 1917 revolution weakened social-democratic parties by creating new
uncompromising rivals to their left, in the form of the communist parties. In
Germany, the divisions between the SPD and the KPD (especially the ‘class
against class’ tactics of Stalin’s Comintern) facilitated Hitler’s rise to power.
In France, the ‘bolshevisation’ of the PCF in the 1920s (Tiersky, 1972) and
the hatred of social-democracy prevented any rapprochement between the
left parties until the 1936 Popular Front.
Only in the UK, where the primary competition was between Labour and
the Liberals, was the structural division of the left less endemic and
detrimental.
French Socialists
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French socialism maintained an equally ambiguous relationship to
governmental office. The first unified French Socialist party - the Section
Française de l’Internationale Ouvrière (SFIO) of 1905- was formed on the
orders of the Second International as a revolutionary party, in total
opposition to bourgeois society. Though the pre-1914 SFIO fought
elections, voted for progressive legislation, and ran many municipal
councils, its ideological identity as an opposition party was of crucial
importance in the young SFIO’s life (Judt, 1974). As in Germany, the 1917
Revolution caused a fundamental schism within the French left: initially
marginal, the French communist party (PCF) gradually became the
stronger leftwing party from mid-1940s to mid-1970s. In order to support its
claim to be the legitimate heir to the original 1905 party, the socialist SFIO
continued to declare itself a revolutionary Marxist party. The Popular Front
government of 1936 finally buried the SFIO’s ‘non-participation’ doctrine
when, under Léon Blum, the SFIO headed the first Socialist-led government
in French history. However heroic in retrospect, the Popular Front
government was short-lived (1936-37), and suffered from a chronic lack of
cohesion, on account of PCF ambivalence and left-wing opposition to
Blum’s economic policy, the pace of reforms and whether or not to intervene
in the Spanish civil war.
German SPD
• The archetypal social-democratic party, which many others imitated,
was the German SPD, created in 1875. Faithful to the dictates of the
Second International (and the doctrine of 'no participation in
bourgeois governments’), the SPD developed as a powerful countersociety until 1914. With its powerful links to the labour movement,
the SPD could claim to be the organisational expression of the
working class. It evolved a class-based identity based on the dual
pillars of theoretical Marxism as a cohesive cognitive code, and a
linkage to organised labour through the party’s trade union,
industrial wing. Unswerving in support of the doctrine of no
participation in bourgeois governments until 1914, during the
Weimar Republic (1919-1933) the SPD became a pro-regime party,
though not abandoning its official belief in Marxism until 1959.
British Labour Party
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The British Labour Party was organically linked with the Labour movement in a
manner which had no equivalent elsewhere. Labour was ‘labourist’, rather than
socialist or social-democratic.
The early Labour party reflected the ‘rather apolitical ethos of craft unionism’ (Padgett
and Paterson, 1991, p. ). Organically bound to industrial labour and the trade union
movement, Labour was originally created as a mechanism for electing trade union
sponsored representatives of the working class to parliament, rather than to combat
capitalism, such as the French or German parties.
Labour never made Marxism into a creed, unlike many continental European
social-democratic and socialist parties. It first made an explicit commitment to
socialism in its constitution of 1918, clause four of which committed the party to
public ownership of the means of production and exchange.
The socialism present within the Labour party was of the intellectual (Fabian),
Christian socialist, or non-conformist variety: Marxism was a minority pastime.
The 1917 Soviet revolution had a minimal effect; the communist party (CPGB) never
established itself as a serious competitor.
Unlike in France or Germany, there was never any principled opposition to
participation in bourgeois governments. Indeed, the two interwar minority Labour
governments of 1924 and 1929-31 depended for their survival upon a measure of
complicity from other parties.
In Sum
• Social-democratic and socialist parties were formed as parties of
opposition. In their ostensibly revolutionary guise before 1914, no
party managed to achieve power in a developed industrial country.
• Even more than the new communist parties, social-democratic
parties were only verbally revolutionary: in fact, they encouraged the
participation of the working classes in politics without posing a
serious threat to the survival of existing capitalist societies.
