Transcript International Helicopter Safety Team
Safety Enhancement in Helicopter Operations
IHST Latin American Regional Conference Sao Paulo , Brazil Somen Chowdhury Executive Committee Member, IHST VP Internationl, AHS
Contents
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Why IHST : Background Objectives, Goals & Implementation Safety : in Design, manufacturing & operations - Every Step of the Way IHSS 2005 Montreal Conference IHST Regional Cooperation IHSS 2007 Conclusions
Too many
Accidents Lives lost
Business loss
Injuries
Background:
Current State of Affairs ~ 565/year worldwide Poor Public image Too expensive UNACCEPTABLE
PumaCrash.wmv
24,294 Worldwide Civil Helicopters United States (12743) 48.44% Worldwide distribution by country Italy (642) 2.44% Japan (799) 3.04% Mexico (368) 1.40% New Zealand (642) 2.44% India (140) 0.53% South Africa (563) 2.14% Germany (698) 2.65% France (796) 3.03% England (1080) 4.11% Canada (1801) 6.85% Others (4386) 16.67% Brazil (435) 1.65% Australia (1215) 4.62%
Six Years Data 2000- 2005
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Civil & Military uses
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3049 accidents
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2643 fatalities
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1027 serious injuries
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5439 minor/ no injuries
Worldwide Helicopter Accidents/ year 1980-2005 Worldwide Helicopter Accidents/Year 1980 - 2005 800 700 600 500 400 300 200 100 0 80 82 84
US Civil Registry
86 88 90 92 94
Non-US Civil & Military
96 98 00 02 04
US Military & USCG (ABC)
Source : Roy Fox Bell Helicopter
Accidents rates per 100,000 hr
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As per AUA ( Mike Kriebel):
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2,225,000 total helicopter hours in USA in 2004 Accident rate per 100,000 flight hours : 8.09
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Fatal rate 1.48
Turbine civil accident rate : 5.11
By contrast : U.S. Air carrier rate : 0.159
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US data shows no change in rate over 24 years Need to bring down helicopter accident rates
Bell civil turbine accident causes worldwide (1994-2003) Airworthiness 14% Unknown 12% Non-AW (human, etc.) 74% Source : Roy Fox, Bell Helicopter Textron
Causes of Accidents
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Bell Civil turbine accident causes world wide (Pie chart)
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Non Air worthiness ( Human) 74%
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Unknown 12%
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Airworthiness 14%
Accident status in SAM countries
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SAM: covers South, Central and Carribean countries Reference ICAO report 297 AN/171presented in ICAO conference RAAC/9 , Santiago Chile 2005 Data primarily discusses large transport aircraft accidents Conclusions of report generally valid for helicopter operations
SAM countries ( contd)
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1992 – 2001 ( 10 year period) Transport A/c accident data Asia-Australia 26.8% of all accidents Europe 21% of accdnts 29% of oprns N.America 20.5% of accdnts 42% of opns Central &S. America 16.8 % vs 9% Africa 14.5% ICAO Conclusion : accidents 3.8 times more likely in Latin American countries than in USA & Canada
SAM countries (contd)
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ICAO statistics (297 AN/171 ADREP) mentions hull losses in the region is 2 to 3 times world average (from 1993 to 2002)
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Flight Safety Foundation suggests a risk multiplier of 5 be considered for CFIT for Central & S American airspace compared to Australia /N Zland /US & Canada
ICAO report conclusions
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Air cargo operations hull losses have tripled from 1993 to 2002 world wide : accidents 22 times more frequent than passenger operations Cause : Less attention paid; operational hours are different; older fleet Helicopter accidents are frequent ( do not have separate numbers) Main causes: Human Factors, maintenance, operational issues, situational awareness, training Helicopter accidents globally about 50 times more than passenger transport aircraft Less attention and lack of enforcement of safety practices seem to be the primary cause of increased accidents
The Real Challenge
Iceberg Theory Accidents Serious Incidents
1 10
Incidents
300
Near Misses
1200 Heinrich Ratio
The BIG Picture Hidden or Unseen Conditions are Below The Surface
The ‘Swiss Cheese’ Model Successive layers of defenses, barriers, & safeguards Barriers are Safety Nets Some holes due to active failures (present in use) Hazards When barriers fail ACCIDENT Other holes due to latent conditions (present, not visible)
The Danger…
- is all around us!!!
Goals & Implementation Need to Act
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Can the industry do better ?
