Transcript Thoughts on the use of general purpose forces versus

Thoughts on the use of General
Purpose Forces
versus
Special Operations Forces and
Special Forces in
current and future conflicts
A presentation by
Douglas Macgregor, PhD
Colonel (ret) US Army
Lead Partner
Potomac League LLC
2 April 2009
National Defense University
Bottom line up front:
Understand what it is you are trying to accomplish
with military power!
What’s the purpose, appropriate method and desired, attainable end state?
“The first, the supreme, the most far-reaching act of judgment that the
statesman and commander have to make is to establish by that test the kind
of war on which they are embarking; neither mistaking it for, nor trying to turn
it into, something that is alien to its nature.”
Carl von Clausewitz, On War, Book 1, Chap. 1, Sect 27, page 100.
“The political objective and the military objective are not the same, and are
never the same. The military strategic objective is achieved by military force
while the political objective is achieved as a result of the military success.”
General Sir Rupert Smith (ret), The Utility of Force: The Art of War in the
Modern World, page 217.
What has changed in land warfare?
Mobile dispersed warfare is the dominant form of combat. Defined, continuous fronts on the
WW II model ceased to exist years ago.
Ubiquitous strike capabilities and the proliferation of WMD make the concentration of large
ground forces whether conventional or unconventional increasingly dangerous. (Air and
missile defense become more and more critical to operational effectiveness and success).
Future conflicts will not resemble Iraq. They are far more likely to resemble the Balkan Wars
of the early 20th Century, except that fights for regional power and influence will overlap with
the competition for energy, water, food, mineral resources and the wealth they create.
Directed Energy, robotics, hafnium, nuclear weapons and other technologies will continue to
alter land warfare over the next ten years.
Centralized, single-service, top-down controlled, stove-piped maneuver forces on the WW II
model will not defeat decentralized conventional or unconventional forces organized for
mobile dispersed warfare. (SOCOM is effectively a separate service now too).
How do we translate this understanding into future military action
that makes sense?
Why does the U.S. maintain general purpose forces?
The United States maintains conventional military power as a hedge against uncertainty, as
insurance against the possibility the United States could be drawn into a war it would
otherwise choose not to fight.
•General purpose forces exist to prevent any one power or bloc of powers from dominating the eastern
hemisphere or intruding into the western hemisphere.
•In the event of war, American conventional forces are designed to deliver a strategic decision that
favors the United States.
General Purpose or Conventional military power is also strategic leverage in the event the
United States Government sees an opportunity to influence an ongoing conflict or crisis in a
way that favors American interests and promotes a return to peace.
The United States should maintain enough general purpose military power to secure its vital
interests without making the rest of the world feel less secure.
The United States does not maintain general purpose forces to conquer, occupy and
transform other peoples' societies into reflections of our own. We cannot afford it, the world
does not want it and it is not in our vital strategic interest to do it.
Why does the U.S. maintain both Special Forces
and Special Operations Forces?
•Special Forces and Special Operations Forces (SF and SOF) exert American
strategic influence where it is required regardless of the conditions, peacetime or
wartime.
•SF and SOF are economical military means to deny strategic dominance to opposing
political, economic and military forces in regions or countries of interest to U.S. national
security strategy. (Example: El Salvador)
•When supported by conventional forces, strategic ISR and communications in the air,
space and at sea, the strategic influence of SF and SOF is disproportionate to their
size and numbers.
•In wars of decision, American SF and SOF integrate with, augment and extend the
strategic reach and impact of America’s General Purpose Forces.
What can we say about the use of these forces in the
near-term?
 The use of general purpose ground forces to occupy parts of Iraq and Afghanistan
imposed severe human and economic costs on the United States, its allies, and even our
friends inside these states. This approach is economically ruinous and politically
unsustainable.
 The “winning” construct as it equates to the establishment of Western-style government
and free market economies is not relevant. In the Middle East, as well as in most of
Africa, Latin America, Central and Southwest Asia “damage control,” not “total victory,” is
the most realistic goal for U.S. national military strategy.
 “For Afghanistan to become a unitary state ruled from Kabul, and to develop into a
modern, prosperous, poppy-free and democratic country would be a worthy and
desirable outcome. But it is not vital for American interests… The problem in Pakistan is
more pressing and direct.” (Graham Allison and John Deutsch, “The Real Afghan Issue
Is Pakistan,” Opinion, 30 March 2009)
 In Afghanistan the U.S. is repeating mistakes we made in Vietnam – in 1965 we
misconstrued a region of temporary, tactical importance as being of enduring strategic
value. The LBJ government had unfounded, naive, and unrealistic expectations of
Vietnam’s near-term potential to evolve into a modern social democratic constitutional
republic if the US put the "right people" in charge and provided a pile of cash and some
"military assistance."
If the large-scale commitment of general purpose ground forces is not the answer,
what is the answer?
What is to be done?
What we know:
•The Muslim world does not want the United States to be its savior; or to “Westernize”
through military occupation regardless of the material benefits American-led Westernization
offers. For that matter, no one in Asia, Africa, the Middle East or Latin America wants
American troops to police and govern their country, even if American troops are smarter,
more honest, and provide better capabilities than their own soldiers and police.
Next Steps:
•Economy of Force (damage control) is the principle that must shape future U.S. military
engagement in Africa, the Middle East, Central Asia and Latin America.
•Limit American involvement in Afghanistan to modest, low-profile SOF and covert
operations backed by air and naval power to eliminate al-Qaeda elements/camps and any
Taliban members that support them. Work with those who will work with us. Emulate this
approach in other areas where appropriate.
•As Mike Vickers points out the American experience in El Salvador is illuminating. It is easy
to imagine combinations of small SF advisory teams and special operations elements
operating ashore in tandem with off-shore air and naval forces.
•However, even here, Americans must scale back expectations. Misapplying old solutions is
hazardous. More important, countries and peoples tend to revert to the regional mean for
culture and governance when Western influence weakens or withdraws.
Final Thoughts for Consideration
 The objective in conflict or crisis is not to spend lots of American blood and treasure, but to
spend as little as possible! The goal is to make the “irregular” bleed for his tribe / religion /
country while we expend as little blood and treasure as possible to secure critical and vital US
interests; democratizing the Islamic World and eradicating poppy production are "nice to
have/nice to do," but not critical.
 An Indo-Pakistani War involving even the limited use of nuclear weapons would render much
of the current focus on fourth generation warfare and counter-insurgency irrelevant.
 When General MacArthur was Army Chief of Staff in 1930, he did not conclude on the basis of
American military interventions in Nicaragua, Haiti and China that wars of decision in the
Clausewitzian sense would no longer occur. Instead, he prepared the Army as best he could
to fight in a future war of decision without knowing precisely what it looked like.
 The United States can and should avoid direct involvement in most 21st Century conflicts.
(Off-shore pre-1914 UK Model) When conflicts or crises involve U.S. forces, the use of
American military power should be limited or terminated before the cumulative human and
political costs defeat the original purpose of U.S. military action.
 The principal strategic purpose for which the U.S. Armed Forces will fight in the 21st Century
involves securing American prosperity, and where necessary, extending American security to
geographical areas vital to U.S. and allied prosperity.
 Homeland defense – U.S. land borders and coastal waters – will demand more and more
military resources to cope with criminality and terrorism emanating from the Caribbean Basin
and Latin America.