• Though the parties in our three test countries - Germany, France
and the UK - all participated in governments during the interwar
period, these experiences were short-lived and fragile. Social
democratic movements came into their own during the early postwar
period.
• The failure of laissez-faire capitalism in the 1930s, the imperatives of
social, economic and industrial modernisation, and a postwar
concern with social justice produced a climate conducive to state
economic interventionism and to concerns for social solidarity.
Postwar consensus
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The postwar consensus was social-democratic in that it involved a new form of settlement
between politics and markets. It implied an acceptance of a higher degree of state interventionism
in economic management (especially through the budget) than was deemed appropriate during
the interwar period. The SD model looked to the public ownership or regulation of certain key
industries, especially natural monopolies like gas, electricity and transport. Governments also
invented interventionist industrial policies where the role played an important role: including in
countries such as the UK. The SD model associated with Keynesian demand management in
macro-economic policies: the role of governments was to pump prime – to create demand in
periods of recession, rather than to allow the market along to determine the sense of economic
direction. Public investment to support consumption would also increase employment.
The SD model invented sophisticated Welfare states: let it be said straightaway that there is a
difference between the Universal Beveridge principle in the UK and Scanidinavia; and the
Corporatist contributions based models in France, Germany , Austria – but the principle of
regulation of the social sphere was consolidated during this period.
As a counterpart, the purest SD regimes – such as those in Sweden – relied on high redistributive
taxation to provide finance and secure equality as the main goal of public policy.
In its purest form (Austria, Germany, Scandinavia) a corporatist style of state-group relations
complemented these macro-tendencies. The role of social partners vital in some versions of SD,
less so in others, but generally a belief that industrial policy shouldo be coordinated by the Iron
Triangle of State, Business and Labour.
Postwar consensus as socialdemocratic ?
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Governments of all persuasions came to accept responsibility for general
economic and social security. The growth of the state sector responded to
postwar conditions (the need for concerted modernisation and
reconstruction), rather than social-democratic action. In the postwar period
in Germany, for instance, all major parties looked to ‘some form of social
control, public ownership and state intervention’ (Padgett and Paterson
1991, p.134); as the principal postwar party, the Christian Democratic
Union (CDU) defined the essential parameters of public policy in the semisovereign west German state. The welfare state was not invented by socialdemocrats, but predated social-democracy. In the UIK, Germany, France,
the basic architecture predated 1945. Social-democrats were not the only
players in developing the postwar consensus. In Italy the right dictated the
terms of the postwar constitutional settlement. In Austria, nationalisations,
welfare reforms and state economic interventionism were consensual
measures emanating as much from traditions of social christianity, as from
social democracy. They were implemented by a consociational alliance
between socialists (SPO) and the centre-right (OVP). In France, Gaullism
and Christian democracy were as important as socialism or communism in
defining the postwar model. There was thus a blurring of boundaries
between left and right. State interventionism was no longer limited to
Socialist governments; and after 1947 Socialist-led governments accepted
macro-economic regulation by market mechanisms.
Social democracy in power: examples from
German, French and British experience.
• The major mutation to affect social-democracy during the
post-war period has been to transform social-democratic
parties into mainstream or potential parties of
government. Despite retaining certain characteristics of
mass parties, several social-democratic parties moved
towards becoming catch-all parties, as defined by Otto
Kirchheimer (1966). They competed openly for the
‘centre’ ground; moved away from ideology, laid
emphasis on issues, and stressed their competence as
parties of government. Even radical Socialist parties such as the French PS or Greek PASOK - moderated
their political programmes once in office.