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How ?
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Need a mitigation Strategy
Need to Act
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Helicopter operations are essential There is a need to have a comprehensive hard look as to how we operate and do business There is an absence of any concerted plan so far IHSS 2005 was held in Montreal to kick – off the accident reduction process CAST (commercial aviation safety team) was considered a good model to follow
IHSS 2005 Montreal Conference
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Four day program
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Training Sessions
• Management • Military • Maintenance – Invited Speakers – Paper sessions • Military & Civil missions • Human Performance & Training • Design & Maintenance • Accidents & Regulation • Management & Economics – Discussion panels – Plenary session •
Results
–Attendance ~250 –International • • 13 countries 5 continents –Industry wide
IHST set up
• Government • Regulatory • Accident Investigators • • OEMs Mission groups • Operators • Pilots • Maintainers • Aviation Press
IHST
Mission To provide government, industry and operator leadership to develop and focus implementation of an integrated, data-driven strategy to improve helicopter aviation safety worldwide, both military and civil.
Vision To achieve the highest levels of safety in the international helicopter communities by focusing on appropriate initiatives prioritized to result in the greatest improvement in helicopter aviation safety. Goal To reduce helicopter accidents by 80% By 2016
Secretariat IHST Organisation Executive Committee IHST JHSAT JHSIT Subcommittees Subcommittees JHSAT - Joint Helicopter Safety Advisory Team JHSIT - Joint Helicopter Safety Implementation Team
Implementation: Process Data Analysis
Agree on problems and interventions
Implement Safety Enhancements - U.S.
Set Safety Priorities
Achieve consensus on priorities
Influence Safety Enhancements Worldwide
Integrate into existing work and distribute
Charters
Joint Helicopter Safety Analysis Team (JHSAT) Charter:
Conduct, review and analyse accident report and identify causal factors; Investigate and recommend improvements and develop mitigation strategies to meet 80% goal ; periodic status measurements; Draft action plans to determine intervention strategies and milestones for IHST approval.
Joint Helicopter Safety Implementation Team (JHSIT) Charter:
Develop and prioritize implementation plan; Carry out rigorous cost-benefit analysis for implementation strategies to achieve IHST goals; Develop action plans; Coordinate implementation of IHST-approved strategies; Develop and track performance; Determine progress in meeting major milestones and effectiveness of interventions .
Buy-in Worldwide: Government, Military & Civil Groups, OEMs • • • •
USA
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AHS - American Helicopter Society International
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AAMS - Association of Air Medical Services FAA - Federal Aviation Administration FSF - Flight Safety Foundation Inc.
HAI - Helicopter Association International NAVAIR - U.S. Navy - Naval Safety Center NTSB - National Transportation Safety Board U.S. Army Combat Readiness Center Europe
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BEA Bureau d'Enquêtes et d'Analyses pour la Sécurité de l'Aviation Civile
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EHA - European Helicopter Association Canada
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TCCA - Transport Canada Civil Aviation
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TSB - Transportation Safety Board of Canada India, Australia & now Brazil & Latin America (ABRAPHE, CENIPA) USA Bell Boeing Sikorsky RR Pratt & Whitney Honeywell Europe Eurocopter Augusta-Westand Turbomeca Canada CHC Helicopters Brazil : Petrobras,Lider Need all operators to buy-in
D
(OEM) Original Equipment Manufacturer
OEM
OEM
OEM
Approach
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How do we achieve the best decisions?
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Regulatory obligations
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Voluntary Actions
Regulation
Regulation = An enforced rule of conduct
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Tells industry: What to do / What not to do Outlines legal Obligations & authorities Assumes the industry will by default not comply Directed towards meeting public expectations Elements of posturing
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New Approach : sharing of responsibilities
Voluntary Compliance In the interest of one’s business, lives and efficiency of operations
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Develop a voluntary code of conduct : reflects maturity of the industry The Safety management system
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Need to Outline a plan Will be a proactive system Will be documented Will have a safety oversight system Training Quality Assurance Emergency preparedness A closed loop corrective system
Continuing Airworthiness
Product Life Cycle
Design Manufacture Operations Maintenance Modifications & Repairs
Safety: Every Step of the Way
IHST Strategy
Continuing Airworthiness
Safety Failure Prevention technologies Quality Assurance
- No Flaw
Reliability
-anti corrosion -- reduce vibrat ion
Survivability technology
-ext. airbag -Crash worthy seats & fuel tanks -- floatation gear -- egress S M S 3 years S M S Airworthy Product
Action
-Training of all parties --Pilot aids -Mission comprehension
20-30 years S M S
Design
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Failure Prevention Technologies
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Fail safe design vs safe life design/ CPR for evolutionary design
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Composite structures : prevents catastrophic failures HUMS : DPHM; embedded sensors Reliability
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Corrosion control No single point failure for critical components : 10-9 probability
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FMEA Survivability
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Energy absorbing seats Crash worthy fuel tanks Energy absorbing structures egress
DESIGN ENGINEERING MAINTENANCE SYSTEMS STRUCTURES SYSTEMS STRUCTURES Functional Hazards Analysis (FHA) Systems Safety Analysis (SSA) - Candidate Certification Maintenance Requirements (CCMRs) - Major Futur Consequences STRUCTURAL MAINTENANCE REQUIREMENTS - Damage Tolerance Insp.
