Transcript 再生能源躉購電價與競標機制的整合

1
Selected Indicators
Unit
2008
2009
2010
Global new investment in renewable energy
(annual)
billion
USD
130
160
211
Renewable power capacity
(existing, not including hydro)
GW
200
250
312
Renewable power capacity
(existing, including hydro)
GW
1150
1230
1320
Hydropower capacity
(existing)
GW
950
980
1010
Wind power capacity(existing)
GW
121
159
198
Solar PV capacity(existing)
GW
16
23
40
Solar PV cell capacity (capacity)
GW
6.9
11
24
Solar hot water capacity(existing)
GWth
130
160
185
Ethanol production(annual)
billion
liters
67
76
86
Biodiesel production(annual)
billion
liters
12
17
19
Countries with policy targets
#
79
89
96
States/provinces/countries with feed-in policies＊
#
71
82
87
States/provinces/countries with RPS/quota policies
#
60
61
63
States/provinces/countries with biofuels mandates
#
55
57
60
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Source:Renewables 2011,Global Status Report,REN 21,P15
項目
太陽光電系統
型態
屋頂型
級距(kW)
2011費率
(元/度)
≧1~<10
10.3185
≧10~<100
9.1799
2010費率
(元/度)
11.1883＊
(相當於無設備補助14.6030)
12.9722
變動(%)
-29.34
-29.23
≧100~<500
8.8241
≧ 500
7.9701
無區分
7.3297
≧1~<10
7.3562
7.2714
1.17
≧10＊＊
2.6138
2.3834
9.67
離岸
無區分
5.5626
4.1982
32.5
川流式水力發電
--
無區分
2.1821
2.0615
5.85
地熱能
--
無區分
4.8039
5.1838
-7.33
生質能
--
無區分
2.1821
2.0615
5.85
廢棄物衍生燃料
--
無區分
2.6875
2.0879
28.72
其他
--
無區分
2.1821
2.0615
5.85
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地上型
風力
陸上
-31.98
11.1190
-28.32
-34.08
註＊ :1kW以上未達10kW太陽光電99年公告再生能源躉購費率另提供5萬元/Kw設備補助，100年則不另提供5萬元/Kw設備補助。
註＊ ＊ ：依規定須加裝LVRT者，則費率為2.6574元/度。
Source:經濟部能源局
對IPP來說，大型發電技術應適用FIT:
AC(邊際成本+合理利潤)=P
• 小型：不同廠商間，每KW平均成本(AC)有差
異，因總裝置容量<10KW，整體差異不大。
• 大型：總裝置容量、每KW平均成本差異大，
收購期間長，整體差異很大，不符技術效率和
公平原則下，經長時間累積(20年),潛在利潤
高。(競租→泡沫化)
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制度可能影響小型分散式發電技術推廣，
影響裝設意願及連帶產業效益，從而無法
發揮”聚沙成塔”效果。
交易成本
• 價格搜尋成本。
• 議價成本。
• 契約成本。
• 行政單位監管成本。
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The California Public Utilities Commission (CPUC) voted
unanimously in December ,2010 California Renewable
Auction Mechanism(RAM)，which is a new mechanism to
require IOUs to purchase electricity from various renewable
technologies with capacity smaller than 20MW.
Three largest IOUs in California (SCE,PG&E and SDG&E)
would participate in a pilot program to hold two auctions
biannually and the bid will be awarded starting from the
lowest cost and viable programs until capacity per auction
was filled with total program capacity 761 MW in 2 years.
The first auction will be hold in the fourth quarter 2011.
IOUs
Total Program Capacity(MW)
per auction(MW)
SCE
259.4
65
PG&E
420.9
105.2
SDG&E
80.7
20.2
Total
761
190.25
Source: http://docs.cpuc.ca.gov/PUBLISHED/NEWS_RELEASE/141590.htm visit 2011/08/28
CPUC Resolution 4414
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State
Eligible Renewable/Other
Technologies
California
Solar Thermal Electric, Photovoltaics,
Landfill Gas, Wind, Biomass,
Geothermal Electric,
Municipal Solid Waste,
Anaerobic Digestion,
Small Hydroelectric, Tidal Energy,
Wave Energy, Ocean Thermal, Biodiesel,
Fuel Cells using Renewable Fuels
Applicable Sectors
Commercial, Industrial
Authority 1:
Date Enacted:
CPUC Decision 10-12-048
12/16/2010
Authority 2:
Date Enacted:
CPUC Resolution 4414
8/18/2011
Source: DSIRE website
http://www.dsireusa.org/incentives/incentive.cfm?Incentive_Code=CA244F&RE=1&EE=1 visit
2011/08/27
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Key Elements
Standard
Contract
Product
Project
Viability
1.Flexibillity in contract language :Simple, non-negotiable contract approved by CPUC.