German SPD
• The German experience was the most instructive. In Germany, the
postwar consensus was defined by the principal postwar party, the
CDU, and by the nature of the creation of the Federal Republic as a
semi-sovereign state. This powerful political and policy environment
first isolated the SPD, then forced it to adapt. Though it had long
ceased to be a genuine working-class party, the postwar SPD
initially remained tied to its pre-1933 Marxist traditions. The party
was reconstituted in 1946 on the basis of the 1926 Heidelburg
programme. After a string of successive electoral defeats in the new
Federal Republic (in 1949, 1953 and 1957) the SPD abandoned all
reference to Marxism at the 1959 Bad Godesburg congress. The
party accepted the liberal pluralism of the German state, and
embraced the market economy. By the time the SPD first entered
government as a junior party to the CDU in 1966, it had become a
party of pragmatic reform. Initially somewhat more Keynesian than
the CDU and less Atlanticist in foreign policy, increasingly little came
to distinguish the two German ‘catch-all’ parties.
German SPD 2
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The SPD lacked the political will or resources to attempt an audacious reform of
German society during its long period of pre-eminence (1969-82). The party had to
respect the polycentric pluralism of the German political system, as well as the
constraints imposed by the party system and the underlying consensus mode of
German society. In most areas of policy, there was continuity with past Christiandemocratic governments. The strength of the market-economy and the Standord
Deutschland (Germany as a competitive location) limited state economic
interventionism. The German social-democrats had to respect a delicate
policy/political environment characterised by the equilibrium between ordoliberalism[1], and the social market economy[2]. Once Helmut Schmidt replaced
Willie Brandt in 1974, German Social-democracy became synonymous with
pragmatism, compromise and a pro-business slant (Schmidt was surrounded by
advisors from the private sector in his second term in office). Keynesian economic
instruments ceded place to a marked monetarist orientation in economic policy.
Unlike in Sweden, few efforts were made to employ political instruments to counteract
the prevailing weight of economic factors. After Schmidt had lost power in 1982 the
German SPD was weakened by internal organisational and political divisions, by the
challenge of new parties (die Grünen) and policy agendas (post-materialism), and by
continuing reaction against the Schmidt administration. By 1994, an internally divided
SPD had lost four elections in a row: social-democratic political and policy divisions
facilitated the task of the provincial Chancellor (Braunthal, 1998).
Red-Green coalition
governments, 1998-2005..
• – notable for v. distinctive stance in foreign policy – but Schroder
reign characterised by difficulties on integrating the new lander of
eastern Germany and by desperate attempts to cut back the Welfare
State, to reduce unemployment entitlements , to reform pensions, to
reduce business taxation and to increase labour flexibility.
• The Hartz 4 labour reforms produced massive opposition from
within the Social Democratic party….. but the GS government
managed, in a painful manner, to put the question of reform of the
welfare state onto the political agenda.
• And in common with the other euro-zone countries, the creation of
the Euro limited the budgetary tools at the disposal of governments.
German SD remains committed to a version of the social market
economy
• Decline in severe decline after its perceived performance in the
Grand Coalition, 2005-2009.
British Labour
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The British experience contrasted with the German and French in one
important respect.
Of our three test countries, Britain alone experienced a homogeneous
social-democratic government during the formative years of the post-war
consensus.
The 1945-51 post-war Labour government established the model of
consensual British social democracy that exercised a preponderant
ideological and policy influence on all parties until the mid-1970s.
The 1945-51 Labour government carried out an important programme of
nationalisations, introduced demand-management policies and - on the
back of the Beveridge report - enacted the most imposing series of welfare
reforms in British history.
The centrepiece of the reforms - the National Health Service - has survived
until the present.
Somewhat less durable was the legacy of a bureaucratic model of public
ownership, with the major utilities (water, gas, electricity, railways) directly
managed by the state. This aspect of the social-democratic heritage was in
the main dismantled by the Thatcher governments (1979-1990).
1964-70; 1974-1979
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Labour’s performance in government from 1964-70, and - especially - 1974-79 has
had a less exalted historical reputation.
Both governments were tormented by economic difficulties. The 1964-1970
government was beset by the problem of the currency, and suffered the humiliation
of two major devaluations of sterling in short succession. The 1974-79 administration
was a minority government that survived after 1976 only thanks to the support of the
Liberals.
