Transcript Document

August 2003 Blackout Review
Brant Eldridge
Executive Manager - ECAR
Presentation Topics
ECAR Overview
Blackout Review
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Current ECAR Members (22)
Allegheny Power
American Electric Power
Big Rivers Electric Corporation
Cinergy Corporation
Consumers Energy
Dayton Power & Light Company
DTE Energy
Duke Energy North America
Duquesne Light Company
East Kentucky Power Cooperative, Inc.
FirstEnergy
Grid America
Hoosier Energy Rural Electric Cooperative, Inc.
Indianapolis Power & Light Company
International Transmission Company
LGE Energy
Michigan Electric Transmission Company, LLC
Midwest Independent System Operator
Northern Indiana Public Service Company
Ohio Valley Electric Corporation
PJM Interconnection LLC
Vectren Energy Delivery of Indiana
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Current Associate Members (16)
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American Municipal Power-Ohio, Inc.
Buckeye Power, Inc.
Municipal Cooperative Coordinated Pool
Wabash Valley Power Association, Inc.
Indiana Municipal Power Agency
Independent Electricity Market Operator
Commonwealth Edison
Tennessee Valley Authority
Cargill Power Markets, LLC
Mirant Americas, LLP
Constellation Power Source, Inc.
Conective Energy Supply, Inc.
FirstEnergy Solutions, Inc.
CMS Energy Resource Management Company
Edison Mission Marketing and Trading
PSEG Power, LLC
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Blackout Review
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Previous Major Outages
November 9, 1965
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30 Million People Affected
20,800 MW Load Dropped
13 Hours to Restore
New York, New England, Pennsylvania, Ontario
July 13, 1977
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9 Million People
6,000 MW
26 Hours
New York City
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Previous Major Outages
July 2, 1996
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2 Million People
11,850 MW
Several Hours
14 Western States, 2 Canadian Provinces, Baja
Mexico
August 10, 1996
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7.5 Million People
28,000 MW
9 Hours
12 Western States
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August 14, 2003 Outage
Largest Cascading Blackout Ever
50 Million People
 61,800 MW
 45 Hours
 Ohio, Michigan, Ontario, Quebec, Northern
New Jersey, Massachusetts, Connecticut,
New York City
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4:13 PM – Cascading sequence essentially complete
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Principal Investigations of
August 14, 2003 Blackout
U. S – Canada Power System Outage Task Force
 Interim Report issued November 2003
 Final Report issued April 2004
North American Electric Reliability Council (NERC)
 Provided significant technical input to U.S. –
Canada investigation
 Initial Report issued February 2004
 Final Report issued July 2004
ECAR
 Two Reports issued February 2004
 “Technical Report” and “Recommendations
Report”
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Key Findings  U.S. – Canada Task Force Investigation
Initiation of blackout occurred in FirstEnergy’s
system in northern Ohio
Blackout could have been prevented
Blackout caused by deficiencies in specific
practices, equipment, and human decisions by
various organizations
Four basic causes of blackout
 Inadequate system understanding
 Inadequate situational awareness
 Inadequate tree trimming
 Inadequate Reliability Coordinator diagnostic
support
Final Report available on DOE and NERC websites
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Key Findings  NERC Investigation
Violations of existing NERC reliability standards
contributed to blackout
FE’s system in northeast Ohio was being operated
with insufficient reactive margins
Relay protection and controls could be used more
effectively to slow or minimize spread of a
cascading outage
Key contributing factors from previous blackouts
were repeated  “Three T’s”
Final Report available on NERC website
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Common Elements Of Major Outages
“Three T’s”
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Trees
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Tools
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Vegetation Management
For system operators to monitor and assess wide area to
evaluate what actions are needed to arrest a potential
major outage
Training
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Simulators, structured programs, drills to assure that
operators are prepared to take appropriate actions
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Key Findings  ECAR Investigation
Two primary factors led to the disturbance
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Tripping of lines below their emergency ratings
Insufficient intervention to relieve line overloads
Absence of either primary factor would probably
have avoided the disturbance becoming a cascading
blackout
Secondary factor that caused system conditions to
be worse than otherwise as outages occurred was
shortage of reactive resources in initiating area
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But this factor did not initiate the disturbance
Final Reports available on ECAR website
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Examples of Blackout Investigation
Recommendations
U. S. – Canada Task Force
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Need for Congress to pass reliability legislation that would
make compliance with reliability standards mandatory and
enforceable with penalties for non-compliance
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Development of regulator-approved funding mechanism for
NERC/RRCs to ensure independence from parties they
oversee
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Evaluate and develop appropriate modifications to existing
institutional framework for reliability management
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Examine and clarify future role of RRCs with focus on
mandate, scope, governance, responsibilities, resource
requirements, geographical boundaries
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Examples of Blackout Investigation
Recommendations
NERC
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Remedial actions by FE, MISO, and PJM by June 30, 2004 to
address causes of August 14, 2003 blackout
Strengthen and implement communication protocols
between Reliability Coordinators, Control Areas, and RTOs
Review, update, and train on contingency plans for loss of
monitoring and control systems
Review, update, and train on emergency plans
Confirm that transmission line ROWs are clear of
obstructions
Readiness audits of Control Areas and Reliability
Coordinators
Re-evaluate system design, planning, and operating criteria
Develop standard for vegetation management
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Examples of Blackout Investigation
Recommendations
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Take action regarding violations of NERC standards on
August 14, 2003
Conduct “peer review” of ECAR member companies
seasonal and long-term transmission assessments
Audit existing vegetation management plans and adherence
to the plans
Confirm that ECAR RCs have authority to order CAs to drop
firm load if deemed necessary to prevent a cascading
outage, and that CAs will do so if ordered
Review reactive and voltage practices of ECAR members
Revise existing ECAR Documents/develop new ones, as
needed, to address blackout investigation recommendations
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Closing Observations
Since August 2003 blackout, considerable progress
has been made to minimize likelihood of another
blackout
Demand for electricity (load) continues to grow
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As does generation capacity to serve the load
In last two decades, relatively little new transmission
infrastructure has been built
Interconnected transmission system is now being
used in ways for which it wasn’t designed
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Long distance transfers of large amounts of power
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Closing Observations
Transmission system is operating with less
overall margin than in past
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Operating closer to limits more of the time
More vulnerable to something going wrong
Until transmission system gets
enhanced/improved, system operators have
to be even more vigilant than normal and
ready to deal with problem situations to avoid
potential major outages
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Closing Observations
Two key things need to happen to improve the
current situation
Enactment of reliability legislation to make
compliance with reliability standards mandatory and
enforceable
Enactment of broad policies that foster a healthier
grid investment climate
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New transmission lines are needed in some areas
Also need to utilize new technologies to enable existing lines
to carry more capacity reliably
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QUESTIONS ?
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