2.IOU would sign contract with winner bidders.
3.Minimum contract size (1 MW) and maximum contract size(20MW):
projects greater or equal to 500kW can aggregate to meet the minimum criteria as
long as they interconnect to the same p-node and contracting size not greater than
5MW.
4.Contract Length:10,15, or 20 years.
5.Length of Time to COD: Project must be online within 18 months of CPUC approval
with one 6-month extension for regulatory delays. Sellers can request a contract
extension with a 60-day notice in advance to guaranteed commercial operation
date(COD).
Firm( baseload): geothermal and biomass
Non-firm peaking(peaking as-available) :solar
Non-firm non-peaking(non-peaking as-available) electricity: solar+ wind
Minimum requirement for participating in the auction:
1.Site control: bidders must show 100% site control through direct ownership, leasing
or and option to lease or purchase upon award of RAM contracts.
2.Commercialized Technology.
3.Development Experience: At least one member has completed or begun at least one
project with similar capacity and technology.
4.Interconnection Application: proof having filed interconnection application and
completed a System-Impact Study, etc.
Source: Summarized from CPUC Resolution 4414(2011);G&E advise letters,SDG&Eadvise letters(2011),SCE advise letters(2011)
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Key Program Elements
Bids Selection
Streamlined
Procurement
Transparency
1.Market-Based Pricing: Bids will be selected starting with the lowest cost until
capacity per auction is filled.
2.IOUs could use approve methods describing in its advise letters
implementing RAM to normalize(adjust) bids to place them on an equivalent
basis; estimated transmission network upgrade costs should be accounted in
ranking bids.
1.Contract must have CPUC staff approval before executing.
2.Price, terms and conditions are non-negotiable.
1.Annual program forums to collect feedbacks .
2.Project development milestones and annual progress report from the utility,
biannual progress report from the developers.
3. Program data is Publicly available.
Source: CPUC Resolution 4414,PG&E advise letters,SDG&E advise letters,SCE advise letters
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Reduced Transaction Costs
• Purchase price is determined by auction and is non-negotiable price.
• Developers would bid at a price close to or slightly higher than cost.
Strengthen Policy Clarity
• Developers who were awarded bids will sign long-tern contracts with IOUs and
electricity generated will be purchased with bid price over a fixed period.
Take Market,Utility,Regulators and Ratepayers into Consideration
• Avoid administration costs of regularly adjusting prices and related disputes.
• Help California to achieve its RPS target more quickly.
• Encourage developers to offer more efficient generating technologies.
• Rate is more market-oriented and reflecting generating costs.
• Avoid administration costs for regularly adjusting prices and possible disputes.
• Independent Evaluators are hired to ascertain cost -competitiveness and project integrity, their
comments are required for CPUC’s approval of bids.
• Performance Deposits and Development Deposits are required
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Under RAM，electricity generated from
the same technology could receive
different prices while under FIT, they
would be purchased with the same price.
Three IOUs participating in this pilot program
(SCE,PG&E,SDG&E) could reject uncompetitive
price or bids susceptible of market
manipulation。
Unsubscribed or subscribed amount
dropped out of the program would be left
for the next auction.
Source: Advise letters from PG&E ,P3.
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Purchase price could be adjusted by TOD(Time of Delivery) under
RAM:sellers will be paid the contract price multiplied by applicable
TOD factor in each hour.
PG&E: TOD Factors for Each TOD Period
Period
A. June-September
1.Super-Peak
2.Shoulder
3.Night
2.20490
1.12237
0.68988
1.05783
0.93477
0.76384
1.14588
0.84634
0.64235
B. Oct-Dec,Jan&Feb
C. Mar-May
Source: Advise letters from PG&E.