Economic crisis severely weakened both Labour governments. The Callaghan
government was forced to go to the IMF in 1976 for an emergency loan to stablise
the economy.
The Labour governmental heritage was also one of failed neo-corporatism. In spite of
attempts to build neo-corporatist structures (collective conventions, regulated pay
bargaining, industrial tripartism) Labour governments entered into direct conflict with
the trades unions over pay policies and industrial relations reform. In 1969, the
Wilson government reluctantly abandoned an attempt to reform industrial relations
law - In Place of Strife - after threatened strikes from the unions. In 1978-79, the
Callaghan government was paralysed by a wave of public sector strikes during the
Winter of Discontent.
Labour government thus became associated with images of economic incompetence,
poor industrial relations and inflation.
New Labour
• New Labour grew from an abnegation of social-democracy, as
understood in its neo-corporatist, Labourite manifestation. Hostile to
traditional symbols of social-democracy- notably the link with
organised labour - the Blair government has developed a political
discourse based on communautarianism, and individual rights and
responsibilities, as demonstrated in its Welfare to Work proposals.
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• Blair’s communautarianism goes way beyond past Labour
revisionist thinking. It stresses duties, rather than rights and
emphasises the moral, rather than the socio-economic basis of
community. This has had a major impact at the level of problemdefinition. Thus the unemployment problem is defined not as one of
scarcity of work, but one of the employability of individuals.
• New Labour thus appears as an original blend of political
radicalism, socio-economic conservatism, and moral conformism. A
minimal welfare state and an acceptance that the universalist
principle is outmoded are the salient features of new Labour.
New Labour: interpretations and
dimensions
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Political enterprise Electoral exercise to allow Labour to be re-elected. Reorientate
Labour electorate away from the declining groups of the population. Appeal to middleclass voters of Middle England
Ideological restructuring… There is more to this than simple ‘neo-liberalism’. The
Welfare to work programme clearly serts out to accompany individuals in their quest
for work : to offer social counterparts for individual effort, notably in the form of
training.
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Thus governments should act – but in terms of improving the overall environment,
notably the education and training system.
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Thus, the NL enterrprise is quite a subtle compromise – not one that avoids collective
action altogether. Moreover, there has been a massive difference between the first
and second/third terms. When in power in 1997, it was essential to demonstrate
economic credibility and to steer the economy in a manner consistent with
globalisation (NB). Since 2001, the labour government was been very heavily
investing in public services ; in fact, spending vast sums of money in a manner that it
recognisably social-democratic.
By 2008, new Labojur had become… old Labour?
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Interpretations of new Labour ?
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a/. D’abord, le nouveau travaillisme comme le nouveau centre de la vie politique
anglaise. Cette interprétation est tenu notamment par Andrew Gamble, ou par
Anthony Giddens. Selon cette interpretation, le PT a reconnu que les marges de
manoeuvres au niveau économique sont hautement limités; les vieux rémèdes
keynésiennes sont inadaptés au monde moderne. La globalisation et la puissance
des marchés de capitaux internationaux sont des contraintes objectives qui
s’imposent sur les gouvernements meme des nations les plus puissantes.
b). Nouveau réaliste, le PT prone une politique économique de l’offre. Mais le parti
garde un programme radical dans le domaine de la réforme constitutionelle (reforme
electorale, decentralisation...) et de l’intégration européenne - le domaine de
prédeliction traditionelle des partis centristes (notamment les liberaux). L’Europe
occupe une place particulière, et un peu paradoxale dans cette ensemble:
l’intégration européenne est un moyen d’accelérer la modernisation de l’Angleterre
(notamment, dans l’avenir, grace à la monnaie unique; mais aussi l’incorporation de
la charte des droits de l’homme dans le droit anglais ). En meme temps, grace aux
transformations structurelles des années 80 et 90 - le modèle anglais doit etre
exporté à l’Europe dans son ensemble, notamment au niveau de la politique
d’emploi. De plus, un accent un peu nationaliste au discours de Tony Blair, qui a
sommé l’Angleterre de devenir un phare pour les autres pays du monde. Plutot
qu’entre la gauche et la droite, le clivage central est redevenu entre liberaux et
conservateurs - comme au dix-neuvième siècle.
Interprétations of New Labour
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c/. Les interprétations réalistes. Le PT a su s’adapter aux contraintes externes plus que le Parti conservateur qui s’est entredechiré sur l’Europe. Le PT accepte que
le keynésienime n’est plus possible dans un monde globalisé. Le GT ne doit pas faire
de faux pas économique, sinon il risque d’ etre sanctionné lourdement par les
marchés . Ce qui compte ici, pourtant, c’est la contrainte externe; cette évolution est
imposé, non pas explicitement voulu. La contrainte va à l’encontre du programme
des travaillistes.
d/. Les interprétations volontaristes. Non seulement le PT a integré le poids des
contraintes externes dans sa stratégie politique; le PT en en a profité pour accentuer
la modernisation d’abord du parti, ensuite du pays. Telle est la thèse defendue par
Eric Shaw. Pour Eric Shaw, les contraintes externes sont importantes pour
comprendre le nouveau PT, mais encore plus important est la philosophie politique
de Tony Blair lui-meme. Pour Tony Blair, les solutions keynésiennes et l’Etat
providence classique entrainent un sentiment de dépendence psychologique vis-àvis de l’Etat. Les veilles solidarités collectives doivent ceder le pas à un nouvreau
sens de responsabilité individuelle, qui sonne le glas de l’Etat providence classique.
En meme temps, Tony Blair tient un discours très axé sur un retour aux veilles
valeurs traditionelles de la famille. C’est dans ce sens que le projet politique de Blair
n’a rien a voir avec le social-démocratie classique.
French Socialists in Office 1.
• The French version of the post-war consensus had its genesis in
the Tripartite government of 1944-47.
• This post-war coalition of progressive forces (Communists,
Christian-Democrats [MRP], Socialists) left a robust reformist record
to its credit after 30 months in office. It introduced France’s
comprehensive social security system. It enacted important civil and
social reforms, notably the advent of female suffrage and the
creation of workplace committees. Moreover, it greatly accentuated
practices of economic dirigisme by taking several major industries
into public ownership, and launching French planning procedures.
• The nationalisation programme created large state firms in the key
sectors of energy (gas, coal, electricity, Atomic energy) transport (Air
France, Renault), banking (the Bank of France, and four deposit
banks, including Crédit Lyonnais) and insurance. With the breakdown of triparitism in May 1947, France had to wait until Mitterrand’s
election in 1981 for its next experience of left-wing government.
French Socialists in Office 2
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Despite its antipathy to the label social-democratic, the Mauroy government (1981-84)
enthusiastically adopted classic social-democratic remedies while these were being progressively
jettisoned elsewhere. The Socialist-led government implemented Keynesian demand
management policies to stimulate growth and combat unemployment. In the early 1980s, with the
US and western Europe in the midst of recession, the French socialist government’s countercyclical economic policy contrasted starkly with the macroeconomic policies being pursued by
France’s principal trading partners. Moreover, its audacious industrial policies (the 1982
nationalisation of 36 banks and five major industrial groups) ran directly counter to the incipient
privatisation trends elsewhere. Its social generosity (as measured by increases in pensions, the
minimum wage, and family allowances) contributed to the goal of economic relaunch, and fiscal
redistribution (consolidated by the Wealth tax), but created intolerable economic strains.
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Harsh economic realities forced the government to modify the pace of redistributive welfare
reforms and Keynesian pump-priming. The French economy simply could not absorb the pressure
imposed by spiralling trade and budget deficits. The left’s economic U-turn - which took place in
two stages, in June 1982 and in March 1983 - demonstrated for most observers France’s
economic vulnerability: unilateral Keynesian reflationary policies were no longer possible for a
medium-sized nation such as France in an interdependent world economy. The failure of Socialist
reflation from 1981-83 revealed the pressures for convergence between French economic policies
and those of its main competitors, especially Germany. There was a particularly strong linkage
between domestic budget retrenchment, monetary rigour, and the drive for closer European
integration in the 1980s and 1990s, not least because of the prominent role by Mitterrand (and
Delors) in negotiating the Single European Act (1986) and the Maastricht Treaty (1993).