- Safe Life Component Retirements Certification Maintenance Requirements (CMRs) AIRWORTHINESS LIMITATIONS SYSTEMS/ POWERPLANTS MAINTENANCE REQUIREMENTS - Maintenance Significant Items (MSIs) MANUFACTURER - Servicing - Maintenance Tasks - Repair Instructions - Components Manuals - Inspection Techniques - Troubleshooting - Tooling - Etc.
STRUCTURAL MAINTENANCE REQUIREMENTS - Structure Significant Items (SSIs) MAINTENANCE REVIEW BOARD REPORT ICAs
Probability and Severity Relationships
Normal Nuisance Operating limitations; emergency procedures PROBABLE Significant reduction in safety margins; difficult for crew to cope with adverse conditions: passenger injuries Large reductio in safety maragins; crew extended because of work load or environ mental conditions, serious injury or death of small num ber of occupants Multiple deaths, usually with loss of aircraft EXTREMELY IMPROBABLE IMPROBABLE PROBABLE FREQUENT REASONABLY PROBABLE IMPROBABLE REMOTE EXTREMELY REMOTE EXTREMELY IMPROBABLE 10 0 10 -1 10 -2 MINOR 10 -3 10 -4 10 -5 10 -6 MAJOR 10 -7 10 -8 HAZARDOUS 10 -9 CATA STROPHE
Failure risk mitigation strategy
HAZARD SEVERITY HAZARD PROBABILITY Catastrophic Level 1 Frequent Probable – Level A – Level B Occasional – Level C Remote/Seldom Level D Improbable/Unlikely - Level E 1A = EXTREMELY HIGH 1B = EXTREMELY HIGH 1C = HIGH 1D = MEDIUM 1E = LOW Critical Level 2 Significant Level 3 Negligible Level 4 2A = EXTREMELY HIGH 2B = HIGH 3A = HIGH 2C = HIGH 2D = MEDIUM 2E = LOW 3B = MEDIUM 3C = MEDIUM 3D = MEDIUM 3E = LOW 4A = MEDIUM 4B = LOW 4C = LOW 4D = LOW 4E = LOW
Manufacturing
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Flawless manufacturing
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Reduce MDRs Improved inspection technologies Reduced variability
Monitoring of Fielded Systems
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Service Difficulty Reporting System (SDRS) Computerized Airworthiness Information System (CAIS) Civil Aviation Daily Occurrence Reporting Systems (CADORS)
Murphy’s Law No. 3 If anything can possibly go wrong, it will!
MAMA MIA !
Murphy’s Law No. 8
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By making something perfectly clear, someone will be totally confused!
Field & Flight Operations
Human Factors Human Factors is cause of 75% accidents It is critical to enhanced safety Need to integrate HF in maintenance Provide smarter maintenance aids Provide increased situational awareness inputs to pilots The door opened in flight!
IHST Regional Cooperation
International Cooperation is essential
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Regulators
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Operators OEMS In all regions of the world.
We started with S Asia, Australia then Brazil Go to: S.Africa, Middle East, Japan Russia We are all in it together
IHSS 2007
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Montreal Dates –September 19 to 21, 2007 Action Plan from JHSAT, JHSIT Report on worldwide participation
Pictures from www.tourisme-montreal.org
Conclusions
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Need to act urgently in improving the safety of helicopter operations Important area of focus is human factors and situational awareness Get involved in the IHST process Accidents can be avoided : need to set up the right process The present accident rates in the helicopter industry are unacceptable
Questions?
Please check out the IHST website: