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2003 MAJOR POWER GRID
BLACKOUTS IN
NORTH AMERICA AND EUROPE
Copyright © P. Kundur
This material should not be used without the author's consent
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August 14, 2003 Blackout of Northeast US
and Canada
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14 August 2003 Blackout
of Northeast US - Canada
Approximately 50 million people in 8 states in the
US and 2 Canadian provinces affected
63 GW of load interrupted (11% of total load
supplied by Eastern North American
Interconnected System)
During this disturbance, over 400 transmission lines
and 531 generating units at 261 power plants tripped
For details refer to: "Final Report of Aug 14, 2003
Blackout in the US and Canada: Causes and
Recommendations", US-Canada Power System
Outage Task Force, April 5, 2004. www.NERC.com
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NERC Regions Affected:
MAAC, ECAR, NPCC
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Aug 14, 2003 US-Canada Blackout
Conditions Prior to Blackout
Electricity demand high but not unusually high
Power transfer levels high, but within established
limits and previous operating conditions
Planned outages of generating units in the affected
area: Cook 2, Davis Bess plant, East Lake 4, Sammis
3 and Monroe 1
Reactive power supply problems in the regions of
Indiana and Ohio prior to noon
Operators took actions to boost voltages
voltages within limits
System operating in compliance with NERC
operating policies prior to 15:05 Eastern Daylight
Time
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Blackout Started in Midwest
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Aug 14, 2003 US-Canada Blackout
Sequence of Events
The Midwest ISO (MISO) state estimator and realtime contingency analysis (RTCA) software not
functioning properly from 12:15 to 16:04
prevented MISO from performing proper "early
warning" assessments as the events were
unfolding
At the First Energy (FE) Control Center, a number of
computer software problems occurred on the
Energy Management System (EMS) starting at 14:14
contributed to inadequate situation awareness
at FE until 15:45
The first significant event was the outage of East
Lake generating unit #5 in the FE system at 13:31:34
producing high reactive power output
voltage regulator tripped to manual on
overexcitation
unit tripped when operator tried to restore AVR
cont'd
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East Lake 5 Trip: 1:31:34 pm
ONTARIO
2
1
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Aug 14, 2003 US-Canada Blackout
Sequence of Events cont'd
Initial line trips in Ohio, all due to tree contact:
Chamberlin-Harding 345 kV line at 15:05:41
Hanna-Juniper 345 kV line at 15:32:03
Star-South Canton 345 kV line at 15:41:35
Due to EMS failures at FE and MISO control centers,
no proper actions (such as load shedding) taken
Critical event leading to widespread cascading
outages in Ohio and beyond was tripping of
Sammis-Star 345 kV line at 16:05:57
Zone 3 relay operation due to low voltage and
high power flow
Load shedding in northeast Ohio at this stage could
have prevented cascading outages that following
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(3:05:41)
(3:32:03)
Star- S. Canton (3:41:35)
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Sammis-Star
(4:05:57.5)
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Aug 14, 2003 US-Canada Blackout
Sequence of Events
Tripping of many additional 345 kV lines in Ohio and
Michigan by Zone 3 (or Zone 2 set similar to Zone 3)
relays
Tripping of several generators in Ohio and Michigan
At 16:10:38, due to cascading loss of major lines in
Ohio and Michigan, power transfer from Canada
(Ontario) to the US on the Michigan border shifted
power started flowing counter clockwise from
Pennsylvania through New York and Ontario
into Michigan
3700 MW of reverse power flow to serve loads
in Michigan and Ohio, which were severed
from rest of interconnected system except
Ontario
Voltage collapsed due to extremely heavy loadings
on transmission lines
Cascading outages of several hundred lines and
generators leading to blackout of the region
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Power Transfers Shift at 4:10:38.6 pm
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Generator Trips to 16:10:38
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Generator Trips - Next 7 Seconds
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Northeast Completes Separation from
Eastern Interconnection
4:10:43 - 4:10:45 pm
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Generator Trips - After 16:10:44
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End of Cascade
Some Local Load
Interrupted
Areas Affected by the Blackout
Service maintained
in some area
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Primary Causes of Blackout
(as identified by the US-Canada Outage Task Force)
1. Inadequate understanding of the power system
requirements:
First Energy (FE) failed to conduct rigorous
long-term planning studies and sufficient
voltage stability analyses of Ohio control area
FE used operational criteria that did not reflect
actual system behaviour and needs
ECAR (East Central Area Reliability Council)
did not conduct an independent review or
analysis of FE's voltage criteria and operating
needs
Some NERC planning standards were
sufficiently ambiguous that FE could interpret
them in a way that resulted in inadequate
reliability for system operation
cont'd
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Causes of Blackout cont'd
2. Inadequate level of situation awareness:
FE failed to ensure security of its system after
significant unforeseen contingencies
FE lacked procedures to ensure that its
operators were continually aware of the
functional state of their critical monitoring
tools
FE did not have adequate backup tools for
system monitoring
3. Inadequate level of vegetation management (tree
trimming)
FE failed to adequately manage tree growth
into transmission rights-of-way
resulted in the outage of three 345 kV
lines and one 138 kV line
cont'd
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Causes of Blackout cont'd
4. Inadequate level of support from the Reliability
Coordinator
due to failure of state estimator, MISO did not
become aware of FE's system problems early
enough
did not provide assistance to FE
MISO and PJM (Regional Transmission
operator) did not have in place an adequate
level of procedures and guidelines for dealing
with security limit violations due to a
contingency near their common boundary
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September 23, 2003 Blackout of
Southern Sweden and Eastern Denmark
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The Transmission Grid in The Nordic
Countries
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Blackout of 23 September 2003 in
Southern Sweden and Eastern Denmark
Pre-disturbance conditions:
system moderately loaded
facilities out of services for maintenance:
400 kV lines in South Sweden
4 nuclear units in South Sweden
3 HVDC links to Germany and Poland
The first contingency was loss of a 1200 MW nuclear unit
in South Sweden at 12:30 due to problems with steam
valves
increase of power transfer from the north
system security still acceptable
Five minutes later (at 12:35) a disconnector damage
caused a double busbar fault at a location 300 km away
from the first contingency
resulted in loss of a number of lines in the
southwestern grid and two 900 MW nuclear units
At 12:37, voltage collapse in the eastern grid section
south of Stockholm area
isolated southern Sweden and eastern Denmark
system from northern and central grid
cont'd
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The Blackout in Southern Sweden and
Eastern Denmark, September 23, 2003
At 12.30: Loss of a 1200 MW
Nuclear Unit
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The Blackout in Southern Sweden and
Eastern Denmark, September 23, 2003
At 12.35: Double bus-bar fault leading to
-Loss of two 900 MW Nuclear Units
-Disrupture of the south-western grid
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The Blackout in Southern Sweden and
Eastern Denmark, September 23, 2003
Hallsberg
Voltage Collapse
Glan
Kimstad
Kolstad
Strömma
Tenhult
Simpevarp
Horred
Breared
Alvesta
Nybro
Isolated Subsystem
Hemsjö
Söderåsen
Barsebäck
Line outages due to:
The fault in Horred
Maintenance work
The voltage collapse
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The Blackout in Southern Sweden and
Eastern Denmark, September 23, 2003
The blacked-out area after the grid separation at 12.37
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Blackout of 23 September 2003 in
Southern Sweden and Eastern Denmark
cont'd
The isolated system had enough generation to cover
only about 30% of its demand
voltage and frequency collapsed within a few
seconds, blacking out the area
Impact of the blackout:
loss of 4700 MW load in south Sweden
1.6 million people affected
City of Malmo and regional airports and rail
transportation without power
loss of 1850 MW in eastern Denmark
2.4 million people affected
City of Copenhagen, airport and rail
transportation without power
Result of an (n-3) contingency, well beyond "design
contingencies"
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September 28, 2003 Blackout of Italy
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Italian System Blackout of
28 September 2003
Predisturbance conditions (Sunday, 3:00 am):
total load in Italy was 27,700 MW, with 3638 MW
pump load
total import from rest of Europe was 6651 MW
Sequence of events:
a tree flashover caused tripping of a major tie-line
between Italy and Switzerland (Mettlen-Lavorgo
380 kV line) at 03:01:22
Sychro-check relay prevented automatic and manual
reclosure of line due to the large angle (42°) across
the breaker
resulted in an overload on a parallel path
attempts to reduce the overload by Swiss
transmission operators by network change was not
successful
at 03:21 import by Italy was reduced by 300 MW but
was not sufficient to mitigate the overload of a
second 380 kV line (Sils-Soazza), which tripped at
03:25:22 due to sag and tree contact
cont'd
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Italian System Blackout of
28 September 2003 cont'd
the cascading trend continued and the power
deficit in Italy was such that the ties to France,
Austria and Slovania were tripped
the outages left the Italian system with a
power shortage of 6400 MW
the frequency decay could not be controlled
adequately by under-frequency load shedding
over the course of several minutes, the entire
Italian System collapsed at 3:28:00
The blackout affected about 60 million people
total energy not delivered 180 GWh
worst blackout in the history of Italy
power was restored after 3 hours in the
northern area and during the same day for
most of Italy
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