Plural left, 1997-2002
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The plural left’s electoral victory in June 1997 brought the Socialists back to
power rather earlier than most observers expected. The Jospin
government delivered a distinctive political message based on defending
the French social model under attack from a neo-liberal onslaught and the
invisible forces of globalisation that bore many similarities with the 1981-83
period. The main difference between the two periods relates to the degree
of interdependence of France and her European partners, and the limited
sovereignty of national economic policies after the Single European Act and
the Maastricht Treaty. The economic activity of the Mauroy government
during 1981-82 presupposed a degree of formal national economic
sovereignty that no longer existed in 1997. The nationalisation programme
of 1982 would certainly not have been possible in 1997, EU competition
policy obliging. Moreover, European policy fashions have shifted over the
period, in favour of greater marketisation and privatisation. Yet a resurgent
French Socialist party, once again in government since June 1997, has
been reluctant to accept the cultural or ideological reference frames in
vogue amongst certain other social-democratic parties (notably the mantra
of labour flexibility), to the extent of being seen as ‘archaic’ by Anglo-Saxon
commentators enamoured with Tony Blair and new Labour.
Plural left, 1997-2002..
• If the margins of manoeuvre open to the Jospin government were
limited, this was partly as a result of the legacy of the Mitterrand
presidency itself. Mitterrand’s principal achievements (of
Europeanisation, marketisation, and modernisation ) were difficult to
reconcile with a traditional social-democratic political agenda.[1] In
European policy, the single European Act and the Maastricht treaty
were major achievements for which Mitterrand could claim some
credit. The Maastricht Treaty imposed a monetarist vision of an ever
closer union, a logic which had little in common with Keynesian
reflationary policies or the left’s traditional social objectives. While
the Jospin method was consciously crafted as the antithesis of the
Mitterrand presidency, the new government had to operate within
the parameters of powerful constraints, not least those relating to
the prospect of EMU and the convergence criteria, which were in a
real sense the legacy of Mitterrand.
[1] Cole François Mitterrand: a Study in Political Leadership,
chapter 12.
35 Hour week and other reforms
• The 35 hours was by far the most audacious reform of the Jospin
government. Premier Jospin refused to accept that nothing could be
done about unemployment; bold government action was called for.
Specialist advice was divided, however; certain economists
predicted real job gains from a move to 35 hours, whereas others
doubted it would have any effect. [1] At a National Conference
attended by government ministers, trade unions and employers
associations on October 10, 1997, premier Jospin announced that
‘a law would fix the legal duration of the working week at 35 hours
from January 1, 2000’, for all firms with more than 10 workers. [2]
Such a law was passed through the National Assembly in January
1998 , instructing employers and unions to negotiate the modalities
of the passage to 35 hours by the year 2000. This decision was
more radical than expected, to the satisfaction of the plural left
majority and the trade unions, and the distress of the CNPF.
Jospin…then oblivion?
• The essence of Jospin’s governing method was to stress the
autonomy of political action, even in a context of strong
interdependence. Jospin did not call into question the market, but
adopted a far less accommodating stance to business interests than
late Mitterrandism; this was demonstrated by the increase in
company taxation in July 1997, and above all by the legally binding
move to a 35 hour week against fierce CNPF opposition. Ultimately,
there were similarities, as well as differences, between Jospin, and
his former mentor Mitterrand. Both leaders placed a high value on
the importance of politics, as against technical constraints. The
attempt at economic reflation and thoroughgoing social reform had
illustrated Mitterrand's belief in the ascendancy of the political over
the economic, a belief strongly maintained until France was
constrained to change course in 1982-83.
• But the 2002 elections ,, represented a major setback for the French
PS and the left. Is it now a municipal socialist party?