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FIT
RAM
• 行政、監督管制成本高
• 小用戶價格搜尋成本高
• 技術進步快，無適當參考價格
• 一般用戶難分析回收期限
• 議價成本高
• 行政監督管制成本低
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RAM could achieve "competitive market”
And ”reduced transaction costs”
• Protection Mechanism：public interests first。
FIT、RPS併行國家
• 考量交易成本和規模經濟，小型發電技術適用FIT
制度，大型技術適用RPS
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項目
再生能源費率
決定
再生能源投資
風險
電業義務
FIT制度
政府主導集合產學界意見
決定合理躉購費率
業者可掌握每期現金流量，
降低營運風險
RPS制度
價格取決市場供需且需建立電
能或REC憑證交易平台
投資風險受電力市場價格波動
影響。
RAM
Bid a price close to or slightly higher than
cost
IOUs purchase electricity with the bid price
for a fixed period and bidders would sign a
long-term contract with the IOUs.
電業具強制躉購再生能源 電業具強制配比再生能源義務 Certain capacity was required to be
purchased through RAM.
義務
Competitive generating market
適用電業自由競爭市場
電力市場適用 無特殊限制
性
電價反應方式 增加成本完全反映至用電 增加成本依市場機制，由電業 Costs would be reflected on bundled consumers.
戶電費
與電力消費吸收
1.Market-based and non-negotiable price(contract).
制度特性
1.按再生能源發電成本訂 1.電力市場供需機制
2.Avoid administration costs for regularly
定費率。
決定收購價格。
adjusting prices and possible disputes.
2.固定費率使業者可掌握 2.訂定未達義務罰
3.Performance and Development Deposits was
每
則。
required to protect ratepayers and utilities.
期現金流量，降低業者 3.市場競爭引導技術
4.Flexibility in constructing its own contracts
with some required standard terms.
營運風險。
進步以降低成本。
5.Independent
Evaluators are hired to
3.利用能量費率及成本標 4.市場偏好較具經濟
ascertain cost -competitiveness and project
效益之再生能源。
竿，
integrity, their comments are required for
鼓勵再生能源資源較優
CPUC’s approval of bids.
區域及經營效率較佳業
6.IOUs are generally responsible for
monitoring project performance.
者優先進入市場，並給
7.Experienced
Participants.
予業者提高發電量之誘
8. Acceptance of additional voluntary procurement.
因，以提升再生能源經
9.Adjustment of Procurement Capacity.
濟效益。
4.躉購費率定期檢討，據
遞
減傾向，引導技術進步
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Source:王勤銓(2011)，國際再生能源推廣制度發展及電能躉購制度，臺灣經濟研究月刊第34卷第7期，p49。
以降低成本。
Decision 10-12-048，
再生能源躉購制度vs.競標機制：
 再生能源發展初期，基於政策鼓勵，各國多以FIT躉購制度給予投資者保障。
 隨著再生能源技術進步，發電成本下降，有能力投資者日益增多，RAM競標制度
相應而生。
 RAM制度因設有收購上限可避免FIT『爆量』情況之發生，且可降低政府管制行政
之交易成本。
 加州RAM競標制度先導計畫(Pilot Program)值得密切關注。
RPS制度vs.RAM制度：
 再生能源收購價格透過市場機制決定，政府干預程度遠低於FIT制度。
 RAM能針對尖離峰不同再生能源發電技術分別進行
SCE already had 19.4% of electricity generated from renewables
in 2011 which is the largest share among 3000 utilities in the U.S.
Hawaii’s HECO planned to achieve 25%, 40% electricity generated
from renewables in 2020 and 2030 respectively.
Estimated 300 MW new, firm generating capacity would be
needed for HECO to replace lost capacity from 4 generating units
to be retired in next 10 years and growing load demand with
solicitation for proposals planned in 2011.
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Source:http://www.heco.com/portal/site/heco/menuitem.508576f78baa14340b4c0610c510b1ca/?vgnextoid=ba878345e6a15110VgnVCM1000005c011bacRCRD&vgnextcha
nnel=3220894ba55bb210VgnVCM1000005c011bacRCRD&vgnextfmt=default